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Abstract
In the 1960s, Roland Barthes sparked a renewed interest in a monumental, ancient, and
largely forgotten institution: the literary-pedagogic-social “empire” of rhetoric, an empire that
often commanded French letters, culture, and education until its baffling decline and alleged
“death” in the final decades of the nineteenth century. This dissertation argues, however, that
rhetoric did not actually die in France. Instead, through a process of “weak survival,” an
enduring institution of rhetoric shaped postwar French thought. Through a pedagogic reading of
the rhetorical longue durée, I approach a series of political-religious-social quarrels rather than
an assemblage of rhetorical theories. These quarrels span from early victories of the Collège de
Clermont against the University of Paris to the late nineteenth-century Republicans trying to
purge the Jesuit legacy from French education. Educational reforms, the rise of the explication de
texte, and triumph of Lansonian literary history ensured that intellectuals born in the early
twentieth century would encounter the term “rhetoric” as a pejorative. But when we consider
everything from classical languages to agonistic classroom cultures as part of a comprehensive
institution of rhetoric, reports of its death would seem greatly exaggerated.
After elaborating rhetoric’s weak survival over multi-century period, I shift to shorter
timescales, and take up the rich interwar scene of Rhetoric and Terror as conceived of by Jean
Paulhan and encountered by Jean-Paul Sartre. Finally, I end where I began: with Barthes’
passionate relationship to rhetoric, and his anxieties and declarations about its institutional
fortunes. I argue that Barthes was more rhetorician than strict structuralist (or poststructuralist),
and his intense, mercurial relationship to rhetoric both haunted and inspired him. This
dissertation explores rhetoric’s creative potential within French literature and philosophy, as well
as an education tyranny that marks the biographies of so many humanistic intellectuals
traumatized by elite (and elitist) pedagogy.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Rhetoric, the art of persuasion or crafty use of language, played a key role in French
education and society for centuries, but seems to have died by the twentieth century according to
many scholars. This dissertation, however, argues that rhetoric underwent a process of “weak
survival” and did not actually die. I explore the role of rhetoric in the work Jean Paulhan and
Roland Barthes, who are among the greatest literary critics of twentieth-century France. In
general, I assert the importance of rhetoric in shaping modern French intellectualism.
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Introduction

“As we know, Rhetoric, that is to say the teachable art (from Techné) of speaking with
the aim of producing certain effects no longer exists: it’s no longer possible to conceive
of language as a mechanism for producing effects. I’m not going to dwell on the
institutional Death of Rhetoric, since this was the topic of my EHESS seminar in 19651966. Rhetoric has been degraded, technocratized → “techniques of expression” (what
ideology!). … Rhetoric = the art of writing (≠ art of reading → arts of language no longer
exist).”—Roland Barthes, lecturing at the Collège de France in 19801
“I’m not going to dwell on the institutional Death of Rhetoric,” claimed Roland Barthes a
few months before his own death in 1980. Supposedly, he had finished excavating the ruins of
l'empire rhétorique2 back in his 1960s seminars, and there was little more to be said on the
matter. In reality, however, Barthes ruminated on rhetoric—and its apparent institutional absence
and intriguing apparitions—across his entire life’s work: he proclaimed “The Future of Rhetoric”
as far back as 1946, deployed the word rhetoric and its lexical and thematic derivatives many
hundreds of times across his career, and explored the sophists in his late Collège de France
lectures, constantly asserting rhetoric’s historic and imperial proportions within literature,
pedagogy, and the study of language. “Barthes spent his life,” according to his student Antoine
Compagnon, “endeavouring to revive rhetoric, until the moment when he realized what he was

1

Roland Barthes, The Preparation of the Novel, trans. Kate Briggs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011),
289.
2

Antoine Furetière’s Nouvelle allégorique ou Histoire des derniers troubles arrivés au royaume d'éloquence (1658)
used this term long ago in perhaps the most interesting meta-rhetorical document of its century: “Long has the Most
Serene Princess Rhetoric reigned in peace, governing with such grace that she was obeyed without restraint. She
wields no other violence than dispatching her Provost Persuasion, attended by Fair Speeches, her Archers, who
seizing subjects by the ears transport them fettered in gold and silken chains. Her chief Minister is Good Sense, and
she has governed by address rather than force, yet she keeps certain regiments of Figures and Arguments on hand,
which she distributed throughout all her domains. …. Yet just as the greatest calm oft yields a tempest, the Empire
of Rhetoric was not entirely exempt from war.” My trans. Antoine Furetière, Nouvelle allégorique ou Histoire des
derniers troubles arrivés au royaume d'éloquence, ed. Mathilde Bompart and Nicolas Schapira (Toulouse: Société
des Littératures classiques, 2004), 5-6.
1

doing and expressly devoted a seminar to it.”3 After Barthes and many of his peers experienced
the pedagogical “tyranny” of so-called Lansonism, which sought to replace rhetoric at the height
of its disrepute with the philology-inspired explication de texte and a new “scientific” discipline
of literary history, they gazed hopefully upon pasts and futures dignifying rhétorique as both
word and thing.4
Yet Barthes sometimes doubted whether rhetoric had truly and fully died.5 And to speak
of rhetoric’s general “death” and “revival” in France—or the innumerable variations thereof—is
perhaps to fall victim to a convenient half-truth. This shorthand formula, a necessary but
inadequate simplification, sums up rhetoric’s fate: death, or something infinitesimally close to it.
Hundreds of scholars correctly note rhetoric’s decline (over a debatable period that precedes the
twentieth century) and eventual comeback (in the mid to late twentieth century). In France—and
I will only be speaking of France unless explicitly noted—this formula runs roughly as follows:
“eclipsed at the end of the nineteenth century, rhetoric is reborn from its ashes over the course of
the second half of the twentieth century.”6 Many scholars go so far as to declare rhetoric
institutionally “dead.” My overarching argument, however, is that rhetoric did not actually die in
France—not in the eighteenth century, not in the nineteenth, and not where it counted most: the
upper echelons of French education during the Third Republic (1870-1940). Instead of a true
“death,” I contend that rhetoric underwent a process of “weak survival,” weak in a sense I will
soon define. The argument that rhetoric survived speaks to at least two audiences of scholars:
those interested in rhetoric’s French history, and those interested in postwar intellectualism,
French Theory, or structuralism and its successors.

3

Antoine Compagnon, Literature, Theory, and Common Sense, trans. Carol Cosman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2004), 131.
Barthes refers to the “Lansonian tyranny of influence, milieu, rapprochement” in 1946. Roland Barthes, "The
Future of Rhetoric," in Album: Unpublished Correspondence and Texts, ed. Marty Éric (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018), 106.
4

5

Cf. Roland Barthes, "The Old Rhetoric: an aide-mémoire," in The Semiotic Challenge (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1988), 11,15.
6

My trans. Antoine Compagnon, "La rhétorique à la fin du XIXe siècle (1875-1900)," in L'histoire de la rhétorique
dans l'Europe moderne 1450-1950, ed. Marc Fumaroli (Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 1261.
2

These two audiences should overlap more than one might think. The relatively arcane
quarrels between Jesuits, Jansenists, and Oratorians, between Louis-le-Grand, Port-Royal, and
the Sorbonne, bear upon thoroughly modern questions: in particular, the origins of the profound
stylization of postwar French thought and its reciprocal interest in rhetoric. Having never been
entirely satisfied by the strictly philosophical justifications given for this phenomenon (“idea X
requires rhetorical form Y”), I turned to pedagogic investigations. Though my “weak survival”
account remains far from an exhaustive explanation, I think it illuminates the rhetorical richness
of modern French thought in a rather different way from the standard explanations appealing to
the Analytic/Anglo-American versus Continental rubric (a fork in the road after Kant that is a
rather young rift by pedagogic standards). Even in Racine’s day, the “war” between the
Sorbonne and the Jesuits was old news.7
The history of French rhetoric should not be written in the passive voice or the passé
simple, for the actions of the centuries-old ordres enseignants reverberate to this day. Already in
1542, we find Ignatius imploring the first Jesuits to zealously perfect their epistolary art “for the
greater glory of God our Lord,” a rhetorical zeal central to the evangelical and educational efforts
of their order, deeply infused into their French secondary education régime, and still perceptible
to Barthes four centuries later during his famous quarrel with Raymond Picard (who fittingly
defended a traditional Racine, the most illustrious product of Port-Royal).8 The secular rhetorical
cultures of the Third Republic enveloping Barthes and other notable students of Louis-le-Grand
selectively appropriated and rejected features from their Jesuit antecedents. Every pedagogic

7

Cf. Jean Racine, Abrégé de l'histoire de Port-Royal (Paris: Oudin, 1908), 39.

8

Cf. Roland Barthes, Criticism and Truth, ed. and trans. Katrine Pilcher Keuneman (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1987), 65.
Ignatius writes to Pierre Favre: “I urge you, then, as I am obliged to do for the greater glory of God our Lord, and I
beg you, for his love and reverence alone, to correct your faults in writing, making it a point of pride and having a
real desire to edify your brethren and others through your letters. Let this time you waste on this be upon my head; it
will be time well wasted in the Lord. I make the effort to write two drafts of any main letter so that it will have some
order. … Even this one I have written out twice in my own hand. All the more reason why each member of the
Society [of Jesus] should do the same.” Ignatius Loyola, Letters and Instructions, ed. Martin E. Palmer, John W.
Padberg, and John L. McCarthy (Saint Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2006), 92. Cf. Loyola, Letters and
Instructions, 95-96.
3

“rupture” we will encounter, Lansonian or otherwise, seemingly smuggled in something of the
past.9
One cannot argue that French postwar thought reanimated a “dead” rhetoric out of a
purely theoretical need, for despite the cobwebs over rhetorical theory, an ideologicalpedagogical-cultural aspect proved continuous and tenacious. As we will see with Jacques
Derrida, for instance, he did not simply take his “thoughts” and then choose to “express” them in
a suitable rhetorical form (this is the “expressive” view of rhetoric that Barthes rightly loathed).
Though Derrida of course had certain freedoms in choosing his rhetorical means, he also
struggled to work within and around numerous institutional and pedagogical constraints.10
Rather than postwar French thought simply appropriating rhetoric as an object out of a bag of
possibilities, a weakened rhetorical institution forms part of its very constitutive matrix, already
on the scene before Barthes gave elaborate justifications for blurring the rhetorical subject into
the rhetorical object.
Though Pierre Bourdieu offers a relatively light treatment of (explicit) rhetoric within his
educational critiques, he quite lucidly perceives the “error … [in] trying to understand the power
of linguistic manifestations linguistically.”11 Within the institutional perspective I develop here,
this is perhaps the mother of all errors in traditional rhetorical scholarship: overestimating
individual “rhetorical choices” and underestimating the social relations and positions that
invariably obscure the line between persuasion and coercion (is the mobster’s “offer you can’t
refuse” indeed an offer?). Though certain cultures feature wide degrees of rhetorical latitude—
allowing for freer, more genuine “choices”—we will see that elite French intellectualism yields
scant opportunities for those hoping to opt out of its games, which are far more institutionally
and geographically concentrated than their American analogues.

9

Cf. M. Martin Guiney, Teaching the Cult of Literature in the French Third Republic (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004).
10

These constraints were partly formative, as Edward Baring has argued regarding the agrégation de philosophie
and deconstruction. Edward Baring, The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945–1968 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
11

Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, ed. John B.
Thompson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 109.
4

After making a historical case for rhetoric’s weak survival in the first two chapters, I will
ultimately focus upon two twentieth-century thinkers spellbound by the life and death of rhetoric,
and all the messy states in between: Jean Paulhan and Roland Barthes. Though far from the only
French critics fascinated by rhetoric, they share a unique position in that rhetoric’s indeterminate
state—weakened, “terrorized,” maybe dead, maybe alive—is absolutely central to their work (a
centrality obvious in the case of Paulhan, and requiring more work in the case of Barthes). Along
the way, we will meet a great many thinkers directly and indirectly engaging with rhetoric’s
ambiguous institutional fortunes, from Paul Valéry to Michel Foucault (but my treatment of this
supporting cast is far from complete—Francis Ponge, for instance, does not get his due). Paulhan
and Barthes ultimately exceed all their contemporary critics in their devotion to thinking through
rhetoric’s institutional status. And although Paulhan’s name is more obscure to Anglophones and
his thinking is harder to instrumentalize, the originality of his rhetorical thought is at least equal
to that of Barthes. Through Paulhan, Barthes, and adjacent thinkers, we will encounter three
modern rhetorical anxieties or obsessions: fixations with banalities and clichés (Paulhan), with
the power, politics, and finality of the spoken word (Barthes), and with figurative language (in
the general rhetoric-structuralism rapprochement). All of these partake in this dissertation’s
fundamental worry: that our histories have buried the “old” rhetoric alive, or in other words, that
we have underestimated its ability to play dead. The old rhetoric does not break off so easily
from the new—if it is truly new at all.
Almost a century ago, Jean Paulhan sensed that such a break might be impossible.
Decades before the structuralist fervour of the 1960s that would successfully promote rhetoric,
he argued that Rhetoric (in his sense of it, usually capitalized) could not actually be killed off by
its arch nemesis (which he calls Terror). Despite his clever self-effacing philosophical and
literary arguments, and despite anticipating the 1960s “spell” or “prison-house” of language, he
failed to truly convert his peers—especially Sartre—to pursue a rhetorical paradigm. And
although he anchored his theory in the explosive symbol of the Terror (1793-94), he did not give
a thoroughly historical account of rhetoric’s decline and possible survival. Like Paulhan, Barthes
navigates the space between a living and dead rhetoric, but Barthes renewed rhetorical inquiry
far more successfully than the old “grey eminence” of French letters. Paulhan plays on the
ambiguities of Rhetoric and Terror; Barthes swings between the “former” rhetoric and a possible
“new rhetoric” (invigorated by structuralism and other contemporary theories).
5

Ultimately, my final two chapters will argue that Barthes should not be regarded as a
structuralist (or any kind of “theorist”) with a mere interest in rhetoric, whether passing or
passionate. Rather, between 1946 and 1980, Barthes’ career plays out over a bewitching and
ambiguous space between the former rhetoric and an inchoate “new” rhetoric (whose existence,
he suggests, is malleable and debatable). By amassing Barthes’ engagements with rhetoric,
before, during, and after the peak structuralism of 1966, it is not hard to show that most scholars
deeply underestimated his rhetorical dimensions. He is both rhetorician and thinker of rhetorical
institutions.
But over the course of this dissertation, I hope to suggest and perhaps demonstrate
something broader and more ambitious. Rhetoric’s weak survival plays a vital role in the
emergence of structuralism and of “French Theory” in general. If we want to understand how
France could yield its Derridas and Sartres—writers who torched the norms of “neutral” writing,
at far remove from “rhetoric degree zero”—during rhetoric’s “dead” period, we come face to
face with the full cultural, pedagogical, political, religious, and social expanses of rhetoric’s
weak survival in France. Structuralism, poststructuralism, and other French wagers upon
language constitute theoretical rationalizations and extensions of the “social fact” of rhetoric
which had never been entirely purged. And if one believes Paulhan, then any movement seeking
to embrace—or reject—a linguistic paradigm risks getting caught up in the Rhetoric-Terror
dynamic. Though he identified the vicissitudes of Rhetoric and Terror within interwar France,
his thought extends to the general problem of fully enacting or annihilating “misology,” the
hatred of the word.

0.1

Weak survival

“Weak” survival: what does this mean? In part, it simply means not strong. For instance,
mathematicians speak of strong and weak versions of certain conjectures (the former implies the
latter, but not necessarily the reverse). The first chapter, which takes up various decline-ofrhetoric narratives, will elaborate forces that worked against rhetoric between the Enlightenment
and the first decades of the Third Republic (1870-1940). Critics dragged rhetoric’s reputation
through the mud; educational formers renamed the classe de rhétorique and slashed rhetorical
features from curricula. Rhetoric’s last defenders died off, barely remembered. Yet whereas the
first chapter suggests that a “strong” continuity of rhetoric is impossible amidst innumerable
6

setbacks, the second chapter entails a dialectical reversal of sorts. After exploring the remarkably
resilient elements of what I term the “rhetorical superstructure,” we find that rhetoric appears in
much better shape than initially expected in elite French education, especially in the khâgne
milieu. In sum, the first chapter downgrades “strong” to “weak,” but the second chapter argues
that we may rightly speak of survival—and that weakness, in the sense of loosened strictures, has
its strengths.
The later chapters will play out over this terrain of weak survival. Paulhan and Sartre get
caught up between Rhetoric and Terror in Chapter Three, a neurotic oscillation between
regarding words with contempt or infatuation, spanning from literature and philosophy to
discourse in the most general sense. Barthes finds himself unable to fully transition from rhetoric
to structuralism in Chapter Four. And in Chapter Five, I take up Barthes’ overall relationship to
rhetoric itself: a fraught relation spanning nostalgia to animosity, traversing his career. Barthes
will take up a full two chapters since, on the one hand, he should be distanced from the “high
structuralists” and the narrative that he simply discovered rhetoric as a corollary of structuralism,
and on the other hand, we should explore his extensive relationship to rhetoric as a theory,
practice, art, science, and institution. I do not see Barthes as necessarily more important than
Paulhan, but the younger and more popular critic is weighed down by stronger doxa.
By weak, I also mean weakened: easier to appropriate, less resistant to change, less
cohesive. Rhetoric became out of joint with itself and with French society: it waxed and waned
at different speeds for different groups. “Not all people,” writes Ernst Bloch, “exist in the same
Now.”12 Thus began his essay on “nonsynchronism.” But instead of Bloch’s divided Germany,
we will enter a world of distinctively French pedagogic-political-religious schisms,
nonsynchronous and out of kilter, allowing for the rises and falls of rhetoric, its smooth stretches
and punctures, to develop over different “Nows.”
A weakened rhetoric would live on through what I call rhe-structuralism: the juncture of
rhetoric’s remains and French structuralism, a term that intends to evoke, in a lesser way, a series
of repetitions and returns emanating from this mercurial meeting. Portions of rhetoric’s history

12

Ernst Bloch, "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics," New German Critique 11 (1977): 22.
7

were excavated and repeated by French structuralism; what outsiders perceive as
poststructuralism represents a rhetorized repetition of structuralism. The rhe-structuralism of the
1960s, which I will describe at the beginning of Chapter Four, represents a dominant vector of
rhetorical revitalization in France—but far from the only possibility.
Whereas structuralism enjoyed an enormous and explicit marketing campaign in France
under Barthes and his peers surrounding its peak in 1966, poststructuralism is a retroactive
American category disavowed by its supposed practitioners such as Derrida and Foucault.13 As
argued by François Cusset’s French Theory, François Dosse’s History of Structuralism, and
especially Johannes Angermuller’s Why There is No Poststructuralism in France, this prefixed
term lacks a stable referent meaningful to its French agents and historians. It must also be
detached from deconstruction, which, as Tilottama Rajan details, imports and embodies much
more serious phenomenological concerns than initially perceived in America.14
But why not go further and question structuralism itself in its more literary domains?
Perhaps instead of structuralism “discovering” rhetoric, we find a weakened rhetoric facilitating
the explosion of French structuralism, or a strange hybrid of the two. As Wlad Godzich puts it,
“rhetoric’s passing created a vacuum—the study of the social space of language—that would
prove to be a pitfall to both linguistics and literary studies, and it would come to haunt the
relationship of the two younger disciplines.”15 In Godzich’s view, Saussure effectively
positioned semiology as the “heir to the abandoned tradition of rhetoric” since semiology was
defined as a “branch of social psychology.”16 Saussure, of course, was no conscious rhetorician.
Yet when structuralism became the dominant intellectual movement in France and “discovered”
rhetoric (which was already weakly on the scene), a complex and conscious relation developed
between the two. Through the notion of rhe-structuralism, I will assert a range of continuities
between them. The most consequential continuity is perhaps their shared hegemonic ambitions:
13
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just as rhetoric ruled the trivium in its mightiest centuries, structuralism found itself on the throne
of les sciences humaines: a new but almost analogous position, whence Barthes and close allies
such as Tzvetan Todorov perceived the old rhetoric as a proto-structuralism.
As I will argue, the immense French receptivity to structuralism owes something to the
formalist, logophilic tendencies deeply imbedded into its rhetorical pedagogies. Derrida
welcomed (and yet prohibited) the “historian of ideas” to interrogate the remnants of the
“structuralist invasion” that “leav[es] behind its works and signs on the shores of our
civilization” (and yet “by the very act of considering the structuralist invasion as an object he
would forget its meaning”).17 Rather than an “invasion,” however, we will have reason to
perceive it as homecoming. I primarily articulate rhe-structuralism not to replace or gainsay old
terms, but to critique the very process of conceptual bundling and mobilization that invariably
happens as such terms enter circulation. Whereas some terms deftly parachute into new contexts
and cultures, rhe-structuralism is predicated upon a French pedagogic “civilization” predating the
conceptual sparks of Saussure by centuries. Though Alain Badiou perceives the “spectacular
change in philosophical writing” in the postwar period as an essential feature of “the adventure
of French philosophy,”18 this shift occurs over a much broader terrain than almost anyone has
suggested, a terrain spanning from Terror to Lansonism, a terrain in need of elucidation.

0.2

Historiography

I envision the French history of rhetoric and its neighbours as if it was the ramshackle
building that an Anatole France character describes: “classical instruction … is an old monument
which embodies in its structure the characteristics of every period. One sees in it a pediment in
the Empire style on a Jesuit portico; it has rusticated galleries, colonnades like those of the
Louvre, Renaissance staircases, Gothic halls, and a Roman crypt.”19 I am particularly interested
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Each part features its inscriptions: “’The Imperial University of 1808—Rollin—The Oratorians—Port-Royal—
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in the groups and individuals who laboured on and lived within this monument, a structure
“constantly in course of repair.” Its labourers, from my perspective, were a thrifty bunch,
inclined to repurpose and recycle rather than demolish and build from scratch. Though I do hope
to reveal certain contingencies and a latent pedagogic-political power within, I would not call
approach my approach “genealogy” or anything so theoretically sophisticated (Foucault would
likely see a more capricious history than what unfolds here). Rather, I am interested in the
syncretic accumulation of features in this pedagogic monument—and indeed in its status as a
monument, a structure that stubbornly resisted attempts to destroy it.
Responding to rhetoric’s mysterious French tenacity, these pedagogic readings extend
beyond the explicit discourse on rhetoric to consider greater social and cultural formations,
especially those around education. “Where one looks for a culture,” as Michel de Certeau puts it,
“one works to define a pedagogy”: the educator is the “obscure hero linked to the greatest
difficulties of his time,” a contemporary “apostle.”20 To understand the rhetorical cultures of
French intellectualism, we must study who reproduced and interrupted them. And of course, the
why and how. If rhetoric is purely treated as the standard theoretical edifice of five canons,21 its
militant tenacity and evangelical reach make little sense.
A few names suggest the historiographic contours of my project over the first two
chapters. Barthes represented, for a time, the “Braudel of rhetoric,” and emphasized its
monumental timescales; my interest in a rhetorical longue durée is indebted to both Barthes and
Braudel (who were colleagues at EPHE). Braudel regarded the ancien régime as “near to us in
time, almost contemporary”: I believe this is especially true of its pedagogical universe.22 A dose
of the Annales tradition—i.e. a sensitivity to long term social structures—helps us balance out
the common theoretical, conceptual, and textual approaches to rhetoric, often overly invested in
events and ruptures. But as the great French historian of rhetoric, Marc Fumaroli, once pointed
can hear some ominous cracking in the structure.” Anatole France, The Wicker-Work Woman: A Chronicle of Our
Own Times, trans. M. P. Willcocks (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1922), 105-06.
20
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out, the Annales unfortunately did not have much to say on rhetoric itself. Long after attending
Barthes’ rhetoric seminar, which Fumaroli termed “brilliant, but irritating,” he would profoundly
shape French historical inquiry through his masterpiece L'âge de l'éloquence (1980) and the
enormous Histoire de la rhétorique dans l'Europe modern project (1999).23 This project included
key scholars such as Françoise Douay, who argues against the “rhetoric restrained” narrative
popularized by structuralism; her work informs my first chapter. The second chapter draws
inspiration from the sociology and history of education, as well historians debating the great
Jesuit legacy in France, such as François de Dainville (S.J.) and Gabriel Compayré.
Under a pedagogic lens the total institution of rhetoric appears less defunct by the early
twentieth century than most scholars believe, for its roots run rather deep: twentieth-century
education inherited, as one history succinctly puts it, a “Napoleonic amalgam of Old Regime
structures with revolutionary principles.”24 I am interested in the pedagogical idiosyncrasies of
France dating to the sixteenth century, but as Douay suggests, one could certainly start much
earlier.25 Perhaps Ignatius’ arrival at the University of Paris constitutes a beginning in medias
res. Still, he came to the right place. Surviving its somewhat mysterious infancy in the late
medieval period and entering the Renaissance, where it was to be challenged by the nascent
Jesuit collège system, this great university represents the “womb” and “matrix,” as Durkheim
puts it, “within which our entire educational system developed.”26
Paris, rhetorical capital of modern Europe, abounds with material traces of l’empire
rhétorique. In 1470, the first ever printed book in France emerges from a brand new press in
Paris: a rhetorical manual in letter form, schooling students in fine Ciceronian composition, soon
23
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followed by further humanistic incunabula presented to cardinals, popes, dukes, and kings;27
precisely five centuries later, the École Pratique des Hautes Études publishes Communications
16, “Recherches rhétoriques” (1970), presented to a new public whom had never known
rhétorique as a prestigious signifier yet were still engaged in a de facto Parisian eloquence
economy (“A single market day at Les Halles,” César Dumarsais famously noted, “yields more
figures than several days of academic assemblies”).28 Approaching the origins of all this
eloquence, one encounters “the eldest daughter of the kings of France, and the very eldest
indeed”29: the University of Paris. It attracted students and teachers who would help demarcate
the pedagogical contours of the Reformation (Johannes Sturm and Petrus Ramus) and CounterReformation (Ignatius of Loyola and the soon-to-be Jesuits). But the University’s dominance
would be assailed by the most treasured school of the French Jesuits, the Collège de Clermont in
Paris (which, under a variety of names, will mark the literary temperament of France from
Voltaire to Barthes, as we will see in Chapter Two). So many intellectual “events” of a patently
rhetorical character—such as the 1960s effervescence—owe enormously to the relatively
obscure “structures” and institutions specific to this city (which do not exist, for instance, in
Vienna, despite its enormous intellectual stature). Paulhan did not fully grasp the Parisian
extremes of Rhetoric and Terror until he came back from Madagascar, which did not seem to
suffer the same literary dysfunctions. If there is any city in the world where rhetoric could enjoy
an “afterlife” based on pure institutional and cultural inertia, it would be Paris.

0.3

Between the Jesuits and Lanson

Every attempt to reform the institution of rhetoric out of existence seemed to leave an
unruly remainder. French secondary education had been cast in the Jesuit mold, and reformers
inspired by Port-Royal and the philological might of the German university did not destroy all of
the Company’s legacies—despite the Jesuits’ mythological status as ‘clerical sophists’ and
despite the laws of 1880 that barred them from teaching (and required other orders to receive
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special teaching permissions). Even among the generations of Sartre, Bourdieu, and Derrida we
will find ideological and pedagogical traces of Jesuit humanism: the value of eloquence and the
so-called gymnastique d’esprit.30 And scattered among these generations, we find, in essence, a
double critique of the educational regime they traversed.
On the one hand, this critique tackles the excesses of the Jesuit pedagogic paradigm—and
on the other, the excesses of reformers who attempted to eradicate the teaching of rhetoric and
replace it with a never-ending series of textual explications and lengthier dissertations.
Rhetoric’s curricular “replacement”—the literary history championed by Gustave Lanson—
would be putatively democratic, for rhetoric seemed to be an aristocratic relic of the ancien
régime.31 Lanson rightly spoke of the “sovereignty of rhetoric.”32 It seems, however, that one
tyranny was supplemented, rather than entirely replaced, by another. In the early to midtwentieth century, young humanistic intellectuals would be squeezed between these poles. In the
mature texts they produced, we perhaps find ideological traces of both the Jesuit and Lansonian
forces. In their better texts, a “Jesuit” eloquence amplifies a “Lansonian” scrupulousness in
reading; in their lesser texts, degraded declamations that one might call Jesuitical meet a
Lansonian obstinacy and tendency for overreading. Scholars correctly point out a clash of
philosophical traditions underlying the polarized receptions of these texts, but this is only part of
a larger pedagogical picture.

30
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0.4

What is rhetoric?

Though it would seem proper to begin with a definition of rhetoric, I hesitate to pin it
down too forcefully. The intractability of fixing its definition indeed motivates my historical
approach. Fumaroli’s disclaimer is apt:
One may seek the true definition of rhetoric. It escapes definition. It is a reflexive
ensemble as fuzzy, mobile, and fruitful as its object: persuasion. But it attaches itself all
the more to precision and to definitions since it rightly concerns Proteus himself, the
insatiable speech of metamorphoses. This alliance between the principle of uncertainty
attached to oratio itself, and the principle of rigorous intelligibility that guides the
orationis ratio of rhetoric, has baffled the modern spirit of geometry. This chimera which
joins theoria and ergon in a single living organism, the thinking of speech and speech in
action, scares off the modern division of labour between specialists.33
Instead of searching for the essence or ultimate definition of rhetoric, I am interested in two
things to be reconciled with each other. Firstly, the explicit French discourse on rhetoric: the
fortunes of the signifier rhétorique. Secondly, the more implicit social structures with bearing
upon this signifier, part of a greater “rhetorical superstructure” I will later describe. This
“monumental” conception is not without risks. Introducing the Oxford Handbook of Rhetorical
Studies, Michael MacDonald cautions against a transhistorical image of a rhetorical monolith—
in the eyes of Barthes, a rhetoric “immutable, impassive, and virtually immortal.”34 Despite the
recent flux of rhetoric around the globe, however, in France we need a somewhat institutional
sense to grasp how rhetoric faked its own death. Put less anthropomorphically, this is the
question of why rhetoric’s numerous nineteenth-century enemies did not—or could not—fully
and finally kill it off. As I will argue in the second chapter, rhetoric’s ability to resist being
constrained to pure theory, pure practice, pure art, or pure science instilled it with an institutional
durability.
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0.5

Motivations across the Atlantic

The present historical inquiry was born from the failures of previous non-historical
inquiries, including my own dead ends. Facing the palpable rhetorical flamboyance of French
thought, many scholars sought to explain, analyze, justify, or condemn it. But in practice, this
amounted to—at best—a largely unreconciled clash of norms, and at worst, a moralistic crusade
to uphold the values scholars internalized from their own educations. Prodigal polemics doled
out normative judgements; Derrida received a particularly vast amount of praise and blame. Yet
the Parisian pedagogic juggernaut he faced as a young man from Algeria, with all of its dogmas,
mythologies, strictures, and liberties, remained basically unknown to these commentators. As
Derrida reflected on his academic beginnings, “Before taking a certain number of liberties with
writing, it was necessary that I first be accorded a certain amount of credit. Before this, I
betrayed the norms only in a prudent, cunning, and quasi-clandestine manner.”35 Examining a
norm-torching book such as Glas yields rhetorical analysis but not rhetorical ideology, and it is
this necessarily collective system of unstated values, largely disseminated by French institutions,
that must be dusted off—if we want to see the “return” of rhetoric as anything more than a
subservient part of a great twentieth-century linguistic turn. Equipped with little more than a
continental/analytic rubric, the exegete’s defense of “difficulty” struggles just as much as the
Sokal-style polemic. Read pedagogically, the Sokal faction would seem to be the modern
Messieurs de Port-Royal, the wardens of clarity and logical expression, or a Ramist enclave, the
cult of “method.”
My perspective on French intellectualism is “French” insofar as I am interested in
structural and historical features that translate poorly into Anglophone contexts; I am not
“importing” and “instrumentalizing” in the way that Cusset describes in French Theory. Indeed,
the most stimulating secondary texts I encountered—for instance, Jean-François Sirinelli’s work
on the khâgne—have never been translated (perhaps rightly so since their potential audience is
vanishingly small). Yet my perspective is still deeply Anglophone in one crucial respect: my
initial interest was piqued by the staggering contrast in the rhetorical tenors across the Atlantic, a

35 Jacques Derrida and Hélène Cixous, "From the word of life," in White Ink: Interviews on Sex, Text, and Politics,
ed. Susan Sellers (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 169.
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contrast immediately and intuitively perceived by “English” students initially encountering
“French” theory (scholars in writing in French use the term French Theory rather than théorie
française to emphasize its hybridity). Few Parisian scholars would have started here.
Today the tremendous “colonizing” power that French Theory exerted in American
academia for several decades is well known, its rhetorical dimension less so. Perhaps America
lacks, in the words of Jean Baudrillard’s transatlantic adventure, “the whole aesthetic and
rhetorical system of seduction, of taste, of charm, of theatre” indeed constituting “the
European’s—especially the Latin European’s—mental and social habitus, that continual
commedia dell’arte, … the dramatization of speech, the subtle play of language, the aura of
make-up and artificial gesture.”36 And Marc Fumaroli, despite being the incarnate antithesis of
Baudrillard’s thought, concluded his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France on a similar
note.37 In cultural comparison, America has long been suspicious of theatrical or conspicuous
eloquence—before, during, and after the structuralist colonization of its humanities and social
sciences. America’s public intellectuals, to the extent that they barely exist or once existed,
typically fall into the oratorical mode of the “Attic” Chomsky, who debated the “Asiatic”
Foucault in a famous and futile exchange on Dutch television. The American affinity for casual
interviews, relieved of heavy rhetorical armour, compared to the French en garde oral tendency,
relishing its strenuous syntax, equally reveals this intercultural chasm.
But it is not necessary to push and overly essentialize this comparison; cultures around the
world possess distinctive rhetorical modes. We should note the sophisticated, localized rhetorical
practices and histories of Latin Europe while acknowledging the danger of a view from nowhere
and a mythic rhetoric zero degree. No comparative ethnography exists, as of yet, that can quite
do justice to the European or French habitus of rhetoric. My attempts make certain compromises:
the vague term Anglophone often becomes the complement of French since it is not always
practical to differentiate between America, Canada, Britain, and other English-speaking
countries. And real historical comparisons to Prussia, whose educational system inspired a great
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deal of French envy, must remain for future work.38 Thus the overwhelming focus is France
almost by itself; contrasts can only be implicit. Studying the development of elite French
educational institutions yields a preliminary sketch of their tenacious, competitive, and elite
rhetorical cultures, but a full comparison to “our” cultures (wherever their location) requires
future work.
Knowing little explicit rhetoric, theoretical discourses in France and then in the
Anglophone world have often been reticent to reveal their métier, concealing the artifice of their
invention and imagination (artifice is not necessarily a dirty word for rhetoricians). Barthes, who
sometimes lamented the waning of rhetoric without explicitly naming it, presciently asked:
“Why today is there no—it seems to me, at least—why is there no longer an intellectual art of
persuasion—or of intellectual imagination?”39 Paulhan was equally prescient: “Having done
away with the old rhetoric, we are obliged to perform all the work of rhetoricians [tout métier de
rhétoriqueurs]. Yet the danger here is all the greater in that everyone keeps their discoveries to
themselves, neither comparing them nor allowing them to be criticized.”40 A great Glasnost or
unveiling never occurred, and it was certainly needed. The point of “doing theory,” it seems to
me, is not to create poor imitations in English of strenuously translated French texts, further
extending a garbled chain of simulacra tracing back to the hypotactic, Latinate diction of the
ENS. Rather, one should understand the invention, and especially the conditions of invention, for
the thought that became “theory.” If so inclined, one can thereby emulate the conditions of its
fertility, producing discourse felicitous to the new author, subject matter, and audience. This
felicity—to prepon, decorum, and convenance in Greek, Roman, and French rhetorical
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traditions—remains the closest thing to a universal of rhetoric that one can imagine. Ultimately,
we must learn how to translate it, and likewise, what we might not want to translate: the tortuous
pedagogic and institutional conditions, sometimes needless, sometimes necessary, latent in the
genesis of postwar French thought—the capricious swings of La Sérénissime Princesse
Rhétorique from brutality to benevolence.41
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1

The Decline and Death of Rhetoric in France
Muse, ouvre-moi la source en images fertile,
Où l'esprit peut puiser les ornements du style!
Je veux chanter cet art qui varie à propos
Par le sens figuré le sens propre des mots.
Ce sujet, renfermé dans des bornes iniques,
Muse, peut t’effrayer par ses détails techniques.
Les Tropes, aujourd’hui, gardent encor les noms
Imposés par les Grecs, de qui nous les tenons.
— François de Neufchâteau, Les Tropes, ou, les figures de mots1

If and when we speak of the institution of rhetoric as dead, we already make a major
presupposition. We seem to presume that this institution belongs to a category of things that
could be dead or alive—two exclusive states, at least strictly speaking. A logician might declare
this to be a category mistake; a rhetorician might detect an unwieldy personification; a poet or
critic might remind us of vampires and other undead creatures that inhabit both categories at
once (or neither). Perhaps rhetoric, however poetically construed, cannot be “acquitted, liberated,
and put to death,” as Tzvetan Todorov once put it organically.2 Or if a dead rhetoric does not
presume an organic substrate, then another sense of life and death is at play: relevancy, presence,
and importance (“alive”) versus their opposites (“dead”). But relevant, present, and important for
whom, and to what end? What if one part of the institution flourished while another decayed?
Though this form of obstinate overreading could be drawn out indefinitely, let us constrain it, at
least, by the specific questions of what happened in France.
Two rough camps of opinion emerge in response to the question “was rhetoric dead in
France by the early twentieth century?” The first camp, the larger one, says “yes: despite certain
complications and qualifications, rhetoric was indeed dead.” The second camp says “no: rhetoric
was diminished but alive”—or gives a longwinded refusal of this entire question and its
potentially false dichotomy. Though I profess to be in the camp of “no,” the arguments for
rhetoric’s death remain excellent, numerous, and instructive; the related questions of why and
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how rhetoric died represent (for an admittedly small number of people) the consummate
whodunit of intellectual history, attracting the structuralists and many thinkers since. Given that I
believe in a weak survival of sorts, I spend a surprising amount of effort in this chapter
elaborating and strengthening the case for its death. In doing so, however, I introduce many
historical currents, rarely addressed in English, necessary to understand rhetoric’s ultimate
tenacity.
Responding to the mysteries of why and how rhetoric met its end, the structuralists
developed an eschatology of rhetoric, imagery of dark and unfortunate endings: a shipwreck, a
state of misery or moribundity, and, most evocative of all, soft intimations of the decline and fall
of the rhetorical empire.3 But with good reason, they sometimes hesitated: rhetoric, for Barthes,
“has taken three centuries to die, and is not dead for sure even now.”4 Why might it be wise to
hesitate?
For recent historians and spectators outside France, it seems clear that the postwar
explosion of extravagantly composed texts has something to do with the French educational
system, in which rhetoric was somehow not dead (in whole or part). The Sartres, Derridas, and
other mellifluous or maniacal writers constitute the knowing or unknowing beneficiaries and
practitioners of a recondite rhetorical matrix that must be investigated in French education. A
remarkable number of humanistic intellectuals followed a narrow pathway which lends itself to
study: from a lycée (secondary education quasi-“high school”) to a khâgne (humanistic
preparatory years for the grandes écoles) to the École Normale Supérieure on rue d’Ulm
(henceforth ENS or Rue d’Ulm).5 In Perry Anderson’s motivating account of postwar
intellectualism:
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Viewed comparatively, the striking feature of the human sciences and philosophy that
counted in this period was the extent to which they came to be written increasingly as
virtuoso exercises of style … Foucault’s oracular gestures, mingling echoes of Artaud
and Bossuet, Lévi-Strauss's Wagnerian constructions, Barthes's eclectic coquetries,
belong to the same register. To understand this development, one has to remember the
formative role of rhetoric, seeping through the dissertation, in the upper levels of the
French educational system in which all these thinkers—khâgneux and normaliens
virtually to a man—were trained, as a potential hyphen between literature and
philosophy. Even Bourdieu, whose work took as one of its leading targets just this
rhetorical tradition, could not escape his own version of its cadences. … The potential
costs of a literary conception of intellectual disciplines are obvious enough: arguments
freed from logic, propositions from evidence. Historians were least prone to such an
import substitution of literature, but even Braudel was not immune to the loosening of
controls in a too flamboyant eloquence. It is this trait of the French culture of the time
that has so often polarized foreign reactions to it, in a see-saw between adulation and
suspicion. Rhetoric is designed to cast a spell, and a cult easily arises among those who
fall under it. But it can also repel, drawing charges of legerdemain and imposture.
Balanced judgement here will never be easy. What is clear is that the hyperbolic fusion of
imaginative and discursive forms of writing, with all its attendant vices, in so much of
this body of work was also inseparable from everything that made it most original and
radical.6
Evidently, these thinkers wielded incredible skills that cannot be attributed to mere individual
genius or eccentricity. They inspired an epideictic industry outside of France that relentlessly
praised and blamed the “hyphen” of rhetoric in French thought, not to mention the serious
scholarly enterprise of explicating the literary writing of philosophy. Anderson’s account
suggests something rhetorical—transcending the individual—indeed survived, even if it cannot
be yet be demarcated and put into a tidy box of culture, esprit, or zeitgeist.

6

Though Barthes attended an elite lycée, he never attended a khâgne due to his health, making him (as we will later
see) an interesting exception to a long list of khâgneux in the literary and philosophical fields. Perry Anderson, The
New Old World (London: Verso, 2011), 143.
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1.1

Introducing the “great paradox”: dead and alive at once?

Yet surely these aforementioned remnants dwindle into insignificance when set against
the mountains of textual evidence revealing an effective erasure of rhetoric? What about
“eyewitness” accounts testifying to rhetoric’s demise over the span of a lifetime? For instance,
Paul Valéry remarks: “I was in rhetoric in 1887. (Rhetoric, since then, became première
[supérieure]: a great change which one can infinitely reflect upon).”7 Under educational reforms
we will soon survey, the word rhétorique practically vanishes, and when it appears, it typically
signifies bad teenage memories among the positivist modernizers of the late nineteenth century.
We thus approach a great paradox: precisely when rhetoric was thought to be “dead,” the
country’s elite educational institutions somehow shaped and certified two generations of the
most rhetorically sophisticated intellectuals—flamboyant, prodigious, irritating, eloquent, or
otherwise provocative—known to twentieth-century France and then the Anglophone world.
These two generations stretch, roughly speaking, from Lacan (born 1901) through Derrida,
Genette, and Bourdieu (born 1930) to Rancière (born 1940), encompassing the most talented and
eccentric writers and orators who so strangely flourished in “post-rhetorical,” post-war France.
Evidently, rhetorical autodidacticism had not entirely replaced the old system; even the
structuralists with a vested interest in the “new rhetoric” occasionally hesitated to eulogize the
“old rhetoric” in full finality. Perhaps the institution of rhetoric had in fact undergone a mutation
or relève rather than an outright death.8
Considered in the broad sense that Barthes preferred, the “former rhetoric” spans so many
dimensions, each fluctuating in its own way, that speaking of its overall state engenders
confusions and paradoxes. But the discourse on rhetoric largely spoke of it as if it were a unified
thing, meaning that we often must engage its totality. Although the state of rhetoric in early
twentieth-century France might not be a true paradox, it makes sense, for expository and
motivational purposes, to patiently present the arguments for decline and continuity separately,
and to suspend our judgement as to the total fate of French rhetoric for as long as possible.
7

I.e. he used to be in the class of rhetoric, rhétorique supérieure. My trans. Paul Valéry, Oeuvres, 2 vols., vol. 1
(Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 1134.
8

These terms suggested by Genette’s more interesting work: Gérard Genette, "Enseignement et rhétorique au XXe
siècle," Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 21, no. 2 (1966): 293.
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We can only sketch the contours of this dead-and-alive rhetoric paradox over the next
two chapters, for its content is commensurate with a total history of rhetoric whose intractability
even Marc Fumaroli’s thousand-page historical tomes do not claim to overcome. But these
contours will suffice to refute the tidy accounts of rhetoric ceding to literary criticism written
from the comfort of modern literature departments and to expand the semantic and historical
scope of the term to better appreciate Barthes’ ultimate dilemma regarding the fate of the
institution. I will proceed as follows in this chapter:
1. Refuting Gérard Genette’s decline narrative (“rhetoric restrained”) centered on
Dumarsais’ Des Tropes (1730)
2. Reinserting Dumarsais into the context of the Enyclopédie and examining its
rhetorical milieu
3. Developing the idea of a rhetorical superstructure and infrastructure, and using
this to assert the necessity of a pedagogical and institutional understanding of
rhetoric
4. Elaborating rhetoric’s decline over the long nineteenth century
5. Examining the current “state of the art” accounts of rhetoric’s decline and
replacement in the Third Republic, centered on Gustave Lanson
In the next chapter, the idea of the rhetorical superstructure will be elaborated into eight
elements, whereby a synthesis and resolution of the great paradox will be proposed. Over these
first two chapters, my bias towards a certain kind of historiography for rhetoric should become
apparent, an approach that takes, as its main “characters,” not geniuses or great ideas, but the
social groups and institutions, in France, that have done the most to shape or shatter the national
architectures and cultures of rhetoric: Jesuits, Jansenists, eighteenth-century philosophes,
nineteenth-century republicans, the university, the collège, the khâgne, and so on. If one had to
pick a main character in the pedagogical arc that emerges, it would have to be the Jesuits, who
represent both protagonists and antagonists for the various centuries and worldviews under
consideration (heros of humanism, villains of positivism, ambiguous architects of classical
French education).
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By asserting these factions and their social struggles, I will begin to pull apart the
triumphalist, overly theoretical narratives that shape the old rhetoric—a total social institution, a
“meta ideological state apparatus”—into a stately museum of Greek and Roman artifacts, curated
by literary criticism or linguistics. Rhetoric has been called “une façon d’habiter le monde”9 in a
much-cited and inspiring phrase, but I do not think we are close to delivering the sort of
interdisciplinary, expansive history commensurate with this idea. Simply tracking the
philosophical discourse on rhetoric and the theoretical development of rhetoric yields, as we will
see again and again, a rather premature “death.”

1.2

The necessity of a pedagogical perspective

Since we still do not entirely understand rhetoric’s European history, our understanding of
the greater “pedagogic unconscious,” which irrupts into the histories of thought and the received
ideas, methods, and values of its thinkers, seems rather poor indeed, although certain waypoints
exist. Though a proper historian of neither literature, pedagogy, nor rhetoric, Bourdieu
acquainted himself with the nineteenth century, particularly in The Rules of Art: Genesis and
Structure of the Literary Field.10 Following Bourdieu and his circle, massive critiques emerged
that highlight the quasi-habitus of academic rhetoric among reproducing and heritable structures
of power, prestige, and capital; institutional elitism molded rhetorical norms.11 We will see in the
next chapter that French thinkers both revealed and suppressed this elitism and the trauma of its
rigour; the majority of them suffered through rhetorical hazings whose traces disperse

9

Bernard Beugnot, Les Muses classiques. Essai de bibliographie rhétorique et poétique (Paris: Klincksieck, 1996),
11.
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“Throughout the nineteenth century, ancient languages and literatures continued to dominate curricula and,
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experimentation, pedagogy remained oriented towards the acquisition of rhetoric (through Latin or French
discourse) and moral education or, more precisely, the ‘elevation of thought’. The combination of a universalistic
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Press, 1994).
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themselves throughout their works. Even after Bourdieu, however, scholars rarely venture into
the historical and comparative terrain required to grasp why, for instance, an Anglophone
Derrida would seem impossible, or why French intellectualism permitted, empowered, and
rewarded rhetorical strategies seemingly untenable elsewhere.12
In searching for this French distinctiveness, educational features become cardinal. As
Alan Shrift contends, failing to address the canon-forming agrégation de philosophie “leads to a
failure to understand what, at a profound level, distinguishes all French philosophers…from their
German, British, and American counterparts, namely, the thorough grounding in the [pre-1800]
history of philosophy.”13 Created in 1766 as a teaching qualification, the agrégation partly
responded to the educational vacuum caused by the Jesuit suppression in 1764. After Shrift’s
work on the exceptional agrégation, we should add further institutions and traditions that
distinguish France, and reveal, in a preliminary way, a pedagogic, “structural” reworking of
overly purified histories of intellectual “content.” Indeed, instead of attributing rich and creative
periods of twentieth-century French thought to educational “progress,” they are better associated
with a peculiar conservative-radical collision: a largely conserved rhetorical culture, value
system, and educational nexus—ignited by radical aesthetic, political, and philosophical
impulses.
Of particular interest in the next chapter will a be certain educational trinity: the exercises
of the explication de texte and dissertation as situated in the khâgne milieu, a framework
allowing the two foremost pedagogical implements to be examined in an elite, competitive
environment. This choice should not diminish the importance of the agrégation, which, in the
case of Derrida, proved vital to the development of his thought, as Edward Baring argues. It
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indeed represents the “gatekeeper of French academic philosophy.”14 Instead of this ultimate
challenge posed to aspiring philosophers, however, in the following chapter we will encounter
the earlier and less vocational years of the khâgne, which I perceive as the most essential host for
rhetoric’s “afterlife” in French intellectualism.
This afterlife is where I diverge most sharply from the scholarly endoxa. Though my
sense of rhetoric’s decline differs from recent French scholars of rhetoric in degrees of emphasis,
it essentially expands upon their work. When it comes to the twentieth century, however, I
envision a much stronger continuity of rhetoric than they do, perhaps because they are more
likely to take French pedagogy as a given whereas, as an outsider, I am inclined towards
exploring its contingent events and structures. By Anglophone standards, a weakened French
rhetoric might appear comparatively healthy, and the most similar argument to my own
unsurprisingly emerges from another Anglophone scholar, Martin Guiney. Though essentially
focused on literature rather than rhetoric, his work maps out how the “cult” of literature in
France, after purportedly democratic reforms during the Third Republic, still retained its
spiritualism and dogmatism in an age of laïcité.15 His continuity argument for literary pedagogy,
like my ultimate argument for the continuity of rhetoric, grounds itself in the latent religiosity
and Catholic history of French education. It took surprisingly long—until the Third Republic—
for a true French pedagogic consciousness to arise under Gabriel Compayré, Ferdinand Buisson,
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and Émile Durkheim. Their relatively unknown discipline, as I begin to show, can enrich and
disturb certain received ideas about intellectual history.
At this point, before embarking on a study of various decline-of-rhetoric narratives, we
should fix in our memories that these incomplete accounts will be complicated and partly
overturned by the next chapter. Using the strategy of a pedagogic reading, the great paradox will
eventually approach resolution. Until then, patience and a suspension of judgement is in order.

1.3

Structuralism’s story of rhetoric’s decline and demise

Literary structuralism eventually envisioned itself as a partial or total heir to rhetoric.
With this in mind, the strange structuralist passion for speculating on rhetoric’s decline makes
considerably more sense: one must tell some sort of story to legitimate the succession and its
nascent order. Yet a troublesome interregnum stands between rhetoric’s ancient triumphs—
unambiguous greatness in the ancient world—and its quasi-return through structuralism. In one
of the gloomiest accounts of rhetoric’s history ever conceived, and certainly a presentist one that
conveniently leads to literary theory, Todorov seizes “one essential feature” of the immense
period between Quintilian (c. 35-100 CE) and Pierre Fontanier (1765-1844):
The function of discourse is forgotten. … Fortune does not smile upon a single
rhetorician, and this longest period in the history of rhetoric—lasting nearly 1800 years—
turns out to be, at least in its broad outlines, a period of slow decadence and degradation,
suffocation and bad conscience. Rhetoric embraces its new object, poetry—language as
such—but it does so reluctantly.16
For Todorov, by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rhetoric represents an “elderly
gentleman…never dar[ing] to stray far from the ideal of his youth,” numb to his contemporary,
changing world.17 What was the nature of this decline (if there was a decline) and what of its
interruptions and reversals? Might there be youth within senescence, gusto within old Lady
Rhetorica? The overall relation between rhetoric and modernity poses the most challenging
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28

historical questions one could possibly ask, for although it is a broadly “negative” relation, its
proliferating modalities and contexts still stifle recent scholars.
Taking the decline of rhetoric as a given, structuralists sought answers as to why and how
rhetoric met its end, answers that were ultimately quite clever, hasty, and in short, mistaken.
From Genette, Todorov, Barthes, and Foucault, and a bit later, from Paul Ricoeur, we find a
great deal of speculation upon the literary and linguistic causes (or consequences) of rhetoric’s
death or decline (and a corresponding dearth of political, social, or economic perspectives).18
Particularly from Genette, the greatest devotee of this domain, emerged an entire explanatory
decline narrative, rhetoric restrained, in an article of the same name in Communications (1970).
The narrative of rhetoric restrained is basically a suicide-by-shrinkage. Supposedly, the five
canons of rhetoric, which had flourished in antiquity, eventually withered to one, elocutio, and
then collapsed further, all the way down to the mere study of trope (especially metaphor and
metonymy). This “rhetoric restrained” thesis,19 which all too conveniently led to the structuralist
passion for trope and figure, turns out, as we will see, to be deeply mistaken.20 Though Genette’s
very article urged prudence, his hypothesis was soon taken as a given. The slow reduction or
restraint of rhetoric from its broad classical concerns to a narrow focus on trope constituted the
primary cause of rhetoric’s death according to Genette, a notion taken up again and again by
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Todorov, Ricoeur, and others.21 In hindsight, this appears to us as a projection of structuralist
desires upon the history of rhetoric, setting the priority of metaphor and metonymy in the manner
of Roman Jakobson.

1.4

A potential perpetrator: César Dumarsais?

At the scene of rhetoric’s demise, each forensic inquiry discovers a remarkable work by
the enlightenment grammarian and encyclopedist César Chesneau Dumarsais (1676-1756): Des
Tropes, ou des différents sens dans lesquels on peut prendre un même mot dans une même
langue (1730), freshly reprinted in 1967 with preface by Genette, who dubbed this treatise
“without a doubt the most important monument of all French rhetoric.”22 Allegedly residing in
the “heart” of la rhétorique classique,23 Dumarsais, in my estimation, belongs instead to its
spleen (a melancholic organ that one can live without). Sometimes spelled Du Marsais, he is a
perfectly pliable figure. Despite ranking as perhaps the greatest French linguist of the eighteenth
century,24 Dumarsais has suffered, especially in the Anglophone world, from being an oftenmentioned but always peripheral name.
Genette valued Dumarsais’ “rhetoric” for it proto-structuralist, grammatical, and
synchronic passions for taxonomization. The specialized and elegant Des Tropes proved to be
anything but a full-bodied, comprehensive rhetoric extending to persuasion, composition, and his
era’s code du bon goût.25 For Dumarsais himself this was a work of grammar; for his
contemporaries, one of poetics; in French accounts of the 1960s and 1970s, one of rhetoric.26 The
“swan song” of rhetoric, Todorov claims, “begins in 1730, when Du Marsais published a
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rhetorical treatise destined to stir up more interest in its own country than any of its
predecessors.”27 Though it stirred the structuralists, we will see that Des Tropes lacks any
hegemonic power over the history of rhetoric; even great texts tend to be swallowed by greater
pedagogical forces.
In defense of the passion for Des Tropes, the work remains useful, innovative, and worthy
of translation. Dumarsais defines metaphor, metonymy, and so on in a particularly lucid and
quotable manner, although he struggled with catachresis, which blurs into metaphor
(distinguishing them rests on the tricky matter of what constitutes an abusive metaphor). Overall,
however, the taxonomic ambition of the treatise successfully seizes the various tropes, as if
Dumarsais captures them all in the wild—in literature—and puts them into a well-ordered
modern zoo rather than a confusing medieval bestiary. Entries are cleanly subordinated;
synecdoche is a species of metonymy. And what is a trope in general? Simply a special kind of a
figure, in which a word obtains “a sense [signification] that is not precisely [its] proper sense.”28
As Dumarsais points out, the Greek etymology suggests a “turn” away from the proper sense.
Though most of the work consists of analyzing, comparing, and contrasting various
tropes, an offhand insight at the start of the first chapter attracted much recent interest. As
Dumarsais provocatively puts it: “Far from the figures being manners of speaking distanced from
the natural and ordinary, there is nothing so natural, so ordinary, and so common as the figures in
human language.”29 This led Genette to speculate on the nature of this distance: if a figure is
some kind of “deviation” from a norm, but the deviation is in fact “normal” or “normalized” (as
in a dead metaphors—the leg of the table), then what does this say about the nature of the figure?
What do we make of the distance or gap (écart) between literal and figurative, between norm and
deviation, when these poles vacillate? Such questions transfixed Genette and were taken up on a
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more philosophical level by Derrida in “White Mythology.”30 Philosophy, Derrida claims,
cannot entirely understand its own metaphoricity from inside itself; even if it can account for its
“‘founding’ tropes,” it will be thwarted by the metaphor of metaphor (as Dumarsais puts it, the
metaphor “dwells in a borrowed home”—il est … dans une demeure empruntée—itself a
metaphor or non-literal statement).31 In figurative language, the distance between norm and
deviation, between true home and borrowed home, remains mysterious.
All of this intrigue of the écart, however, barely intrigued Dumarsais’ peers: in the
decades surrounding Des Tropes, no notable rhetorical revolutions or ruptures transpire.32 Nor
was Des Tropes a cause of restraint. For French rhetoric was effectively unrestrained from the
Edict of Nantes in 1598 to its removal from national curricula circa 1885 in France (as suggested
by Douay’s quantitative analysis of published texts).33 Though it would certainly be convenient
to categorize vast swaths of rhetoric’s history as favouring inventio, elocutio, or dispositio, these
generalizations, if there is any hope for them, must be narrowed to traditions, whether Ramist,
Jesuit, and so on. By reattaching conceptions and practices of rhetoric to social groups—instead
of abstracting it away from its students, teachers, religious orders, and political factions—we
facilitate stronger generalizations.

1.5

Negative consequences of “rhetoric restrained”
Had this account of restraint, the so-called “semiotician’s history of rhetoric,”34 been

confined to Genette and his peers, it would be of little importance to revisit. And yet, rhetoric
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restrained effectively grounds a literary-critical industry practically devoted to ignoring the
classical breadth of rhetoric despite Genette’s request to “fill out and correct this more than
cavalier account” with an “immense historical investigation.”35 As one book describes itself:
“While not pretending to be deconstructive, Rhetorical Poetics shares the view, expressed by de
Man, equating ‘the rhetorical, figural potentiality of language with literature itself.’ The starting
point of this book is that limited rhetoric of which Genette speaks, the rhetoric of tropes and
figures.”36 Its first page cites the rhetoric restrained hypothesis to justify its subject matter,
reproducing rhetoric’s limitation. Decades after Genette’s influential thesis, he offered an
obscure quasi-apology for what he calls this “semi-misunderstanding”: “I had to subsequently
realize that rhetoric is not limited to this one aspect [of figure], and that such a restriction was
evidence of a rather restricted view, and most likely prevaricated by an overly partial
comparison.”37 Unfortunately, this retraction scarcely registered, and the total institutionalpedagogical-social universe of rhetoric has been barely acknowledged outside of specialists.
Rhetoric restrained impeded structuralism and adjacent movements in French thought
from understanding themselves in rigorous terms drawn from classical rhetoric—topoi, status
causae, dissoi logoi, enthymemes, the realm of the probable—since they desired trope and figure
to the detriment of rhetoric’s other riches, as did a broad subset of Anglophone intellectuals in
the heyday of Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. Barthes, as we will see in the final
chapters, often tried to fight this tendency, but could not singlehandedly expand the rhetorical
domain.
I agree with Françoise Douay, the harshest critic of rhetoric restrained: “the old vases of
Metaphor and Metonymy,” as she amusingly writes in an eloquently figured phrase, are but
“chiens de faïence who stupidly guard the entrance of the expansive rhetorical domain, and who
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forbid you from perceiving its vitality.”38 Metaphor and metonymy are neither rhetoric’s
theoretical panacea nor the historical singularity they were made out to be. Though it was
Jakobson who definitively shrunk the purview of rhetoric to these two tropes, he never pretended
to seriously engage the history of rhetoric. The last great rhetoricians for certain Parisian
intellectuals were not true rhetoricians at all: they were French grammarians such as Dumarsais
and the successor to his project Pierre Fontanier (1765-1844) (who Genette terms the “Le denier
grand rhétoricien français”).39 Too often Des Tropes and Fontanier’s Les Figures function as
representatives—perhaps synecdoches—for a one to two century period of French rhetoric
before the twentieth century. The contemporary humanities adjacent to rhetoric still bear a vague
sense that the final destination of rhetoric was, or should be, the study of trope.

1.6

Dumarsais and the Encyclopédie in the Enlightenment

The “cavalier” histories running through Dumarsais correctly assessed his brilliant
tropology but missed his passionate advocacy for the ideals of the Enlightenment philosophe, as
well as his contributions to grammar and the teaching of Latin. Dumarsais indeed belonged to
perhaps the most anti-rhetoric coterie in his contemporary society: the philosophes. Sketching
him out here will provide a stark contrast to avowed rhetoriphiles we will encounter later.
Though his life has been obscured by a censorious environment, he appears sporadically in
histories of linguistics, clandestine philosophical literature, the Enlightenment, and the
Encyclopédie of Diderot and d’Alembert. His name was well known to Groupe μ, Chomsky,
Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Ricoeur, Todorov, Genette, Lyotard, Paulhan, Perelman, and
Foucault (who assessed him fairly: “one of the subtlest grammarians of the period”).40
Outside of the French rhetorical tradition into which he was inserted, Dumarsais’ greatest
fame is perhaps philosophical. Widely believed to have penned a clandestine tract that became
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the most famous philosophy article of the entire Encyclopédie—“le philosophe”—he finds
himself anthologized today in Enlightenment collections and French secondary education. “Le
philosophe” offered a bold Enlightenment manifesto, proclaiming that “reason is to the
philosopher what grace is to the Christian.”41 Dumarsais’ ideal “philosophic spirit … of
observation and exactness, which relates everything to true principles,” dovetails with
d’Alembert’s often-studied “Preliminary Discourse” to the Encyclopédie.
Though we will eventually see that the Enlightenment proves to be both too early and too
late a point from which to narrate rhetoric’s decline, we should note how it fared in the
Encyclopédie: quite poorly indeed. Whereas systematized philosophy flourished in the
Encyclopédie, rhetoric floundered, scorned in its scattered mentions across the twenty-eight
volumes. Its main rhetoric articles were crafted—capriciously and without unity42—by
d’Alembert, Diderot, Jaucourt, and Voltaire, not Dumarsais, who worked on grammar articles
until he died and Beauzée succeeded him. From the vantage of the Encyclopédie, Dumarsais was
thus primarily a grammarian—but a multifaceted one, who would fall under the banner of
philosophe that Dumarsais himself defined in his clandestine, originally anonymous tract.
Representing this grammatical zeitgeist, Dumarsais was the most cited author in the
Encyclopédie’s articles on grammar and linguistics, mentioned profusely in the articles after his
death at the letter G (cited in 54 articles, he even exceeds the Port-Royal Nouvelle méthode latine
(44) and Quintilian (42)).43 Julia Kristeva’s account of Dumarsais, unlike that of her peers,
emphasizes that his work “allowed the grammarian to discern, from the grammatical categories
inherited from Latin, relations between linguistic terms.”44 Though Dumarsais’ innovations in
teaching Latin and his educational contributions to the Encyclopédie—perhaps “more clever than
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profound”—failed to impress early historians of pedagogy such as Gabriel Compayré,45 he
remains leader of the project’s grammatical passion, even more so after his death, which allowed
him to be memorialized as the consummate grammarian, more of a scientific humanist than a
rhetorical one.
Dumarsais enjoyed a strangely cratylic death during the Encyclopédie’s drawn-out
alphabetical production, rounding out our grammatical sketch. In its first volume his articles
include “Accent,” “Adjectif,” “Anaphore,” “Adverbe,” and so on; by the seventh volume, the
encyclopedists had made it to the letter ‘G.’ Here he expired in 1756, penning the article
“Grammarien” but leaving the key article “Grammaire” to his successor Beauzée.46 Though he
lived for a whole eight decades, he died a long way indeed from “Rhétorique” in Volume XIV.
Given its prominence in European history, “Rhétorique” ultimately fared rather poorly next to
the nearby “Rhinoceros.” On the other hand, Beauzée wrote generously of “Grammaire” and
Dumarsais’ “Grammarien” lauds the vocation.
To be a grammarian, in the way Dumarsais imagined it, is not just to understand the
rudiments of grammar or to rank as linguistic martinet. These people he calls mere grammatistes
(like Flaubert’s definition of “Grammariens” in his Dictionaire: “Tous pédants”). Citing
Quintilian’s capacious sense of the grammarian, and evoking his old definition of the philosophe,
Dumarsais leaves us the image of the grammarian as someone with a total command of history,
thought, and letters—and perhaps above all, a dedication to society, channeling Roman
civilitas.47 Douay identifies Dumarsais with a “rationalist aesthetic of good sense and of nature
that is less of a rhetoric and more of an antirhetoric.”48 He seems more akin to a French Locke
than the French writers of rhetorical treatises; contemporary rhetoricians gradually developed
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and sustained the discipline without enticing ruptures of the kind Genette sought.49 In the ideals
of texts such as “le philosophe” and “grammairien”—ideals that emphasize erudition and service
to civic society—we note the conspicuous absence of eloquence as a value, especially one
pursued for its own end. As we will soon see, some of his Jesuit-educated philosophe peers such
as Voltaire were still comfortable valuing eloquence despite their contempt for the term rhetoric.
D’Alembert’s éloge, memorializing Dumarsais as a “Grammairien profond &
philosophe,” noted that the philosophe seeks to organize and regiment (régler) languages
whereas the bon écrivain seeks to arrange and establish them (fixer).50 In this sense, Dumarsais
was no écrivain, and we will soon be able to contrast him with a vastly different world of
rhetoric—one that actually cared about the pursuit of eloquence and the task de fixer les langues.
This portrait I have given of Dumarsais is not unlike the one that today hangs in the Louvre,
painted by Louis Tocqué: his face projects a subtle confidence; his left hand clutches a book; his
index finger props it open; its spine reads “Gramm. Françoise.” Dumarsais’ repose, his closed
lips, and his lack of writing instrument represent features, quite fittingly, opposite to the
impassioned, gesticulating orators found in Jan Steen’s Rhetoricians at a Window and other
famous depictions of the “act” of rhetoric.
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1.7

The rhetorical superstructure

The missteps of the “rhetoric restrained” narrative suggest that rhetoric’s often-intractable
decline cannot be measured by a thin “history of concepts.” One must consider not just great
texts representing rhetorical theory, but a total matrix that encompasses literary, religious, and
pedagogical practices, which reside in social and institutional bodies, along with their latent
ideologies and explicit doctrines, a matrix shaping discourse. Let us call this totality the
rhetorical superstructure, a term chosen for multiple reasons. Firstly, as an alternative term to
“rhetoric,” it allows us to bridge the gaps between theory and practice, and between abstract
institutions and their concrete instantiations, differences which often infect “rhetoric” with
polysemic instability (these ambiguities are almost a scholarly genre in themselves). Since
thinking of rhetoric as pure theory or pure practice leads to historical blunders, we will refer to
everything as one continuous entity. Secondly, this choice implies a relation between a more
cultural-discursive superstructure, and another more material entity, which we later call the
“rhetorical infrastructure.”51
The two terms of this reciprocal relation are not meant to invoke Marxist teleology but
have been chosen to suggest that the superstructure can never be fully independent of the
infrastructure. The purpose of these terms will not be grand system-building, but simply a nonce
vaccination against a certain way of thinking. This thinking, though appropriate for the history of
linguistics, hides from arguably the most frustrating and fascinating feature of rhetoric: its
virtually total—and confounding—integration between social, political, pedagogic, religious, and
literary realms, stretched between continuous oscillations of theory and practice, science and art,
with respect to these domains.
What initial form might this rhetorical superstructure take on in France? We could
imagine it thusly. Despite manifold nooks, crannies, tattered edges, and other features taxing the
imagination, there must be large clusters, separated by fissures, where multiple pedagogic-
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religious layers, under the ordres enseignants, stack tightly upon each other. From the medieval
Benedictines and Dominicans to the more recent Jesuits, Oratorians, and Ursulines, and finally to
the Sulpicians educating Ernest Renan and the Assumptionists inveighing against Dreyfus, these
factions represent pedagogical juggernauts and hence key determinants of the superstructure’s
fortunes, for they maintained virtual educational monopolies until they were out-competed by
secular alternatives (and finally wrestled into educational submission circa 1880 under Jules
Ferry). They would be blown about by various theological movements, especially Jansenism.
Foremost among these congregations were the Jesuits, who at their peak can be called the
“schoolmasters of Europe.”52 Since the teaching orders enclosed literature, theology, and
pedagogy into reasonably holistic and distinct units (and even geographic sites) they yield a
preliminary map of the totality under consideration. Like all maps, it has an ineradicable
arbitrariness to it, but at least it is not too big to comprehend: in a good day’s journey, one could
travel from the Latin Quarter to Port-Royal-des-Champs, southwest of Versailles.
Neglecting the teaching orders and the alignment of rhetorical-religious power, as Genette
did, omits a vast part of this superstructure. Though quasi-secular sections will eventually split
off, partly thanks to the encyclopedists and philosophes, they never achieved the pedagogic
hegemony of the clerical teachers (Renan rightly suggests that the teacher is the closest
profession to the cleric).53 Indeed, we will see in the next chapter that “secular” education in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century inherited more than it might want to admit from early
clerical configurations. Though representing the rhetorical superstructure via these orders
remains reductive, it gives us a viable alternative to narrativizing, for instance, the eleven
massive volumes of Henri Bremond’s Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France depuis
la fin des guerres de religion jusqu'à nos jours (in combination with all of the post-Fumaroli
scholarship).54 The work of abbé Bremond charts, with particular vigour and originality, the
unfathomably complex denominational disputes shaping and splintering what we are calling the
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rhetorical superstructure of France. The value and methodologies of eloquence differed greatly
among the ordres enseignants, as well as the theological quarrels, which so readily became
literary (and brutally political). Let us consider a few, however superficially.

1.8

Rhetorical-religious ruptures

The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 crushed Huguenot (French Calvinist)
education, meaning that interdenominational struggles among Catholics will be our ultimate
focus. The Reformation, however, inadvertently caused a true “restraint” of rhetoric in certain
Protestant regions, cracking massive pedagogical fissures into Europe which ran through
sixteenth-century Paris. For instance, before Petrus Ramus was stabbed to death in the St.
Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, he worked towards shrinking the scope of rhetoric while
expanding dialectic. After completing his M.A. at the University of Paris, then dominated by
scholasticism, he soon published scathing criticisms of Aristotle which inflamed the university.55
He argued, roughly speaking, that inventio and dispositio belonged to dialectic, not rhetoric.
According to Chaïm Perelman, Ramus thus committed “an error that was fatal to rhetoric” (fatal,
at least, for Ramism).56
Though Ramus’ conception of rhetoric has little to nothing to do with organized religion,
his reception hinges upon his professed faith: Ramus gave up Catholicism for Protestantism
about a decade before his decapitated body hit the Seine. Thus the dispersed yet powerful
international Ramism that Walter Ong captures—taking hold in Protestant regions which might
regard Ramus as a martyr of St. Bartholomew’s day—depends upon his mysterious conversion,
which inadvertently led to the mutilation of rhetoric’s purview in a significant part of Europe.
Scholars of rhetoric, resenting Ramism’s brutalization of the trivium, might be inclined to call it
a “superficial pedagogic method,” as Frances Yates did.57 On the other hand, the pedagogy and
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humanism of the Protestant innovator Johannes Sturm (1507-1589), associated with the
Gymnasium system, was much broader in terms of rhetoric, and not so far from Jesuit pedagogy
(Sturm thought the Jesuits plagiarized him, but it was mostly a case of shared humanist heritage).
Though Ramus had actually learned much from Sturm in Paris, they left the Protestant world
with two very different rhetorical purviews. For Ramus, the “entirety of true rhetoric” could be
found in elocutio (style) and actio (delivery), and the latter could be almost neglected in practice,
arguably making Ramus the greatest ‘restrainer’ the art has ever known.58
In the Catholic world, a broader—and if I may say, richer—conception of rhetoric exists
on the whole, partly unified by the Church’s promotion of Latin and the hegemonic “plan of
studies” of the Company of Jesus: the great Ratio Studiorum (definitive edition: 1599).59 The
story of the classical canon in France could be said to begin with the “normativity, universality,
[and] duration” of the Ratio Studiorum, implemented and established through the company’s
growing school system. Thanks to the cornucopian breadth of Jesuit pedagogy, the Company’s
countless students, from Descartes to Diderot, would not have experienced a restrained rhetoric
unless instructed by a rogue teacher. Free of Ramist restraint, the educators following the Ratio
and its derivatives could not readily pretend that they were teaching an art of a mere one or two
canons as they guided prelections of Aristotle’s synoptic Rhetoric and the expansive works of
Cicero.
The consequences of the Company’s deep, broad, rigorous, integrated, and highly
Latinate program were particularly immense in France. Barthes would claim that the
“monopoly” of Jesuit pedagogy “left bourgeois France with the concept of ‘fine writing’”60 and
that signifiers of French culture adhered to the “constraints of Aristotelo-Jesuit rhetoric” until
quite recently.61 This would only seem a slight exaggeration; in Jesuit humanism, “Rhetoric
itself is the noble substance, it dominates everything. … Until around 1750, outside the sciences,
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eloquence constitutes the only prestige.”62 Traces of this domination, as we will see in the next
chapter, can be readily detected in Barthes’ day.
No single example can suffice to express the Jesuit view of rhetoric, nor the diversity of
its styles and scholarly traditions. Yet in regard to the sheer value placed on eloquence—in its
dignity, beauty, utility, and especially its power—we might cite a passage from Nicholas Caussin
S.J. (1584-1651) that appears near the beginning of his massive eloquentia sacra et humana
(1619), a tome of more than a thousand pages (in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, physicians sing
the praises of Caussin’s loquacity: the most soporific substance known to medicine, a cure for
any insomnia).63
Though Caussin declares sacred eloquence superior to pagan, he would seem intoxicated
by a rather pagan rhetorical revelry, in striking contrast to the sober exactitude we perceived in
Dumarsais, this “janséniste puis libre-penseur.”64 Caussin bursts forth:
Eloquence is a procuress and can effectively seize and bind people’s spirits, especially
when it is joined as a companion to wisdom and moral integrity. Carried on its wings, as
it were, the orator’s soul flows into the very hearts of his auditors, and he purchases them
for himself in a form of slavery that is most pleasing to all. Once he has entered them,
what does he bring to pass? Are spirits to be inflamed? He lights the fire. To be strung
into action? He sharpens the goad. Enlightened? He spreads the light all around.
Consoled? He sprinkled on Nepenthe. Restrained? He puts on the brakes. Healed? He
supplies Panacea. Allured? He turns into a little Siren. In short, one cannot say how many
gentle juggling tricks this pandering eloquence possesses, how many and how admirable
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its effects. A person would hardly err who said, in the words of Philo Judaeus, that
eloquence is the “siege-engine of the soul.”65
This imagery of effusive, protean eloquence, shifting into a form proper to every occasion from
the elixirs of nepenthe and panacea to the erotic pull of the procuress and siren, would seem a
fitting testament to the reverence felt by the Company of Jesus towards the sublime substance of
rhetoric. Caussin freely glorifies eloquence. The ebullient style here draws heavily on the Second
Sophistic (the Greek rhetors between the first and third century CE, who represent a more
literary version of the sophists of the fifth century BCE, roughly speaking). Caussin exemplifies
what Fumaroli calls the “sacred sophistic,” associated with the Jesuits, although this elevated
style cannot be found across Jesuit rhetoric. The profound concern with propriety, circumstance,
and audience in this passage, however, faithfully indicates the Jesuit insistence on adaptation,
whether as missionaries or as teachers, an adaptability ideologically connected to their optimistic
view of providence. Michel de Certeau rightly calls the Jesuits the “partisans of adaptation.”
But this is not exactly a freewheeling adaptation to anything. Rather, its aims reach
outside the self. Loyola epitomizes this adaptive genius in his letter “How to Deal and Converse
with People in the Lord” (1541). To “win the love of highly placed persons and superiors for the
greater glory of God our Lord,” one must “study their temperament and adapt”: when speaking
to “choleric” persons, for instance, “avoid seeming grave, phlegmatic, or melancholic.” Rather,
be “quick and merry in speech.”66 Loyola then references a Pauline epistle: “To the weak
became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all
means save some.”67 The Jesuits would later approvingly quote Cicero’s ideal: “We are not born
for ourselves alone” (Non nobis solum nati sumus).68 These adaptive and civic or outward-facing

65

From an edition of 1630. Nicholas Caussin, "From On Sacred and Profane Eloquence," in Renaissance Debates
on Rhetoric ed. and trans. Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2000), 279.
66

Loyola, Letters and Instructions, 66.

67

1 Cor. 9:22 KJV

68

John W. O'Malley, "From the 1599 Ratio Studiorum to the Present: A Humanistic Tradition?," in The Jesuit Ratio
Studiorum: 400th Anniversary Perspectives, ed. Vincent J. Duminuco (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000),
129.
43

imperatives are perhaps the closest thing can find to the ideological essence of the rhetoricalreligious alliance among the Jesuits. To say that they helped institutionalize eloquence is only to
begin describing their rhetorical import,69 which will continue to unfold in the next chapter.

1.9

Jesuit rivals: the Oratorians and Jansenists

The Jesuit educational monopoly did not last. The Oratory of Jesus, established in France
in 1611 by Pierre de Bérulle, originally sought to avoid incursions into educational and
geographic strongholds of the Jesuits. Yet a rivalry grew, and the Oratorians became effectively
Gallican (i.e. under shared authority of monarch and pope), not ultramontane (allied to the pope
only) like the Jesuits, even though Bérulle had originally favoured the papacy.70 The founding of
the Oratory represents the “culminating point of the French Counter-Reformation,” for Bremond,
a former Jesuit, who amusingly describes their difference as follows: “the Oratorians are more
spontaneous and nearer the Attic standard, the Jesuits more artistic and more Latin. The first
cared less for fine writing, and that perhaps explains why they wrote so well.”71 The Oratorians
yielded their own great philosopher in Nicolas Malebranche, and rhetorician-mathematician in
Bernard Lamy.
Compared to the Jesuits, the Oratorians took a more modern approach, at least from our
vantage today. Though still deeply preoccupied with Latin mastery, they did not always insist on
it as a language of instruction, and eventually provided textual explanations of Latin grammar in
69
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French (learning Latin grammar in Latin strikes us as absurd, but this had been standard). They
ultimately took over eight Jesuit colleges after their suppression and gained a reputation for
being relatively welcoming to the Revolution, a revolution that in fact led to their demise.72
The Oratorian-Jesuit tensions, however, were minor compared to the bitter, war-like
rivalry between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, which would have grave effects on the rhetorical
superstructure. Some Oratorians became Jansenist sympathisers; the Jansenist-Jesuit quarrel
proved closer to a political and theological zero-sum game than any of the Company’s past
altercations.73 Whereas the Jesuits had been, in the words of de Certeau, “partisans of
adaptation,” emphasizing “civil practices,” the Jansensists “opt for practices of worship” and
retreat.74 From the Jansenist perspective, the Jesuits served both God and a humanist mammon.
The civic and evangelical felicities of eloquence, radiating outward into the masses, would be of
little use to Jansenism, for as conceived (tendentiously) by Bremond, this doctrine “clumsily and
invariably directs us to the saddest region of ourselves, … hypnotising us before the spectacle of
a natural misery of which we are not guilty and which we cannot cure.”75 Jansenists still
dutifully taught rhetoric—and wrote quite well—but treated it as just one of the various subjects
that would give way to theology, demoting rhetoric’s civic dimension. It would be misleading to
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say they were simply “against” rhetoric, but under Jansenism a passion for language could merit
shame.76
This pedagogic-spiritual-political rivalry will play over innumerable cultural domains.
Historically, it helps form great antitheses of French literature: “Corneille Jesuit, Racine
Jansenist; Corneille optimistic, Racine pessimistic; Corneille political, Racine psychological.”77
The rhetorical superstructure seems cleaved here by theological difference, between, in a word, a
“worldly” doctrine of engagement—communication ad maiorem Dei gloriam—versus a spiritual
retreat into silence and the self.78 Such oppositions, whose political, pedagogic, and literary
dimensions I have barely broached, structure themselves deep into the social reproduction of
rhetoric in ancien régime France, outweighing the machinery of theoretical innovation that
would typically be associated with a history of linguistics or another science. A tidy history of
trope and figure might include Aristotle, Quintilian, and Dumarsais, but however expanded,
cannot apprehend rhetoric as total social fact. The effects of this theoretical trope-figure
discourse on the overall rhetorical superstructure remain de minimis.

1.10 The rhetorical infrastructure
If we define a rhetorical superstructure, let us also define an infrastructure: the nondiscursive historical factors generally considered outside the “proper” rhetorical domain.
Events—wars, revolutions, schisms—all perturb the rhetorical superstructure, as do broad
sociological shifts, such as changing class relations, education for girls, mandatory education,
and the appetites of capitalism (perhaps one could argue that the “age of capital,” spanning from
1848 to 1875 in Eric Hobsbawm’s formulation, yields rhetoric’s true swan song). For instance,
between the Middle Ages and the advent of compulsory education in the late nineteenth century,
French society did not exactly become literate but rather transitioned from so-called “restricted
literacy” to “mass literacy”: the expansion of literacy from elites, clerics, and specialists to the
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masses (one would typically learn to read in Latin rather than French until the Revolution).79 The
pan-European growth of primary education between the mid and late nineteenth century proves
particularly staggering.80 Many of these sociological forces represent headwinds blowing against
rhetoric, at least when it is conceived as a pure ruling class instrument (which it is not purely).
The eloquence of the senate risks impropriety in the salon; the eloquence of the salon offers less
and less to the human sprockets of an increasingly industrialized France.
We should be open to the possibility that rhetoric’s decline was not an endogenous one—
such as rhetoricians’ failure to innovate—but an exogenous one arising at least in part from
structures outside its control. The eloquence of a Demosthenes, Cicero, or Bossuet seemingly
requires a healthy state of orality in society and would be challenged by the “Gutenberg galaxy”
and post-print media. A materialist argument could be made that rhetoric—even if it had better
adapted to rationalism, romanticism, and positivism—would still have been neutralized by
socioeconomic forces, or distorted and instrumentalized by capitalism. Ultimately, an intractable
mess of reciprocal relations between the rhetorical superstructure and infrastructure obscures any
omniscient view. However, one part of the superstructure can be readily tracked, affording us
some stability: a nearly continuous discourse on eloquence-as-value, its means and ends, and its
relative importance compared to other pedagogic aims.

1.11 The Enlightenment: an incomplete revenge of student against
teacher?
Though the work of Dumarsais was no true rupture, the rhetorical superstructure did
undergo a strange twist along social axes in Enlightenment France, an era that defies easy
characterization for rhetoric’s fate. It is safe to say, however, that things had generally worsened
since the Renaissance. During the eighteenth century, as Fumaroli captures it,
The main battle in Europe … was no longer between Reformation and Counter
Reformation, but between, on the one hand, ‘philosophical’ and secular Humanism,
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which in Catholic countries stemmed largely from former pupils of the Jesuits like
Fontenelle, Voltaire, and Diderot, and on the other hand, the anxious and angry clerical
anti-Humanism of the Jansenists, which the philosophes were happy to identify with the
Roman church in general. The Jesuits’ teaching and learning could seem in Jansenist eyes
to fuel the new humanitarian and deist philosophy, whereas all the while they stood too
firmly on the side of Roman church orthodoxy for the taste of the lay philosophers. There
is no doubt that the Jesuits amply nourished the new lay philosophical enlightenment.
Most of their pupils, notably in France, were superbly trained in ethico-rhetorical as well
as scientific or technical skills.81
In this predicament, the various humanisms prized “eloquence,” and yet the rhetorical systems
that yielded this eloquence had trappings of religious authoritarianism or appeared opposed to
emerging Enlightenment principles. What emerged from certain key philosophes, however, fell
far short of a total condemnation of the rhetorical superstructure, for they still clung to some of
its values.
Voltaire, Diderot, and d’Alembert82 broke from so-called “rhetoric” yet pledged
allegiance to “eloquence”: that is to say, they disdained the theory and formalization of
eloquence, but supported and valued its practice, which should be as “natural” as possible.83
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Voltaire admitted his deep debts to his Jesuit teachers at Louis-Le-Grand,84 but his Encyclopédie
article “Eloquence” surely would have disappointed them, for it begins and ends with the
premise that true eloquence cannot be taught. “Nature renders men eloquent,” he contends from
the outset, “under the influence of great interests or passions.”85 He concludes by claiming that
“in an enlightened century, genius aided by examples knows more of eloquence than the sayings
of all the masters”; books on eloquence have “said too much.”86 Perhaps these books said too
little to Voltaire, since he distorts them greatly in his haste to valorize genius. In this protoRomantic vein, Voltaire betrayed Louis-Le-Grand’s well-established precedent that eloquence
could in fact be taught, which it would prove, again and again, up to the era of Barthes.
Recent scholarship suggests that the textbook Enlightenment narrative—pitting the forces
of “reason” against “religious superstition”—must be questioned, especially in the realm of
rhetoric, due to the ambiguities of the so-called “Jesuit Enlightenment.” On the one hand,
considerable Jesuit contributions to science, their optimistic view of human nature, and
intellectual culture of curiosity fired the passions of future philosophes, who often received
eloquence as unquestioned value. On the other hand, the Jesuits teamed up with the Jansenists,
roughly speaking, to stifle the Encyclopédie, and the Company never became sufficiently
enlightened for radical tastes. Rising anti-Jesuit sentiments in France could be regarded as a
delayed “vengeance” exerted from students to teachers (who were wise but insufficiently radical
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for the philosophes).87 This vengeance certainly found rhetoric to be an easy victim (but only as
term, and not as the total, resilient institution we shall keep exploring). The writers who so
benefited from Jesuit pedagogical culture—while claiming that nature alone yields true
eloquence—today risk a great deal of hypocrisy. Ultimately, this revenge of student against
teacher strikes us as a somewhat botched endeavour: after besmirching rhetoric as signifier they
failed to take their plot to its full ideological and institutional conclusions and uproot its
signified.
We should note (and will note again) the potentially extreme disparity between, on one
hand, rhetoric’s (potentially terrible) reputation among thinkers within domains such as
Rationalism, Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Positivism, and on the other, the mighty
reproductive forces of the rhetorical superstructure: the pulpits and printing presses, curricula
and classrooms, that functioned long, long after rhetoric’s iniquities were “settled” by Descartes,
Voltaire, Hugo, or even Renan. Viewed from the vantage of high thought, Rationalism should
have virtually ended rhetoric. And if the Encyclopédie represented a philosophic snapshot of
knowledge, then the generous number of words afforded to Rhinocerous compared to Rhetoric
suggest its afflications would be terminal. Yet, as we continually see, it endured.

1.12 French rhetoric “dies” during the Third Republic
Though mapping a French rhetorical decline has barely begun here, we should begin to
suspect that this decline will stretch across the entire contours of the rhetorical superstructure—
theory and practice, philosophy and religion, politics and pedagogy. No smoking gun might ever
turn up, as it did with “rhetoric restrained”; the culprit’s alias will not be a proper noun. Just as
the decline and fall of the Roman empire, contra Edward Gibbon, cannot be attributed to a
singular Christianity, l’empire rhétorique will not crumble in the tidy way that pioneering
historians prefer. So we continue expanding on these various domains, and lay the groundwork
for probing Barthes’ great rhetorical dilemma, a turmoil of equivocations, vacillations, even
hypocrisies. He constantly struggled to separate the goods of rhetoric, and the Good in rhetoric,
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from its plethora of unseemly institutional roles, roles that became increasingly obvious to an
increasingly literate public in the anticlerical and positivist nineteenth century.
The death of rhetoric, according to contemporary scholars, is a surprisingly recent affair.
It runs something like this. Under a series of pedagogical reforms, literature departments
emerged and the teaching of rhetoric vanished during the long and eventful Third Republic
(1870-1940) due to anticlericalism, republicanism, positivism, and a spectrum of other religious,
sociological, and political factors. Perhaps a death certificate could even be issued at the
auspicious juncture of the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1), when Prussian victory arguably
signalled the defeat of French education (Prussia had come to analogous conclusions after being
trounced by Napoleon in 1806). In the wake of the siege of Paris, Michel Bréal, a philologist
who had studied in both nations, partly attributed the French failures to a conservative
educational system, as did Ernest Renan, who excoriated a decadent French literary education
that was “less that of modern science than that of the rhetors of the 4th or 5th century BCE.”88
Both philologists complained of the Jesuit influence in France that had so shaped its intellectual
institutions, an influence continuously praised and blamed for France’s classically oriented
pedagogy.89 Though this pedagogy would be widely criticized for its untold hours devoted to
Latin and Greek—enhancing the effect of a Rome or ‘Athens in Paris’90—rhetoric represented
the supreme target.
The French educational emphasis on rhetorical and literary excellence seemed utterly out
of joint with industrial, scientific, and military exigence, and yet the defeat by Prussia still did
not prompt a total purge of classical pedagogy. We might highlight the less noted year of 1880,
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when reforms gutted composition in Latin, an ancient stronghold of rhetoric, from the
baccalaureate, and the Latin discours would no longer challenge students taking the (national)
concours général.91 A greater rhetorical defeat of 1880, at least symbolically, coincided with
prohibiting religious congregations—often the subjects of conspiratorial rumours and intrigue—
from teaching activities: the Jesuits were banished entirely, and other orders would now require
special state permissions.92
A few decades prior, French novelists and politicians, and even some all-too-literary
historians such as Jules Michelet,93 had mythologized the Jesuits into the nineteenth century’s
‘clerical sophists’: they personified the dark side of rhetoric, as well as the furtive forces of
ultramontane authoritarianism. Jesuitisme approached charlatanism in meaning and became just
as baroque as antisemitic conspiracy theories, although not nearly as disastrous.94 The Jesuit
quasi-monopoly on teaching had been defeated long, long before 1880.95 Mythologically,
however, the Jesuits remained a mighty nineteenth-century force and were the perfect scapegoat
for a diverse array of political complaints. Thus, as police forcibly removed priests from
classrooms in 1880, the ancient religion-rhetoric alliance in pedagogy suffered a grave and final

91

Antoine Prost, Histoire de l'enseignement en France 1800-1967 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968), 247.

92

Debray begins his “University Cycle” chronology for charting the rise of modern French intellectuals in 1880.
More generally, the “institutional foundations … of a university milieu” were erected between 1871 and 1885. Régis
Debray, Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France, trans. David Macey (London: Verso,
1981), 42. (42).
93

Lucien Febvre links Michelet’s remarkable invention of the concept of the Renaissance to his vehement rejection
of the Jesuits, clerical authority, and the church in general. Lucien Febvre, "How Jules Michelet Invented the
Renaissance," in A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Lucien Febvre ed. Peter Burke (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1973), 265.
94

Nineteenth-century literature often associated the stock character Jesuit with the masculine subterfuge of the
confessor, a dangerous figure alone with the female confessant. Sometimes, however, the masculine role was
imported into feminine wiles: “The most Jesuit of Jesuits is still a thousand times less Jesuit than the least Jesuit
woman; behold what Jesuits women are!” My trans. Honoré de Balzac, "Petites misères de la vie conjugale," in
Oeuvres complètes (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1879), 573.
95

I say “quasi-monopoly” because of state-run engineering and military schools. The Jesuit lost their schools when
driven from France in 1764. After their order had been dissolved by Clement XIV and re-established by Pius VII in
1814, their nineteenth-century educational influence remained minor compared to their massive accomplishments in
the seventeenth century.
52

symbolic defeat. Soon after, the eponymous Jules Ferry laws of 1881 and 1882 finally realized
the old “Jacobin dream” of mandatory and free primary education system under strict laïcité.96
Yet perhaps it would be premature to conceive of the “end” of rhetoric, which would
leave an enormous vacuum, until something appears that could take its place. In 1890 another
round of reforms declared the effective curricular replacement for rhetoric: “the center of gravity
of secondary education is [now] in explication,” and no longer in the compositional and imitative
realm.97 The new, self-identified intellectuel (a recent, post-Dreyfus neologism) would be
stamped by an endless series of explications de textes. These would be purportedly “democratic”
exercises replacing the indulgent individualism and elitism of a rhetorical composition associated
with aristocratic rule. Boosted by associations with science, philology, and history, and
championed by Gustave Lanson, explication became the hegemonic pedagogical paradigm into
which the structuralists emerged; it was especially tenacious at the Sorbonne that Barthes would
attend. Perhaps only when explication was fully institutionalized could rhetoric be declared
defeated. Let us say with warranted imprecision, then, that rhetoric “dies” some time during the
Third Republic. These three waypoints—1870, 1880, and 1890—give the briefest tour of much
more comprehensive historical efforts.98

1.13 “The only error of the Greeks” over the long nineteenth century
Despite these glimpses into an era of rapid decline in the Third Republic, we have barely
broached the complex ideological hostility towards rhetoric mounting over the long nineteenth
century. Scholars of rhetoric tend to savour Renan’s famous quip of 1885 that rhetoric (along
with poetics) was the “only error of the Greeks,” and deploy it, with good reason, as a marker of
its reputational nadir. Yet in itself, it explains nothing of the accelerating decline, for his
argument against rhetoric simply recycled old commonplaces: no rules can make masterpieces;
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only thinking well can lead to speaking well; “absolute sincerity” is the key.99 There is nothing
new here. Why should such stale accusations finally find purchase during the Third Republic, in
the decades surrounding Renan’s speech, after failing for centuries to vanquish l'art de bien
parler? We should turn to the Republican political climate which makes the question of rhetoric
rather different than it had been under the ancien régime, yielding new political-pedagogic
angles of attack that reinforced the usual philosophical and literary critiques (rhetoric as enemy
of truth, sincerity, or beauty).
An increasing contempt for elitism certainly does not bode well for the institution, and the
First Republic (1792-1804) will offer the Third Republic (1870-1940) the prototypes of an antielitist argument against rhetoric.100 As Martin Guiney summarizes, a “myth” birthed in the
French revolution held that “language in its regenerated state could serve as a perfect vehicle for
communication”; “The rejection of literature took the form of a rejection of rhetoric as a basis for
separating literature from the rest of human discourse, and as a basis for elitist Jesuit pedagogy
that monopolized the institution of literary studies at the time.”101 As we will later see with
Paulhan, a post-revolutionary “terrorist” attitude towards language posits that rhetorical excesses,
or even rhetoric itself, could be dispensed with.
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1.14 Mythologies of rhetoric
Though we will soon see the Jesuits enmeshed in a dark conspiracy theory that proved
unfavourable to rhetoric, a positive myth valorizing their “other” also proves important. In the
nineteenth century, that old nexus of anti-Jesuit sentiment and stylistic sobriety—Port-Royal—
witnessed “its most illustrious period as a cultural icon” despite Jansenism’s retreat: “instead of
fading into oblivion, Port-Royal entered the cultural sphere, where it was exalted as the
quintessence of the Grand Siècle.”102 Saint-Beuve played a crucial role as he mythologized PortRoyal into a spiritual refuge.103
Initially founded as a Benedictine abbey in 1204 (on a rather swampy site) and piously
reformed by Marie Angélique Arnauld in 1608, Port Royal finally relocated to Paris in 1626 (and
away from what seemed to be a nun-killing swamp).The famous petites écoles de Port-Royal,
formed under Saint-Cyran, only lasted from 1637 to 1660, instructing relatively tiny numbers of
students. And yet, their memory and example would be deployed by Protestant or secular
Republican reformers more than two centuries later, who preferred Port-Royal pedagogy and the
Port-Royal Logic. Though Giambattista Vico had excoriated this text for raising a useless,
passive, yet judgmental youth whose ungainly means of expression were arida e secca,104 early
efforts to theorize and historicize French pedagogy began with Port-Royal in a highly favourable
position.
Meanwhile, nineteenth-century France witnessed a breakthrough in its anti-rhetoric
argumentation: a grandiose conspiracy theory which scholars have perhaps underestimated.
Vilifying an allegedly nefarious group of real people often proves easier than criticizing an
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abstract idea without a face, and this is entirely true of rhetoric and its wily agents. Though the
sophists had brilliantly fulfilled this role in antiquity—users and abusers of rhetoric, teachers and
salesmen of a false art—the French Jesuits of the nineteenth century were far better villains. For
they represented not only cunning teachers of rhetoric and casuistry, but agents of clerical
authority, an authority that was sworn enemy of countless republican intellectuals. And although
the French Jesuits were far too weak and scarce to dominate nineteenth-century education after
being reinstated in 1814, they were readily personified into the institution of rhetoric, facilitating
new angles of attack.
The fervor, complexity, and extent of the so-called “Jesuit myth” has been largely
forgotten. From the explosive lectures of Michelet and Quinet at the Collège de France
excoriating the furtive Jesuit influences on society to the massively popular anti-Jesuit novel Le
Juif errant, diverse critics assailed the Company of Jesus in nineteenth-century France:
Republican thinkers of various stripes, dispersed Port Royalists, bureaucrats, novelists, and
pedagogues (over a range of political orientations, but generally the non-socialist left). At its
base, the mythology of Jesuitisme references their para-national network of political-religiouspedagogic influence that had so shaped French education and society. Allegedly, their students
could be neither good citizens nor good thinkers, and the Voltaires and Diderots they trained
were explained away.105
Even for their milder critics, such as Renan, the Company’s post-suppression legacy was
tremendous: “The French education system created after the Revolution under the name
‘University’ in reality carries forward much more from the Jesuits than from the former
universities.”106 This genuine influence, however, anchored the most passionate and extreme
hyperbole. Renan’s criticisms of a mechanistic Jesuit moral education pale in comparison to
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Michelet’s fiery harangues,107 and the philologist’s gripes against the French University—a
quasi-Jesuit school of style, of pompous declamations, of squandered talent—were indeed
restrained and nuanced compared to what had gone before him.
Michelet launched his invectives at the Collège de France by defining jésuitisme as “the
spirit of the police and their informants, the mean baseness of the tattletale pupil, once
transferred from school, college, and convent into the community at large,” as “the spirit of the
police introduced into the matters of God.”108 The Jesuits allegedly transposed the secretive
inculpations and disciplinary regimes of the classroom into society itself; the historian fretted
over his beloved French people “whom the Jesuits are daily plunging a step lower into this hell
of everlasting corruption.”109 “The” Jesuit, for Michelet, represents an automaton of power—as
if derived from Foucault’s nightmares—a “machine, a mere instrument to be put in motion,
without any individual will.”110 Barthes knew of his dear historian’s “loud cries” about the
Jesuits and their “sterile invention” and “negative proliferation,” their function as scapegoat.111
Unsurprisingly, Michelet also felt anxious about rhetoric. Barthes said of the historian that he
“feared art”—or “traditional rhetoric, with its rules and formulas”—“precisely to the degree that
he had a gift for it.”112 The mythic Jesuit became, among his other guises, a mechanical Turk of
rhetoric.
Lecturing with Michelet, Edgar Quinet proclaimed that the Jesuits’ “great plan of
education” consisted in “allow[ing] the spirit an apparent movement, which should render all
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movement impossible; to waste it in incessant gymnastics[:] … never was so much reason
brought to bear in conspiracy against reason.”113 Quinet’s charges made the Jesuits out to be
sophistic charlatan-pedagogues:
The pompous display of discussions, theses, of intellectual struggles, of word-combats …
characterize[s] the education given by the order of the Jesuits. The more they stripped
reflection of its gravest topics, they more they allured to those intellectual exercises and
tricks of fence which marked the nothingness of the discussion; so that they abounded in
spectacles, solemnities, academic tourneys, spiritual duels. ... Here was the miracle of the
Society of Jesus... to render him [l’homme] immoveable at the very moment in which he
was beguiled by all the appearances of literary and philosophical progress. If the Satanic
genius of inertia had been bodily manifest on earth, this is the course it would have
pursued.114
Though typical in their vehemence, these characterizations are but a tiny sampling of the range
of accusations that inflamed complex anti-Jesuit sentiments in nineteenth-century France. In
addition to their wily reputation, most important here are their ultramontane,
counterrevolutionary associations: they were subject to a “special hatred and mistrust reserved
for their order in the demonologies of the secular Left.”115 These politically charged mythologies
of the nineteenth century should be remembered as we struggle to reconcile contemporary
rhetoric, as Barthes did, with its social history.

1.15

Quitting words for things
Outside the Jesuits, rhetoric remained negatively associated with the worst parts of

religious education and fared poorly under increasingly positivist attitudes. Renan’s youthful
experiences are particularly instructive in understanding his contempt for rhetoric, so
characteristic of his time (we will continually see that attitudes towards rhetoric tend to be
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formed early in life). Renan had studied the art via the “somewhat insipid classical teaching of
M. Dupanloup” at the seminary of Saint-Nicholas du Chardonnet. A moderate, compromising
ecclesiastic and reformer, the voluble Félix Dupanloup was far from a clerical authoritarian. But
for Renan, Dupanloup was still the very personification of literary-rhetorical extravagance, since
the “principal dogma” of Dupanloup was allegedly “No salvation without a good literary
education.”116 Finishing his rhetorical training, Renan then entered Issy, a branch of the St.
Sulpice seminary, where the labour of style would no longer torment him:
St. Sulpice is now the only place where, as formerly at Port-Royal, the style of writing
possesses that absolute forgetfulness of form which is the proof of sincerity. It never occurred to
the masters that among their pupils must be a writer or an orator. ... In this way St. Sulpice with
its contempt for literature is perforce a capital school for style, the fundamental rule of which is
to have solely in view the thought which it is wished to inculcate.117
From St. Sulpice, Renan celebrates Port-Royal as the nepenthe of formalism; all his previous
rhetorical training was mere enfantillage. Under the Sulpicians, Renan enjoyed what he saw as a
more open-ended yet more rigorous education than at Saint-Nicholas.
Renan ultimately began to doubt ecclesiastic authority and the truths of the Christian faith.
His immensely popular Life of Jesus (1863) fortified positivism, through biography, with an
authoritative power drained from the Church.118 His life, in some ways, captures the relation
between declining religious, rhetorical, and literary convictions (literary in the sense of valuing
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form) as juxtaposed against an ascendant positivism.119 Ultimately, to Renan’s famous slur for
rhetoric—la seule erreur des Grecs—we should add his personal decree: je quittais les mots
pour les choses,120 a mythic pronouncement extending, in many ways, to the anti-rhetoricism of
the long nineteenth century. Though we have barely begun to explore this distrust or hatred of
words (misology), we will later revisit its literary scene via Paulhan’s “terrorists,” who will not
only quit words for things, but burn them for good measure.

1.16

The replacement of rhetoric?
Though far from elaborating a complete nineteenth-century narrative of decline, we now

sense that rhetoric does not seem to die by its own hand, for it got caught between republican
politics, anti-clerical sentiments (especially anti-Jesuit ones), and a positivist belief that rhetoric
runs contrary to the “facts.” With these prerequisites, we can now introduce the best scholarly
accounts concerning themselves with the mystery of rhetoric’s end (which will be complicated
by the next chapter). Compagnon’s account, in essence, narrates rhetoric’s rapid replacement on
curricula by the nascent discipline of literary history. In his telling, Gustave Lanson effectively
becomes the hero—for literature departments—or the villain—for rhetoricians, finally delivering
the coup de grâce.
Though Compagnon’s account focuses on the rather recent birth of literature departments
(and hence downplays a more purist rhetoric or philosophy perspective), he frames it with one of
the key quarrels we have examined: the Jesuits—associated with rhetoric and theory—and Port
Royal—associated with philology and history (one could also call the Port Royal faction the
Jansenists or the Benedictines, and he chooses Benedictine). It took until the Third Republic for
the Benedictine tradition to win out:
The two traditions began to be perceived as rivals when the Benedictine espoused
particularism and the Jesuits generalism. After the Revolution, when the Benedictine
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abbeys and the Jesuit colleges were dispersed, particularism took refuge in the Academy
of Inscriptions and Letters, while rhetoric flourished in the Napoleonic universities
established in 1803. The situation changed after the defeat of 1870, which many observers
[such as Renan] saw as the defeat of France's educational system ... The reformers of the
French educational system were essentially a few historians ... [who] propagated the
discipline of the positivist method for establishing facts. ... History, based on this cult of
facts, became the science that would prepare the nation for revenge on Germany. And
their bête noire was literature, which was irretrievably associated with rhetoric. ... The
literary faculty, who were rhetoricians, did not know how to teach [literary history]. ...
But a savior appeared, to whom, it is no exaggeration to say, literary studies in France
owe their survival. ... The notorious “Lanson,” as his textbook was soon called, made it
possible for professors of rhetoric to retrain themselves into the historical method, a
generation after the historians had done so. …He insisted the techniques of philology
would give scientific legitimacy to literary studies ... [and eliminated] their
“impressionistic imagination” and “systematic dogmatism.”121
In this account, Lanson resolves much of the turmoil we have seen brewing by promoting two
pedagogical exercises with which he is so famously associated: the explication de texte and the
dissertation, which we will examine in the next chapter.
Lanson seemingly triumphed where countless anti-rhetoric thinkers had failed. Due to the
massive anti-rhetoric campaigns that had proceeded him, this was partly mere good timing. Yet
he also bypassed the massive tradition of ethico-philosophical attacks from Plato onward and
instead assaulted rhetoric’s reproduction more than its reputation, striking its curricular organs.
What finally supressed rhetoric in France, in this reading, was not a more persuasive or betterreasoned argument against it, but a far more bureaucratic endeavour of reform and replacement,
heavily buttressed by republican politics.
Likewise, the philosophical defenses of rhetoric did not hold, notably that of Ferdinand
Brunetière, whom Compagnon has highlighted as a kind of anti-Lanson (and anti-Dreyfusard).
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Brunetière could be called “last eloquent rhetorician” of his day. He had actually mentored
Lanson, the supreme anti-rhetorician.122 Brunetière’s “An Apology for Rhetoric” likely
represents the discipline’s best philosophical defense in the late nineteenth century: “Rhetoric is
the body of rules and laws which govern the art of writing, considered in itself as inseparable
from the art of thinking: and whether it is known or not, and I rather fear it is not known very
well, what one denies in attacking rhetoric is an art of thinking and writing.”123 Whereas the
critics of rhetoric constantly separated “things” from “words” in order to denigrate the latter,
Brunetière claims thinking and writing are “inseparable.” Hearkening back to Aristotle’s sense of
rhetoric as an art for probable and uncertain matters, and foreshadowing twentieth-century
convergences of psychology and rhetoric, Brunetière mapped its “empire,” an “entire province of
the human mind”:
What is really attacked under the name of rhetoric is all the means for urging [persuader]
on men things which are not to be proved [démontrent]. Liberty, and immortality, and
even morality cannot be proved: they are to be urged. We cannot establish the necessity of
obedience, or of self-control, or of self-sacrifice; but we can incline our hearts to them. …
Yes, where the power of logic and dialectic ends, there begins the power of rhetoric.
Where reasoning wanders, and reason even blenches, there does it come and found its
empire. It lays hold of an entire province of the human mind, not the least vast and
inaccessible, and impenetrable to the demonstrations of erudition and the inductions of
metaphysics; it establishes itself there, and reigns in sovereign sway.124
Rhetoric’s relationship to reason, the difference between persuasion and proof, has always been
vital for establishing its possible sovereignty. Brunetière’s conception here of rhetoric’s mental
“empire,” “an entire province of the human mind,” is impressively modern, at least compared to
the impoverished senses developed by his contemporaries. He also took Renan’s scientific
optimism to task in his somewhat mystical, anti-positivist polemic Religion and Science.
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Wondering whether “the historical sciences … deserve this name at all,” and lamenting the
broken promises of philology, Brunetière believed contemporary thought could not deliver on
expectations.125 Yet Brunetière’s name is scarcely remembered, let alone remembered as a
rhetorical nostalgist, partly because his former student Lanson would introduce a new historical
paradigm that heavily contravened the old art.
In a wry twist for a critic of rhetorical pedagogy, Lanson became chair of éloquence
française at the Sorbonne in 1904, an astrologer in a chair of astronomy (though he would see it
the opposite way). Shunning Brunetière’s embrace of the airy expanse “where reason wanders,”
Lanson understood rhetoric in the most brittle, pejorative sense. This vision, implemented into
pedagogy, greeted the generation of Sartre, and later, of Foucault:
In this system, Latin and even Greek will keep their place. Nothing will be endangered
but rhetoric, this woeful habit of not examining the truth of things, under the guise of
analyzing or admiring beauty, which one calls the culture of literary taste, and which is
nothing but perversion and abuse. The humanities will be renewed, freed of rhetoric, and
directed by the concern for the scientific formation of the mind.126
The true problem for Lanson remained rhetoric’s formalism and alleged vacuousness, and he
specifically spared Latin and Greek in his condemnation of classical education.127 This
Lansonian vision still flourished as Barthes entered the Sorbonne in the early 1940s, working on
Greek tragedy, and slowly realizing that something was missing from an otherwise classical
education.
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Tentative conclusion: rhetoric cedes to Lansonism

1.17

If structuralism eventually went too far in “emptying” history, then it must be
remembered that the pendulum between theory and history (or rhetoric and philology) was
returning from a particularly pedantic point in its long arc. As Jean Guéhenno wrote in his
wartime journal, complaining of a decadent state of Lansonism in higher education:
I have ample proof, unfortunately, that the teaching of literature in the Sorbonne and the
Universities has become pathetic. The abuse of history, of the footnotes of history, has
destroyed all critical sense and taste. I know of a professor who spent a whole year giving
a commentary on Lamartine’s “Le Lac.” He traced the history of a little pink or blue
notebook in which Lamartine had scrawled a few stanzas of his poem. … When the last
[lecture] came around, neither he nor his students had read the poem yet. To these socalled historians, it seems that all the artists of the past suffered, wrote, and lived only to
provide matter for a few bibliographical index cards.128
Brunetière could be credited for foreseeing such a stultified, scholastic endeavour bereft of
“critical sense and taste.” Though this ridiculous example—spending a year on the genesis of
poem without reading the text itself—seems rather extreme, it offers a taste of Barthes’
motivations for his rehabilitation of rhetoric that will unfold in the final chapters: he and many of
his peers experienced Lansonism as a tyrannical force that must be subverted. Given that the
reformers of the Third Republic envisioned themselves democratizing literature, the return of
rhetoric in the 1960s will thus inhabit a curious mythological space of both reaction and
revolution.
In the beginning of this chapter, we set out to address the “great paradox,” and we have
now confirmed its first half: that rhetoric suffered genuine and severe setbacks on multiple fronts
from politics to pedagogy. From Fumaroli’s Histoire and the other work that its experts
produced—Douay, Sermain, Compagnon—one could potentially build a chronological and fairly
comprehensive decline-of-rhetoric narrative of five hundred to a thousand pages. But this was
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not our goal, and as we have seen, doing it properly requires addressing multiple intersecting
domains. Responding to this complexity and the structuralist folly of taking a tiny textual sample
as a bellwether for the whole of rhetoric, I have sketched out the concept of a rhetorical
superstructure as an imperfect shortcut or heuristic. This concept will prove useful in the next
chapter as we examine the other half of the paradox: the curious continuities of rhetoric into the
formative years of the humanistic thinkers who will eventually ascend in the postwar period.
In this chapter, we stumbled upon at least two remarkable tendencies in the history of
French rhetoric which bear repeating and remembering. First, a great disparity of decades and
centuries separates the philosophic, critical thought on rhetoric from the institutional fortunes of
rhetoric. Reading the rationalists or encyclopedists in isolation, or even a figure as late as Renan,
yields a sense of decline that is premature compared to rhetoric’s ideological conditioning of
pedagogy, materialized into various social groups. Secondly, the mythos of rhetoric became
increasingly associated with factions readily demonized, rightly or wrongly, from a secular
center-to-left perspective. This mythos illuminates the sometimes-baffling trepidations of
twentieth-century French thinkers in reviving rhetoric, and the sometimes-baffling hypocrisies of
radical postwar intellectuals who were too often—at least from a nineteenth-century vantage—
drunk on the dregs of a bourgeois, aristocratic, or “Jesuitical” art.
Ultimately, we should be skeptical of the seductive powers of narrative that schematize
and simplify the decline and fall of an empire such as rhetoric. An apt narrative anecdote comes
to mind. In Balzac’s La peau de chagrin, Valentin finds a magical leather skin that grants wishes
yet shrinks each time it is called upon and drains his lifeforce. After referencing Genette’s
“rhetoric restrained,” Ricoeur claims, “L’histoire de la rhétorique, c’est l’histoire de la peau de
chagrin.”129 Today, this story misleads us in two ways. Firstly, rhetoric, although in terrible
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shape by the late nineteenth century compared to its seventeenth-century grandeur, simply did
not shrink down to trope, to the size, in Balzac’s novel, of a “periwinkle petal.” And secondly,
Ricoeur’s analogy omits that Valentin was indeed granted wishes—powerful wishes (though he
dies in the end, he dies grasping his true love). In the next chapter, we shall shift to the scene of
this twentieth-century amorous encounter, trying to fortify ourselves with an analysis of
transhistorical structures that will variously fail and succeed to resist the novelistic temptations
of a Balzac or a Michelet.
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The Continuities of Rhetoric in France: The Resolution of the
Great Paradox

2

“The desire to write took hold of me only when I was around thirty. Of course, I had been
involved in what are called literary studies. But those literary studies—the habit of explicating a
text, of writing papers, taking tests—you can well imagine that they in no way made me want to
write. Quite the contrary.”—Michel Foucault1

2.1

Introduction

Routed in French pedagogy and retreating from public awareness, replaced by Lansonism
and remote from literary history, rhetoric supposedly dies down, or dies off, during the Third
Republic. A rare account from 1888 worried that the replacement of rhetoric with a synoptic,
historical approach to French, Latin, and Greek literature would endanger “the general culture of
the youth,” “classical taste,” and “l’esprit français” through a great transformation that
“substitutes an exposition of facts, without principles and laws that explain them, for a
theoretical form of teaching.”2 Were such fears justified? Certainly, the explicit theory of
rhetoric suffered. But the rest of these concerns seem overblown. In Genette’s more stimulating
work on teaching we find an intriguing ambiguity: despite rhetoric’s official disappearance, “a
code of expression (and an intellectual instrument) of such proportions does not vanish without
leaving traces or finding a successor: in reality, its death can only be a taking-up (relève), or a
mutation, or both at once.”3 Genette correctly perceives the rise of the dissertation—an extrarigid quasi-essay—as indicative of a rhetorical mutation towards dispositio and notes a
pedagogic and epistemological shift: “the scholarly exercise is no longer imitative, but
descriptive and critical; literature has ceased being a model in becoming an object.”4 This model1
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to-object transformation of literature seemingly relieves rhetoric of many of its old duties, and as
a narrative of rhetoric’s demise, satisfies many scholars of literature.
But what about the relève of rhetoric as such? And might the “code of expression” and
“instrument” of rhetoric still haunt literature itself? Whereas the next chapter will focus on the
latter question via Jean Paulhan’s concerns over literary “Terror,” the present chapter will focus
on rhetoric as part of a total pedagogic experience of reading, writing, and speaking unconfined
to literature or genre (lege, scribe, loquere, as one pedagogic motto has it). We will briefly
consider some of the potential implications of rhetoric’s relève for the structuralist generations as
motivation, and then shift to mapping sites of continuity and transformation. Whereas the last
chapter took a more diachronic approach for evoking decline, a more synchronic approach will
unfold here, made possible, in part, by the traditionalism and relatively static nature of various
French institutions. Those truly new institutions, the khâgne and ENS in particular, often derived
their pedagogic culture from older models, allowing us to observe certain truly long-term
continuities.
In keeping with the last chapter, we will take up the rhetorical superstructure, whose
elements seem to resist the four most standard perspectives: rhetoric-as-(proto)science, rhetoricas-art, rhetoric-as-theory, and rhetoric-as-practice. Eight elements, although preliminary and
certainly not exhaustive, will be useful in dissolving the great paradox:
1. A constitutive conflict: the collège, roughly speaking, liberates the arts from the
university, prompting an enduring “universitization” of secondary education in
France.
2. A relation to antiquity: humanism, but restrained humanism.
3. A pedagogical architecture: the Ratio Studiorum and its legacy.
4. A social mechanism: agonistic hierarchies rewarding eloquence.
5. A linguistic program: Latin-for-Latin’s sake shifts to Latin for the sake of French;
Greek continues as mark of erudition.
6. A way of reading: explication.
7. A way of writing: dissertation.
68

8. A way of speaking: “talk like a book.”
These eight sites typically support one another and are sometimes inextricable. For instance,
humanist erudition requires skill in Latin and Greek, which in turn fosters French eloquence
through relentless translations. In this list, one should note the conspicuous absence of the “great
works” on rhetoric, poetics, and language in general (e.g. Lamy, Fénelon, or Dumarsais). Some
of the forces most responsible for rhetoric’s permanence, it would seem, are the hardest to
textualize.
These eight elements will help illuminate the pedagogical and ideological conditions of
éloquence française or, in the more modern terminology of Bourdieu and Passeron, “the preeminent value the French System sets on literary aptitude.”5 They argue forcefully for the “social
function” of this literary aptitude, noting the “humanist tradition inherited from the Jesuit
colleges—an academic, Christian reinterpretation of the social demands of an aristocracy.”6 Yet
they offer few early historical details beyond this claim. While Reproduction and Academic
Discourse prove that a professorial “magisterial discourse” and other rhetorical practices
remained alive and well in French higher education (after rhetoric’s supposed “death”), this is
not, in itself, a satisfying resolution to our paradox. That said, their work helps correct the great
de-socialization of language endemic to structuralism and encourages us to think of rhetoric as
much more than a particular form of disciplinary knowledge.
A more sociological perspective also reveals the importance of the rhetorical
infrastructure, which witnessed explosive growth—relative to the reasonably static population of
France—during the Third Republic and beyond. For instance around 1880, a mere 2% of the
male population finished secondary education, with only about a thousand total arts students in
the university system; by the late 1970s, this number had increased two-hundred-fold, despite the
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total population of France only increasing by about a quarter.7 In 1880, the state finally takes
women’s secondary education seriously, although women are still offered an overly practical
education, inferior to the male lycée, until the end of WWI.8 The option for de Beauvoir to study
philosophy at the Sorbonne in 1925 had only emerged the year prior.9 Soon university women
are abundant. Though the number of highly literate women and men grows enormously during
the Third Republic, the khâgne-ENS pathway does not expand in proportion to these new
demographics.
Whereas the average French youth in the twentieth century increasingly encounters new
educational pathways—scientific, technical, or otherwise modern—those destined for the ENS
letters division continue with a remarkably classical program. This allows for a disjuncture
between the khâgneux-normalien relation to rhetoric and the broader one of French society. Thus
instead of imagining rhetoric’s “death,” we might eventually envision a somewhat continuous
elite core of rhetoric, around which a more accessible educational regime, more hostile to
rhetoric, expanded—slowly at first, but rapidly during the Third Republic. Given my aims, I
have reduced the rhetorical infrastructure to almost a footnote of the superstructure, but it is
worth remembering that most accounts do the reverse—an often-productive move for the general
history and sociology of education.

2.2

Implications of permanence

Rhetoric, said Barthes, “has taken three centuries to die, and is not dead for sure even
now.”10 He was right to hesitate. The tenacity of the French rhetorical superstructure that unfolds
here suggests structuralism’s “rhetorical” turn, justified by constant references to linguistics, was
7
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arguably more institutional and unconscious than explicitly dictated by the consequences of its
propositions: French intellectualism ‘regressed’ to a rhetorical mean, approaching its ancient
pedagogic preference for linguistic excellence over historical erudition.
To the extent that this return is real—and it not a simple, reactionary return to an ideal
past—we should shift interpretive tactics. Time and time again, scholars have engaged postwar
intellectuals in relation to writing, style, and rhetoric, as if their individual “projects” or
“intellectual milieu” of a few decades compelled them towards their profoundly idiosyncratic
modes of discourse. Their thought supposedly necessitates certain unconventional forms of
writing or, in a weaker formulation, the content and conveyance of their thought resonate with
one another: useful and even necessary schemes for explicating their work. Though certainly
amenable to engaging individual thinkers, such approaches cannot account for some of the
spectacular collective tendencies unfolding in this chapter.
These individualist, le style c'est l'homme même formulations elide the reality that the
most rhetorically sophisticated French intellectuals of the twentieth century clustered together in
a handful of elite institutions that had continuously inculcated rhetorical virtuosity since their
very establishment, inducting students into a matrix of normative expectations, implicit and
explicit values, agonistic hierarchies, incentives, disincentives, and examinations constraining
(but not eliminating) their philosophical and literary agency. French education funneled its
(potentially) elite humanistic intellectuals into a narrow range of educational paths. Of these one
stands out as unambiguously the greatest. Neither Harvard nor Yale, Oxford nor Cambridge,
yields a true analogue to the special journey from a khâgne—hopefully that of Louis-le-Grand or
Henri IV—through the conours d’entrée to rue d’Ulm.11 The extremely competitive
concentration and centralization so characteristic of French education represents one of the most
obvious potential factors contributing to the creative explosions of postwar intellectualism.
From Sartre to Derrida, thinkers often testified to tumultuous relationships with their
schools, laced with both gratitude and resentment, oscillating between appreciating the benefits
11
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of their institutional formations and recounting various traumas, especially examinations. Sartre
will admit the “undeniable influence” of ENS classicism on his writing and in the same breath
disparage the “lousy culture” of the institution—and then, shortly after, reminisce over his happy
days there.12 Insecurities about institutional elitism also emerge, particularly from the left,
confronting the ENS mythology of nobility: “One is born a normalien,” As Georges Pompidou
put it, “as one is born a chevalier (knight). The concours is only dubbing.”13 Though we should
always balance the gifts of nature with the formations of culture, we must reject the notion that
one is simply, so to speak, “born a Derrida.” Far from being a ceremony of “dubbing,” the
concours d’entrée, in fact, structures a great deal of the education preceding it; the khâgne was
born to serve this examination; limitless natural genius does not in itself allow one to pass. We
should thus understand the writer’s justifications for certain forms of discourse in a dialectic with
the rhetorical superstructure. In this undertaking, educational institutions do not provide total
answers, but they are an apt place to begin.
Despite the emergent diversity of literate and oral modes among the lycéens, khâgneux,
and normaliens, the general rules of the “game” were relatively fixed—and very old. Scholastic
distinction partly coincided with stylistic distinctiveness in a system hailing precocious talents as
collective rhetorical subjects while simultaneously energizing them into atoms of stylistic
individualism. Writers as different as Derrida and Bourdieu, for instance, received a rather
similar push into this matrix, attending one of most storied schools in all of Europe as khâgneux.
Continuously radiating and reproducing a complex humanistic and literary culture since its
founding by the Jesuits in the mid-sixteenth century, the Collège de Clermont, ultimately
renamed Lycée Louis-le-Grand, exerted a heavier hand on intellectual history than many
prestigious universities; it has been rightly called the “model and father” of secondary
institutions in Napoleonic France.14 Lest this fanfare appear hyperbolic, and it certainly must
12
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seem so, we should examine some of its achievements. In itself, Louis-Le-Grand will not resolve
our paradox, but it gives a promising site of rhetorical ethnography for introducing our broader
questions.

2.3

Introducing Louis-le-Grand

From its prestigious centralization in Paris to its ultra-demanding classical, humanistic
pedagogy, the school lives halfway between archetype and prototype of elite French secondary
education. It inspired much imitation since its early formative conflicts with the University of
Paris, conflicts imprinting both secondary and higher education up to the present. Before the
Jesuit suppression in 1764, their prized collège taught Molière, Sade, Diderot, and Voltaire.
Amidst revolutionary upheaval, every Parisian college shut its doors, except, of course, Louis-leGrand, the so-called “school of the French Revolution.”15 Victor Hugo and Charles Baudelaire
would experience it in the first half of the nineteenth century, Jean Jaurès, Ferdinand Brunetière,
and Romain Rolland in the second. The path between Louis-le-Grand and the ENS is particularly
well trodden; the ENS reçus in Rolland’s year, for instance, had come from Louis-le-Grand by
an overwhelming margin (fifteen out of twenty-four—other schools sent a maximum of two).16
Louis-le-Grand boasted too many twentieth-century intellectuals to name comfortably; a short
list might include Alain Badiou, Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Marc Bloch, Jacques Derrida,
Gilles Deleuze, Georges Dumézil, Émile Durkheim, Lucien Febvre, Jacques Le Goff, JeanFrançois Lyotard, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Nizan, Pierre Nora, Jean-Paul Sartre, and JeanPierre Vernant (lycéen or khâgneux).17 Certain great students, such as Deleuze, would even
return as teachers.18 In its mythos, this “great barracks of pale brick” and “gilded inscriptions”
represents a retreat into arcane and elite culture, where, as Nizan’s novel puts it, “boys of
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nineteen could not learn much about the world on account of having to live among the Greeks”
and other recondite figures.19 Though Louis-le-Grand yielded disproportionate numbers of
French presidents and Fields medalists, I will say nothing further of its excellence outside the
arts and social sciences.
So eminent that it was renamed for Louis XIV, and briefly for Napoleon (Lycée Impérial),
Louis-le-Grand continuously garnered an immense and perhaps nauseating prestige, being
entirely unashamed of classicism. Its most famous Jesuit teacher, Joseph de Jouvancy (16431719), launches the first chapter of his pedagogic method on the premise that there is no
erudition without perfect Greek.20 In the 1920s, Sartre and Nizan, attending its khâgne, would
complain in a ribald poem that “we caress the Bailly”—the famous Greek-French dictionary—
instead of women’s breasts.21 A commemorative work for Louis-le-Grand’s khâgneux between
1934-1939 begins with an “hommage aux philhellènes”22 and proceeds to regale us with the
victories of its alumni across society, though we are left to fill in the many implicit steps between
learning Greek and succeeding in business and bureaucracy.
On the other hand, Latin’s role at Louis-le-Grand, with more immediate literary, political,
scientific, and ceremonial utility than Greek, is much easier to justify. The carriage of Louis XVI
and Marie Antoinette, for instance, stopped in front of Louis-le-Grand after the coronation to
receive a Latin epideictic oration from one of its most precocious students. This student, as it
turns out, was a seventeen-year-old Robespierre—ominously wishing them a happy reign (in
Latin) long before he helped dispatch them to the scaffold (in French). The early epithet of this
star Latinist and rhetorical prizewinner was indeed “the Roman.”23
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But the school yielded much more than Jacobins and future leftists; it would eventually
host some of the most famous fascist writers, such as Robert Brasillach and Maurice Bardèche.24
Noting considerable numbers of fascists at Louis-le-Grand, Barthes helped form a group called
Défense Républicaine et Antifasciste.25 Later, during the Nazi occupation, Jean Guéhenno
worried about the “terrifying indifference” of most of the khâgneux toward the outside world.26
Students received, regardless of the political orientations of their peers and teachers, constant
reminders that their experiences were exceptional. In addition to all the political and economic
idiosyncrasies of interest to sociologists, often anti-meritocratic ones, we might single out the
immense vibrance of Louis-le-Grand’s literary and rhetorical culture.
The ideal of eloquence, and its pursuit through classical languages and ultimately French,
did not simply flow from the fountain in Louis-le-Grand’s courtyard for its students to imbibe.
Rather, eloquence was exercised through a pedagogical paradigm that is sometimes called the
“gymnastique d’esprit,” under intense supervision that abated little between the Jesuit
pedagogues and the secular agrégés teaching Derrida and his khâgne classmate Nora. These
great pedagogues—bad teachers were rather scarce at Louis-le-Grand—inducted promising
students into an elite cadre of rhetors replete with shibboleths and ceremonies; Nora claims that
it was the severe, strenuous French class, not history or philosophy, that represents “the tattoo
that would inscribe you for life in the tribe of fine and cultivated minds.”27 And from Gabriel
Compayré to Pierre Bourdieu, Louis-le-Grand yielded its share of students who would go on to
criticize the “Jesuitical” excesses of rhetoric and elitisms of French education. This central
fixture of French letters over the centuries should be singled out for its reciprocal selection and
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shaping of future intellectuals.28 Adding in Lycée Henri-IV, perhaps Lycée Condorcet or Jansonde-Sailly, and certainly the École Normale Supérieure, we span the modern French intellectual
alphabet from Raymond Aron to Simone Weil.

2.4

The khâgne, humanist school of rhetoric and philosophy

Though Louis-le-Grand as collège, lycée, or khâgne offers a fixed address for charting
rhetoric’s fortunes, the khâgne in general, implemented throughout the country, represents a true
lieu de mémoire of French culture (it is indeed featured as such in Nora’s lieux de mémoire
project). Since it both filters and grooms students for the ENS, the khâgne promises the harshest,
and arguably the most decisive, years for a young intellectual. The term esprit normalien partly
deceives us, for this quality of mind originates, according to the students who possessed it, not in
the destination on rue d’Ulm, but in the journey through the khâgne.29 Out of all French
institutions, it is arguably the most important in explaining the rhetorical vibrance of twentiethcentury French intellectualism—and certainly the most foreign to the North American education
system. Jean-François Sirinelli has fortunately done much to historicize the khâgne, especially in
relation to the ENS: in his metaphor, the central island of the khâgne archipelago.
For the best chances of entering Rue d’Ulm, not any khâgne will do. Louis-Le-Grand and
Henri-IV greatly surpassed all others in sending students to the ENS; the former sent about
double that of the later; few khâgnes outside of Paris, aside from Marseille, sent appreciable
numbers.30 Being at the wrong school, or in the wrong city, potentially thwarted the best of
students. Didier Eribon’s biography of Foucault, for instance, emphasizes his futile years in the
khâgne of the Académie de Poitiers—and how, upon moving to Paris, Foucault’s fortunes
improved in the khâgne of Henri-IV, where he would be spellbound by Jean Hyppolite’s
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legendary course on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.31 On the other hand, Deleuze resigned
himself to the Sorbonne after attending Louis-le-Grand’s khâgne yet still failing a required
portion of the concours d’entrée. Since the ENS entrance examination measures—among other
things—written and oral test-taking aptitudes in potentially disagreeable subjects, the brightest
minds in the best khâgnes were not guaranteed entry to the ENS.
The formidable caliber of khâgne teachers goes against the conventional wisdom of
reserving the “best” teachers (in whatever sense) for older, more advanced students. On the first
day of class, for instance, a lucky hypokhâgne student in Orléans might be greeted by a coy
Deleuze performing an amusing stunt. He would claim he had been victim to a briefcase mix-up
at the train station, worrying that a traveling salesman, some stout Belgian oaf, would be now be
stuck showing his clients the Critique of Pure Reason instead of his normal merchandize of
toiletries. Having “lost” his lecture notes in this mix-up, Deleuze would then give a
“extemporaneous” philosophy lesson that he had in fact carefully prepared, leading students to
insight with his feigned ignorance—a scatterbrained Socrates.32
Whereas Deleuze would become best known as a philosopher, the most famous teacher of
the modern khâgne is certainly Alain (Émile Chartier), who taught première supérieure at Lycée
Henri-IV (his portrait hanging, during the occupation, where Pétain’s should have been).33 His
remarkable and charismatic influence, upon Simone Weil for instance, almost makes him a oneman school; his popularity attracted listeners, such as Sartre, who were not enrolled in his class.
His impact extends beyond the inspiration, preparatory knowledge, and famous pacifist attitude
he delivered under his so-called Chartieriste pedagogy. As we will later see regarding Alain’s
topos, he imparted a range of literary values and a rhetorical habitus. On the other hand, Jean
Guéhenno, at Louis-le-Grand, reflected on a sophistic, “dangerous dialectical skill” that seemed
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innate in his students. Such preeminent khâgne pedagogues, it is said, could exceed the impact of
great Sorbonne professors upon upcoming generations.34
This short list of the great aforementioned khâgnes approximates the elite educational
scene reasonably well.35 Not everyone, however, would follow the same arc as Foucault and
Derrida (from the khâgnes Henri-IV and Louis-le-Grand to the ENS respectively). Prior to
Simone Weil’s generation, the khâgneuse did not exist. Jacques Lacan attended the Collège
Stanislas de Paris, private and Catholic, unlike the aforementioned schools; Michel de Certeau
went through seminaries en route to becoming a Jesuit; Barthes had to “settle” for the Sorbonne
because of his medical issues. Overall, however, studying the khâgne in general, and as
specifically implemented in Louis-le-Grand and Henri-IV, goes a long way in revealing an
enduring rhetorical culture and a pivotal educational environment in general.

2.5

Rhetorical functions of the khâgne

The putative function of the khâgne is essentially preparatory. It does not exclude
research, but the acquisition of an immense amount of material is key: “The khâgne student
learns to know and the university student learns to doubt.”36 Its birth is basically accidental: the
khâgne organically responds to the need for extra training before the arduous ENS entrance
exams.37 From this strangely humble exigence, and without any grand manifesto or educational
ideology handed down from above, emerged an ultra-prestigious institution, flavouring French
intellectualism perhaps just as potently as the better-appreciated ENS (though exclusive, its
students will sometimes take Sorbonne courses, making it less pedagogically unique than the
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khâgne).38 In Nora’s reflections, the khâgne will be defined by its complex, conflicted
humanisms.39
The rhetorical origins of the khâgne were eventually concealed. In the first decade of the
twentieth century, the khâgne class of rhétorique supérieure becomes première supérieure.40 Yet
this hardly meant the end of inculcating a range of skills in the domains of argument, textual
planning and arrangement, and the inventive, “pre-writing” stage. As Genette argues, in the
khâgne system contemporary to him we find an incredible emphasis on the structural planning of
the student’s text (plan in French—the design, blueprint, progression, or scheme). The student is
taught to prize the plan; a poor plan will supposedly entail a poor dissertation (an exercise
which, as we will see, is utterly unavoidable). The khâgneux deliberately acquire the reflexe du
plan: “to find as rapidly as possible, facing a subject, the most suitable and effective
construction.”41 For instance, if assigned to a particular writer, the student would efficiently
devise a three-way scheme such as 1) physical portrait 2) intellectual portrait 3) moral portrait; if
possible, these should correspond a Hegelian dialectical movement (thesis: physical/body,
antithesis: intellectual/mind, synthesis: moral/heart).42 For Genette, this tremendous emphasis on
textual structure—the “mystique du plan”—represents the most characteristic element of a “new
rhetoric”: the reorientation around dispositio, or the arrangement of texts.43 On this account, the
khâgneux no longer learn how to style their texts, but to structure them.44
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By no means, however, were the khâgneux always prohibited from a freer form of
writing. Consider Alain’s famous method of the topo, a liberal, topical essay.45 Like the topoi
one finds in Aristotle or Cicero, its purview is invention. But in Alain’s classroom, the method
appears closer to “themes” or perhaps ekphrasis:
In the argot of the khâgne one speaks of topos. Elsewhere the topo is a sketch to spare
verbiage; the topos of the khâgne, on the contrary, were exercises of putting-into-words.
… For the dissertations, the subject, the date was fixed, regulated, obligatory. There were
no rules for the topos. … Some dealt with the will, egotism, superstitions, space, time,
music, theatre, etc.: all close to the syllabus but taking after some personal experiences or
readings.46
Weil’s topos ranged from “The Fairy Tale of the Six Swans in Grimm” to “The Beautiful and the
Good”; another student covered everything from a reading of the Sirens episode in the Odyssey
to personal observations of a particular staircase.47 Set against the fixity of a dissertation or
explication, the topo constitutes a remarkably uninhibited form. As we will later see, however,
students tended to use the dissertation-explication pair to represent their experiences.
In Alain’s classroom, literature and philosophy mingled freely, which is arguably true of
the khâgne in general. Reticent towards history and the contemporary plight of the 1930s,48
Alain would start the year by pairing a philosopher together with a literary icon, taking them
both up throughout the term. In Simone Weil’s three years studying under Alain, for instance,
she faced formidable, curious pairings: Plato’s dialogues juxtaposed with Balzac’s novels, the
Critiques of Kant unfolding alongside the Illiad.49 This philosophy and literature mixture also
emerges in Alain’s evaluations of Weil’s work, and the values it seems to imply. Roughly
45
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speaking, these values could be divided into 1. general character (“excellent student”) 2.
philosophical and intellectual aptitude (“profound and abstract subtleties of thought”) 3. literary
and rhetorical aptitude (“her style lags a trifle behind her ideas,” “almost impenetrable
language”).50 He evinces the values one might expect from a philosophy teacher, but also a
deeply literary sensibility—supplementing it or perhaps competing with it. Badiou echos this
characterization of (the other) Alain: “to all intents and purposes a classical philosopher” and yet
“closely involved in literature; the process of writing was very important to him.”51 Alain did not
need to be particularly philosophically transgressive himself to loosen his students’ inhibitions.
One also finds this philosophy-literature concoction in the classroom of Deleuze, who would
teach the expected (Spinoza) as well as the unexpected (Proust, Claudel), and even the baffling:
“Deleuze urged his students to read certain mystery novels published in Gallimard’s Black
Series.”52 This mixture faithfully follows the khâgne’s humanist heritage, an ideological balance
of ratio and oratio that positivism and other rivals to rhetoric had never quite purged. Though
outside observers of French intellectualism never fail to notice a widespread literaryphilosophical promiscuity, so evident in Deleuze, Derrida, and especially Sartre, perhaps this
tendency merits study as a delayed manifestation of the khâgne milieu (which itself reflects an
even older humanism). The pedagogical paradigm, at least under an Alain, ultimately centered
upon “a method for learning to think by means of a severe act of attention brought to bear on the
art of writing.”53 To this end, the charismatic teachers of the khâgne performed rather elegant
shifts between the multiple humanistic inquiries and aptitudes under their command: a
pedagogical glissando rather than staccato, fresh and enticing to foreign ears but rather
traditional in this idiom.
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2.6

The khâgne between myth and practice

The mythological import of khâgne rivals that of its daily practices. As if hurrying to fill
in the vacancies around its unimpressive origins, myths sprung up around the institution. Jean
Giradoux, for instance, hailed it as a veritable Plato’s academy.54 In the years of Sartre and
Nizan, khâgneux might wear the brass badge of an owl: a reference to Athena’s glaux, a symbol
they deploy in their poem “Complainte de deux khâgneux qui travaillaient fort” (perhaps
intended to be sung together in comradery).55 Adding to its classical connotations, the khâgne is
often described as a “gymnastic” institution (and like an ancient gymnasium, it stands as an
effectively all-male space up until the rather late entrance of Simone Weil and other young
women).
The term khâgne, however, comes from neither Plato nor Greece: it is fake transliteration
meant to appear classical and perhaps thus more distinguished (at base, it is something like the
epithet “nerd”: literally “knock-kneed” or câgneux). As a history teacher laughingly put it: “It’s a
very highly selected milieu, already an elite; there are no discipline problems. It's really the last
bastion of Greek education!”56 At Louis-le-Grand, Derrida and Nora discovered that students,
though all brilliant and “elite,” did not consider everyone an equal. The externes were from Paris
and could stay in their family homes; the internes were boarders from elsewhere (i.e. internal to
the school) and thus scorned. Internes and externes, however, united themselves around one
cause: feeling superior to the students at the Sorbonne.57 Mythologically, the khâgne secludes
itself from society, reincarnating a young male Athenian elite. They did not look the part,
however. As Sartre’s biographer puts it, the “slovenliness” of khâgneux at Louis-le-Grand—with
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“hands sunk in the pockets of their long sloppy gray smocks”—emanates from a “cultivated
snobbery, in which, as would be expected, Sartre finds himself perfectly at home.”58
The daily workings of the khâgne evoke a gymnasium of the logos. The institution
spanned political and intellectual rivalries through what Sirinelli calls an “absolute reverence for
language”: “consecutively reading Taine, Bergson, Sartre, Aron, Althusser, Foucault, one cannot
escape the feeling that, if they do not form a spiritual family, then they interrelated by their form
of reasoning or expression as a consequence of the assiduous gymnastics of their years in the
khâgne.”59 Sirinelli emphasizes the “repetitive gymnastics” of composition, analysis, expression,
and other exercises, and, citing Genette, the “mystique du plan”; this gymnastic metaphor is
closer to the essence of the khâgne than “force-feeding [gavage],” although it is true that an
immense amount of material must be consumed.60 The “pedagogic action” of the khâgne
teachers, according to Bourdieu, “resembles that of a coach who passes on the structure of an
exercise and the framework of learning over knowledge itself”; “they tend, like Jesuit prefects
and monitors, to develop a total patrimonial-style relationship to their students.”61 The khâgne’s
ultra-demanding “gymnastic” training and “absolute reverence for language” indeed inherited
elements of classical pedagogy. The “gymnastique d’esprit,” the cardinal element, focuses on the
perfection of the individual student aptitudes through increasing efforts on given tasks under a
coach-like teacher, standing in contrast to more passive methods relying upon the students’
agency to “exercise” themselves.
This intense régime, in combination with the teacher’s erudition, yielded an education
both deep and broad. As Georges Dumézil put it, the years of the khâgne “arm the mind against
the double pitfalls of subsequent studies in sciences or letters: general but superficial curiosity
and excessive or hasty specialization.”62 Yet of course, while it appears educationally rich from
58
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the perspective of the humanism inherited by bourgeois society, a less sympathetic take on the
khâgne (or ENS) might depict it as a modern phrontisterion where the logoi duel in clouds
through the most abstruse arguments, far above the humble people on the ground.63
The rhetorical culture of the khâgne indeed looks different depending on whether we
regard it from above or below, from the vantage of teacher or student. Jean Guéhenno captured
the experience of teaching in occupied France in his classic Journal des années noires. He writes
in November 1941:
It is my profession to produce Normaliens. This is a species I know pretty well. I
don’t think there is, anywhere in France, a gathering of young people more devoted to
beauty, to truth, to all the ideal values, than in the École Normale or in a class preparing
for the École Normale, a khâgne. But then, too, no doubt, nowhere can one see what an
evil power culture can have, what a vile instrument the Logos can be. … There is in every
good khâgneux, at the same time as a mind able to devote itself to noble, disinterested
research, a dangerous dialectical skill from which he is always tempted to profit. The
practice of Logos makes him capable of doing anything at all, to serve a lie as well as the
truth. Among these marvelous young men I deal with every year, I have hardly any
difficulty in discerning, unfortunately, those who … will turn into the new sophists,
serving institutionalized power—vile servants of the strongest, whoever the strongest
may be. They are “maids of all work.” Thus each class of Normaliens has its lot of
Graeculi esurientes [hungry little Greeks].
The khâgne and ENS, for Guéhenno, ultimately yield a “rather large number … of brilliant
careers in French society.” But the bad apples are as rotten as can be: Marcel Déat and Robert
Brasillach, these notorious collaborators, represent evil “masterpieces of the École and Logos”—
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just as much as its more illustrious and noble alumni. Both are sentenced to death: Déat escapes
to Italy, Brasillach mounts a skillful defense no doubt enhanced by his normalien oratory, but
still faces the firing squad.64 Guéhenno’s concerns over the “practice of Logos” are not unlike
the panics over sophistry in classical Athens; his student sophists hint at Thrasymachus in
particular. Good character, for Guéhenno, holds back the “dangerous dialectical skill[s]” and the
mighty Logos from enabling evil deeds.
Yet whereas Guéhenno, as teacher, perceived these tendencies issuing from individual
student morality, the young Derrida experienced the rhetorical norms imposed by the system
itself. His case perhaps best illuminates the idiosyncratic brutality of the khâgne, so hard to
separate from the benefits of its gymnastic training. Late in life, he explained his deep debt to his
“classical training” in rhetoric, particularly in the khâgne: “probably people who read me and
think I'm playing with or transgressing norms—which I do, of course—usually don’t know what
I know: that all of this has not only been made possible by but is constantly in contact with very
classical, rigorous, demanding discipline in writing, in ‘demonstrating,’ in rhetoric.”65 Yet
perhaps an examination system of what Derrida calls “monstrous torture,” subjecting students to
a “horrible machine, … awaiting its sentence of life or death,” is not worth the price of
eloquence.66 One cannot strike a properly Faustian bargain with a faceless system, for
Mephistopheles never takes stage to pitch the deal.
The young Derrida, in poor mental health, failed the concours twice before passing.
Given his macabre lexicon one could accuse him of hyperbole, yet nightmarish imagery—a
vision of the Inquisition or Hades—seems standard. As Romain Rolland explained the trauma of
the concours of the previous century: “I will never be able to make those who have not
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experienced it sense the nightmare of the examinations which my comrades and I had undergone.
… All of our youth was made somber under the black wing of this burden.”67 Pierre Nora
sustains such dark descriptions in his piece “Khâgne 1950” (written anonymously, giving it a
more literary, confessional quality). For Nora, of all the classes in the khâgne, it is French class
that painfully “brand[s]” and “tattoo[s]” the students as a special “tribe”:
French was invested with the highest mission: to give us the form that, whether in other
disciplines or in life in general, and whatever you later do, will allow you to do it.
…Philosophy, whose teaching is open to criticism; history, belonging to neither time nor
country.68 But French was the brand of the red-hot iron, the blue circle of the convict
who on every occasion would explode the critical and paradoxical spirit of the “young
and brilliant” normalien, the tattoo that would inscribe you for life in the tribe of fine and
cultivated minds. The mission of the teachers was thus to prepare us for these two basic
exercises: the six-hour dissertation, and the thirty-minute explication de textes.69
Whereas Derrida refers to an explicit rhetoric, Nora refers to the teaching and mastery of French:
for the inculcation of stylistic and argumentative virtuosity, much the same thing. French class is
the tribal marker, with the dissertation and explication de texte as the corresponding rituals.
These sketches of Louis-le-Grand and the khâgne, though tendentious, suggest something
important about the great paradox: examined from the holistic perspective of an elite institutional
culture and ideology, the rhetorical superstructure does not seem to decay as much as it should.
A disjuncture exists, it would seem, between an elite tradition running through Louis-le-Grand
and the greatest lycées, a de facto rhetorical permanence, and the de jure death of rhetoric as
theory or practice, held in contempt by the public. As this chapter maps out various features of
the rhetorical superstructure, we see that most of it exists, so to speak, below the surface
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immediately visible to society, a society that increasingly used the word “rhetoric” as a
pejorative—or did not use it all—but could not upend the entire educational system at once.

2.7

The arts, stolen (or liberated?) from the University

Up until this point in our investigation, the university has been suspiciously relegated to
the background. We should sketch its early pedagogical universe so that it may be linked to the
revolutionary, republican, and imperial institutions (lycée, khâgne, ENS) attended by modern
intellectuals. In particular, we should turn to the challenges the University of Paris faced from
the Jesuits. Such challenges lasted all the way to their suppression in 1764—and arguably, in
legacy form, to the present.70
The University of Paris constitutes the literal and figurative alma mater of the Jesuits and
their pedagogy, despite their associations with Spain (the homeland) and Rome (the destination).
Arriving in Paris in 1528, Ignatius reached out to fellow M.A. students—including his
roommates—to recruit his first companions. Of these, Jerome Nadal did the most to establish
their teaching methods and humanist affinities, wielding a superior rhetorical practice to Ignatius
himself.71 The University of Paris gave the Jesuits the pedagogic “manner of Paris” (modus
parisiensis)72 whose innovations were also appropriated by a variety of Protestant educators and
miscellaneous humanists. The Jesuits, however, displayed a particular genius in organizing,
systematizing, and instrumentalizing the modus parisiensis. From the outset they proved to be
masters of syncretism.
The nascent Jesuit pedagogical empire and its doctrines, developed through key colleges
such as Messina (1548) and Clermont (1563), offered training that could compete with
humanistic university courses in a nimbler and more dispersed format. Printing presses and

70

Cf. Bréal, Quelques mots sur l'instruction publique en France, 403.

71

John W. O'Malley, The First Jesuits (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 13-14.

72

Early Jesuits first encountered the modus parisiensis at the University of Alcalá, Many of them would transfer to
Paris. Gabriel Codina, "The 'Modus Parisiensis'," in The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th Anniversary Perspectives,
ed. Vincent J. Duminuco (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 38-39.
87

Counter-Reformation book culture followed in the wake of their colleges.73 The papal bull of
1540 that constituted their order bestowed wide powers over education (even though they were
not founded as a specifically educational enterprise, which is easy to forget). Ultimately, the
University of Paris suffered so much that some of its emptying classrooms were appropriated as
stables; secondary education, not primary or higher education, proved to be most opportune and
became the great Jesuit triumph.
The Jesuits, in short, could be said to “universitize” secondary education. Not in full, of
course, but enough to worry universities. This will radically reconfigure the rhetorical
superstructure by offering humanistic education at a younger age to (comparatively) massive
numbers of students. Secondary education in France retains a special prestige as a primary site of
literary and cultural formation rather than the higher education more typical of the Anglophone
and Germanophone worlds.74 Recent historians thus display an “immense interest” in the School:
“In France, the School is at the heart of ideological debates from before, and especially after the
Revolution; it becomes Temple of the Nation and of the Republic after 1880; and it is around the
School that the new intellectual and political elite of the country constitutes itself.”75 If forced to
select the foremost structural factor that makes French education French, it would likely be this
early and largely enduring triumph of the School. Durkheim had already sensed this near the turn
of the century: the French “national genius” as well as the “serious flaws” of the “national
temperament” partly formed within the Jesuit schools.76 One need not make a value judgement,
however, to apprehend this structure.
The rupture between the nascent Jesuit system and the older medieval university is
perhaps the greatest event of French education. For Durkheim, the competition-oriented Jesuit
colleges represented a “revolution,” “instantaneously develop[ing] to the point of super73
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abundance,” challenging the lax and often trivial University examinations of the late middle
ages.77 Or as Marc Fumaroli captures it in L'age de l'éloquence:
The principal novelty of the Ratio Studiorum, the more liberal attitude towards “humane
letters,” and the rehabilitation of the regents of Grammar and Rhetoric to equal status
with the regents of Philosophy and Theology, was something in principle acquired as of
1535 in Paris. Between the ancient University of Paris, formerly pontifical, and the
colleges of the Company of Jesus, which now had the favour of the Papacy, emerges a
rivalry at the end of the sixteenth century that will last up to Jules Ferry [1832-1893] and
beyond.78
And this is not the only great tension one might date to this period. Centrally at stake the
development, distortion, and appropriation of humanism. Durkheim claims that the Company of
Jesus had effectively “realized the educational ideal of the Renaissance” yet warns “they did not
achieve this until they had mutilated and impoverished it”79; Jesuit scholars, of course, typically
minimize such alleged disfigurations. Faced with a genuine and entrenched scholasticism,
perhaps one ought to be grateful for any humanism at all.

2.8

Humanism, but restrained humanism

A vigorous emphasis on litterae humaniores, humane letters, emerged among the first
Jesuits. Diego Laínez worried about an overemphasis. If “a mind nourish[es] itself excessively
on the humanities,” perhaps it becomes “so dainty and spoiled that it loses ability and inclination
for profounder matters,” specifically theological and philosophical ones.80 To this concern, Juan
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de Polanco replied with a fascinating defense: ten points in favour of the humanities.81 Polanco’s
appeals range from learning Latin to communicate God’s gifts (Ignatius insisted upon robust
Latinity) to the notion that the humanities were analogous to lighter physical exercises that must
strengthen the student before the heavily lifting of “philosophy and scholastic theology,” these
“toilsome subjects.”82 A few reasons stayed relevant: humanities students “exercise their wits
and powers when they engage in rhetorical disputations … or in original compositions.”83 Jesuit
humanism, however justified, became built in to their educational system from the outset.
Without the formative experiences of the first Jesuits at the University of Paris, especially
Jerome Nadal’s, the great transposition of Jesuit humanism into French secondary education
would be virtually unimaginable.
The students of the Jesuits, however, would encounter curricula expurgated according to
Christian demands. In Durkheim’s overly harsh judgement, the Jesuits “only expounded
Humanism in order to contain it”; “they had to expunge virtually all positive content from the
classical authors.”84 It is not clear, however, how an unrestrained, unexpurgated humanism could
have been tolerated in France at this time. Viewed more positively, Jesuit humanism was a
pragmatic negotiation; Max Weber refers to their “liberal utilitarian compromise with the
world.”85 The compromise regarding classical Pagan content coincided with another
compromise: initially prohibiting the teaching of French grammar and literature, or in other
words, promoting the Latin language, and to a lesser extent, Greek.
This promotion would have profound consequences for the rhetorical superstructure: a
sort of formalism of the longue durée, born through an artfully restrained form of Christian
humanism, emerged as a precautious practice of reading, writing, and oratory; a victory of words
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over things. Detractors accused the Jesuits of propagating a “culture of pure form.”86 This wager
upon form became particularly apparent during the late nineteenth century as rival historical
models emerged and pedagogical thought took a critical turn. Compayré claimed that Jesuits
“pay more attention to words than to things, … to the elegancies of language, to the elocutionary
effect; in a word, to the form, which, at least, has no religious character, and can in nowise give
umbrage to Catholic orthodoxy.”87 All the way back to Augustine—who confessed not only to
sins of the flesh but of the tongue—Christians struggled with the moral and theological import of
instrumentalizing or idolizing Pagan eloquence.88 Although Augustine termed his chair in
rhetoric the cathedra mendacii, the perils of rhetorical mendacity were much outweighed, for the
first Jesuits, by the benefits of a supple eloquence suited to the souls the Company intended to
save. By prizing and rationalizing pure Latin excellence the riskier parts of Paganism could at
least in theory be left behind.
The amount of extra-linguistic education offered by the Jesuits has been debated
considerably. The Ratio itself certainly features this historically “erudite” knowledge (eruditio)
but subordinates it to linguistic education. Erudition has a precise Jesuit meaning: “the study of
historical events, ethnology, the authoritative views of scholars, and wide sources of
knowledge,” but this is to be promoted “rather sparingly according to the capacity of the
pupils.”89 The “more recondite subjects,” from political and military organization to Roman and
Athenian dress, could only be addressed “in moderation” on the weekly holidays.90 As Marc
Fumaroli keenly details, however, there were both “erudite” and “rhetorical” Jesuits; the great
historian of humanism François de Dainville (S.J.) argues that the neglect of eruditio in the Ratio
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Studiorum does not mean that Jesuit education actually neglected it in practice, and provides
certain counterexamples.91 By modern standards, though, it seems fair to say that the average
student would experience erudite knowledge firmly subordinated to the task of linguistic
excellence.

2.9

From the modus parisiensis to the Ratio Studiorum

Parisian pedagogy diverges from Oxford, Bologna, and other late medieval universities
with the so-called modus parisiensis. The modus parisiensis grew out of scholastic disputatio,
yet was “humanized” and set apart from the lax Italian systems, which gave the students more
autonomy. In sixteenth-century Paris, one would take classes, administered in a top-down
manner, in the colleges or residences of the university; in Italy, the students would take classes
and exercise more freedom in the university structure itself.92 This Parisian dressage for the
young mind, eventually spreading throughout Europe and its colonies, emphasized a teachercentric pedagogy with many examinations and rigorous drills, which nonetheless progressed the
student based on individual aptitude rather than age. The original manner of Paris was
fundamentally about exercise: “Exercises and constant practice, as a ‘spiritual gymnastics,’ put
into play all the faculties of the human person.”93 The modus parisiensis represents a highereffort form of teaching and learning than mere “study,” but potentially a more effective (and
more strenuous) one than a student might have encountered at Bologna. The underlying model of
the original Jesuit teacher-student relation is that of the person directing the Spiritual Exercises
and the person performing them.94 Despite centuries of incremental change punctuated by
revolutionary reforms, twentieth-century elite Parisian education has remained closer to the
modus parisiensis than the laxer methods originating in Italy.
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Protestant educators too were inspired by the pedagogy of sixteenth-century Paris, but
they lacked the organizational genius of the Ratio Studiorum, which traces back through
intermediaries to the modus parisiensis.95 The Ratio of 1599 codified into a stable and persistent
form an entire educational architecture: demanding, top-down, and focused on exercising the
student to his limits within a competitive system pitting him against his peers. Like the Spiritual
Exercises (which Barthes will grasp via inventio) the watchword here is exercise. Though many
of the Ratio’s methods had been appropriated and synthesized from previous humanist
pedagogies, it will triumph via the unmatched organization and rapid growth of the Company’s
schools. The dreary scholastic methods latent within the modus parisiensis became more exciting
when applied to humanist content.
As Barthes put it, the Ratio Studiordum reveals, “in the ideology it legalizes, an identity
of an academic discipline, of a discipline of thought, and of a discipline of language”: the Ratio
“sanctions the preponderance of the ‘humanities’ and of Latin rhetoric; it invades all of Europe,
but its greatest success is in France.”96 At face value—a list of arcane rules covering the
minutiae of attendance policies and minor classroom infractions such as passing notes between
students—the Ratio would seem drier than the most derivative of rhetorical manuals.97 In reality,
however, it arguably tells us more about the endurance of French rhetorical culture than any
other single document, since it lucidly reveals the social structures behind the pursuit of
eloquence, which is so often framed from the language-user’s perspective.

2.10 Agonistic hierarchies: prizes, prize-givings, and distinction
One of the most stunning features of the French educational system, at least from an
outsider perspective, remains its relentless hierarchies, inextricable from its tradition of what
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Bourdieu and Passeron call “competition for competition’s sake.”98 The exams and their
rankings decide so much in academic life—and even in life itself. For instance, upon hearing of
Sartre’s initial agrégation failure, the parents of Simone Jollivet promptly decided that their
daughter must not this marry this impish underachiever.99 Or as Barthes mused in his journal:
“French professors discussing a doctoral candidate: what teaching skills has he shown?
Confusion, embarrassment. Suddenly, to the great relief of all, someone exclaims: his agrégation
lecture!”100 Of course, academic hierarchies, distinctions, and competitions can be found almost
universally, but the French system stands out in its tenacity and (arguably) in its brutality;
Derrida found it generally “terrible” despite its possible utility.101 Though much could be said
about the creative and repressive effects of cultural agonism in general, as well as the contests
open to the public such as the great concours académique,102 we will confine ourselves to a
discussion of private contests within schools and their remarkable tenacity.
Rife in the Jesuit and Oratorian schools under Louis XIV, “competitive examinations,
prize contests, and award ceremonies protruded from every corner of the cultural map”; Oral
contests, disputatio scolaire, gave their largely-elite students experience in a “ruthless” quest to
“cut an opponent down to size by exposing his contradictions and fallacious arguments.”103
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These were joined by less ruthless contests in Latin and Greek prose and verse. Such joutes
savantes channelled values of chivalry and nobility, anticipated by the original agonism of the
Dionysia festivals of the 6th century BCE.104
Under the rule of the Ratio Studiorum, the classroom itself became something of a
miniature Republic of Rome. “Honorable rivalry” (honesta aemulatio) constitutes the primary
student “incentive” (incitamentum).105 If the teacher was overburdened, one’s work might be
corrected by a “rival” (aemuli), and this corrector would himself be “corrected” if he failed to
catch a mistake.106 Which student deserves the greatest glory? The most eloquent, of course.
Rule 35 reveals the classical equation of social distinction and eloquence:
Those [students] who write the best theme will be chosen chief magistrates. Those who
are next highest will likewise receive positions of honor in the order of merit. To give the
election an air of erudition, the titles of the officials may be taken from political or
military offices in Greece or Rome. The class should be divided into two fairly equal
camps to stimulate rivalry. Each camp shall have its officers opposed by those of the rival
camp and each pupil shall have his rival. The chief officers of each camp should have the
seats of honor.107
These camps were typically termed the Romans and the Carthaginians. Students might be
physically rearranged in the classroom in honorable chairs or lowly benches according to the
results of competition.108 As Durkheim put it, they “lived, so to speak, on the brink of war, each
striving to outstrip the other”: this gainfully-harnessed agonism was a “revolution” against the
universities and colleges of the middle ages, which, although they had disputatio, knew of no
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such totalizing competitive system.109 The Ratio Studiorum implemented a severe agonistic
hierarchy, by present standards, with little to no trace of a cooperative element. As Bourdieu and
Passeron put it, “the Jesuits fashioned a homo hierarchicus, transposing the aristocratic cult of
‘glory’ into the order of social success, literary prowess and scholastic triumph.”110 Though the
early Jesuits often pandered to the aristocracy and their sons, it should be noted that they did in
fact instruct some poor students; the Jesuits themselves drew largely from the professional and
merchant “middle class” (an anachronism).111 Whereas the competitors in the school contests
were merely likely to be social elites, the structural logic of the contest ensured that the students
could not escape being hierarchized in the classroom.
Just as eloquence structured itself into classroom contests, the general collège
environment sought to enforce discipline through means that were more persuasive than
punitive. Rules were manifold. The Royal College of Savoy in Torino, for instance, has been
compared to the world of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish; this school stipulated everything
down to the precise times, locations, implements, and methods by which students’ hair must be
combed—and the consequences of transgression.112 But the preferred Jesuit method for shaping
students was charismatic: they were to be won over.113 Rather than a teacher simply
“transmitting” information in a detached, contractual, and almost unidirectional manner, the
teacher cultivated a relationship to bring the student to his side, engaging the Jesuit ideal of cura
personalis (care for the person) and perhaps Cicero’s oratorical trinity of teach, move, and
delight. Compliance with rules was primarily incentivized; as the Ratio puts it, “Faithful
observance will be better secured by the hope of honor and reward and the fear of disgrace than
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by corporal punishment.”114 This Jesuit reticence to punish was relatively “progressive”;
elsewhere, as Durkheim grimly notes, students might venture “solemnly into the woods to gather
the rods that would be used to beat them.”115 A quasi-aristocratic honor system, in sum,
disciplined the students of the Jesuits towards both eloquence and compliance. The Company
partly inherited, from the Roman Republic in particular, the alignment of social distinction with
an oratorical command of language and its virile power.
The incentivized agonism of French education became naturalized and almost invisible.
As Durkheim noted in early 1900s, the Jesuit “goad” for motivating students “consisted
exclusively in competition,” and although diminished, “still has considerable importance” in
France; “the competitive system created by the Jesuits with its endless compositions, its public
recitations, [and] its prize-givings,” after its successes in secondary education, “was imported
virtually in its entirety into the University.”116 This incentivized agonism continued, without the
Jesuits, into the lycée, khâgne, and ENS (the top ranking student in the concours would now be
called the cacique—a sample of the sizable khâgneux-normalien argot). As Dianne Rubenstein
argues in her political ENS study, “However much the ENS celebrates illustrious normaliens of
the left, it does so in a language (as seen in the necrologies and distribution of literary prizes)
that reinforces notions of superiority, exclusivity, hierarchy that bear a startling similarity to
analogous notions on the right.”117 These hierarchies, partaking in what Bourdieu and Passeron
call the “typically French religion of classification,” seem to have self-perpetuation as their main
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objective.118 Though other kinds of academic distinction outside the humanities would
supplement the original eloquence-based hierarchies endemic to Jesuit education, rhetorical skill
remained a key structural requirement in the French system.
National differences are also instructive. An American rhetoric teacher, embedding
himself in French education system of 1912, noted that the “ideal of writing” for the young
French student greatly exceeded that of the American: “when pupils distinguish themselves in
examinations—which in France are always largely a matter of composition—they receive prizes
and public mention very much as if they were the winners of athletic trophies.”119 He published
this assessment in How The French Boy Learns to Write, a book amusingly endorsed by Lanson
himself.120 Though a France with American “football values” might be hard to imagine, other
pedagogical models—more collaborative than competitive, or more empirical and scientific than
intuitive and rhetorical—were in fact possible. This preliminary analysis suggests that regardless
of the declining state of explicitly rhetorical theory, the old ideological regimes in fact persisted,
via hierarchies, contests, and titles that the Third Republic reformers did not fundamentally alter.
The great critic of rhetoric’s educational empire, Gustave Lanson, ironically occupied the
Sorbonne’s chaire d'éloquence française—a chair which he did not or could not destroy—
evoking the futility of a total educational reform.121
With agonistic and hierarchical education comes prizes, and with prizes ultimately comes
the spectacular public ritual of prize-giving and its requisite oratory. In the twentieth century this
ritual’s contingencies became more obvious; perhaps the young Sartre’s irreverence towards
“Prize Day” foreshadows his mature refusal of the Nobel prize in literature in 1964. As
characterized by his biographer Annie Cohen-Solal, the yearly Prize Day constitutes an “unjust,
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cruel ceremony, which pushes to the extreme an educational system whose key words are
selection and competition: the ‘best’ are picked, all others forgotten.” Deployed to a boys’ lycée
in Le Havre, Sartre would soon desecrate this award ritual of “laurel crowns and gilt-edged
books,” over which he was assigned to preside as the youngest teacher.122
Violating every oratorical norm in a ceremonial gown too large for his short stature,
Sartre torched the decorum expected by the city’s bourgeois parents who had hoped for the sober
valediction and edification of their sons—who had hoped Sartre would link academic distinction
with a distinguished future. Instead, Sartre rushed through a frenzied speech and arrived at a
baffling climax—entirely directed towards the students instead of their parents. The take-home
message was not exactly ‘work hard and follow your dreams.’ Rather, Sartre concluded that the
cinema (of all things) constitutes a true artform (and “not a bad school” of contemporary
society). He leaves the youth with a final imperative: “Go to the movies often. But do it
preferably during bad weather; first, enjoy your vacation.”123 Though one could read this as an
erratic Sartrean outburst, it certainly highlights the mounting fatigue with the competitive
vicissitudes of classical French education, perceived experientially before being quantified
empirically. Or as Bourdieu and Passeron put it, less anecdotally, in a higher education context:
The French University always tends to go beyond the technical function of the
competitive examination and to solemnly draw up, within the quota of candidates it is
asked to elect, hierarchies based on the imponderables of derisory quarter points.
Derisory no doubt, but decisive: consider the weight the academic world attaches in its
assessments—often fraught with professional consequences—to the rank attained in the
entrance examinations taken in late adolescence.124
But the problem, for aspiring humanistic intellectuals at least, is not merely that the examinations
prematurely weigh out their fates in “quarter points.” As we will see in studying the explication
de texte and dissertation, these exercises became highly overrepresented compared to potential
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alternatives, measuring interpretive and rhetorical aptitudes over a rather narrow terrain that falls
short of the full purview of scholastic skills, and certainly, of a holistic Bildung.

2.11 Latin for the sake of Latin; Latin for the sake of French
Descartes wrote Discourse on Method (1637) in French rather than in Latin, an event
laden with meaning for Derrida.125 As a young man from Algeria, however, Derrida found
himself forced to learn Latin more than three centuries after Descartes’ bold switch to French.
One might think that Latin should have been devastated by some of the same Third Republic
blows that rhetoric received: the curricular fortunes of the two subjects have often been
compared during the last two or three decades of the nineteenth century.126 The formal pursuits
of rhetoric and classical languages could be sacrificed, according to modernist reformers, for
content useful in a vocational sense, or at least the pursuit of “things” (such as history) rather
than “words.” Yet even after these attacks, we encounter some remarkable figures: a lycée
student in 1890 might have taken about three hours of French per week—and ten for Latin and
Greek.127 Facing the concours d’entrée of the ENS, even a science student would need to know
Latin until the first years of the twentieth century. The young structuralists in the Letters division
could theoretically avoid Greek, but the alternatives to the Latin-Greek option (Latin-Foreign
Languages, and Latin-Sciences) were not popular.128 The khâgne, and lycée before it, would thus
need to keep the classical languages. The retention of Latin helped slow the transformation of the
rhetorical superstructure and maintained an elite compositional practice in France. Given that
Latin’s death knell arguably began in the Reformation, and given that it was doomed by the
ability of the printing press to reinforce vernacular languages and literatures, Latin’s endurance
in French intellectualism appears rather impressive. Let us briefly examine this great inertia.
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In Counter-Reformation Europe, the Church sanctioned Latin, a language taught across
the teaching orders. The Latin methods of those orders differed, however, as did the social stakes
of the language. As the Oratorians and other orders later proved, Latin could be effectively
studied as a dead language by focusing on its translation into French (with helpful Latin
grammars written, for the first time, in French). Yet among the early Jesuits, perfect, living Latin
eloquence—and the linguistic proficiency supporting it—cannot be overstated as a formative
ideal, around which their educational enterprise turned.
More than a mere “subject,” it was a way of life, integrated between multiple cultural
levels of honour, discipline, and competency. We could call Latin a “male puberty rite,” as
Walter Ong does, undertaken “outside the home in a tribal setting.”129 Latin proficiency is indeed
classically wed to virility: “nobody ever admired an orator for merely speaking good Latin,”
claims Cicero’s Crassus. If people hear him speaking poor Latin, then “not only do they not think
him an orator, but not even a man.”130 Under the early Jesuit regime, a student should not speak
French on the city streets lest they require “fraternal correction” (snitching); poor Latin
represented one of the gravest pedagogic sins. An early Jesuit rector at Tournon complained that
one of his teaching staff “cannot say three words of Latin without committing either a
horrendous blunder or a barbarism, or both at the same time, so that whenever I see a visitor go
into his class I am completely mortified.”131 Errors that could be tolerated for a “dead” language
would not go uncorrected in the Jesuit classroom. Long after their expulsion, Latin might still
serve as a disciplinary or punitive instrument; one unfortunate day, the rebellious Maxime Du
Camp was forced into solitary confinement at Louis-Le-Grand, writing out 1500-1800 lines of
Latin as penalty.132
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This disciplined Latin excellence, at base grammatical and ultimately rhetorical,
embedded itself into the structure, content, and teaching environment of the Jesuit collèges:
The course structure for these students, who already knew how to read and write,
consisted of five classes, beginning with lower grammar, progressing through two more
grammar classes to humanities, finishing with rhetoric. Placement in the classes was
according to ability, not age, and a student could move to the next class when he
mastered the contents of the lower one. Through the five courses, instruction was in
Latin, and students had to speak Latin to each other. The courses in the humanities
introduced Greek. If all went well, in the final course of rhetoric students could compose
in both Latin and Greek, in both prose and poetry, and could pronounce both languages
so well that, in the words of [rector] Claude Matthieu, “you would not say they were
French.”133
This collège system, of course, would face numerous revisions, subtractions, and expansions en
route to becoming the modern lycée; the ideal of Latin for the sake of Latin, after the Jesuit
expulsion, would shift to Latin for the sake of French; Latin ceased to be the essence of what it
means to be literate. Despite these changing ideals, the notion that Latin or French composition
was the culmination of secondary education is an absolutely remarkable legacy; the final class of
rhetoric marked student maturation, as well as an elevated teacher status. This had not strayed far
from the old Roman hierarchy, in which the primus magister (primary teacher) ranks below the
grammaticus who ranks below the rhetor—with a pay grade to match.134
Likewise, the notion that Latin would edify students in their vernacular language, two
millennia after reaching its Ciceronian “peak,” speaks to the profound pedagogic conservativism
we have been exploring. Even someone as late as Derrida would cite this concept: “We speak
French, therefore Latin.”135 One could not say the same of English, and especially not German.
What Bourdieu and Passeron term the bourgeois parlance, lexically and syntactically Latinate
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French, ultimately emerges from education, not domestic life: “University French has never been
anyone’s mother tongue,” even for those raised among the upper classes.136
This endurance of Latin—both as a linguistic ideal and subject demanding hundreds of
hours of instruction—concealed a certain rhetorical habitus well into the twentieth century. The
procedure of version (translating Latin to French) represents “partly a stylistic exercise designed
to have students once again undertake a form of literary writing.”137 Even though “style” was
supposedly contained by the scientific and neutralized practice of explication, a command of
French style and a general stylistic sensibility are in fact demanded by an elegant translation. An
idiomatic knowledge of the target language, ways of translating tropes and figures, a sensitivity
to linguistic register: all of these aptitudes are closer to a rhetorical purview than a grammatical
one. Whether one uses a rhetorical manual with explicit norms, or whether one intuits norms
from experience, a collective code of some sort underlies one’s translation decisions. In the case
of Latin-to-French or French-to-Latin, such codes feature a beneficial degree of congruency.
A true purge of rhetoric should have taken translation exercises with it. The notion of
improving style via translation is already quite explicit in Quintilian: “Our earlier orators thought
the best exercise was translating Greek into Latin. … The Greek authors are full of varied matter,
and they introduce a great deal of art into the practice of eloquence; when we translate them, we
are free to use the best possible words, for the words we use will all be our own.”138 This
somewhat covert realm of stylistic exercise largely escaped criticism from Lanson, Renan, and
other critics of explicitly rhetorical education. Given Derrida’s extensive experiences and
engagement with translation and some of his tantalizing remarks (“the question of deconstruction
is … through and through the question of translation”)139 future research should pursue the
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pedagogic conditioning of French thought via the effectively unavoidable “task of the
translator.”

2.12 Methods of reading: explication de texte
The explication de texte exerts an idiosyncratic and hegemonic force by the late Third
Republic, even a tyrannical presence according to the memories of its conscripted apprentices.
The first thing to note about this exercise, though obvious, is its textuality: generally speaking,
one produces an explanatory French text about a French text.140 Before the reign of explication,
nineteenth-century secondary education had maintained a considerable amount of orality,
supported in ideology and method by the oral orientation of classical rhetoric. As the historian
Ernest Lavisse141 (1842-1922) describes his experiences:
At this time, the true end of study was the class of rhetoric where the best students spent
two years. In rhetoric, everything yielded to speech [discours]. We gave two speeches per
week, one in Latin and the other in French. … Our teachers ranked them by merit,
reading the entirety of the best ones and the good passages from the lesser ones.142
For Lavisse, his classes were fundamentally geared towards being able to speak, and speak about
anything: “This rhetoric, in which we talked too much about people we hardly knew, about
things we did not know any more about, was the natural culmination of an imprecise
education.”143 Plenty of written exercises such as translations From French into Latin and Greek
(thèmes) and the inverse operation (versions) kept him busy, but these were a subservient part of
the greater goal of viva voce eloquence.
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In the twentieth century, however, the structuralists were born into a veritable culture of
explication, and of texts in general. As Lucien Febvre put it as he probed the textualization of the
historical discipline:
Young men intellectually fashioned by a culture based solely upon texts, on explications
de textes, passed, without any interruption in their habits, from the lycées where their
skills as textuaries had placed them alone, to the École normale, to the Sorbonne, to the
Faculties where the same work of textual studies, of explications de textes, was presented
to them, the sedentary deskwork and paperwork of closed windows and drawn
curtains.144
This culture and its cardinal exercise enveloped the young Barthes, who would understand the
explication de texte as a “very culture-specific” or nation-specific practice that tended to baffle
foreign students.145 As Compagnon puts it, Barthes was a “model student of the Third Republic
of Letters: schoolboy in the 1920s, lycéen in the 1930s, Sorbonne student in the early 1940s.
Lansonisme was all he knew.”146 Whereas Barthes met it in the lycée and then at the Sorbonne,
his equally famous peers encountered it on the lycée-khâgne-ENS trajectory.
What is the explication de texte? In essence it brings together a grammatically oriented
explication of “literal meaning” with a historically oriented explication of “literary meaning.”147
The imperative of the second step, to “situate” the text within a context, often overshadows the
first step. Yet the first step is here vital, since it is the proto-structuralist dimension; Barthes
spoke of the “tendency to want to identify the ‘construction’ of the text (the influence of the
‘explication de texte’), the plan; to reconstruct the ‘units’ (how the codes appear) and the manner
in which they’re combined.”148 Thus the explication de texte yielded a crucial set of skills that
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were adopted by structuralism—and yet were purged of what the young Barthes called the
“Lansonian tyranny of influence, milieu, rapprochement.”149 Structuralist theory gave
justifications for jettisoning the second step and emphasizing the first, but students were already
acquainted with the requisite skills.
Though Lanson haunts the Barthes-Picard quarrel of the 1960s three decades after his
death, in life he was an important presence. Sartre, unlike Barthes, knew Lanson himself—all too
well—since he directed the ENS during Sartre’s education there. His compatriot Nizan described
the school as a “ridiculous and more often odious thing, presided over by a patriotic,
hypocritical, powerful little old man who respected the military.”150 Donning a fake beard and a
Légion d'honneur medal for the ENS Revue of 1925, a plucky Sartre assumed the role of a
tyrannical-yet-gullible Lanson in a lampooning musical, Le Désastre de Langson, penned by the
young rebel (“I danced naked with a half-naked Nizan in that Revue.”)151 A series of such
humiliations led to Lanson’s resignation.152 But the meaning of Sartre’s anti-Lanson vendettas
exceeds mere churlish, juvenile rebellion. As Sartre’s biographer points out, Lanson “had
abolished the teaching of rhetoric”—and perhaps more importantly for Sartre specifically—“had
dealt the death blow to the tradition of subjective analysis” through the explication regime: Sartre
took his revenge against “the very ‘patron of the French language,’” the patriarch of the stifling
pedagogy that molded Sartre’s teachers.153
Setting aside the grudges of the Sartre set, what was so objectionable about Lansonism?
In René Benjamin’s La Farce de la Sorbonne (1921), we find the figure of the Lansonian scholar
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ridiculed as the sort of pedant who tallies up, all the way back to the twelfth century, every
drunkard appearing in French literature (a counting impulse recently rebirthed through today’s
digital humanities).154 In other words:
A file clerk who scrutinizes, tabulates, and enumerates, who makes lists of names,
comparisons of dates, notes on sources, tables out of notes and groupings with dates,
occupying, to the great surprise of those who have never heard of him, a chair of French
Literature at the grand University of Paris, this light of the world.155
Benjamin’s farce ridicules the édition savante et critique, the proliferation of voluminous
footnotes and commentaries, squeezing the main text to a mere two lines per page.156 In this
light, the explicator becomes a sort of scholastic scrivener, a Benedictine commentator without
taste or rhetorical verve.
In many locales a student might struggle to speak of the text without explication, and it
was perhaps Barthes whom was most keenly aware of its pedagogic hegemony. As Barthes put
it, “The text, in our schools, is always treated as an object of explication, but an explication of
the text is itself always attached to a history of literature; the text must be treated not as a sacred
object (object of philology), but essentially as a space of language.”157 He observed that the
explication de texte, though suited to classical literature, can fall apart in the modern context.
Breaking free of “author, school, and movement” and Taine’s famous race, milieu et moment,
Barthes’ S/Z frontally assaulted the explication de texte. His strategy in S/Z (which we will meet
again in Chapter Five) essentially entailed pushing the structural dimension to fill the space of
the historical dimension until this exercise in all-too-close reading became virtually
unrecognizable. Praise for explication from intellectuals in the orbit of structuralism, or at least
praise unaccompanied by blame, remained scarce.
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Derrida’s struggles with the concours d’entrée reveal how a certain form of rhetorical
virtuosity might still emerge as a response to the challenge of explication. He recalls his
approach for the exam’s explication de texte on a simple and drab Diderot excerpt from the
Encyclopédie: “I decided that this text was a trap… everything about it, in its form, was
ambiguous, implied, indirect, convoluted, suggested, murmured. … I invented a Diderot who
was a virtuoso of litotes.”158 He passed this portion—but not without the jury admonishing him:
“this text is quite simple; you’ve simply made it more complicated and laden with meaning by
adding ideas of your own.” Similar comments haunted him previously in the khâgne; a failed
Malebranche exam represented “an exercise in virtuosity, with undeniable intelligence, but with
no particular relation to the history of philosophy.”159 Faced with a very high chance of failure,
Derrida’s “virtuosity” responded to a series of perceived traps at every point. Given a game that
is effectively unwinnable—even a mark of 17/20 is unthinkably high—rule-bending rhetorical
tactics of invention-interpretation represent natural, “structural” responses just as much as
eccentric, “personal” ones.

2.13 From praelectio to explication
Where did the explication de texte come from? Though imposed by Lanson, it was not his
invention. He deferred to the philologists: the exercise, an “effective and necessary gymnastics,”
was not “torture” but in reality “essentially identical to the exegesis practiced in religious
sciences and in Greek and Latin philology.”160 Though it displaced the rhetorical composition
associated with the Jesuits, the seemingly disruptive explication de texte surprisingly parallels
another aspect of Jesuit pedagogy: praelectio. For some scholars praelectio indeed births
explication; Barthes regarded as “rooted in a very particular style of teaching inherited, by and
large, from the Jesuits.”161
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Extensively developed by Quintilian, and then rediscovered by Erasmus and other
humanists, praelectio eventually formed the basis of an extremely sophisticated practice of
reading in the Jesuit classroom featuring five or six steps (Lanson will have merely two). The
steps, which would vary depending on class (humanities, grammar, rhetoric), run approximately
as follows:162
1. Subject. Read the text and give an overall exposition of its subject/argument.
2. Interpretation and development. Explain the literal meaning of the text at a low
level, substituting simpler expressions if need be.
3. Rhetoric and/or Grammar. Explain how the text uses various
rhetorical/grammatical precepts.
4. Erudition. Connect the text to “outside” historical details, particularities, and
erudite knowledge.
5. Latinity. Appreciate the style of the author, improve one’s Latin.
The praelectio might also conclude with a moral lesson, but this does not seem to be its main
ambition. What is important here is not the precise directives of each step, but their culmination
towards the final step of stylistic appreciation, and the overall emphasis on form—leaving only a
single step, erudition, for situating the text. In comparison, then, the explication de texte
represents a great rebalancing of the praelectio’s priorities: a serious effort to situate the text,
buttressed by philology and eruditio, becomes the equal of the formal, rhetorical, and
grammatical. Instead of amassing the stylistic gems of another Ciceronian speech to “selfishly”
improve one’s Latin, the new overarching goal, more or less, involves the formation of a national
canon, the collective creation of entry after entry in Lanson’s hefty Histoire de la littérature
française (1894). Although the explication de texte is often thought to be a pedagogical rupture
of sorts, the main discontinuity lies in purpose and ideological background rather than the degree
of textual skills a student might acquire; a scrupulous attention to formal, rhetorical, and
grammatical details persisted.
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2.14 Practices of writing: dissertation
Whereas the explication de texte follows and manifests the structure of its object, the
dissertation lacks a textual “object” in the same sense. In the nineteenth century, the written
dissertation began replacing the discours, which was modeled on Latin oratory, shifting from a
kind of impassioned discourse to a sober critical reflection modeled on classical rhetoric’s
amplification (roughly, to expand on material).163 “The rhetorical monopoly of the dissertation,”
as Genette said, “is almost total”: “we can define our scholastic rhetoric as a rhetoric of
dissertation without leaving out much.”164 Compared to other academic genres, the dissertation
enjoys a high degree of autonomy, being unbound to a predefined object.
Still, the dissertation is hardly free of impositions and artifice. Compared to the British
traditions of academic and literary essays, with a degree of personal latitude and perhaps a touch
of whimsy, the dissertation française “must start with an introduction setting out the problem
‘with brio and brilliance,’ but in a style free from all familiarity or personal comment.”165As
Derrida explains it:
You had to write what we called a dissertation according to a certain pattern: in the
introduction you should ask a question after having played naive; that is, you should act
as if you do not know what the question is, then you invent the question, you justify the
question, and at the end of the introduction you ask the question.166
This fake naturalness heightens the conceit of the dissertation, which ultimately became the form
that traumatized Derrida the most: “the rigidity of those forms...was terrible. It had some good
aspects too, but it was terrible. ... It was terribly rigid.”167 Long after his student days, Derrida
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called for the “deconstruction” of the dissertation and the critique of its ideology and authority
while acknowledging the formative influence of such institutions on him. His Herculean efforts
to disrupt his introductions during the height of his career—elliptical orbits around questions that
no one else would dream of asking, dances around the fiery imperative to begin in the beginning,
and a simultaneous recognition and refusal of the generic requirements of exordium—all seem to
point to the early trauma of the dissertation.
It is debatable whether the shift from discours to dissertation exceeds that of praelectio to
explication. Both transitions coincide, roughly speaking, with an orality being overtaken by
writing, and with a certain freedom and variation in reading and composition being increasingly
restricted to a smaller “scientific” and “critical” realm. At this remove, it would be inappropriate
and likely impossible to assess precisely how tyrannical these two exercises were, or which of
their features could be defended. What might strike us as more obviously oppressive is the fact
that these two exercises came to dominate a generous breadth of exercises previously offered to
students. Under the former Jesuit system, diverse descriptive and imitative drills were
encouraged; imitation had not yet been saddled with Romantic complaints; genres of rhetorical
composition were numerous.168 The Lansonian paradigm was perhaps more of a hyperpurification than an outright rejection of the pedagogic past.
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2.15 Practices of speaking: “talk like a book”
The Revolution, it is often said, marks a broad symbolic shift in French society from oral
to written culture; Republican ideology would be primarily secured via texts.169 Yet this did not
eradicate a remarkable holdout of orality: the professor’s oratorical performance in front of the
class. Coming “at the expense of other techniques of inculcation or assimilation,” modern
French education, according to Bourdieu and Passeron, gives a “well-nigh absolute” value to the
“oral transmission and the manipulation of words”; “transmission by literate word of mouth”
remains the sole “unconditional imperative” of the professor, clearly ranking above marking and
other duties of assessment.170 This special relation between oral and literary excellence in elite
French education, in sum, is the ability to “talk like a book,” as they put it. This relation, by
contemporary Anglophone standards, places great emphasis on oral, monological eloquence in a
high linguistic register, yielding discourses such as a leçon that are well suited to transcription,
seeming perhaps too artful to be extemporaneous. Though oral gaffes tend to be filtered out by
selective transcription, editing, and publishing before becoming printed gaffes, videos of French
intellectuals during lectures and interviews, less likely to be manipulated, tend to confirm their
living felicity with language.
Such abilities, doubtlessly the product of both nature and culture, arguably reach their
educational apex at the ENS for the structuralist generations. As Dianne Rubenstein remarks in
her political-literary study of the ENS:
The parallels between Jesuit book culture and the “culture liveresque” of the ENS are
striking. Between the Book and the book, between the interpretation of the written, sacred
texts and Lanson’s explication, between the meditation on the written word and its oral
instruction lies the ENS dual insistence on the written word (“something of permanence
and death”) and its spoken substitute: Scripta manent verba volant [inscriptions stay,
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spoken words fly away]. These two requisites are reconciled in the normalien pedagogy
which “strives to speak like a book.”171
As Rubenstein correctly observes, there is a parallel here to Jesuit culture, and likely more than a
parallel. The daily Jesuit praelectio in the rhetoric class entailed oral readings of written texts
which were, in the case of Cicero, originally speeches (and likely “touched up” as they became
texts).
The “well-nigh absolute” value given to the “oral transmission and the manipulation of
words,” identified by Bourdieu and Passerson in twentieth-century French education, keeps with
the priorities of the Ratio Studiorum of 1599. Over its long reign, it conserves the priority of the
spoken word in a society increasingly bewitched by “the coming of the book.”172 It describes the
class of rhetoric with an evident bias towards orality and reading aloud:
The scope of this class is not easily defined. Its purpose is the development of the power
of self-expression. Its content spans two major fields, oratory and poetry, with oratory
taking the place of honor. The purpose of the formation is both practical and cultural. It
may be said in general that this class is concerned mainly with the art of rhetoric, the
refinement of style, and erudition. Although the precepts may be studied in many authors,
the daily prelection shall be confined to the oratorical works of Cicero, to Aristotle’s
Rhetoric and, if desired, his Poetics. Cicero is to be the one model of style, though the
best historians and poets are to be sampled. All of Cicero’s works are appropriate models
of style, but only his orations are to be matter for the prelection, so that the principles of
his art may be observed as exemplified in his speeches.173
The great orator and “one model of style” was also author, it is sometimes forgotten, to some
rather ugly and immature texts, such as De Inventione, which are not pleasant to read, let alone to
read aloud. Fortunately, these would be avoided for prelections of, for instance, Cicero’s oration
on behalf of Archias, a textbook application of a classical five-part speech structure. Speeches
are spoken in the classroom; Jesuit pedagogy manifests an acute propriety of medium. Compared
to the other teaching orders—who would just as readily study Latin and Greek texts as objects—
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the Jesuits emphasized a spoken, living Latin whose point, more or less, was the linguistic
reincarnation of Cicero. Ultimately, an abated Latin orality continued in elite French education
deep into the nineteenth century, where it reached the reformers who despised such
“declamations,” and a newer emphasis on French oral excellence in the classroom and lecture
hall persisted until Bourdieu’s and Passerson’s critiques.

2.16 Conclusions
We have visited eight preliminary sites that span the elite pedagogical horizons of the
early-to-mid twentieth experience of rhetoric and its antecedents, especially in relation to the
khâgne and its transition to the ENS. What remains unvisited is regrettably immense: most of the
modern Sorbonne and provincial lycée, the largely segregated and inferior rhetorical education of
women before Weil and de Beauvoir, and indeed the experience of rhetoric for most of the
French population (perhaps more accurately, a non-experience of rhetoric). However, an
awareness of these gaps helps us realize something of vital importance in resolving the great
paradox: rhetoric did not decline uniformly across French society: it was nonsynchronous. As
Régis Debray puts it, “a pocket of memory” or “tribal reservation” links the nineteenth-century
khâgne teacher, through a line of disciples bound by institutional inertia, to a student of the
1960s.174 Elite pedagogy was a sheltered island.
The dearth of rhetoric textbooks in the early twentieth century suggests to many scholars
that rhetoric was of little use, value, or interest to the general public. This is true; meagre scraps
of rhetorical theory often could only be published under the aegis of a book on stylistics or
grammar.175 Yet some still required an integrated theory-practice of rhetoric: the students who
endeavored to pass grueling examinations in which rhetorical skill was a decisive factor, and the
teachers preparing them, whom had once been students in a milieu that was less hostile to
rhetoric.
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Since this preparation had been the mission of the khâgne from the outset, this institution
has been the most interesting and important inheritor of the old rhetoric in this discussion.
Though the class of rhétorique supérieure became première supérieure and infused itself with
Lansonian exercises and Republican ideology, this change has led to an exaggerated sense of
rhetoric’s death. The paradigm of explication felt “tyrannical” to so many students, overwhelmed
by the task of situating the text historically. Although the historical half of explication entailed
tediously situating text after text, its other half still contained a great deal of formalism.
Explication rebalanced the priorities of Jesuit praelectio, but it did not create its imperatives
from scratch.
Nor was the broader pedagogical program that the structuralists would experience born
ex nihilo. As Guiney has argued with a particular emphasis on the secular versus spiritual status
of literature—much more thoroughly historicized than my own rhetoric-focused account—we
should not take the arguments of the Third Republic reformers at face value. The “content of the
canon changed only superficially in the transition from the Catholic to the Republican school,”
and yet, “the discipline of literature provided the Republic with an ideal opportunity to claim
independence from the authoritarian, Church-based power structure whose legitimacy it sought
to replace.”176 The pedagogic shifts of the Third Republic—“from an exclusively Latindominated, rhetorical transmission of ‘literary’ values, to a Latin- and French-dominated,
attenuated rhetorical approach”—cannot be deemed revolutionary. As it turns out, the “death” of
rhetoric turns out to be a “rhetorical” stunt (in the dismissive sense of “rhetorical” that one
should almost never employ).
What could have been revolutionary—and I do not mean to make a positive or negative
judgement here—was a pedagogic rupture at certain earlier opportune junctures. A variety of
potential kairotic moments presented themselves in the previous chapter. For instance, between
the Jesuit suppression in France (1764) and the Bourbon restoration (1815), the First Republic
and First Empire could have conceivably rebuilt secondary education from scratch around more
Oratorian or Jansenist models, or even imports from Protestant countries. Perhaps the dominant
pedagogical ideology would have been a “humanism of judgement,” which Compayré attributes
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to the Jansenists, rather than a “humanism of form,” associated with the Jesuits. An innumerable
number of such contingent paths exist, all the way back to the sixteenth century’s pivotal
humanist encounters at the University of Paris, and the monumental pedagogic-religious-national
cleavages associated with Loyola, Ramus, and Sturm. Though these hypotheticals readily
devolve into intractable fantasies, they do suggest some general insights.
First, any origin story for the “hyphen of rhetoric” pervading French intellectualism
cannot possibly be a purely secular affair—or a scientific one, leaving out the rhetors themselves
in favour of their rhetorical knowledge. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
Weber incidentally notes that “Catholics prefer the sort of training which the humanistic
Gymnasium affords” over a more Protestant emphasis on technical-commercial learning, and,
although it would require a great deal more evidence, one could perhaps attempt something of a
Catholic Education and the Spirit of Rhetoric.177 Bourdieu and Passeron claim “The teaching of
the Jesuits should doubtless be seen as the source of most of the systematic differences which
distinguish the intellectual 'temperament' of the Catholic countries marked by its influence from
that of the Protestant countries.”178 We should prudently hedge the word “most” and say “many”
until we carefully weigh the legacy of Port-Royal, which formed a strange yet influential enclave
of intellectual separatism that confounds generalizations about a singular “French” temperament.
Had nineteenth-century education modeled itself more after Port-Royal than Louis-le-Grand, the
pedagogic preconditions leading to “French Theory” would seem impossible. Though this is a
mere fantasy of alternative history, we can be certain that the bond between (anti)rhetorical,
pedagogical, and religious attitudes radiates across the intellectual horizons of France.
This bond manifests in various national contrasts that have mostly been implicit in this
discussion, contrasts that perhaps should be exemplified. For instance, in the eighteenth century,
Hugh Blair already noted that the “principal field” of French eloquence was not the parliament
but the pulpit, being generally impressed with their éloquence de la chaire. In comparison to
Great Britain, thought Blair, “the style of their Orators is ornamented with bolder figures; and
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their discourse carried on with more amplification, more warmth and elevation.”179 Despite its
beauty, however, French discourse risked becoming “too diffuse, and deficient in that strength
and cogency which renders Eloquence powerful.” Blair claimed, “The French Preachers address
themselves chiefly to the imagination and the passions; the English, almost solely to the
understanding”; French homiletics leans towards the “florid” and “enthusiastic.”180 Though we
should avoid too much generalizing on a national basis, this polarity seemingly persists into the
Anglophone-Francophone encounters of the postwar era.
Second, we see that French rhetorical “temperament” should not be merely grasped as a
disposition or spirit. The competitive rhetoricism of French intellectual life, if it were purely an
élan or esprit, would not have survived without deep social and educational structures that
reproduced it. This rhetoricism flourishes within an environment of strenuous “gymnastic”
procedures to discipline the mind, an array of social hierarchies, distinctions, and incentives to
separate literary patrician from plebian, and a handful of elite schools that filtered students based
upon implicit argumentative and stylistic aptitudes in addition to more explicit academic criteria
(as well as social class, of course). Facing distinct events such as the Jesuit expulsion and broad
forces such as Republican ideology, various elements of this milieu found themselves repurposed
or renamed, mildly impeded or utterly thwarted. Yet on the other hand, an educational historian
would note that the legacies of the Ratio Studiorum, Louis-le-Grand, and other institutions
nourished this environment, and a sociologist might argue that the managerial class demanded by
industrial and postindustrial capitalism benefited from an eloquence that had once been firmly
aristocratic.
Tallying up all the tailwinds and headwinds for rhetoric remains messy, but we can be
sure that its remarkable tenacity in France owes less to a French comportment or set of
autonomous cultural attitudes and more to the structural, institutional remnants of a great
pedagogic empire. The inquiry into the precise causes for rhetoric’s decline and fall in Europe, a
question as difficult as the genesis of modernism, continues to occupy scholars. In France
specifically, however, we should perhaps go back a step and assess whether the battered and
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somewhat “nonsynchronous” institution of rhetoric, as it were, faked its own death in public so
that it could live on in private. An elite rhetorical culture partly decoupled itself from the
vagaries of its host society: whether the wayward eyes of the classroom fixed upon a portrait of
Napoleon or Pétain, they would invariably return to the requisite gymnastic exercises for
“learn[ing] to dominate language instead of being dominated by language,” as one khâgneux
described his experience.181
Third, although structuralism is an “idea,” the emergence of French structuralism, the
“return” of rhetoric in France, and indeed of the birth of “French theory,” cannot be reduced to
an intertextual grid or genetic chain of primary texts. Too many formative forces are hidden,
concealed in the arcane protocols of French education and adjacent literary and social traditions.
French structuralism needed Saussure—but it also needed thinkers ready, in their aptitudes and
values, for a cult of language (and sick of Terror, as we will see in the next chapter). Or consider,
as a speculative example, the great “hermeneutics of suspicion,” which Eve Sedgwick will later
understand as “paranoid reading.” The conventional view holds that Ricoeur’s trinity of Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud essentially taught suspicion via their texts. While many suspicious
imperatives can certainly be found therein, we must not forget about the existence of an entire
elite education system that fostered suspicious readings as a survival strategy of differentiation
within a brutally competitive field of examinations. Particularly after Lanson, students needed to
hone their skills of (all too) close reading: facing the usual “good” mark of 11/20 or 12/20, they
benefited from textual paranoias producing original interpretations for their explications de textes
(perhaps achieving a 15/20). Pursuing these pedagogic forces demands new methods of a
different kind than co-reading Nietzsche and Foucault to establish each citation, rapprochement,
or return to probe the origins of suspicion. But perhaps pedagogic inquiry might eventually tell
us something new about the postwar saga in which the great imperial power of America found its
humanistic intellectual sphere recolonized under the rhetorical legacy of the old “schoolmasters
of Europe.”
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Fourth, pedagogic analysis suggests that the hundreds of Anglophone reactions to French
rhetorical “grandeur,” “stylistic excess,” and “obscurity” in the 1970s and beyond all too often
imagined a deliberate intention to write extravagantly, to scheme and then execute textual
convolutions. In reality, one does not often think to oneself “this is right place for polyptoton!”
and then execute this figure (characteristic of Bourdieu: his prose strangles itself with figures of
repetition). As Bourdieu rightly puts it, “the limits of Saussurean objectivism are never more
clearly visible than in its inability to conceive of speech and more generally of practice other
than as execution, within a logic which, though it does not use the word, is that of the rule to be
applied.”182 Likewise, rhetoric as an art of rule-following and discrete choices readily becomes
an unhelpful conception. In an improvisational “feel for the game”—Bourdieu’s famous
metaphor for habitus— French intellectuals enacted a performative ritual flaunting a certain
rhetorical capital, whose value had been originally structured into the daily, monthly, and yearly
schedules of the Jesuit classroom. Instead of producing more moralistic tracts on the rhetorical
sins, mortal and venial, of French intellectuals, or celebrating writers as stylists and artists, under
the lens of an indulgent individualism, one might hope to study further the collective rhetorical
ideologies interspersed between hidden or poorly documented classroom practices and the wellknown texts the khâgneux and normaliens eventually produced. Perhaps Barthes wrote more
freely and eloquently than his peers partly because he was fortuitously barred from the khâgneENS machine and thus avoided its psychic and stylistic trauma, imbuing his art of writing with
more lyricism and empathy than most agrégés one can name.
Fifth and finally, we return to the great paradox of the outset. Rhetoric, according to
standard scholarly opinion, effectively dies—at debatable dates, for debatable reasons—near the
cusp of the twentieth century. On the other hand, those intellectuals rising through the French
school system after its purported death acquired and practiced a great deal of something that is
safe to call “rhetoric,” learning a reduced amount of theory while still developing French stylistic
aptitudes through version and other exercises. To hastily resolve this paradox, we could simply
say that the “practice” of rhetoric did not, as it turns out, need a substantial “theory” to sustain it.
But this is unsatisfying for many reasons. Modern students were in fact taught something that
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could be called “rhetorical theory” to prepare them for their relentless explications and
dissertations, even if this theory no longer bore its classical organization, and had a new
Republican impulse towards forming a national literature.
More importantly, however, the entire theory/practice distinction appears somewhat
untenable in light of the many continuities and mutations we have noted within the rhetorical
superstructure. Its institutions transmit customs and values that cannot be faithfully described as
either theories or practices: a cultish reverence for language, the relation between oral and
written excellence, the ideals of French Latinity, the hierarchies of social-rhetorical distinction,
and a rhetorical agonism that rewarded precocity. These must be reconciled with the widespread
suspicions that the institutions of rhetoric had, roughly speaking, been in decline after the French
classical age. Barthes aptly achieved balance in his suspicions that the old rhetoric “has taken
three centuries to die, and is not dead for sure even now.”183 Again and again, its critics ripped
out the surface manifestations of rhetoric, but like amateurs weeding a garden, did not tackle the
entire root system all at once.
Absolutely vital in resolving the paradox, I think, is realizing that a “total social fact”
cannot be eradicated by either simply purging its descriptions (rhetorical theory, its structure,
canons, etc.) or prescriptions (write in this way) when hierarchical social structures—designed
around perpetuating this social fact—persisted on the order of centuries. I do not mean to
suggest, however, that the institution of rhetoric is necessarily immortal: the American education
system, for instance, generally managed to construct itself at some remove from the pedagogical
juggernaut this chapter describes—a distance evident in methodology, ideology, organization,
geography, religious influence, and a language far less intimately connected to Rome.
Historical contingencies should inform us. Today one can go visit ruins of Port-Royaldes-Champs and ponder an alternative history of an intellectually Jansenist France or wonder
what might have happened to twentieth-century thought had the educational system more
fundamentally transformed itself after the Prussian invaders of 1870–1. But this kind of
pedagogic thinking is not popular; intellectual and literary history has been relentlessly analyzed
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with respect to national and conceptual categories such as “German Idealism” or “French
Theory.” Yet under the weighty influence of German philosophy and largely Parisian
educational institutions—as filtered through Anglophone tastes abroad—“French Theory” has
exceedingly little to do with the 98% of French territory outside the Île-de-France. We might as
well call French Theory something like Americanized Normalien Theory, the Latin Quarter’s
American Half, Rue d’Ulm Meets Yale’s Beinecke Plaza, or variations thereof.
These half-serious suggestions, however, have a more serious implication: modern
academics, in some sense, are all subjects of pedagogic empires that we scarcely understand, and
whose ideologies have yet to be captured by the most familiar categories. Despite the immense
critical power of French theory—in both its truly Parisian and Americanized senses—it largely
refused to see, or could not see, how it was in fact situated within and captured by a pedagogical
legacy inconsistent with its more egalitarian values (though exceptions to this naiveté have been
noted). Much more work is needed to historicize this colonization of thought and discover how
this ad hoc methodology for analyzing France might be revised for other nations under the
rhetorical influence of Athens and Rome. Though far from easy, this seems more intellectually
auspicious than perpetuating the dead-end discourse on rhetorical excess and necessity in the
realm of “theory,” an unpleasant passion of the 1990s from which I have spared the reader.
Though my purpose has not been overtly political, or to simply retrace Bourdieu’s
critiques, it is hard to ignore the deleterious effects of the resulting social-rhetorical
stratifications of the French system, which insinuates itself into even its very critics. As Perry
Anderson points out, “Even Bourdieu, whose work took as one of its leading targets just this
[khâgne and ENS] rhetorical tradition, could not escape his own version of its cadences.” The
pathways of escape remain difficult and scarce, as I have myself discovered. The remedy,
according to the philologist who shunned the great Greek “error,” consists in the pursuing the
“proof of sincerity”: the “absolute forgetfulness of form.”184 Today Renan’s imperative still
seems equally impossible and undesirable, just as it must have for the generations of Barthes and
Bourdieu, bound by their rhetorical fealties. There is still a certain freedom: one can cut a deal
between the personable realm of the individual—rationalized by an ethic or an aesthetic—and, to
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put it euphemistically, the faceless “rules of the game.” But it seems to me that the truer
freedom—the freedom to not make this compromised deal—remains as elusive today as it
always was.
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3

Paulhan, Sartre, and the Terror in Letters

“Évariste Gamelin was to begin duty on September 14th [1793]. ... Prisons were overflowing; the
public prosecutor was working eighteen hours a day. Faced with routed armies and revolt in the
provinces, faced with conspiracies, plots, and treasons, the Convention gave its reply: terror. The
Gods were thirsty.”—Anatole France, Les dieux ont soif1

3.1

Introduction

The weak survival of French rhetoric as a total institution features a specifically aesthetic
and literary dimension vibrant and perplexing enough to merit a dedicated investigation. Two
figures at the heart of twentieth-century French letters, Jean Paulhan and Jean-Paul Sartre,
struggled with the rising terreur dans les lettres: a revolutionary and quasi-romantic force, a
neurotic urge to get “beyond words,” and an aesthetic contempt of cliché, reaching its climax
between the wars.2 This “terrorist” force, for Paulhan, represents rhetoric’s true enemy, and he
essentialized Rhetoric and Terror into a sophisticated binary which governs his thought (and it
will take much more effort to properly introduce). The Rhetorician, roughly speaking, believes in
the power and dignity of words; the Terrorist, on the other hand, despises words (a “misologist”
as Paulhan says, against the logos). Paulhan claims, however, that Terror will never be able to
fully triumph over Rhetoric, nor Rhetoric over Terror, because they are liable to turn into each
other at their extremes in a dramatic paradox: thus Paulhan becomes a thinker of rhetoric’s weak
survival (or in his specific terms, how one is stuck between running away from or going after
language).3 Launched into print by Paulhan’s patronage at the NRF, Sartre sometimes agreed
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My trans. Anatole France, Les dieux ont soif (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1912), 122.
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Paulhan speaks of letters rather than literature for good reason: the term lettres amalgamates literary criticism,
literature, and generally philosophical or literary discourses together, a broader terrain over which Terror and
Rhetoric operate.
3

“Run away from language and it will come after you. Go after language and it will run away from you.” Jean
Paulhan, The Flowers of Tarbes, or, Terror in Literature, ed. and trans. Michael Syrotinski (Urbana, IL University
of Illinois Press, 2006), 82.
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with the old critic about Rhetoric and Terror, but later broke away in a series of curious
disagreements which we will soon encounter.
In addition to the primary task of illuminating rhetoric’s weak survival, I hope to
rebalance these two figures: not by belittling Sartre, but by bringing Paulhan into the spotlight he
so often avoided. Massively interconnected within the French intellectual scene and yet a
minuscule figure in terms of his Anglophone reception, this enigmatic critic finds himself so
often termed the “grey eminence” of French letters.4 This is common ritual. Yet one could
proffer a much rarer argument that Paulhan represents the older, untimely, and rhetorical shadow
of the younger, timely, and historical Sartre, the radiant eminence of French letters in the years
before structuralism occluded him.
Whereas Paulhan ultimately failed to persuade contemporary critics—especially Sartre—
to join a rhetorical-linguistic paradigm, Barthes succeeded two decades later, inviting us to ask
why.5 Paulhan and Barthes shared a vocational position outside of literary history and universitybased scholarship.6 Yet whereas Barthes will seek to demystify literature circa Criticism and
Truth, Paulhan had in fact mystified literature decades prior (but in a rather different manner than
what Barthes ultimately targeted). This mystification presents itself in Paulhan’s masterpiece The
Flowers of Tarbes, or Terror in Literature [Lettres] (published in 1941 but conceived much
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Paulhan’s zeal for correspondence and his massive epistolary network became renowned and indispensable for the
NRF. He spanned from Wallace Stevens and T.S. Eliot to dozens of major and minor figures of French letters. But
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French Theory, trans. Jeff Fort (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
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(London: Routledge, 1998), 252-53.
6

Michael Syrotinski, Defying Gravity: Jean Paulhan's Interventions in Twentieth-Century French Intellectual
History (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 11.
124

earlier).7 No tidy Saussurean signs can be found here, no scientific union of signifier and
signified. Instead, we encounter what Paulhan calls “a strange kind of telescoping or joining
together of two foreign and irreconcilable bodies,” the anatomy of “sirens or the minotaur.”8 The
Paulhanian proto-sign joins together “word” and “thought” in a volatile relation which constantly
threatens to reverse the priority of one “body” over the other. This idiosyncrasy, one of many,
isolated Paulhan from appropriation even though he sits in the middle of French letters—and in
the middle of Max Ernst’s Surrealist painting “Au rendez-vous des amis” (1922), where he is one
of the first figures to hold our gaze.
Though it will take until the final chapters to fully assess the differences between
Barthes’ and Paulhan’s marketing of rhetoric, many hints emerge here. The Rhetoric-Terror
dynamic constructs itself around Paulhan’s personal insistence upon an aesthetic tolerance for
paradox, rather confusing dialectical reversals, and a faith in “word magic.” Reading The
Flowers of Tarbes is akin to deciphering the inscriptions of the right hand moments before the
left hand erases them. Moreover, Paulhan refuses to make scientific appeals to linguists—for he
largely distrusted them—and he lacked the support of jubilant structuralist contemporaries, a
comradery which Barthes will enjoy (as writer and teacher). Indeed, Barthes will more often ride
with intellectual currents, whereas Paulhan will resist them. But this is not the resistance of a
pure contrarian. Rather, Paulhan tried to hold onto multiple contrary ideas at once, an “editorial”
reconciliation and suspension of final judgement, a skill that he indeed practiced regularly at the
NRF.

3.2

The struggle between Terror and Rhetoric

The struggle between Terror and its dialectical partner Rhetoric characterizes interwar
literature for both Paulhan and Sartre: a battle, in essence, between “Terrorists” and
“Rhetoricians.” Yet these cannot be regarded as exclusive, reified tribes: sometimes it makes
more sense to think of a Terrorist or Rhetorician state of mind that oscillates instead of a long7

The title and some of the key ideas for The Flowers of Tarbes date to the mid-1920s; a shorter version was
published in the NRF in 1936. I quote from the 1941 version as translated by Michael Syrotinski (the English
publication does not include all the appended material of the original).
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term vocation; writers certainly changed commitments. Still, Paulhan devised arguably the best
way of sorting out literary attitudes towards language between the wars, including those of
Georges Bataille, André Breton, Maurice Blanchot, Albert Camus, Paul Éluard, Jean Genet,
André Gide, Michel Leiris, Brice Parain, Francis Ponge, Raymond Roussel, and Paul Valéry.
Rather than balancing these names, however, I will highlight Sartre’s response to Paulhan, who
fundamentally allied himself with Rhetoric, but not as an extreme partisan. Rather, Paulhan takes
the arguments of Terror quite seriously—and demonstrates he can perform them—but settles
upon a kind of self-conscious and moderate rhetorical entity he calls “Maintenance.” Sartre, on
the other hand, claimed to move beyond the Rhetoric-Terror continuum entirely.
The usual story of the arrival of structuralism, a kind of rapid Saussurean revolution that
dethroned phenomenology and toppled Sartre, gives the acrimonious Rhetoric-Terror dialectic
little to no consideration. But as this chapter will argue, the violent oscillations between Rhetoric
and Terror in the interwar period tell us something crucial about intellectual attitudes towards
language: a reasonably large faction felt exhausted by the exhortation to go “beyond words,” to
get away from “mere words”: not much remained that could be further terrorized. This
exhaustion facilitated a new receptivity to a variety of more logophilic literary and theoretical
paradigms, some more explicitly neo-classical, and others, like rhe-structuralism, that were
avowedly more radical.
Even in accounts of structuralism as thorough as François Dosse’s, Paulhan and the felt
menace of Terror—recognized by almost every interwar writer of note—remains missing. In the
1960s there will be a kind of détente between Rhetoric and Terror as structuralism vindicates
Rhetoric as intellectual paradigm while maintaining rather Terrorist literary tastes. As we will
see, Paulhan obsessed over “signs” just as much as any structuralist: not signs in Saussure’s
signifier-signified sense, but a pairing of what Paulhan calls “word” and “thought” in an arbitrary
relationship. Unlike the true adherents of Saussure, however, Paulhan will dizzyingly switch
back and forth between two orientations towards language: the word-based Rhetoric and
thought-based Terror.
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3.3

Relations between Sartre and Paulhan
In 1938, Paulhan gave Sartre a salary, a monthly NRF column with literary autonomy,

and significant promotion; Paulhan writes to Gide: “Have you read Sartre’s The Wall? He is
going to become somebody.”9 Paulhan was of course right. Their relationship began in the late
1930s with a “deferential, courteous, and grateful” Sartre who would become increasingly
intransigent, and soon shatter the vocational classifications known to Paulhan’s older generation:
this suspicious “objet Sartre” appeared sui generis.10 During the early years of the Sartre-Paulhan
relationship their thinking about language had not yet radically fissured, and Sartre appreciated
Paulhan’s introspective approach to the “power of words,” an approach that perhaps reveals a
“magical” rather than “conceptual” sense of words.11
In 1945 Sartre founded Les Temps Modernes, financed by Gallimard, with Paulhan on the
editorial board. The premiere issue’s feature piece—Sartre’s “The Nationalization of
Literature”—references an interwar swing from terrorism to rhetoric. Overall, however, Les
Temps Modernes will be anything but Paulhanian, and he does not last long on the board. Sartre
will attempt to make the Terror-Rhetoric dynamic merely a feature of a certain historical period
rather than an integral basis of literature itself as Paulhan wanted. And while Sartre gained
international renown as philosopher, novelist, and activist, eclipsing his old impresario, Paulhan
remained at the NRF while producing criticism, playful yet discrete as always, until his death in
1968.
Given Sartre’s and Paulhan’s publishing powers, their professional relationship, and their
often-opposing orientations towards language, literature, and especially rhetoric, they form a pair
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Quoted in Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, 122.
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“My dear sir and friend, I have just finished reading your letter on the power of Words, and I agree with you
entirely. … Your own words seemed to imply a challenge: show me somebody who, at the very moment he is
speaking, can say ‘I am sensitive to the power of words.’ At this point you are no longer dealing with the question
sociologically … but rather psychologically: you are appealing to introspection. And if this is the case, I can
certainly answer that I am that rara avis (not so are after all). I am sensitive to something in words that is not their
conceptual sense but rather what I could call their magical sense.” Letter from Sartre to Paulhan, 1938. Quoted in
Cohen-Solal, Sartre: A Life, 123.
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as natural as Sartre-de Beauvoir or Sartre-Aron, though far less intimate.12 As Sartre wrote to de
Beauvoir, Paulhan is a “guy who thinks about language. … That’s [his] business. You know the
old stuff: dialectics is merely logodisputation, because you can never exhaust the meaning of
words.”13 On the other hand, Paulhan eventually wrote a piece called “Jean-Paul Sartre is not on
good terms with words,” and argued precisely that. Despite such tensions, Sartre’s critical essays
borrowed heavily from Paulhan when it came to understanding literary Terrorism, for Paulhan
had marked the interwar scene as both a tastemaker and theorist of its literary dysfunctions.

3.4

Editors and self-fulfilling prophesies
Paulhan’s role at the NRF and Sartre’s role at Les Temps Modernes present two faces of

the same perplexing problem. Rather than practicing a literary-linguistic augury that would
simply describe and predict attitudes—aligned with Rhetoric, Terror, History, or otherwise—
they themselves influenced the range, intensity, and balance of opinion: it was easy to put one’s
editorial thumb on the scale. Paulhan’s case reveals much. Though Terrorist tendencies greatly
predate this “prophet” of the Rhetoric-Terror struggle, his role cannot be bracketed out after he
took charge of the NRF in April 1925, following Jacques Rivière’s death. This newly minted
editor did not want to alarm the readership by suddenly shifting directions, but his decisions
could not avoid being somewhat personal.14 He maintained a novelistic focus but nonetheless
published Surrealist poetry and, in general, a balance of classical and radical tastes in the NRF,
which would seek its own form of literary autonomy.
The NRF relations with the Surrealists had never been placid, and in 1927, a certain
“Jean Guérin” caused a kerfuffle. Guérin, an alias for the whole comité de direction (but
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Their relationship sometimes seems calculating on both sides. Sartre speaks of Paulhan’s “Machiavellian political
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primarily Paulhan), accused the Surrealists of hypocritically expressing their contempt of
literature through literature: if words are so bad, why not shut up? Tempers flared, Breton
dispatched a Rabelaisian retort to Paulhan, who then summoned Breton to a duel (but Breton
failed to show up: perhaps a duel did not meet his famous Surrealist criteria of shooting
randomly in the street).15 Paulhan’s own situated experiences do not, unsurprisingly, show up in
Flowers. He gave one of his articles for Sartre’s Les Temps Modernes the apt title of “Rhetoric
Was A Secret Society,” a secrecy that still lingers over his eminently rhetorical body of work.
Though Sartre will ultimately be more transparent than the old éminence grise, both raise the
question of where the editorial role ends and theoretical prognostication begins.

3.5

Paulhan’s meagre reception

Even if Paulhan preferred to operate behind the scenes, how could the 1960s linguistic
thinkers have been so oblivious to him? Paulhan’s name adorned the mighty NRF for more than
a third of the twentieth century. He had performed quasi-Saussurean analyses of etymology and
other linguistic ruses, penned arguably the greatest interwar work of literary criticism, and
modeled a way of liberating literature from Lansonism. Paulhan wrote an influential preface to
Sade’s Justine, and would challenge and inspire Anne Desclos, his lover, to write a novel more
“sadistic” than Sade: The Story of O (under the nom de plume of Pauline Réage). Paulhan fought
to get it published and knew many literary “extremists” personally or professionally, often
getting them into print. Yet still, after all of this, the structuralists preferred the younger
Blanchot—who was in fact a devoted reader of Paulhan and praised his central Rhetoric-Terror
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Breton sent Paulhan this likely drunken (and certainly less than delicate) note: “Putrefaction, swine, French
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paradox as a literary Copernican revolution,16 a paradox formative for Sartre too (though we will
see him resist it).
Given that various declines and remnants of rhetoric, and vacancies and fissures left by
rhetoric, ground the oeuvres of both Paulhan and Barthes, their minimal relationship is surprising
(or perhaps expected: some thinkers refuse to comment on things “too close to home”).
Supposedly, Barthes had not yet read Paulhan by the mid-1950s,17 and he sought to address more
obviously Sartrean questions in the Writing Degree Zero (though we will see it has one
Paulhanian chapter). In 1955, Barthes had a minor political scuffle with Paulhan (qua Jean
Guérin).18 They exchanged some letters—Paulhan wanted to win over Barthes to NRFGallimard—but not much more. What they will do with “rhetoric” differs dramatically: roughly
speaking, Paulhan deploys the capitalized term as a somewhat esoteric polarity and institution of
literature and discourse, centered around literary invention, originality, and banality, whereas
Barthes uses it to name a total, intricately structured institution that can be productively studied
vis-à-vis structuralism. In both, however, we will perceive a fundamental ambiguity about the
historical status of rhetoric upon which many of their notions perch. Both were conversant with
the Terrorist idiom, but fundamentally preferred Rhetoric in Paulhan’s sense. This takes the form
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Blanchot writes extensively of Paulhan in “How is Literature Possible?” (1941) and in “Mystery in Literature”
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of an attitudinal affinity towards successful, amorous communication in Barthes, and a conscious
comfort with cliché in Paulhan.
Despite these affinities, the impact of Paulhan’s esoteric thought proved minor compared
to Saussure and other linguists. Genette and Todorov could develop Valéry’s poetics into
structural poetics19 far more readily than they could adopt Paulhan’s cryptic and less patently
useful notions regarding literary invention, commonplaces, and inevitable misunderstandings
between reader and writer. Todorov once approvingly quoted Paulhan’s decree that “every
literary work is essentially a machine—a monument, if one prefers—of language,” but such
references are extremely rare.20 Paulhan’s quasi-mystical dialectics make him more of a Walter
Benjamin than a Barthes or a Foucault.21 A critic who ends his masterpiece with the phrase “let’s
just say I have said nothing,” as Paulhan does in The Flowers of Tarbes, is not the type to incite a
critical revolution.
Aside from his humility, eccentricity, and critical mysticism that resists easy application,
Paulhan’s obscurity emanates in large part from bad timing: he developed his central dialectic of
Rhetoric and Terror, so invested in the status of language, before Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, and their
contemporaries turned linguistics into a practically obligatory point of reference. He gained a
head start as the son of the philosopher, psychologist, and linguist Frédéric Paulhan, who was
interested in the suggestive, non-representational aspects of language.22 Teaching in Madagascar,
the younger Paulhan devoted himself to the Malagasy language and its poetry, fostering his
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whimsy and suspicion that French letters suffered from a unique dysfunction: an agonizing rift
between revolutionary Terrorists and counter-revolutionary Rhetoricians. Absent from Malagasy
poetics, this rift, as Paulhan discovered, is not universal among all cultures.23 And although
terreur seemingly translates to terror, the term cannot be semantically and symbolically
extricated from the French revolution and its reception, nor can terroriste be purged of its
specifically French pejorative and historical connotations.

3.6

Extending Paulhan’s dialectic: 1960s implications
As scholars inevitably mention, Paulhan runs theoretically and ideologically askew to

any given school or genre (despite, paradoxically, participating in various circles through the
NRF). Though indebted to the readings of Michael Syrontinksi, Anna-Louise Milne, and Michel
Beaujour, I differ from the standard treatment of Paulhan as “theorist” in emphasizing his quasiHegelian dialectic that plays out over history rather than a single literary moment (since the
primary goal is illuminating rhetoric’s weak survival). For my purposes, he is not a protodeconstructive puzzle to be perfectly reconciled with 1960s theory, but a thinker of rhetorical
attitudes and anxieties.
The Rhetoric-Terror dynamic narrates, and in some sense predicts, how discourse swings
back and forth between an infatuation with the power of words at one extreme, and a contempt
for “mere words” at the other. Paulhan’s decree from Flowers, later taken up by Blanchot,
evokes these oscillations: “Run away from language and it will come after you. Go after
language and it will run away from you.”24 Applying this to history, we might begin in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the conquest of rhetoric had yet to meet any Terror
which might oppose it, as Marc Fumaroli noted in his inaugural College de France lecture (itself
a lurch towards Rhetoric).25 The long nineteenth century, on the other hand, clearly succumbed
to Terror, finally reaching what Fumaroli calls “the cutting edge [fine pointe] of anti-rhetorical
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modernity”: surrealism.26 Terror had gone through “a thousand irrational marriages” in the
nineteenth century according to Sartre, and “finally bursts forth shortly before the First World
War.”27 If the Rhetoric-Terror dynamic is taken seriously, defining the modernity of literature as
a post-rhetorical state no longer makes sense, because—if we believe Paulhan—Rhetoric can
never be entirely purged and is liable to swing back into prominence.
This dialectic, we might say, represents the twin of Ricoeur’s: “the great debate that, over
the course of centuries, never stopped alternating between giving the sign priority over meaning,
and meaning priority over the sign.”28 Rhe-structuralism would mark, for a time, the apogee of
sign and figure. Though the linguistic paradigm would succumb to various forces—the famous
1968 slogan, les structures ne défilent pas dans la rue, would seem to be strikingly Terrorist—it
cannot ever be entirely eradicated if Paulhan is taken seriously. Rather than advocating for
“Paulhanian” criticism, I am highlighting a certain Paulhanian inevitability, an attitudinal flux
regarding the “power of words,” which has in fact continued since structuralism became passé.

3.7

The reception of the Terror

The Terror of 1793-4, one of the most controversial events in the entire history of Europe,
represents the very prototype of a sublime break or rupture,29 and thus will always be associated
with radicalism and the question of excess, relentlessly revisited, debated, and connected to later
events. Though the reception of the Terror in history, philosophy, and literature deserves its own
26
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133

encyclopedia, we might visit a few highlights. Moving against the grain of condemning the
Terror outright, historian Sophie Wahnich’s recent In Defense of the Terror responds to François
Furet’s infamous argument that the Terror in some sense yielded the gulag,30 as well as the
countless and less hyperbolic condemnations of its seemingly wanton killings. Out of all Terror’s
interpreters, however, Hegel is the one we must not leave out, for his understanding of the Terror
proved equally influential and incendiary. And for good reason: as Charles Taylor’s exegesis
bluntly puts it, “the aspiration to absolute freedom engenders the Terror.”31
Hegel implicitly compared the sheer meaninglessness of guillotine’s action to the
cleaving of a cabbage (Durchhauen eines Kohlhaupts), an act since inscribed with a great deal of
meaning.32 Hegel’s sense of the Terror, in which all individual particularity is vanquished,
certainly underlies Blanchot’s curious claim that “when the blade falls on Saint-Just and
Robespierre, in a sense it executes no one.”33 Indeed, as Taylor explains, “the drive to absolute
freedom ends in the contradictions of the terror, a kind of destructive fury which destroys the
individual it came to liberate.”34
Hegel’s French reception further stretched Terror’s philosophical and ethical proportions
in the 1940s under Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite, which is to say nothing of the
emerging comparisons between terrors in France and the Soviet Union. Even more perils and
peculiarities, hermeneutic and historiographic, would accumulate after Paulhan died in 1968,
30
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estranging him from Anglophone audiences reticent to engage the concept’s enormous reception
history; few things are so formidably French as Terreur (one must forget all Americanizations of
the term). As Wahnich reflects (after 9/11): “‘The abyss of the Terror’ is never completely
closed,” for this “unlikely encounter between the political and sacred” will never fail to provoke
and perturb us.35 This abyss seems to have swallowed Paulhan’s thought.

3.8

Terror in the entirety of les lettres

The affective weight of Terror evidently suggests caution. When transposed into the
realm of letters, however, no other term so explicitly captures the anti-rhetoric climate between
the wars, overrun by “Terrorist” destruction and gripped by a great logomachy that had mounted
over the long nineteenth century. Paulhan charted a proto-structuralist struggle between the
signifiers of Rhetoric and the signifieds of Terror, subject to the synchronic rules of literary
production. And as we will see, Paulhan represents a vital and effectively missing piece of
structuralist pre-history; The Flowers of Tarbes, though studied less than Sartre’s What Is
Literature?, better anticipated the structuralist milieu.
By examining Paulhan’s dialectic of Rhetoric and Terror as a historical instrument, one
finds the inevitability of the coming mania for language, a “mirage linguistique” for Thomas
Pavel, a “prison-house” for Fredric Jameson, a “denial of history” for Sartre: Terrorists between
the wars had exhausted themselves in conquering the Rhetoricians and had more or less run out
of victims, opening the possibility of a linguistic revanchism and new mania for “words” over
“things.” And one also finds in Paulhan’s dialectic the inevitability of this mania’s collapse: the
very extremes of Rhetoric, Paulhan suggests, contain within them the seeds of a new Terror.
The standard story of phenomenology yielding to structuralism, though not wrong, has a
disciplinary bias towards purely philosophical thought. Terror, on the other hand, concerns an
attitude towards language that can be found across the intellectual landscape—including
literature, criticism, pedagogy, politics, psychology, visual art, and even everyday discourse—
making it a more interesting and powerful category than a tidy and principled “school of
thought.” Part doctrine and part disposition, Terror transcended disciplinary boundaries. For
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instance, Foucault identified an effectively Terrorist “network,” centered around Breton, “the
spreader and the gatherer of all this agitation in modern experience,” linking “Bataille, Leiris,
and Blanchot, and extending through the domains of ethnology, art history, the history of
religions, linguistics, and psychoanalysis, … effacing the rubrics in which our culture classified
itself.”36 Although postwar rhe-structuralism would become far more scientific than the interwar
Terror, both tended to spill over their confines into a variety of language-heavy domains.
How does one define the Terrorist, and who were they in actual practice? The easiest (but
somewhat incomplete) way of defining the Terrorist, for Paulhan, is as a “misologist,”37
someone seeking to eradicate all clichés and liberate the writer from language and tradition in
hopes of accessing the raw materials to which language refers. On the other hand, the
Rhetorician deploys templates and toolkits, stock phrases and well-worn patterns, happily
dwelling within the world of words. Between the wars, the Rhetoricians (or the Maintainers, as
Paulhan terms the wiser ones) were outnumbered by the Terrorists. Though not an exhaustive
feature, misology arguably ran rampant among them. For instance, Bataille shares a “hatred” of
language, according to Sartre, “with a great many contemporary writers.”38 The most interesting
figure who flirted with Terror, however, was undoubtedly Sartre himself, condemning it as he
sometimes fell into it, at least in Paulhan’s view.
The epitome of Terror, for Paulhan, was Surrealism, a movement that he and Sartre both
promoted and criticized at various times.39 What makes the Surrealist a Terrorist? The literarylinguistic dimension of Surrealism aspires towards a violent triumph over mediation. Rather than
being a “poetic form,” the declaration of 1925 claims that Surrealism constitutes “a cry of the
mind turning back on itself, and it is determined to break apart its fetters, even if it must be by
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material hammers!”40 The poet of Surrealism will take on “the responsibility for the reception
and transmission of signals which press upon him from the depths of souls,” at last overcoming
“the depressing notion of the irreparable divorce of action and dream.”41 How was this vision to
be put into practice? As Breton declares in his “Second Manifesto of Surrealism” (1930), the
movement must set loose “hordes of words”— often produced by automatic writing—into “the
silly little towns and cities of literature” to revitalize them since “the logical mechanism of the
sentence alone reveals itself to be increasingly powerless to provoke the emotive shock in man
which really makes his life meaningful.”42 Rarely referring to terror explicitly, Breton clearly
seeks out shock tactics for literature—the more extreme, the better. Perhaps the greatest Terrorist
document remains Éluard and Breton’s “Notes sur la poésie,” which takes Valéry’s poetic
aphorisms and negates them in the most violent, bizarre, or playful way possible. Valéry writes:
“Thoughts and emotions, totally naked, are as weak as naked men. Thus one must clothe them.”
Éluard and Breton retort: “Thoughts and emotions, totally naked, are as strong as naked women.
Thus one must unclothe them.”43 Éluard and Breton’s Terror retaliates against Valéry’s Rhetoric.
Just as the historic Terror ultimately ended, various literary Terrorists eventually burned
out or recanted. The most extreme Terrorists risk acquiring the very psycho-linguistic disease or
logomania they attempt to cure, plagued by the order of words that they so want to escape: “the
terroristic exclusion of the flowers of rhetoric … may become an obsession that can turn into
neurosis.”44 Robespierrean purity may well devolve into paranoia. The lexicon of Terror is often
that of anguish, torture, and excess; its practitioners had successfully neutralized the word
rhetoric to the point where it no longer aroused fear. For this, Paulhan claims, “The blame does
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not lie with us, but with Terror alone, and with how disreputable it has made the thing (so that
rhetoric is no longer taught in the classroom), and the word (so that it has become synonymous
with verbose and bombastic).”45 As we will see, however, both Terror and Rhetoric will
inevitably fail to conquer or neutralize one another in their entirety.

3.9

Terror as transcendent

Since Terror concerns an attitude towards language, it has little need to differentiate
between literature, criticism, and philosophy. Though “the great event of literature” emerges in
dynamics of Rhetoric and Terror, “the history of literature is not the only interested party.”46
Paulhan treats philosophy more rarely than literature, but he is very explicit about Henri
Bergson, in whose work “Terror finds its own philosopher”; “The facts, Bergson and the
Terrorists say, are there for all to see.”47 Paulhan was skeptical of the (language-based) praise
Bergson often received for having “gone beyond language.”48 Nothing could be “more alien and
more hostile to literature, or more liable to reduce it to a pile of quivering and neglected
words.”49 Whereas Paulhan identifies Sainte-Beuve as Terror’s “artistic director” and points at
other literary and critical “disciples” and “grand inquisitors” of Terror, Bergson represents “the
metaphysician who would provide its demonstration, but at the same time aggravate and
accelerate it.”50 Bergson gets caught up in the “illusion of verbalism, or of great words,”
thinking that we are more inclined to eat the great French delicacy, the ortolan, thanks to the
“flattering tint” of its name.51 Yet this sort of neo-Cratylism was not Paulhan’s only grievance:
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the philosopher had upheld thought as “fixed, shared, [and] abstract,” relegating language to the
“fugitive, personal, [and] unique.”52 Though Paulhan did not want to simply reverse this
opposition and trivialize thought, the thought/language barrier would find itself relentlessly
assailed. Paulhan happily bombarded this barrier from both sides, embedding himself with both
belligerents to acquire their best armaments.
The borders of Rhetoric and Terror, sometimes traversed by a writer surrendering to the
other side, seemingly structured the debates of French letters between the wars. Paulhan probed
these divisions relentlessly, prompting Sartre to deploy a surprising number of explicit RhetoricTerror arguments. Though Sartre, as we will see, tried to distance himself from the Terrorists, his
relentless minimization of language meant he at least remained in their orbit, and he arguably
covered up his Terrorist tendencies better than anyone (though he speaks extensively of
revolutionary Terror in Critique of Dialectical Reason).
On the other hand, Paulhan considered Paul Valéry, Julien Benda, and Alain to be in the
camp of Rhetoric. One should add Gide and Paulhan himself to this list (Valéry and Gide will
become early Barthes fixations).53 Paulhan explains in a letter that the rhetorical (and neoclassical) camp attracted three essential criticisms over the past 150 years, and he associates each
with a contemporary apologist:
1. Faux. Valéry: “The écrivain is always a forger”54
2. Abstrait. Benda, eg. Essai d'un discours cohérent sur les rapports de Dieu et du
monde
3. Banal. Alain: “the most banal being, if one sublates its [etymological] origins,
becomes the most astonishing”55
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As we will later see, Paulhan does not urge the Rhetoricians to refute these three accusations.
Rather, he encourages them to absorb, tolerate, or even embrace them, soothing the neurotic
element of the internecine conflict.
In French letters, Terror never vanquished Rhetoric—for Paulhan, neither side can ever
fully triumph—but it did leave a legacy. In the 1960s and beyond, we will see Tel Quel’s literary
tastes tilt towards the earlier Terrorists, whereas Barthes, especially in his early work, preferred
the quasi-classicism of Gide and Valéry. Though the logical workings of The Flowers of Tarbes
will be elaborated later, these personages exemplify, for now, the central concept of his
sometimes-baffling book, a concept that might seem pointless until we appreciate the extreme
threats (along with certain truths and insights) that Paulhan perceived in the accelerating Terror.
When “mastery and perfection” have been reduced to “artificiality and empty convention,”
Paulhan believes there are “no dangers that are more insidious, nor any curses crueler”: in
Terror, “even literature signif[ies] above all what one must not do.”56 These questions of
whether one should “do literature”—or for Blanchot, “how is literature possible?”—or for Sartre,
“what is literature?”—encircled each other in an epochal debate for French letters.
Even if a total triumph of Terror remains a logical contradiction, its provocations
succeeded brilliantly. Terrorist publications nettled and incited debates over the constitution of
literature among Paulhan, Blanchot, Sartre, and their contemporaries. For Sartre specifically,
Terror allies itself with an obsession with silence, which he perceives in Camus’ The Outsider.57
In “Introducing Les Temps modernes,” an annoyed Sartre wryly noted that “Hachette used to
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distribute capsules of silence, in the form of voluminous novels, to many a railroad station
bookstore.” His new journal, of course, would not seek to publish “capsules of silence.” This
quasi-paradox—Sartre terms it “voluble silence”—was most vexing, this belief that “the secret
aim of all literature [is] the destruction of all language.” Stoked by a “mighty metaphysical
pride” in the years after WWI, the Surrealists had propelled the problem to its climax.58 But the
insular struggles in literature would be ripped open by history: “what did surrealist destruction,
which leaves everything in place, matter to us, when a destruction by sword and fire threatened
everything, surrealism included?”59 Sartre never converted Paulhan to this new way of thinking.

3.10 The problem with linguists
To worry about language was often to whinge about linguists—at least before
structuralism lionized them—and both Sartre and Paulhan complained in their own ways. “The
linguist,” griped Sartre, “studies language when no one is speaking it,” as if “the words are
thrown on the table like dead fish, already killed and cooked.”60 How then, in a few short years,
could linguists arrive as a prophets, architects, or heroes of structuralism after being disparaged
by the star of French intellectualism? Rather than emanating almost purely from linguisticscientific discoveries, as many histories suggest, French intellectualism thoroughly
overdetermined its wager on language, and Paulhan put quite a few chips on the table as both
critic and editorial tastemaker, betting against Sartre and the Terrorists more radical than him.
Though Paulhan would complain about “the linguists at fault” and the contradictions between
Saussure and Bally around the “still shaky” realm of stylistics, he nonetheless created an ad hoc
linguistic-rhetorical criticism often unknown to Anglophone scholars, founded in the arbitrary
(yet deeply mysterious) relations between “word” and “thought.”61
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Paulhan sought something linguistic that linguists did not as of yet seem to offer him. He
initiated, but never finished, a doctoral project under Antoine Meillet, arguably the greatest
French linguist at the time.62 In particular, Paulhan did not like the “idea of meaning” that was in
vogue:
These linguists [Meillet and Bréal] have an idea of meaning that is too simple and, in
some way, too unilateral. This meaning seems to them to be a natural property of the
word, whereas it is an invention—and sometimes one that has to be slowly and painfully
executed—made on each side with their own resources by the speaker and the spokento.63
Paulhan’s refusals of various linguistic theories preclude him from being a proper or dogmatic
structuralist; as Milne points out, “Paulhan worked from within quite different epistemological
parameters from those generally perceived to have been inaugurated in French critical thinking
by Saussure.”64 Yet as we will see, Paulhan prizes the strictly linguistic quality of literature as
much as any structuralist, and certainly makes various quasi-structuralist moves.

3.11 Paulhan’s literary “science” and the critique of etymology
“My whole point,” Paulhan explains, is “sketching out, as the basis of literature, a system
of knowledge that would be precise and rigorous, in short scientific.”65 Though he did develop
quasi-mathematical literary formulas, he failed to write a true “scientific treatise” of literature.
His linguistic thought, however, could be rightly called more scientific than some of its rivals,
particularly the literary etymology that was often in vogue in French letters.
Long ago, Saussure had banished etymology to the margins of the Course in General
Linguistics as a mere ad hoc “trac[ing] back” of words, harnessing “phonetics, morphology,
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semantics etc. as the need arises” without interrogating “the nature of the processes it is obliged
to engage in.”66 Saussurean thought had not yet shaken up literary studies when Paulhan’s Alain,
or Proof by Etymology (1951) criticized the “scientific” failures and “rhetorical” successes of
etymology. Paulhan concerns himself with (his of version of) the arbitrariness of the “sign,”
yielding one of his most compelling, original, and quasi-structuralist texts.
Paulhan analyzes etymological “proof,” taking Alain and other writers to task for
engaging in the “vanity of etymology” and “myth of the original word.”67 In Flowers, Paulhan
had already noted that “When we actually use it, our language is, with a few exceptions, quite
arbitrary.”68 In Alain, Paulhan explores how etymology simultaneously represents a failure from
the vantage of linguistics and yet achieves a rhetorical success (the etymology of etymology, as
he points out, legitimates itself as the etumos or authentic logos). For instance, learning that
shallot comes from Ashkelon tells us nothing about the vegetable.69 Worse still, “a false
etymology will inform, in many cases, better than a true etymology.”70 Proof by etymology
might appear as absurd to the linguist as “squaring the circle, or perpetual motion”; on the other
hand, “etymology does not differ at all from the pun [calembour]; and in general the etymologist
discovers in his so-called primitive words what he originally put into them.”71 Thus etymology,
for Paulhan, offers no discovery of meaning; one should instead examine the coded systems of
literature.
In this way, Paulhan anticipated the rhe-structuralists of EPHE. Yet unlike their later bias
towards codes of trope and figure (elocutio) and narrative (dispositio), Paulhan seized a
discourse of originality and banality, mainly under the purview of inventio. Though Paulhan did
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pen a spoof of Du Marsais’ Des Tropes, the figurality of literary language produces little anxiety
compared to its inherent banality. He fundamentally concerned himself with the relations
between word and thought: does the cliché liberate, or constrain, one’s ideas—does it facilitate
easy expression or stifle thought itself? How trustworthy is language as an expression of thought,
or might it serve other purposes? Paulhan groups his responses to such questions into the poles of
Rhetoric and Terror so that he may alternate between them in the tumultuous, dialogical
reversals so characteristic of his method (via prosopopoeia, Terror actually gains a voice).
Paulhan, we could say, updates the dialogue of Hermogenes and Cratylus, expanding beyond
convention versus nature to Rhetoric (words) and Terror (thought).
Another one of Paulhan’s quasi-structuralist endeavors emerges in the rather
mathematical Key to Poetry, which dates, in its early versions, to 1944. Though clearly aware of
Saussure, he does not speak of signifiers and signifieds. Rather, he builds a “formula” out of
“words” and “ideas” that differentiates between the true and false “laws of poetry currently in
use.”72 For the Rhetorician, each “poetic event”—eg. an “image, commonplace, [or]
antithesis”—corresponds to a formula of the form:
F(a b c) implies F’(α β γ)
where F is a function of the words a, b, and c
and F’ is a function of the ideas α, β, and γ
That is to say, for the Rhetorician, the poetic event’s transformation of words implies a
transformation of ideas. However, for the Terrorist, the words now correspond to α, β, and γ, and
the ideas to a, b, and c.73 Thus the Terrorist witnesses this same poetic event’s transformation of
ideas implying a certain transformation of words. But just when one might expect Paulhan to rest
at ease after this tidy scientific distinction, he fixates on the fundamentally mysterious relation
between words and thoughts (and hence between Rhetoric and Terror): a properly linguistic
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method for separating them appears remote after noting Saussure and Bally’s “elusive, uncertain,
and contradictory … conception of language.”74 In effect, Paulhan embraces a certain mysticism
regarding the word-thought relation, allowing himself to be contented rather than tormented—the
fate of so many peers. But of course, this mysticism, so inward and esoteric, is precisely the
opposite of the stable building blocks that structuralism would soon demand.
His eccentricities continue. If Paulhan so acutely perceived the struggles of Rhetoric and
Terror playing out over French letters, it was only, perhaps, because he was able to leave its
battlegrounds behind and see things afresh through his teaching in Madagascar and his study of
the Malagasy language and its proverbs. During his three years as a lycée teacher, Paulhan
researched and transcribed the hain-teny, a form of oratorical contest where proverbs would be
exchanged until one proverb trumps all (he will come back to Paris and teach at l'École des
Langues orientales vivantes).75 This Malagasy tradition, a healthy game of invention for
Paulhan, lacked the Terror-Rhetoric dysfunction. A kind of rhetorical ethnography empowered
his thinking, setting him apart from Barthes, Foucault, and many others who often discussed
literature, rhetoric, and discourse as such, without the all-important French qualification. In
Paulhan’s (anti-colonial) experiences in Madagascar and later eclectic writings, we find literary
models that could potentially escape from the vicissitudes of Terror and the triteness of Rhetoric.

3.12 The logic of Terror
Before engaging the historical dialectics of Terror, let us examine its synchronic logic. In
Terror, says Paulhan, “ideas are worth more than words, and the spiritual is worth more than the
material”; “language is essentially dangerous for thought.”76 The “faith” or “prejudice” of the
Terrorist entails ranking the word below the idea in both “dignity” and “nature.”77 In seeking the
motivation for Terror, Paulhan claims that a work of literature might convey “joy or despair,” but
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it “more secretly reveals an idea about language: the understanding we have of it, … how we
place ourselves in relation to it, and in opposition to it.”78 An undisclosed linguistic ideology,
though he does not use the term, lies below the surface of the work: its “system of expression” is
concealed for Rhetoric (“like the skeleton of a mammal”) but visible for Terror (“like the shell of
a crustacean”).79 The task of Terror, as it were, is to crack the shell, prompted by a deep
cynicism towards the fidelity and expressivity of language. Indeed, for Terror “certain words
reveal a hypertrophy of matter and of language, at the expense of ideas”—completely contrary to
all of the grammarians, philologists, and linguists whom the critic considers. 80 Yet the “power
of language” still remains “too subtle or secret” to undergo their scholarly analyses, according to
the often-mystical Paulhan.81 Thus, instead of linguists, he mainly considers the arguments of
Terror’s partisans: Taine accusing Rousseau of “verbalism” or Renan lambasting most of
classical literature as an “abuse of rhetoric”; in this Terror, “no one is safe.”82 The inquisition
into hollow or duplicitous political terms such as “freedom” and “equality” seemingly spills into
literature, infusing it with a “polemical element.”83 For Paulhan, Terror’s literary and political
arguments feature remarkable similarities, hinting at why he fixated upon such an allusive and
divisive term.
If Terror merely means a certain kind of prejudice towards language, defined ex nihilo, it
would not be such a curious entity. Yet it is a prejudice that both derives from and reflects upon
the histories of revolution and literature in France, especially the Terror’s leveling of status and
ability, the equality before the guillotine. So we should consider its diachronic element in
addition the synchronic arguments of Terror. Since, according to Hegel, “fanaticism wills only
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what is abstract, not what is articulated,” the Terror was a “time of trembling and quaking and of
intolerance towards everything particular,” when “all differences of talents and authority were
supposed to be cancelled out.”84 This issue of talent bridges the historic and literary Terrors.
Paulhan notes that Joseph Lebon, who sanctioned many executions in Arras, declared that the
revolutionary tribunal would first judge the prisoners who “stood out because of their talents.”85
Figuratively speaking, the skilled Rhetoricians would be executed first: “When Hugo, Stendhal,
or Gourmont talk about massacres and slaughters, they are also thinking about a kind of talent:
the kind that is betrayed by flowers of rhetoric.”86 As Paulhan defines Terror historically: “We
call periods of Terror those moments in the history of nations ... when it suddenly seems that the
State requires not ingeniousness and systematic methods”—associated with Rhetoric—“but
rather an extreme purity of the soul”—associated with Terror.87 Robespierre’s “Republic of
Virtue” comes to mind; restrictive rules would be seemingly marched to the scaffold by the
radicals whom Paulhan dubs the “adversaries of Rhetoric: Romantics, Terrorists.”88 Indeed,
those aspects of rhetoric associated with techne—“skill, knowledge, and technique”—“become
suspect,” during periods of Terror, “as if they were covering up some lack of conviction.”89
Thus emerges a parallel between revolutionary and literary history.
Terror necessarily invokes history: every Terror seems to refer back to the Terror.
“During periods of Terror,” as Paulhan puts it, “literature happily welcomes, and even seeks out
… mad poets or absurd thinkers, those small or great Satans of the quill.”90 Paulhan speaks of
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periods, emphasizing a historical phenomenon that threatens to sweep up individuals, something
more complex than an inner belief or emotion. Constructing a simpler and less historically
grounded rivalry between misologists and philologists (or logophiles) would censor Terror’s
explosive and perhaps undecidable connotations, its political provocation to condemn or condone
the events of 1793-94. What increases the value of the term in France may well hamper it in
those locales and eras without a relevant rupture or revolution.

3.13 Terror’s history and merits
Paulhan’s “Satans of the quill” primarily belong to Romanticism and the contemporary
Surrealism that surrounded him in the 1920s and 1930s while The Flowers of Tarbes was taking
shape. An old critical commonplace holds that rhetoric and Romanticism were natural enemies,
but this has certain exceptions in the British case and perhaps more in the French.91 Surrealism,
however, represented a consistent and extreme manifestation of Terror for interwar intellectuals.
As Sartre puts it, if the Surrealists have reduced words to “ashes” and nothing remains, is this “a
nothing I create or one that I disclose? The Surrealist makes no choice between these two
contradictory hypotheses.”92 Thus, for the Surrealists, “the bonfire of words is an absolute
event.”93 The word would now receive a mere show-trial: the culmination of a long process of
juridical decline in the literary courts.
In literature, Terror took the form of a crescendo. Since the original revolutionary Terror,
literary terror—so preoccupied with “purity” and “rupture” had, according to Maurice Blanchot
in 1942, “dominated the world of letters for the past 150 years.”94 Blanchot pictured Terror
reaching new heights: “With Victor Hugo it rejects ‘rhetoric’, with Verlaine ‘eloquence’, with
Rimbaud ‘poetic old hat’; but with more recent writers, driven by a distaste for clichés and
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tormented by an obsession with revolt, it claims to break with all forms of discourse and even
with all language.”95 Blanchot summed them up thusly:
The Terrorist, completely enchanted with a dream of innocence in which things and
emotions can appear to us in their original purity, … is obsessed by the linguistic aspect
of language. One must wring the neck of eloquence, push away technique, be mistrustful
of words, for words are only words. No ideal aspect for language the way Terror sees it:
the star here eternally shows the frozen landscape of its extinguished volcanoes and its
lifeless mountains.96
Terror, in this imagery, would seem to voraciously consume and extinguish its enemies. And yet
for Paulhan, the historical and conceptual process of Terror can never quite complete itself.
When pushed to its extremes, Terror relentlessly encounters an obstacle: the act of pushing past
words engenders an obsession with them. As Paulhan puts it, “No writer is more preoccupied
with words than the one who at every point sets out to get rid of them, to get away from them, to
reinvent them.”97 In this way, the extreme Terrorists now become Rhetoricians, for cataloguing
abusive clichés—stereotypes that must be avoided to liberate thought—creates a pathological
devotion: “Terror is verbal, and more preoccupied with language than rhetoric has ever been.” 98
Thus, we can imagine the Terror-Rhetoric continuum not as a straight line or spectrum, but as a
horseshoe, in which the endpoints draw close together. Though often irritating and wrong to
those at either extreme, and disdained by political scientists, the horseshoe structure would seem
to capture Paulhan’s thinking.
Though Paulhan “sides” with Rhetoric, we must note that Paulhan’s thought was shaped
by a truly intimate encounter with (and appreciation of) chronic and acute Terrorist tastes in
French literature, and he was far from an old literary conservative or moralistic elder attacking
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the avant-garde. Milne’s book on Paulhan is wonderfully titled The Extreme In-Between,
capturing his vexing orientations across aesthetic and political spectra. Jumping into almost any
point of The Flowers of Tarbes, the reader lands “extremely in-between” Rhetoric and Terror:
even in the final pages, the resolution in favour of Rhetoric is deliberately moderated and even
undermined. The book’s final gesture is not a raised hand or a closed fist but a shrug.
Much of what makes The Flowers of Tarbes so difficult, original, and subtle is that
Rhetoric, though preferred by Paulhan, does not simply triumph over Terror. Rather, Terror
propounds viable critiques that arrive at the disturbing ambiguities of language, which for
Paulhan often revolve around the cliché. The cliché is indeed:
The perfect place in language for the reader to completely lose sight of the writer—since
he cannot tell if this writer has thought carefully about the cliché, or whether he has
simply repeated it; this reader then imagines the author who surrenders entirely to
thought as someone caught up in arranging words. The cliché is a place of nonunderstanding. … We see language betraying us before our very eyes, by introducing into
speech … the very obscurity and misunderstanding it was designed to dispel. … If justice
is to be done, commonplaces should be the first terms to be banished from a wellconstructed language.99
To exemplify how the “cliché is a place of non-understanding,” we can turn to Sartre, of all
people, and his Saint Genet (1952). He thoroughly analyzes a sentence from Genet’s Funeral
Rites (1948), which Genet himself had set off with quotation marks: “‘The gardener is the
loveliest rose in his garden’” (the floral imagery, of course, is Paulhan’s old friend). Sartre
explains its ruse:
“‘The gardener is the loveliest rose in his garden’”: this sentence, which is casually
slipped in among twenty others, like a counterfeit coin among genuine ones, is protected
only by its air of innocence and its comfortable banality. A hasty reader sees that a young
man is a rose: he does not quite approve, perhaps, of one’s comparing a male to a flower,
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but does Genet mean a flower? The image is trite one, it has lost its bloom. He continues
reading; he installs within him this seeming commonplace without having noticed that
Genet was unable to keep from setting it off by quotation marks. Of course, no sooner has
the gilding entered than it melts. We have been tricked. Why is it that we no longer
understand this hackneyed locution? The cleverest reader will realize—too late—that the
gardener, his roses and the banal comparison were chosen only in order to mask the
aberrant form of the proposition. … [Ultimately] the sentence is absurd only in
appearance: it alludes to Genet’s entire history, to all his hopes. … Yet it is impossible to
realize this signification; every precaution is taken to prevent us from doing so: a good,
round prose sentence, a “cliché,” suddenly challenges itself, is swallowed up, and the
wreckage seems to point vaguely to an inaccessible constellation.100
Sartre’s lengthy, incisive, and rather Paulhanian analysis of this sentence evokes the potential
pathologies—neuroticism, paranoia, or conspiratorial thinking—of Terrorist practices of reading
and overreading. Paulhan even speculates about whether the situation could be worse than what
we have just seen.
What could be worse than a misunderstanding between reader and writer? Perhaps,
Paulhan wonders, “there might exist a kind of Terror between ourselves and ourselves.”101
Rather than “vagueness and inexactness” between author and reader, one gets caught up in fully
internalized Terror: “hermeticism, exclusivity, or absence—only leaving behind, between
ourselves and ourselves, the briefest of flashes.”102 Here one sees why Paul de Man became so
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interested in Paulhan: if this study of misunderstanding was pushed further, one might arrive at
something proto-deconstructive.103
Yet Paulhan stops before the edge of this cliff. He always hedges, reverses, or synthesizes
such positions: he is too dialectical to remain in the extremes of aporia. The liberalism of the
Rhetoric-Terror dynamic aligns with Paulhan’s editorial role at the NRF, in which he sought to
hear out the competing classical and radical voices—and resonates with his own politics. Neither
Marxist nor right-wing, Paulhan developed a distinctive radical centrism, or at least a considered
oscillation around the centre. Perhaps Paulhan could be the considered the first (or last) Girondin
of “theory,” a legacy often forgotten in the wake of the deconstructive Jacobins who followed.
Paulhan’s relentless focus on the cliché as a “place of non-understanding” (his term) or as
pointing to an “inaccessible constellation” (Sartre’s term) further distinguishes him from those
prizing tropes, binaries, and other rhetorical-philosophical materials.

3.14 From Terror to Rhetoric
With Terror surveyed, we turn to Rhetoric. Modern literature, for Paulhan, effectively
coincides with the eclipse of rhetorical institutions, with the defeat of what we could call
rhetoric’s “ancien régime.” As Paulhan recalls, “Rhetoricians—at a time when there were books
on rhetoric—used to explain obligingly …which rhetorical flowers one should use”: they
recommended specific means of expression.104 And yet, “the literary arts these days are marked
by refusal”: they tell us which devices “are apt to frighten poetry away for good.”105 Early in
Flowers, Paulhan notes a sign, at the entrance of the public park of Tarbes, warning “It is
forbidden to enter the park carrying flowers.” To this sign, Paulhan replies: “The same sign can
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be found these days at the entrance to literature.”106 Though prohibited, the flowers of rhetoric
had been kept alive as a scapegoat: “when all is said and done, rhetoric has never stopped
existing, since Terror has also never stopped condemning it.”107 In recent memory, Rhetoric was
left to “rot in its own chains,” on account of its reputation, by even the “honest writer.”108 But
the problem is an ancient one. For Paulhan, the rhetor who believes “true rhetoric begins with a
feeling of disgust for rhetoric,” like the philosopher who might say “philosophy begins with the
hatred of philosophy,” has already anticipated the coming of Terror. Indeed, “If Montaigne
knows Cicero, Cicero is expecting Montaigne.”109 This anticipatory movement is characteristic
of Paulhan. Like an orator engaged in refutatio, he looks ahead to the coming arguments and
imagines how to refute them in advance.
The Flowers of Tarbes swings back and forth, considering Terror from the vantage of
Rhetoric and vice versa. At first it would seem that the paradox of Rhetoric and Terror will result
in devastating aporia—as if Paulhan had created a monumental version of the infamous sophistic
text dissoi logoi and its unresolved quarrel between two dueling arguments. And yet, Paulhan
slips in a modest solution towards the end, and argues for something he calls Maintenance: the
pendulum should stop on the side of rhetoric, but it must be a rhetoric that is deeply aware and
accepting of its own status.
Take courage and embrace the cliché, argues Paulhan. If the conventionalness of literature
makes us uneasy, then “there is a way we can turn this unease to our advantage, which is to make
theatre a bit more theatrical, the novel violently novelistic, and literature in general more
literary.”110 Put concisely, “we simply need to make commonplace expressions common.”111
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This extends to the micro and macroscopic levels: “literary rules and norms, rhetorical figures,
dramatic unities, which are all subject to the same fortunes and obey the same laws.”112 Once
Rhetoricians take a stance on language, they are “thereafter free to talk about love or fear,
slavery or freedom.”113 In Paulhan’s final embrace of rhetoric, he likens the art to marriage: what
appears to be an “intolerable and cold restraint” yields “the original joy of that first
commitment,” latent within every subsequent moment.114 Paulhan urges a degree of faith in
language—but a measured faith sobered after studying Terror’s best arguments. Mirroring the
sign at the book’s beginning that forbids entering the park with flowers, the conclusion erects a
new sign, forbidding us to enter without flowers. Yet whereas the beginning merely referred to le
jardin, the ending refers to le jardin public: the commonplaces can now be held in common.115
One might think that Paulhan’s “flowers” are superficial or supplemental to language;
however, precisely the opposite is true. Aligned with many modern rhetoricians, and perhaps
with Nietzsche, he envisions the primacy of “rhetorical thought”:
It is not at all because rhetorical thought was abnormal and artificial that we remained
powerless to represent it to ourselves, but rather because it was a little too normal and
natural—I mean too close to nature and to those original thoughts of which our ideas and
our feelings, as soon as we distinguish them, are no more than a distorted echo.116
In this vision, the rhetorical treatises that so interested Paulhan117 stand as mere ladders reaching
towards this higher vantage. Though “rules and commonplace expressions” tend towards a
“dissociation of word and idea”—a point upon which Rhetoric and Terror agree—these only
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gesture towards rhetorical cognition and cognitive rhetoric, realms between which Paulhan so
playfully glides.118 More than just literary language, Paulhan claims to dutifully seek “the
everyday milieu where Terror and Rhetoric operate.”119 Here, each word uttered potentially
overcommits the speaker: “Master of the word you are about to say, slave of the word you have
said.”120 This power struggle, for Paulhan, reaches out into manifold domains, making language
exceedingly political, polemical, and impossible to ignore, but in a rather different way from
Marxist thinking on the matter. Paulhan’s idiosyncratic work, we should remember, was
remarkably well isolated from contemporary philosophical and political dogmas. By this point,
we now have a reasonable introduction to Paulhan’s work and can turn to understanding its
implications for structuralism and the uncertain remains of rhetoric.

3.15 On the eclipse of Sartre
The standard story of French intellectualism tells us, roughly speaking, that structuralism
dethroned existentialism and phenomenology following the liberation of Paris. François Dosse,
for instance, capably charts “the eclipse of a star”: Jean-Paul Sartre was the “postwar intellectual
tutelary figure”; and yet, “the law of tragedy requires a death before a new hero can come
onstage.”121 This hero, for Dosse, was Lévi-Strauss, who will accuse Sartre of turning history
into a mythic signifier; the nascent structuralism doomed Sartre because he had spent his career
downplaying the order of words.
Though claiming to be “not entirely hostile to structuralism,” Sartre detested the notion
that “thought is only language, as if language itself were not spoken.”122 This is simply the
“opposite error” of an older era when “thought was defined as independent of language, as
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something unknown and ineffable, existing before expression.”123 Dosse summarizes Sartre’s ill
fit: “As a philosopher of consciousness, of the subject, he considered linguistics to be a minor
science and avoided it practically systematically.”124 However, Dosse never mentions Paulhan,
who had warned that “Sartre is not on good terms with words” in 1950 in La Table Ronde, and
who had indeed conceptualized and predicted the ruin of those who entirely retreated from the
order of words.
Foucault’s Les mots et les choses (1966), according to Sartre, “replaces cinema with a
magic lantern, movement by a succession of immobilities”: Foucault allegedly banishes
“historical reflection” through his appeals to structuralist and Tel Quelian thought.125 Structures,
for Sartre, must bow to history: “Man is the product of structure, but yet he goes beyond it”;
structures are given to him, but only insofar as “he is engaged in history, engaged in such a way
that he cannot fail to destroy them.”126 Whence came this belief? Sartre’s enduring historicism
had been forged in the factious interwar period, not merely as a response to the “events” of the
depression and fascism, but also as an antidote to the great Terror in Letters that polarized so
many writers.
Sartre, like Paulhan, acutely perceived the menace of Terror before the war, and
responded to its crisis in “The Nationalization of Literature” (1945), “Introducing Les Temps
Modernes” (1945), and What is Literature? (1947). By 1945, Sartre could claim “pride is no
longer taken from separating thought from words,” and thus “literature and rhetoric have been
restored in their dignity and their powers”: “one cannot even conceive how words might betray
thought.”127 Yet Sartre, born in 1905, had been tossed around by the confluent currents of
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Rhetoric and Terror during his most formative years, and he would look back upon them using
Paulhan’s dialectic.
Recalling his youth in The Words (1963), Sartre recognizes the duplicity and double
temptations of Terror and Rhetoric. Meeting “idle heaps of whiteness” in Aurillac, the young
Sartre split in two: “As a terrorist, I was concerned only with their being: I would establish it by
means of language. As a rhetorician, I cared only for words: I would set up cathedrals of words
beneath the blue eyes of the word sky.”128 Sartre-as-Rhetorician equated language with the
world: “To exist was to have an official title somewhere on the infinite Tables of the Word,” yet
his misologist other had “launched a reign of terror.”129 In the unpublished manuscript, we find:
One could say that my metamorphosis started with the transformation of my relationship
with language. I have passed from terrorism to rhetoric: in my most mystical years, words
were sacrificed to things; as an unbeliever, I returned to words, needing to know what
speech meant. But it is hard: I apply myself, but before me, I sense the death of a dream,
a joyous brutality, the perpetual temptation of terror. For forty years, I have been thinking
against myself. 130
The oscillations of this “perpetual temptation” had been formative not only for Sartre, but for a
good part of his literary generation: “When we were still schoolboys,” he recalls, “on the lycée
benches or in the Sorbonne amphitheaters, ... we swung between terror and rhetoric, between
literature-as-martyrdom and literature-as-profession.”131 To use Beaujour’s phrase, this was the
tourniquet of Terror and Rhetoric, the merry-go-round upon which so many writers had
chaotically careened between the wars.132
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And yet Sartre claimed, so to speak, that the tourniquet had stopped, or could be stopped.
After the liberation, the “scars, the traces of these varying temptations” of Rhetoric and Terror,
are “all very far away from us now”; interwar literature, especially Bataille, “has a hard time of it
these days.”133 In What is Literature?, Sartre proposed that engagement, in a sense, would be the
pious refuge from these temptations, and thus broke from Paulhan. They agreed about the
Rhetoric-Terror vicissitudes and vacillations but disagreed about the solutions, as well as the
current state of affairs.
Sartre’s view that language could be virtually forgotten was certainly not ubiquitous. As
Camus wrote in 1944, “The most significant works of the 1940’s are perhaps not the ones people
think, but those that call language and expression once more into question. The criticism of Jean
Paulhan, the new world created by Francis Ponge, and Parain’s historical philosophy seem to me
to answer this need.”134 In Situations I (1947), Sartre responds to the challenges of language in
his essays on Georges Bataille, Francis Ponge, and Brice Parain:
Bataille will define poetry as ‘a holocaust of words’ in the same way that Parain defined
Bolshevism as ‘a destruction of the word.’ … [Blanchot] reveals the secret of this
endeavour, when he explains that the writer must speak in order to say nothing. If words
annihilate each other, if they crumble into dust, won’t a silent reality at last emerge
behind them? The hesitation evident here is significant; it is Parain’s own hesitation: is
this suddenly emergent reality waiting for us, unnamed, behind the words or is it, in fact,
our creation?135
Parain, a NRF figure virtually unknown outside of France, proved central to the Sartre-Paulhan
quarrel; Parain had been agonized by linguistic questions since his Essai sur la misère humaine
(1934). This, according to Sartre, was Parain’s plight: “He is suffering from word-sickness and
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wants to be cured.”136 Though such afflictions were endemic to inter-war Terrorism, Parain
proposed a distinctively theological solution.

3.16 Sartre Responds to Parain
According to Sartre, Parain had displaced, in effect, an existential question into an
esoteric theological realm.137 Parain’s God, who reminds Sartre of Kafka and Kierkegaard,
suffers from a thoroughly modern impotence. The messages he sends to men are
scrambled—or, rather, they reach us the wrong way round. Starting out from the bosom
of silence and from the unity of a thought governing matter, we receive them as a
plurality of noises and it is matter that has subjugated the meanings in them to itself. This
God doesn’t speak to man, he suggests His silence to him by means of sounds and
words.138
To counter this, Sartre shifts into his own territory: “Language is being-for-others. What need do
we have of God?”; “if it is true that to speak is to act under the gaze of the Other, there is every
danger that the famous problems of language will merely be a regional instance of the major
ontological problem of the existence of others.”139 Parain had defined a kind of homo loquens,
most unsatisfying for Sartre. This move, and its negation, characterized a host of writers
following WWI.
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The extent of the literary-linguistic agony after WWI, so motivating for Sartre and
Paulhan, must be continually emphasized. Sartre chronicles an entire “crisis of language”
between 1918-1930:
Ponge and Parain had, from the outset, defined man by speech. They were caught like
rats in a trap, because speech was now worthless [after 1918]. We can truly say in this
case they were in despair: their position denied them the slightest hope. We know that
Parain, haunted by a silence that constantly eluded him, went first to the extremes of
terrorism before returning to a nuanced rhetoric. Ponge’s path was more tortuous. His
objection to language is, first and foremost, that it is the reflection of a social
organization he abhors. … As a poet, he sees poetry as a general enterprise of cleaning up
language, just as the revolutionary may, in a way, look to clean up society.140
A Terrorist “revolt” against language, a “profound distrust of discourse,” indeed characterizes
this period:
In these magnificent post-war years [after WWI], there were many other young people in
revolt against the human condition, and, in particular, against the language that expressed
it. The obsession with intuitive knowledge or, in other words, with a knowledge without
indeterminates, which, as we have seen, first motivated Parain, was initially a driving
force of Surrealism, as was that profound distrust of discourse Paulhan has dubbed
‘terrorism’. But since one has, in the end to speak, since, whatever one does, the word
intercalates itself between the intuition and the object, our terrorists were ejected, like
Parain himself, from silence, and throughout the postwar period, we can see an attempt to
destroy words with words going on.141
In the “destroy[ing] words with words” we begin to discover the futility that Paulhan and Sartre
identify in the Terrorist position: a true misologist should yield silence rather than loud
complaints. As Sartre put it, “the surrealist … ends up doing a lot of painting and writing but he
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never actually destroys anything.”142 On this, Paulhan and Sartre agree. Their contention would
arise from Sartre’s emergent strategy: neither the destruction of words nor silence, but avoiding
the problems they pose altogether.
What is Literature? would elaborate Sartre’s solution which hinges upon historical forces.
“From 1930 on,” according to Sartre, “the world depression, the coming of Nazism, and the
events in China opened our eyes. ... The detachment which our predecessors were so fond of
practising had become impossible. ... History flowed in upon us."143 Camus, on the other hand,
noted a new “inner discipline” emerging among writers in response to the surrealist tendency of
“using the uncertainty of language and the world to justify every possible kind of liberty, ”
moving closer to Paulhan’s position.144 Sartre, however, would reject Surrealism in his own way,
seeking a “concrete and liberated literature” following the “tangle of vipers” that constitutes the
“terrorist complex.”145 Here Sartre saw three serpents:
One might distinguish, first, so deep a disgust with the sign as such that it leads in all
cases to preferring the thing signified to the word, the act to the statement, the word
conceived as object to the word-signification, that is, in the last analysis, poetry to prose,
spontaneous disorder to composition; second, an effort to make literature one expression
among others of life, … and third, a crisis of the writer’s moral conscience. … Without
for a moment conceiving the idea of losing its formal autonomy, literature makes itself a
negation of formalism and comes to raise the question of its essential content. Today we
are beyond terrorism.146
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And yet, this last sentence proves troublesome. Given that Sartre wanted to replace the RhetoricTerror dynamic with a return to history, one must ask whether this gesture is itself a new form of
Terrorism since Sartre seemingly runs away from words.

3.17 Paulhan responds to Sartre
Paulhan’s response in “Jean-Paul Sartre n’est pas en bons termes avec les mots” (1950)
avoids the political-historical aspects of Sartre’s program in favour of a more subtle, but perhaps
harsher, critique. In three hundred pages of Sartre’s literary criticism (Situations I), Paulhan finds
no consideration of the literary: thus Sartre represents a “strange case of Terror.”147 Sartre cut
himself off: “For not wanting to isolate words, it is ultimately thought that our philosopher finds
himself isolating from both words and things.”148 For Paulhan, Sartre would tendentiously
separate thoughts and words only when it suited him:
When he defines Blanchot’s Aminadab by a certain way of treating “the fantastic as a
language,” or Renard’s Journal by “the systematic condensation, in a sentence-formula,
of a certain sum of ideas,” Sartre does stop invoking, even for a moment, this gap [écart]
between words and things, which he denied just now. This gap supports him, and
whoever removes it sees Situations, deprived of its skeleton, collapse altogether.149
Though Paulhan had once promoted Sartre’s fiction, his whole critical paradigm was deemed
“upside down” by 1950, long before the famous structuralists rebelled against Sartre in the mid1960s. Sartre, however, would still use the distinction in Saint Genet (1952)—“he is against
terror and for rhetoric because it is beautiful to sacrifice the most beautiful prose to poetry”—and
even dissected Genet’s prose rhetoric: “a funeral oration, the haughty confession of a man
condemned to death.”150 As we have seen with both Sartre and Paulhan, the Rhetoric-Terror
distinction proved invaluable in charting the dysfunctions of the literary field, although it could
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be turned against its users. Sartre’s rhetorical analyses—ingenious and eloquent in themselves
but rare because of his linguistic reticence—did not go unnoticed by Paulhan.

3.18 Legacies of Terror at Tel Quel
Thus far we have not gone much past 1950: what became of this strange and divisive
breach in French letters? Sartre’s demotion of the Rhetoric-Terror dynamic after the liberation of
Paris would seem most premature during the reign of Tel Quel, which has often been associated
with terrorism, although rarely in the explicit sense of Sartre and Paulhan. With Tel Quel we will
perhaps see Rhetoric attach itself to an orientation towards language, and Terror attach itself to
an orientation towards literature.
After its polite beginnings in 1960, the journal entered a more aggressive phase between
the mid-60s and mid-70s with a “terroristic take on the materiality of literary practice.”151
Foucault described a “paradoxical act of critical terror” in Les Aventures d'une jeune fille152 by
Jean-Édern Hallier, who helped Sollers found Tel Quel, but then was excommunicated from the
group. In an interview with Tel Quel, Barthes wondered whether “writing cannot avoid being a
terrorist act (a terror that can turn against its author).”153 Tel Quel’s various intellectual and
interpersonal terrors, however, were joined by reflections on Terror in Paulhan’s sense, and thus
of course, on Rhetoric.
Rhetoric, the “cornerstone” of the Tel Quel project according to Dosse,154 was not revived
as a neoclassical gesture, but to instruct avant garde literature and structuralist speculation.
Writing in Tel Quel, Gérard Genette, following Barthes, sought to study rhetoric not for its
content, but for its formal examples:

151

Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack, "Introduction," in The Tel Quel Reader ed. Patrick ffrench and
Roland-François Lack (London: Routledge, 1998).
152

My trans. Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: NRF Gallimard 1994). Page #.

153

Barthes, "Responses: Interview with Tel Quel," 253. In its avant-garde and often paranoid mindset, the journal,
as Dosse puts it, “gave free rein to a veritable terrorized terrorism.”Dosse, The History of Structuralism, 1, 277.
154

Dosse, The History of Structuralism, 1, 277.
163

For us, today, the oeuvre of rhetoric only offers, in its contents, a historical interest
(although underestimated). The idea of resurrecting its code to apply to our literature
would be a sterile anachronism. This is not to say that one cannot find all the figures of
the former rhetoric in modern texts: but the system is out of tune, and the signifying
function of the figures has disappeared with the network of relations articulating them in
this system. The self-signifying function of Literature no longer passes through the code
of figures, and modern literature has its own rhetoric, which is precisely (for the moment)
the refusal of rhetoric, and which Paulhan has called Terror. What we can take from the
old rhetoric is thus not its content but its example, its form, its paradoxical idea of
Literature as an order founded on the ambiguity of signs, on the slight but steep space
that opens between two words of the same meaning, two meanings of the same word: two
languages of the same language.155
Echoing and citing Paulhan, Genette suggests that the refusal of rhetoric, characteristic of
modern literature, does not truly exceed the rhetorical domain: perhaps a sort of bad faith on the
part of the Terrorists. Sartre had already made a similar point in Saint Genet: “we know that
terror, too, is a rhetoric”; “the law of rhetoric … is that one must lie in order to speak the
truth.”156 Though Genette would go on to extensively interrogate the figurative codes of
literature, Foucault surprisingly engages a kind of Rhetoric/Terror binary more than Genette and
anyone else writing in Tel Quel. For Foucault, literature begins with the death of rhetoric, at least
in the controversial definition of literature he offers us. We will soon see him retrace the steps of
Paulhan.

3.19 Foucault, rhetoric, and literature
During the time of his Tel Quel engagements and Raymond Roussel (1963), Foucault
became remarkably interested in the institution of rhetoric and the literary-linguistic ruptures
after the Revolution that can only be described as Terrorist, although he does not cite Paulhan
explicitly. Rather, Foucault finds himself fascinated by a Terrorist tradition stretching from Sade,
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roughly speaking, to Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski.157 Indeed, “the works of Sade and the
tales of terror” mark a “transformation” in writing; Foucault claims that “language now listens
from the bottom of its burrow,” referencing Kafka’s “Der Bau,” for a “disquieting sound.”158
Literature, in the sense that Foucault uses the word, effectively begins at the end of the
eighteenth century, an era which witnessed the appearance of a language that “appropriates and
consumes all others in its lightning flash.”159 And from this era, “literature, as it has existed ever
since the disappearance of rhetoric … will be obligated to employ a unique language”; this new
language must be “doubled” since, in the absence of rhetoric that “tell[s] us what beautiful
language should be,” one level of language must tell the story and the other must “make visible
what literature is.”160 He goes on to claim:
Beginning in the nineteenth century, we stopped listening for this originary speech and in
its place could be heard the infinite murmur, the accumulation of words already spoken.
Under these conditions, the work no longer has to be embodied in the figures of rhetoric
that would serve as signs of a silent, absolute language. The work no longer has to speak
other than as a language that repeats what has been said and which, through the force of
repetition, simultaneously erases everything that has been said and brings it closer to
itself, to take hold of the essence of literature.161
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Foucault concludes that “Mallarmé’s book,”162 though a failure, “is the first book of literature,”
and that “literature began the day something we might call the volume of the book was
substituted for the space of rhetoric.”163
Foucault’s “Language to Infinity” (1963) muses on the relation between language,
rhetoric, and the library of Borges. While never citing Paulhan, the essay describes something
“paradoxical” and profoundly Terrorist in Sade’s languages:
These languages which are constantly drawn out of themselves by the overwhelming, the
unspeakable, by thrills, stupefaction, ecstasy, dumbness, pure violence, wordless
gestures, and are calculated with the greatest economy and precision to produce effects
(so that they make themselves as transparent as possible at this limit of language toward
which they hurry, erasing themselves in their writing for the exclusive sovereignty of
what they wish to say and lies outside of words)—these languages very strangely
represent themselves in a slow, meticulous, and infinitely extended ceremony.164
Later on, Foucault explains that in novels of terror, “Language should acquire the thinness and
absolute seriousness of the story; in making itself as gray as possible, it was required to transmit
an event to its docile and terrorized reader.”165 Such statements enact a Foucauldian fugue on
Paulhan’s theme, and perhaps suggest that Paulhan lurks behind the scenes of Tel Quel’s
simultaneous attractions to both ends of the Rhetoric-Terror spectrum. Foucault’s sense of
rhetoric’s decline bears little resemblance to the trope-based accounts we saw in Chapter One,
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and is ultimately rather Paulhanian since it seeks to grasp the dawn of a literary, quasi-Terrorist
entity.166

3.20 Conclusion
The Sartre-Paulhan relationship oscillated just as Rhetoric and Terror swung back and
forth. After a brief period of initial harmony, Sartre tried to escape the dynamic: as he confided
to Camus, Paulhan got caught up in a “false paradox concealing dryly stated banalities”: he
amounted to “a con, mediocrity, and feeble pisser [pisse-peu].”167 For a more mature Sartre,
“language is merely existence in the presence of someone else.”168 And even at the very peak of
structuralism in 1966, Sartre intransigently insisted that le refus de l'histoire characterized and
inspired the younger generation, specifically Foucault. Linguists were the supreme heroes of
1966—not historians, and not alleged historicists such as Sartre. So then, was Paulhan happy?
After all, the surge towards structuralism—towards Rhetoric—seemingly confirmed the
dialectical reversal ensuing after peak Terror. Yet Paulhan’s late texts in fact suggest his
disappointment.169 All of the linguists propping up structuralism had missed out on the “secret of
language”: their terminology did not speak to mysterious and magical reversals between the
priority of words over thought, and thought over words, reversals epitomizing the Paulhanian
method. He would die in October 1968, shortly after the events of May that would again affirm
Sartre’s insistence on History and partly restore his reputation. But neither thinker could ever be
permanently vindicated, for the Rhetoric-Terror dynamic seems to inevitably swing back into the
wrong polarity, whatever this might be.
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Ultimately, at least two aspects of the Rhetoric and Terror dynamic emerged in this
chapter that illuminate the strange tenacity of French rhetoric as an institution. First, the dynamic
represents a distinctive “literary psychopathology” within the writer’s mind; second, it represents
a Hegelian historical instrument transcending the writer and capturing widespread literarylinguistic attitudes.
First, the psychopathology. Perhaps Blanchot best dramatizes this psychic distress in
“Literature and the Right to Death,” which mentions neither Paulhan nor Sartre but responds to
the forces they all knew with intimacy and pain. The writer, claims Blanchot, constitutes
“several people in one,” querulous and irreconcilable. Thus “Several absolute and absolutely
different commands” fetter “the” writer—the writers within the writer—who have been bound
by “implacably hostile rules.” These include the Terrorist’s imperative (“You will keep silent,
you will not know words”) and the Rhetorician’s (“Know nothing but words”). Blanchot names
more rules, more “voice[s]” bewitching the mind from inside. He wonders: “Which voice should
be listened to? But the writer must listen to them all! What confusion! … He must therefore
oppose himself, deny himself even as he affirms himself, look for the deepness of night in the
facility of day.”170 This anxious internal dialogue, so aptly expressed here, runs through The
Flowers of Tarbes and even reappears within the recollections of The Words, long after climaxes
of interwar literature. Before Blanchot’s neurotic internal dialogue, Paulhan had likened Terror
to a “neurosis”; Terror “can never quite prevent joy, or grandeur. It simply gives its victims a bad
conscience, and that fear of being fooled which makes fools of us.”171 Paulhan and Sartre,
however, prescribe different therapies for this psychopathology: Paulhan advocates for what we
might now call “mindfulness,” Sartre for focusing on something outside this mindset, a higher
“other.” The Rhetoric-Terror dynamic, in this sense, constitutes a kind of communicable anxiety,
paranoia, or neurosis prevalent in French letters, transmitted forward to Tel Quel but failing to
take hold universally.
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Second, Rhetoric-Terror dynamic constitutes a historical instrument, necessarily linked to
revolutionary memory.172 For better or worse, it imports the events of 1793-4, and to a lesser
extent 1789, into the scene of “linguistic politics.” This entails a truly remarkable reversal: from
the vantage of Terror in language, structuralism would not be a “revolutionary” force as it is
often called, but a reactionary one—even though the structuralists largely belonged to the
political left.173 One of rhetoric’s strangest journeys as a French institution would be a long
leftward shift away from the monarchy and the religious right towards republicanism, finally
reaching those like Barthes who would sometimes reproach it for its aristocratic and bourgeois
legacies.
After Barthes, and especially after Fumaroli, a thorough effort to historicize rhetoric in
France will take place. Decades earlier, however, Paulhan had already made a key insight about
the baffling decline of rhetoric over the long nineteenth century. As historians sometimes
mention, this arguably represents the most inscrutable era for rhetoric despite its recency.
Though Paulhan was far from a historian, he used the single event of the Terror to generate a
dialectic for discourse, a dialectic with applicability to both past and present.174 When the
Renans of the nineteenth century relentlessly belittled rhetoric and continually proclaimed they
were shunning words for things, Paulhan would posit that they actually imbued the order of
words with an excessive power, through which it could eventually regain sovereignty. Until we
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reconcile Paulhan with the whole rhetorical superstructure, we should only call Rhetoric and
Terror a dialectical heuristic. Yet since it compresses an enormity of historical details into a
memorable polarity, it is indeed a good heuristic (even it fails to become a true law of literature,
as Paulhan basically believed).
The swings of Terror to Rhetoric and back to Terror do not seem to have stopped in
contemporary domains, from literary criticism to linguistic politics. Paulhan is strangely missing
from the contemporary scene even though he anticipated and theorized the discord around
speech codes that prevails today, as well as the “power of words” that parties tend to minimize or
maximize for various aims: we now have Rhetorics and Terrors of the left and right. Though
these may lack the idée fixe of 1793-94 and the imaginary of the guillotine, which makes
Paulhan’s work so suited to French discursive histories, the continuum of misology to philology,
or logophobia to logophilia, is not easy to escape.
As we saw in the first two chapters, the purge of rhetoric failed to reach its conclusion and
the extremes of this continuum. And as we will see in the final two chapters, Barthes will
struggle with envisioning the “new rhetoric” when the “former rhetoric” shows faint but palpable
signs of life. The history of rhetoric, and even the history of some of its fellow travelers, has
often been conceived as a history of discrete states: a history of life and death, of ascents and
descents. This too was my initial inclination, for it lends itself to lucid expression. Yet between
the institutional declines and continuities, between Paulhan’s Rhetoric and Terror, and between
Barthes’ “former” and “new” rhetorics, we seem to find a dialectical tendency that thwarts the
discrete state from fully manifesting itself, pulling back from the asymptote and never quite
reaching its stated ambitions. In the end we can indeed say with Paulhan: “we have pushed
Terror to its limit and discovered Rhetoric.”175
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4

Barthes Between Rhetoric and Structuralism

“The Doxa is current opinion, meaning repeated as if nothing had happened. It is Medusa, who
petrifies those whose look at her.”—Roland Barthes1
Having broadened weak survival into the manifold domains of the first three chapters, we
must ultimately return to one of our points of departure: the rapprochement between rhetoric and
the theoretical-linguistic terrain of structuralism. Even someone as anti-theoretical as Fumaroli
credits this encounter for renewing interest in rhetoric (through it featured too much bricolage for
his tastes). I will be emphasizing that Barthes found rhetoric and embraced it as “theory” before
structuralism, before identifying with Saussure. Barthes, I will argue, never really left rhetoric
behind, nor was he accepted by the “high structuralists”: he never practiced a fully rigorous
structuralism consistent between texts. Before getting to this argument about the early Barthes,
however, it would be wise to sketch out the Parisian rhe-structuralism of the 1960s and early
1970s, when structuralism excitedly perceives its commonalities with rhetoric, and hastily digs
through its history. I will approach this through rhe-structuralism’s theoretical foci, as well as its
journals. This will motivate a return to Barthes’ early, pre-structuralist work, and a revisionist
reading of his career.

4.1

Rhe-structuralism in review

What perhaps underwrites “rhe-structuralism” is not the sign, but as it were, the figure of
the figure. In addition to the figure as some kind of vague signifying motif, thought converged on
the rhetorical and otherwise literary figures dear to Genette’s work (Figures vol. I-V), promoted
by his republications of classic manuals (eg. Fontanier’s Les Figures du discours). Despite
rhetoric’s marginal position in Deleuze’s “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” (1973) and
his work in general, he admitted “structuralism is riddled with reflections on rhetoric, metaphor
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and metonymy, for these figures themselves imply structural displacements which must account
for both the literal and the figurative.”2 Lyotard’s thèse de doctorat d'état—Discourse, figure
(1971)—more strongly reacted to an ever-present psychoanalytic discourse on figure. Brushing
up against the figural theories of Todorov and Jean Cohen among others, Lyotard asked “how
can figural discourse—invested by the forms of desire, offering the illusion of fulfilment—
perform the function of truth?”3 A psychoanalytic fugue on old rhetorical themes emerged:
Émile Benveniste had famously written that “the unconscious uses a veritable ‘rhetoric’ which,
like style, has its ‘figures’”;4 Lacan cited Quintilian’s figurae sententiarum to ask, “Can one
really see these as mere figures of speech when it is the figures themselves which are the active
principle of the rhetoric of the discourse which the patient in fact utters?”5 From psychoanalysis
to new poetics, figures were invested with immense import.
The polysemy of “figure” imbued it with a lucrative suppleness for critics or philosophers
ranging over massive aesthetic and linguistic terrain: they could treat the figure similarly to a
Saussurean sign, specify a new meaning, or leave its connotations adrift in the discursive void.
Here, Barthes was master. Whereas he dubbed Sade a “great rhetorician of erotic figures,” he
claimed the lover’s discourse “exists only in outbursts of language, which occur at the whim of
trivial, of aleatory circumstances. These fragments of discourse can be called figures. The word
is to be understood, not in its rhetorical sense, but rather in its gymnastic or choreographic
acceptation.”6 In his sense here, “the figure is outlined (like a sign) and memorable (like an
image or a tale).”7 Furthermore, Barthes notes that Genette blew open the scope of figures to
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include micro and macroscopic textual details, even narrative features.8 At its worst, the figure
thus became a pseudo-sign and weasel word, and at its best, an inkblot for invention and creative
vehicle. Even if we ignore the sense of “figure” that means “personage,” there were few notable
thinkers who did not at some point rely on the play within this word. Vaguely semiotic and
motivic yet flexible and gestural, figure became a cardinal term.

4.2

The resurgent interest in rhetoric in general

But there was also broader, more institutional passion for rhetoric, a passion suspiciously
coinciding with the peak of structuralism. The sixth section of EPHE constitutes one of the great
focal points, where Barthes taught two successive rhetoric seminars during 1964-66, attended by
Gérard Genette, Tvzetan Todorov, Phillipe Sollers, George Perec, Severo Sarduy, and Michel
Butor.9 Whereas the first seminar of 1964-65 considered classical rhetoric, the second seminar of
1965-66 related rhetoric to contemporary literature (Flaubert, Mallarmé, Valéry, Proust, Kafka,
Sartre, Butor, and Blanchot) and yielded Barthes’ unpublished “Valéry and rhetoric” (now in
Album). In early 1967, Barthes’ teaching turned to “Recherches sur le discours de l’Histoire”
after finishing with the institutional aspect of rhetoric, continuing his linguistic-rhetorical
program at a discursive level superior to the sentence in hopes of understanding historical
writing.10
In these years, representing structuralism’s apogee, excited pronouncements about
rhetoric abound in the works of Barthes and the séminaristes. Between 1964-1967, these occur
frequently in his interviews and texts, including “Rhetoric of the Image,” “Elements of
Semiology,” "Structural Classification of Rhetorical Figures,” “Rhetorical Analysis,” and
“Structural Analysis of Narrative.” Rhetoric also hid in his least popular monograph, The
Fashion System (1967), whose rhetorical content was transformed into “Showing How Rhetoric
Works” (1969). Though Barthes’ literary applications of the art were primarily modern, in 1965
he discussed Dante with François Wahl for France-Culture, lamenting the reduction of rhetoric
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to figuration and adornment: true rhetoric concerns the “total organization of the spoken thing of
discourse.”11 In appropriately epideictic style, Barthes’ lecture at the famed Johns Hopkins
conference in October 1966 both starts and ends with appraising the multi-millennial rhetorical
tradition;12 Todorov, who accompanied Barthes to Baltimore, was almost equally preoccupied
with rhetoric and concluded his review of The Fashion System by optimistically positioning
semiology as a “distant echo of this classical discipline that had attempted an initial organization
of speeches, Rhetoric.”13
EPHE’s return to rhetoric culminated in the 1970 issue of its journal Communications:
“Recherches rhétoriques.” Front and center lay Barthes’ aide-mémoire on the old or “former”
system of rhetoric that, for Barthes, represented the constitutive, transhistorical feature of the
West. Here he expanded upon his lecture notes from 1964-65, overtly producing a structuralist
understanding of rhetoric’s synchronic and diachronic domains—and more covertly, a
commentary on structuralism itself. In its very title, his course “La rhétorique : esquisse
historique et structurale” (1970-71) at the University of Geneva highlighted the question of
rhetoric’s “events” versus its “structure.” The concomitant return of rhetoric and triumph of
structuralism between about 1964-1970, so poorly documented today, indeed represents l’avenir
de la rhétorique that Barthes first spoke of in the 1940s—but with a massive structuralist twist
that the young Barthes, ignorant of Saussure, could not have imagined. Looking back at
rhetoric’s fashionable rise in 1960s, Aron Kibédi Varga claimed that “we talk of it much but
know of it little.”14 In this scene, rhetoric was not a massive historical tradition intrinsically
worthy of exhaustingly patient or pedantic investigation, but a kind of suggestive means of
invention. The discipline of topoi itself became a topos for French thought.
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4.3

Journals

The moment of rhe-structuralism can be readily introduced through its journals. Tel Quel
was founded in 1960, Communications in 1961, and Poétique in 1970: the three publications
provide a preliminary approximation of rhe-structuralism in France, perhaps also adding in the
much older Critique (1946). Whereas Critique had been interdisciplinary and socially flexible,
following Bataille’s vision as its founder, Tel Quel witnessed “papism, excommunication,
tribunals”; basically, it was an intellectual clique.15
The less well-known journal Communications, vastly more academic and less polemical
than Tel Quel, came from the new Centre d'études de communication de masse (C.E.C.MAS) at
the sixth section of EPHE.16 Barthes wrote a brief manifesto for C.E.C.MAS in 1961:
consciously inspired by the American expression “mass media,”17 it claimed to be the first
French venue for studying mass communication in a variety of sociological, economic, and
ideological dimensions, and over the 1960s proved to be a most fertile host for combining
rhetoric and semiology. A few issues of Communications bear mention: “Recherches
sémiologiques” (1964) presented Barthes’ Elements of Semiology and “Rhetoric of the image”
for the first time, plus Todorov’s debut piece in Paris; “The Structural Analysis of Narrative”
(1966) successfully moved away from poetic language to narratology; “Recherches
sémiologiques: le vraisemblable” (1968) featured Barthes, Genette, Kristeva, and Todorov (who
positioned Corax, the apocryphal progenitor of rhetoric, as the first thinker of the vraisemblable).
Umberto Eco contributed several pieces to the journal. This is only to highlight a few key names
known to North Americans; untranslated thinkers such as Claude Bremond held
Communications together and built it into a still-enduring force.
After Tel Quel’s somewhat unassuming start, it launched its famously volatile and
byzantine plots into French intellectual life. Flipping through its first issues of 1960—spring,
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summer, and fall—one is amazed to find translations of T.S. Eliot, Virginia Woolf, and John
Donne, so genteel compared to the increasingly theoretical and rhetorically violent texts that
would soon follow. Genette timidly mentioned rhetoric in “Une poétique ‘structurale’?” (1961),
quickly followed by Foucault’s aggressive “Language to Infinity” (1963), which somehow seems
tame to compared to Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1968). The obviously polemical, political,
and pugnacious efforts of Tel Quel—a performed, applied rhetoric—enjoyed a symbiotic relation
to its theoretical discourses on writing and poetics. As Dosse puts it: “Tel Quel was
interdisciplinary from the start …The cornerstone of the project was rhetoric, a particular realm
of knowledge made popular by structuralism”; Tel Quel would shake up the literary scene via the
“new stylistics.”18 Writing in Tel Quel in 1964, Genette claimed that a “code of literary
connotations” represented rhetoric’s true “ambition,” making no mention of its much broader
classical functions; citing Paulhan, he linked the modernity of literature to the terrorist rejection
of rhetoric.19
During the 1960s, Barthes had one foot in Communications—and the other in Tel Quel.
After Tel Quel witnessed a streak of formalism from about 1962-1967, Barthes drew closer to
Sollers, Kristeva, and the journal’s board. According to Bremond, who had edited and written for
Communications with Barthes, this “provoked a break between people like Genette, Todorov,
and me, on the one hand, and Tel Quel, on the other.”20 Still, a rhetorical bond united them: by
1970, Bremond confidently touted rhetoric as an “essential dimension” of signification, no
longer an “anachronism” or “struggle of the avant-garde” in France; the figures (and thus
elocutio), he admitted, would be the focus of this rhetorical revival; it was uncertain whether
inventio, dispositio, memoria, and actio soon return.21 Paulhan had in fact linked the fortunes of
literature directly to inventio three decades earlier in his discourse on cliché and originality, but
this was not widely touted. Bremond correctly understood the tendentiousness of this
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appropriation; it would take years to balance out the neglected canons (and memoria and actio
struggle for recognition even among the most judicious rhetoricians).
Poétique, founded by Cixous, Genette, and Todorov in 1970, represents the most essential
and deliberate manifestation of rhe-structuralism, capping off almost a decade of meditations on
poetics for Genette. Its first issue noted a “reawakening of theoretical consciousness and
activity” after a long “slumber” following the “abolition of classical rhetoric” and the related
“quasi-monopoly” of literary history.22 Dosse characterizes Poétique as “a warhorse against
psychologizing theory,” grounded in the “structuralist and formalist orthodoxy” and diverging
from Barthes at this time because of his increasing commitment to the “textual ideology” of Tel
Quel.23 The first ever article in Poétique, however, was a Barthes piece on the theme of
beginnings. Dosse’s characterization of Poétique is largely correct, but it omits a very fertile
angle of thought derived from Nietzsche’s rhetoric course, published there in 1971, that violently
propelled metaphor into “the text of philosophy” (Derrida’s phrase from “White Mythology” in
the same issue).24 Just like Tel Quel, Poétique issued from Seuil, a publishing powerhouse that
became crucial to structuralism and often bested the great Gallimard, as well as Flammarion.
Pushing into social-political territory unknown to Poétique’s formalism, the journal
Literature sprang up in 1971 at “the structuralist university”: Vincennes (Paris VIII). As Henri
Mitterand, a Zola specialist, described the journal team: “We had a common core that was
vaguely Marxist and sociological, and some were rhetoricians impassioned by the study of forms
and ideology. Our two masters were Benveniste and Althusser.”25 Under headings such as
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“Lexique, rhétorique et idéologie,” Literature opened up properly rhetorical (i.e. effect-oriented)
terrain, although its primary object was still literature. Here, scholars such as Pierre Kuentz
began to firm up relations between rhetoric and linguistics that had been hastily thrown together
in the 1960s. Moving into the 1970s and beyond, a variety of manifestations of rhe-structuralism
emerged that rarely captivated Anglophone attention. Groupe µ (mu for metaphor), the collective
of six Belgian scholars at University of Liège, created the hyper-semiotic Rhétorique Générale
(1970) and later moved into studies of visual rhetoric. The Paris School of Semiotics, centred
around Greimas and vastly more technical than Barthes, noted the convergences and divergences
between rhetoric and semiotics (eg. Jacques Fontanille, Joseph Courtés).26 These groups were
very much centered around a linguistics-literature-communication axis. On the other hand, a
certain rhetoric-philosophy-classics axis spawned a confrontation between philosophy and its
“others.” Foucault, for instance, drew inspiration from Marcel Detienne’s The Masters of Truth
in Archaic Greece (1967) and a powerful classics milieu.27 A philosophical dialogue on sophists
(i.e. “masters of truth”) emerged, running through Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard all the
way up to Badiou and Cassin.

4.4

Rhetoric before structuralism

I am far from the first to note the encounter between rhetoric and structuralism. On
Dosse’s account, the “structuralist moment” witnessed a revival of rhetoric’s ancient “critical”
and “poetic” functions, i.e. the descriptive/analytic and productive/performative ones.28 What we

26

Joseph Courtés, "Rhétorique et sémiotique : De quelques divergences et convergences," Revue des Sciences
Religieuses 52, no. 3-4 (1978).
27

For his debt to classicists, see Charles H. Stocking, "Hesiod in Paris: Justice, Truth, and Power Between Past and
Present," Arethusa 50, no. 3 (2017).
Foucault deploys the figure of the sophist in two texts on Deleuze: “Ariane s'est pendue” (1969) and “Theatrum
Philosophicum” (1970). Foucault became, in his own words, “radically on the side of the sophists”: they had
succeeded in creating a strategic theory and practice of discourse. The problem was now to “study discourse, even
the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedure,” in short, “to ‘rhetorize’ philosophy.” My trans. Foucault, Dits et
Écrits, 1, 632,34.
Rhetoric would be increasingly linked to parrhesia in Foucault’s late work, which would take up contested terrain
between philosophy, politics, and rhetoric. See Geoffrey Bennington, "The Truth About Parrhesia: Philosophy,
Rhetoric, and Politics in Late Foucault," in Foucault/Derrida Fifty Years Later, ed. Penelope Deutscher Olivia
Custer, and Samir Haddad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
28

My trans. François Dosse, "Oxymore, le soleil noir du structuralisme," EspacesTemps 47-48 (1991): 140.
178

will see with Barthes, however, is not a fusion of equals, but perhaps a rhetorical base with
structuralist toppings. The history I have just reviewed represents an important consummation
point in the desire for rhetoric, but it is far from its origins.
If Barthes is indeed the “nurturing mother figure” of French structuralism (Dosse’s
phrasing), then totally predicating the postwar “spell of language” upon linguistics seems
unwise. Rather, this spell depends upon the broad cultural-pedagogical-institutional remnants of
rhetoric (Chapter One and Two), upon the exhaustion of Terror in Paulhan’s sense (Chapter
Three), and finally, upon the powerful theoretical apparatus of recent linguistics and its relation
to rhetoric under Barthes (Chapter Four). The concept-history approach to structuralism, as
important, practical, and academically standard as it may be, gives us a truly stunted sense of
rhetoric if isolated from pedagogic, political, religious, and aesthetic realms. Introducing
structuralism, however, is absolutely vital in grasping why Paulhan “failed” and Barthes
“succeeded” in their rhetorical revivals: had Paulhan valued, promoted, and cited linguists as
much as Barthes, a rather different scene could have played out.
One of the arguments threading through this dissertation asserts that rhetoric offered a
kind of structuralism-before-structuralism; scholars have been overly taken in by structuralism’s
marketing campaign which announced its newness, its rupture, and its credentials derived from
linguistics. We saw this in the first and second chapter: the elite core of rhetorical superstructure
never ceased to promote a skill set and value system oriented towards linguistic excellence and
highly formal reading skills (despite rhetoric’s increasing disrepute). And we saw this again in
the third chapter: Terror distains Rhetoric, but if it pushes too hard, becomes shackled to the
order of words that it seeks to escape. Thus Rhetoric is here to stay (and in Paulhan’s view, a
mild, thoughtful Rhetoric is preferable to Terror). From the more materialist vantage of Chapters
One and Two, and the more idealist vantage of Chapter Three, we confirm that rhetoric’s weak
survival tends to be narrated as a death for a variety of ideological, political, and aesthetic
reasons, coinciding with an exaggeration of the entities that allegedly replaced or succeeded
rhetoric. The institution feigns death—like a rabbit engaging in thanatosis—and once again lopes
off when the coast is clear.
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I will now introduce a new reading of Barthes by considering three major moments in the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s; each of these casts doubt upon whether he ever entirely “converted” to
structuralism from his original rhetoric-heavy paradigm. Then I will briefly contrast Barthes’
hybridized rhe-structuralism with the “structuralism for purists” associated with Dumézil,
Benveniste, and Lévi-Strauss. To begin this reassessment, we must note that Barthes knew
almost nothing of linguistics in the 1940s. In 1949, Barthes arrived in Alexandria and soon
thereafter met Greimas, who decisively pushed Barthes to read Saussure, Hjelmslev, and
linguistics in general.29 Yet up to that point, the only apparent linguistic encounter of the 1940s
was when Barthes took the term “degree zero” from Viggo Brøndal circa 1947.30 In the mid1940s one enters a fascinating alternate theoretical universe free of Saussure, especially in
Barthes’ “The Future of Rhetoric” of 1946 (unpublished until 2017). This text represents the
“smoking gun” of a rhetorical Barthes, a manifesto for why rhetoric should have a future. Long
before Barthes spars with the legacy of Lanson as upheld by Raymond Picard, “The Future of
Rhetoric” argues for an atavistic form of freewheeling nouvelle critique distancing itself from
Lanson’s historical insistence upon “influence, milieu, [and] rapprochement.”31 Though vague
and promissory, even by Barthes standards, this text advances a remarkable idea: rhetoric as a
basis for “theory,” as a science—in the relaxed French sense—of the human sciences.

4.5

Idiosyncrasies of Barthes

The version of Barthes I present here—the “rhetorical Barthes”—does not aim to be
authoritative, but rejects three common images of his work. Firstly, the Anglophone belief that
he was a “cultural theorist” with a view from nowhere, a thinker who can be parachuted into any
context without regard for his formative influences. Secondly, the pervasive narrative that
Barthes was a typical or representative structuralist: as we will see, he is so atypical as to make
the structuralist label deeply suspect. Thirdly, a tidy “poststructuralist” Barthes: as a partial
consequence of Barthes’ messy relationship to structuralism, it becomes difficult to imagine
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Barthes going beyond (“post”) a movement that never entirely accepted him, whose method he
could never practice in an entirely convincing way. The rhetorical Barthes does not aspire to
capture every work, but it does aspire to coherency (three rough critical schools attempt to
capture a coherent Barthes, a divided Barthes, and a multiple Barthes).32 Despite Barthes’
coherent fascination with rhetoric, however, he was racked by an uncertainty about the
institution of rhetoric—how to inherit or reject it— which emerges in the next chapter.
Whereas highlighting a “rhetorical” Barthes helps dispel these faulty images common
among Barthes readers, a different misunderstanding often emerges among the relatively few
scholars interested in his rhetoric. Whereas it is easy to assume the structuralist paradigm of the
1960s drew Barthes back to rhetoric—and this is the impression generated by Barthes’ work
between 1960-1980—I argue that a rhetorical paradigm underlies and predates a structuralist
paradigm, resulting in a strange hybrid or palimpsest effect. In other words, Barthes often took a
kind of rhetorical criticism and superimposed linguistic concepts and rationalizations on top of it,
giving him great breadth at expense of rigour. On the tone hand, linguists often considered him a
“bad structuralist”; on the other, flexible rhetorical models powered his thought. These models
reward the critic for certain intuitive leaps, avoiding the agonizingly slow methodological setup
that Barthes attempts, for instance, in The Fashion System. But this ungainly work is not what we
remember of him. Some of his most celebrated works, in my estimation, combine a rather
impressionistic linguistics with a somewhat traditional (and then-forgotten, and therefore fresh)
rhetorical impetus.
We will consider three important eras in his career to observe how this imperfect yet
ingenious palimpsest of “theory” amassed its sheets. First, the 1940s, when Barthes knew
nothing of structuralism but was immersed in classics and rhetoric. Second, the Mythologies era
of the 1950s: the appended essay “Myth Today” aggressively embraced Saussure and is
sometimes seen as a threshold to the mature, more theoretical Barthes. Third, the mid-1960s,
when Barthes worked hardest to promote structuralism in “The Structuralist Activity” (1963) and
other pieces. This peak of his structuralist passion coincided with his rhetoric seminars and
related explorations. Moving between these three eras (marked in the coming section titles), we
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will witness Barthes’ increasing adoption of modern linguistic concepts—which supplement, but
do not displace, his older rhetorical models. Then, Barthes’ sometimes dubious status as
structuralist will be assessed from the perspective of his critics and the better-legitimated
structuralists and linguists in Paris. This will help free Barthes from the doxa that burdens him,
and thus allow the next chapter to pursue his rhetoric more generously. This chapter pays
particular attention to Paul Valéry, a poet and critic who died in 1945 before French
structuralism took off, but guided Barthes towards a rehabilitation of rhetoric.
Ultimately, I agree with Dosse that Barthes represents a “subtle and supple incarnation”
of structuralism, “wrought of moods rather than of rigor.”33 What must be added to Dosse’s
account, and countless narratives of Barthes’ (pseudo) structuralism, is that his suppleness as
thinker and writer owes in large part to his rhetorical and classical training—which had its own
strictness and discipline, yet lacks rigor according to the standards of linguists, who tended to be
Barthes’ most ruthless critics. Amicable readers tend to trust Barthes on the methods he
professes to use—such as semiotics—and this conceals often unacknowledged techniques of
rhetorical provenance such as topoi, as we will see in the next chapter.
A few years after the curious vision of “The Future of Rhetoric” (1946), Barthes
encountered Saussure and began his canonized career as we know it. Yet we must not forget that
rhetoric was his first, and could have been his last, theoretical vehicle for literature and culture,
and came back decisively in his teaching and thought from 1964 onwards. What emerged in
practice, perhaps, was a rhetorical toolkit augmented with Saussure—and vying against
Saussure—tainting his supposed purity. When other linguists were later stitched into Barthes’
pied linguistic theories—Hjelmselv, and more dramatically, Benveniste—Barthes could always
return to the stability of classical rhetoric when the contemporary scene became too muddled. He
never attained a great distance, in my estimation, from what he famously called the “monumental
history” of rhetoric, a history so vast and “virtually immortal” that it has “digested regimes,
religions, [and] civilizations” and is indeed commensurate with two and half millennia of the
“historical and geographical West.”34
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4.6

The young Barthes and “The Future of Rhetoric” (1940s)

More than any other text, “The Future of Rhetoric” (1946)—unpublished until 2017—
demands we re-evaluate Barthes’ career and the standard story of how structuralism invited a
rhetorical revival. Here Barthes expounds the literary applications of rhetoric as a “science of
written language” before he knew anything of Saussure, semiotics, or structural linguistics.35
Barthes’ apology for rhetoric directly engages the pedagogical world we explored in Chapter
Two. The methods of Lanson, promoting the historical, philological study of literature, had
swept into the French education system and became particularly associated with the Sorbonne.
Having recently traversed this system, Barthes writes:
Within the framework of Lansonism … the traditional distinction between le fond and la
forme—content and form—blossomed. … Form is always the poor cousin; it prompts
only a short, vague commentary, a kind of false window for symmetry. Philology, which
nevertheless has the merit of rigor and of historic spirit, restricts itself to the chronology
of forms and does not try to penetrate the verbal automatisms belonging to a writer.36
In this early manifesto, Barthes seeks to part ways with the “scientific spirit” of Gustave
Lanson’s historical method: its claim of scientificity represents its “most debatable feature,”
“authoriz[ing] … the triumph of the letter over the spirit, the secondary over the essential,
collation over organized explanation.”37 Barthes wanted to retain Lanson’s approach as an
“available” option, but fundamentally, it was “unsatisf[ying]” and risks a “tyranny of influence,
milieu, rapprochement.”38 With great confidence, and perhaps a deficiency of details, Barthes
decrees, “There will be no materialist history of literature so long as literature is not restored to
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the practice of a language.”39 Though other discontents of Lansonism are not hard to find—
Sartre for instance—Barthes was almost uniquely certain rhetoric would act as remedy.
“The Future of Rhetoric” chronologically precedes the early sketches of Writing Degree
Zero, and certain conceptual seeds for the later work can be readily found (for instance, the
“rhetorical structures of the classical language” as they relate to social class and History with a
capital ‘H’).40 Barthes’ essay of 1946, however, perhaps best foreshadows the 1960s polemical
scene around Nouvelle Critique. Against the backdrop of a quasi-scientific and constraining
Lansonism, Barthes positions rhetoric, in 1946, as a more scientific and yet more liberated
“future”: “the future of criticism, an open, nondogmatic future, can only exist where the
mechanisms of language, and thus of thought, will be elucidated in accordance with a gradual
synthesis of the other sciences.”41 Such statements surprise us today because they upset the usual
narrative that Saussure’s French legacy was chiefly responsible for this thrust towards the
“mechanisms of language.” Any subsequent references to the “science of semiology” Barthes
makes, any claims about the various sciences and formalisms of literature derived from
linguistics, can be revaluated in light of statements such as these emerging several years before
his crucial encounter with Saussure:
Written thought must be reduced to an order of verbal processes, that is to say, to
rhetoric. It is, in fact, to a resurrection of rhetoric that we will sooner or later be led, not,
of course, as the art of persuasion through the means of formulas and formal
classifications, but very much as the science of written language, taking into account all
that experimental psychology will have to teach us about the acquisition of verbal habits,
the conditioning of speech, the construction, conclusion, and use of word groups, all of
which, under the name of expression or even themes, we will learn to recognize and
appreciate their importance.42
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Here Barthes looks to the linguistic-psychological extremes of rhetoric, rather than to its classical
centre of persuasion, for renewal (central to Aristotle, at least). The movement is bidirectional:
forward to “experimental psychology” and a linguistic paradigm, and yet backwards, about half a
century, to before the reign of Lansonism.
The purpose, in a word, was “freedom.” Barthes’ final two paragraphs proclaim a strange
and grandiose manifesto:
So, why this effort, why revive rhetoric, why prolong the life of literary criticism at all?
Well, simply for the sake of understanding. To understand is to create a kind of freedom,
and that aim is not immaterial. The most subjective disciplines arising from the cultural
practices and the art of a limited society, like aesthetics, psychology, or literary criticism,
will eventually become part of the gradual synthesis of the sciences; and it is necessary
for that to happen. At that time, exact knowledge of these matters will in itself create a
kind of freedom, if it is true that freedom is born the day one recognizes a necessity. Thus
we have the right to work toward a recognition of the necessity of poetics.
It would be ridiculous to prescribe or predict what freedom would produce in this
domain. It is enough to know that it is on the level of language, of social language, that
the fate of Belles Lettres will be played out in order to bring light into that taboo world of
verbal creation, even if this must contribute to the death of all that we would now call
literature.43
Though we are always told that the science of signs will be the triumphant liberator, the “taboo
world of verbal creation,” or rhetoric, represents a wellspring of Barthesean thought that rarely
failed to inspire him, despite his eventual distrust for rhetoric’s conservatisms. The rhetorical
“science of written language” that he seeks and admires would eventually taint his purity as a
classical structuralist (a Greimas or a Martinet). Out of the many classic works of Barthes that
should be revaluated in light of “The Future of Rhetoric,” Criticism and Truth ranks highly: two
decades before Barthes defended himself against the Lanson-Picard-Sorbonne axis in Criticism
and Truth, he already plotted against it here in 1946. Given that Barthes fulfilled various aspects
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of “The Future of Rhetoric” as he relentlessly returned to rhetoric in his later career, he cannot
innocently and exclusively inhabit the semiotic-structuralist-poststructuralist universe: in both
formation and destiny Barthes was sui generis.

4.7

Valéry and the young Barthes (1940s)

What incited Barthes to begin his rhetorical odyssey? When he wrote “The Future of
Rhetoric” in the spring of 1946, he proposed rhetoric’s rehabilitation right after his own
rehabilitation in the Leysin sanatorium, and had not yet read Paulhan. It is conceivable that
Barthes simply discovered classical rhetoric through earlier years of reading primary texts during
his education from the lycée onwards.44 Yet rather than mere exposure to (perhaps hostile) Greek
or Latin works, it is much more likely that Paul Valéry’s enthusiasm inspired the young Barthes
to call for rhetoric’s return. Valéry was the critic-poet par excellence for Barthes: as far back as
1932, the teenage Barthes excitedly referred to Beethoven and Valéry as his “great gods of music
and poetry.”45 Ultimately, Barthes’ career took relatively little interest in poetry, but poetics, as
developed by Valéry, constituted the first theoretical model that Barthes explored and remained a
crucial reference thereafter.
Rather than Valéry, critics conventionally regard André Gide as Barthes’ point of origin.
Barthes’ early tastes are worth reviewing. Though I contend Valéry-as-critic is vital, it is true
that the very young Barthes “knew no other writer than Gide”46; Gide was the star writer who
Barthes praised and emulated in some of his earliest texts (and was much more of a Rhetorician
than a Terrorist). Gide resonated with ancient Greece for Barthes—he describes Gide
“becom[ing] truly Greek, i.e., tragic”47 and Barthes’ “In Greece” derives from The Fruits of the
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Earth (1897); Gide was his “original language” as he reflects in Roland Barthes.48 In addition to
Gide, Barthes’ network of classical influences included Nietzsche (circa Birth of Tragedy) and
Hellenist Paul Mazon. Barthes’ first-ever publication was a Nietzsche-inspired piece entitled
“Culture and Tragedy” (1942); he pursued his dissertation on tragedy under Mazon, an
influential translator of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Homer, and Hesiod, and according to Barthes,
“the only teacher I loved and admired” as a student.49 Extrapolating from his early life, we might
envision Barthes on the path to becoming a Hellenist or a more conventional professor of French
literature. Yet after contracting tuberculosis, what Barthes could not become was a normalien:
mandatory medical testing at the ENS meant that Barthes need not bother preparing himself with
its entrance exams; he would not join his closest friend Phillippe Rebeyrol in the hypokhâgne.50
Instead he studies classics at the Sorbonne. There would be no agrégation de philosophie as with
Derrida and Foucault, and no easy comfort with the history and discipline of philosophy.
As important as this Greek-Gidean-Nietzschean Barthes may be, without Valéry and a
few lesser points of reference, Barthes’ early adoption of an avant-garde relation to rhetoric,
poetics, and language remains baffling, a relation too often seen as directly and solely inherited
from linguistics. Valéry the critic had much more to offer for thinking about poetic and rhetorical
language in the abstract than the aforementioned influences. “Literature,” claimed the mature
Barthes, “didn’t need Roman Jakobson to tell it it was language—the whole of classical
Rhetoric, up to the work of Paul Valéry, attests to the fact.”51 Valéry, curiously positioned by
Barthes as both part of classical rhetoric and part of something new, thus centrally motivates this
investigation. The rhetorical writings and teachings of Nietzsche, arguably more radical than
Valéry, were inaccessible to the young Barthes. Thus if we do not study the 1940s Barthes
alongside Valéry, it is easy to forget that he could have slipped into a much more conservative
and banal engagement with literature and language.
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Valéry embedded himself in some of Barthes’ earliest memories and intellectual
experiences—he met him as a boy and attended his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in
December 1937.52 In Barthes’ inaugural lecture of January 1977, he would hearken back four
decades to Valéry, “whose lectures I attended in this very hall.”53 In “On The Teaching of
Poetics at the Collège de France”, Valéry declares, “Literature is, and cannot be anything but, a
kind of extension and application of certain properties of language.”54 This declaration became a
consequential manifesto for rhe-structuralism, and launched, for instance, Todorov’s paper at the
Johns Hopkins conference and his work The Poetics of Prose (1971). It was also well known to
Genette, equally invested in poetics.55 Valéry had published two volumes under the name Tel
Quel in the early 1940s, and although the name of the later Tel Quel journal supposedly derives
from Nietzsche, Valéry’s poetics indeed attempted to perceive literature “as such” or “as it is.”
Though structuralism in the capacious sense would need Saussure in order to tackle the breadth
of les sciences humaines, one can imagine an alternate timeline of literary criticism ignorant of
Saussure and enamored with Valéry, whom Barthes often celebrated but was no longer
fashionable.
Valéry lamented the disappearance of rhetoric from teaching, a complaint that Barthes
seemingly internalized at a young age. The poet-critic explains how the figures of classical
rhetoric reveal the “nascent state” of language:
The formation of figures is inseparable from that of language itself, all of whose
“abstract” words are obtained by some misuse or shift in signification, followed by
forgetting the primitive sense. The poet who multiplies the figures thus only finds
language in its nascent state. Furthermore, considered from sufficient elevation, can we
not consider Language itself as the masterpiece of literary masterpieces, since all creation
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in this realm reduces itself to a combination of forces from a given vocabulary, according
to forms instituted once and for all?56
The near equation of literature with language, and the impetus to reflect on language as such, are
crucial milestones here. Valéry, in effect, was the closest thinker the young Barthes had to a
Saussure or a Jakobson: someone who claimed to consider language itself. The young Barthes
had wanted to see “literature … restored to the practice of a language,” true to Valéry’s
conception: “Language … is a creation of practice.”57 Late in his life, Barthes was still touting
Valéry as an underappreciated visionary, who was ahead of his time in pursuing the “problems of
language.”58 Gide perhaps did more for Barthes’ style and self-understanding, but Valéry had set
the terms of the linguistic and critical problems that Barthes took it upon himself to interrogate.
According to Barthes’ “The Future of Rhetoric,” Valéry became a poet, in part, to grasp the
“very mechanisms of thought”: “Everything comes back to poetry, rarely so experimental, and
conveys through the means of rhetoric a nostalgia for the animality (which poets call innocence)
by which man would be released from thought, that is to say, from adapting beyond verbal
automatisms.”59 From this statement, it might be surprising that Barthes’ later career
overwhelming favoured prose over verse.
As he attended Valéry’s lectures, Barthes wrote his dissertation on Aeschylus (1941). He
draws his dissertation’s epigram from Valéry’s work Tel Quel I: “Ancient rhetoric considered as
ornaments and artifices those figures and relations which successive refinements by poetry have
come to call essential; and which the future progress in analysis will one day designate as effects
of deep properties of what we might call formal sensibility.”60 Barthes’ rehabilitation of rhetoric
and efforts to address its shortcomings in the 1960s seemingly represent the “future progress in
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analysis” to which Valéry alludes. Over the next decades, Barthes, like Valéry’s vision of the
future captured in his epigraph, kept the ancient origins of rhetoric close at hand, but did so in
hopes of reaching the “deep properties” of “formal sensibility.” And Barthes would do much,
like Valéry, to part ways with traditional French approaches to the history of literature. Indeed,
Valéry had given various historians of literature such as Hippolyte Taine the memorable title of
“prolix mutes.” These prolix mutes often made the history of literature a chronicle of works and
authors, whereas Valéry sought “a History of the mind as it produces or consumes ‘literature’,
and this history could even be made without having pronounced the name of a writer.”61 Though
Barthes downplays the mental categories important to Valéry, in Writing Degree Zero he hopes
for “a history of literary expression, … a purely formal history”62 or “an Introduction to what a
History of Writing might be.”63 Yet since the work so directly engages Sartrean problematics
with heavy-handed Marxist categories, Valéry’s impact on Barthes has been underestimated;
Barthes certainly did not derive his interest in formalism and language from Sartre.

4.8

Reflecting on Valéry’s Legacy (1940s as seen from the 1960s)

From the later vantage of Barthes’ rhetoric seminars of the mid-1960s, he looked back to
Valéry and credited him for dispelling crucial superstitions. In his seminar meeting “Valéry and
rhetoric” (1966) Barthes begins by reflecting on the decrepit state of the rhetorical “empire”—as
he often did—and names two of its most serious French enemies: Descartes and Pascal. Barthes
motivates his analysis of Valéry’s rhetoric by considering his response to Pascal:
We can see that Valéry is reproaching Pascal for not knowing—or rather for pretending
not to know—what I will call the fatal theatre of language. Language is a theatre to which
man is condemned. Rhetoric is the discipline that transforms that condemnation into
freedom. It is a technique of responsibility. And it is not nothing.
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Thus Valéry’s conception of Rhetoric is profound, serious. It is not a simple pastiche of
classical conceptions, even if it does not have their scope, because Valéry completely
despised the Rhetoric of the dispositio. [arrangement]64
Rhetoric in Valéry’s sense liberates man from the “fatal theatre of language,” a serious
undertaking far removed from surface effects of rhetoric Barthes reviewed in the beginning of
his seminar: “pompous, cold, conventional, ornate writing.”65 Barthes goes on to establish three
principles of Valéry’s conception of rhetoric:
[1.] Literature is language; there is a universe of words. …
[2.] If literature is a language, it is because the very function of the language inevitably
divides in two. There is a practical language, meant to transform reality and thereby be
abolished as soon as it achieves its goal. … And then there is poetic language (let us say
more generally, literary language), which is essentially speculation on palpable properties
of language; there is an opacity and an independence from the form. ...
[3.] The form has a preeminent value because the content does not.66
In and of themselves, these three principles fail to surprise: what is exciting is the route that
Valéry and then Barthes took to thinking about language as such without Saussure or Jakobson.
As Barthes points out, Valéry and Saussure “knew nothing of each other.”67 And yet Valéry, via
his mediations on rhetoric and poetics, certainly anticipated some of the more strictly scientific
work on language: “If literature is a language, then it is, in some way, a matter for linguistics,
and from this perspective, we are only at the very beginning of inquiries and explanations in
which Valéry is already considered a predecessor. Haven’t some of his texts on the sign just been
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taken up again in the review of pure linguistics, Cahiers de Ferdinand de Saussure?”68 For
Barthes, Saussure is something like a “more anxiety-prone” version of Valéry: they both
independently wondered and worried about the “social contract” underlying language.69
Though the recently publication of Barthes’ “The Future of Rhetoric” (1946) and “Valéry
and Rhetoric” (1966) accentuates these debts, the Valérean Barthes already reveals himself in
what Anglophones deem his most iconic text, “The Death of the Author” (1967), which was
strangely published in English before French (it will be covered in more detail in the next
chapter). As Barthes explains, the attempt to undermine the “Author’s empire” is not new:
Valéry, entangled in a psychology of the ego, greatly edulcorated Mallarmean theory, but
led by a preference for classicism to conform to the lessons of Rhetoric, he continued to
cast the Author into doubt and derision, emphasized the linguistic and “accidental” nature
of his activity, and throughout his prose works championed the essentially verbal
condition of literature.70
This untimely Valérean path Barthes took—the rhetorical path, the “linguistic” and “verbal”
relation to literature—upsets the story of Barthes’ structuralism. Yet Valéry’s poetics (which
begin to displace the Author), and his preference for elocutio over dispositio, partly explains the
extreme skew towards figurative language (and away from persuasion) that gripped the 1960s
and beyond.
The thinkers whom Barthes called “writers not far from rhetors”71—such as Valéry and
Paulhan—were often out of joint with contemporary movements of thought. As Genette realized
while working closely with Barthes, there was something “simultaneously quite modern and
quite ancient” in the Valéryean “idea of literature,” touching upon New Criticism, Russian
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Formalism, and contemporary structuralism.72 Indeed, Valéry and Barthes’ criticisms of the
Author are less radical than often believed: both hearken back to before the dawn of literary
positivism and biographical criticism—as Barthes noted, the author “still reigns in manuals of
literary history, in biographies of writers”73—and this era, on the institutional timescale of
rhetoric, is not so long ago.

4.9

Early historical ideas on rhetoric and politics (1940s)

Though Valéryean poetics represented a vital “synchronic” dimension of rhetoric, the
young Barthes also began considering rhetoric’s historical, political, and institutional status,
associated with l'écriture classique. For a time during the 1940s, Barthes came close to a rather
naïve and uncritical relationship to “the classics.” His “Plaisir aux classiques” (1944) for
instance, explains rhetoric’s glory in the seventeenth century:
This century has given rhetoric its place and its greatness. The problems of rhetoric are
neither specialist, incidental, nor useless; the art of speaking well commands, in a
decisive way, the essential operations of life. It is the key to every excellence. Can those
who humanity considers to be great men do without being writers? …The multiform and
methodical investigations of classical rhetoric towards the maxim, eloquence, the treatise
and the dialogue, I read as an essential attempt of the mind to renew the myth of Orpheus
and tie objects and unruly men to speech.74
Such is the very first reference to rhetoric in Barthes’ Œuvres complètes: affirmative, backwardlooking, and embedded in an essay with enough clichés and uncritical statements to render it
rather foreign to the typical Barthes reader who might begin with Writing Degree Zero (1953) or
later works. Whereas “Pleasure in the classics” displays little political awareness, a mere three
years later he mounts a political critique of clarté française in “Should Grammar Be Killed Off?”
(1947), culminating in Writing Degree Zero’s claim that “classical writing is, needless to say, a
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class writing.”75 Henceforth Barthes will often associate certain periods of rhetoric with
bourgeois writing or state power.

4.10 Rhetoric in Writing Degree Zero (1950s)
Brash and peculiar, the Barthes of Writing Degree Zero resembles, we could say, a Sartre
intrigued by rhetoric and language—a “committed” Sartre with a dash of Paulhan. The anxieties
over engaged literature play out over terms such langue, style, and écriture, as well as over a
hastily sketched out history of rhetoric as it relates to literature. Barthes elaborates, for the first
time, an important hypothesis linking the death of rhetoric to the birth of modern literature: “It
was at the very moment when treatises on rhetoric aroused no more interest, towards the middle
of the nineteenth century, that classical writing ceased to be universal and that modern modes of
writing came into being”; for “classical writers … the only thing in question was rhetoric,
namely the ordering of discourse in such a way as to persuade.”76 But over the last century,
Barthes claims, writers from Mallarmé to the Surrealists are not undertaking “rhetorical
achievement or some bold use of vocabulary” but the “call[ing] into question” of “the existence
of Literature itself.”77
The short chapter “Writing and Silence” of Writing Degree Zero leaps right out of the
Rhetoric-Terror milieu of the previous chapter. Without using the word “terror,” Barthes
describes a Terrorist sect who has “undermined literary language”:
They have ceaselessly exploded the ever-renewed husk of clichés, of habits, of the formal
past of the writer; in a chaos of forms and a wilderness of words they hoped they would
achieve an object wholly delivered of History, and find again the freshness of a pristine
state of language. But such upheavals end up by leaving their own tracks and creating
their own laws. The threat of becoming a Fine Art is a fate which hangs over any
language not based exclusively on the speech of society. In a perpetual flight forward
from a disorderly syntax, the disintegration of language can only lead to the silence of
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writing. The final agraphia of Rimbaud or of some Surrealists (who ipso facto fell into
oblivion), this poignant self-destruction of Literature, teaches us that for some writers,
language, the first and last way out of the literary myth, finally restores what it had hoped
to avoid, that there is no writing which can be lastingly revolutionary, and that any
silence of form can escape imposture only by complete abandonment of
communication.78
A certain literary practice of language that “restores what it had hoped to avoid” is precisely
what Paulhan explores in Flowers, and the “object wholly delivered of History,” sought out by
the “Terrorists,” is reminiscent of Sartre. To this quasi-terrorism, Barthes opposes the rhetoric of
“craftsmanlike writing” (écriture artisanale).79 Though these dimensions of rhetoric associated
with “classical” or “craftsmanlike” writing were politically important for Barthes, they did not
cause the dramatic alignment and near-equation of literature and language indicative of Valéry’s
influence on Barthes and structuralist criticism. Barthes’ relation to Surrealism will be much
more oblique than that of Paulhan and Sartre: though “Surrealism helped desacralize the image
of the Author,” Barthes does not present it, or Terror, with the visceral intimacy of the older
critics.80

4.11 Mythologies (1950s)
After sketching out rhetorical features of the relatively obscure pre-Mythologies era, we
now turn to his better-known 1950s work. Even a work as famous as Mythologies—published in
1957, with parts appearing as early as 1952—has not been particularly well connected to his
1940s thought, partly because of his troublesome essay “Myth Today” (which has been offered
as an inflexion point between the immature and mature Barthes).81 This famous piece, a
retroactive theorization, cannot be deemed a trustworthy guide to the myth analyses that Barthes
undertook earlier: as he puts it, “the method is not very scientific and did not pretend to be so;
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that’s why the methodological introduction only came later, after reading Saussure.”82 Yet when
we read Mythologies in light of his letters, his dissertation on Aeschylus, and especially this
affinity towards rhetorical analysis, the analytic art practiced by Barthes appears much more
intuitive and arguably more elegant than the heavy-handed semiotic framework developed in
“Myth Today.”
Why myth in the first place, we might ask? Why did Barthes take this as his unit or object
instead of, for instance, an update on Flaubert’s idée recue, or a more Marxist notion of
ideology? At first, one would imagine that Barthes’ myths have nothing to do with Greek myths.
He indeed takes pains in “Myth Today” to strip the terms myth and mythology of their classical
connotations; anything can be a myth; no magical, divine, or supernatural senses are implied. Yet
Barthes began considering various mythological and magical forms of thinking at the time of his
diplôme d’études supérieures (DES) in a profoundly classical context, making this era crucial to
investigate.
In his masters-level dissertation entitled “Evocations and Incantations in Greek Tragedy”
(1941), Barthes becomes fixated upon the “magic” power of the word. Indeed, these excerpts
establish this as its central topic:
The origin of this dissertation is the aim to study a number of aspects of the problem of
musical catharsis in Greek tragedy. ... This meant returning to the study of those
incantations and evocations in which, by word, gesture, sound and thought, the man-actor
tries to have an effect upon the gods or the dead.83
With its intense use of the asyndeton, nominal phrases, short, chopped periodology,
alliterations, repetitions, the whole style of tragic incantation is designed to give the
maximum efficiency to the word: lyrical efficiency for those who wish, at all cost, to
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express a rare and violent feeling, and a magical efficiency for those who wish, via an
ennobled [sic], to reach the most profound essence of death and of divinity.84
The intrinsic power of the word is enormous; once used it has incalculable
consequences.85
In all primitive peoples the word possesses a magic power. The Greeks did not escape
this belief, but they dressed it up using a very subtle deployment of their imagination: a
name has an influence on destiny (Ajax, Œdipus, Helen, Ulysses, etc.).86
There is something profound and frightening in this unbreakable power of the word for
the Greeks.87
Whether treated seriously or dismissed as juvenilia, the fixation on magic and the word is
remarkable. A few years later, in a letter to his closest friend Rebeyrol, Barthes shifts from
pursuing “the word” in the context of Greek tragedy to understanding the whole of literature
using the “mythological value of the word,” moving from “magic to art, to poetry, and to
rhetoric”:
Since my graduate degree, I have been pursuing some vague but powerful ideas on the
mythological value of the word. It seems to me that literature could be considered from
this perspective. There’s an imperceptible and uniform movement from magic to art, to
poetry, to rhetoric; that is what my thesis demonstrated. That marvelous thread could set
us free from the idea, the content, to grasp literature in its creative—that is to say,
organic—phase where it is most pure, as nascent oxygen is the strongest. Basically,
everything holds together and I anticipate exciting connections: a history of literary art on
the surface—that is, at its greatest depths—captured in samples, cuts taken from the
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purest episodes in the continual drama of the word: the Greek lyric, sophistry,
scholasticism, euphuism, classical rhetoric, Romantic illusion … I’m very ill-prepared for
it [this plan] given my deficiencies: a weakness of intelligence; the very cancer of the
word; … philosophical incompetence in a time when you can no longer do literature
without a degree in philosophy; and the frequent feeling of having an intelligence—at its
best moments—that dates back about fifty years and would be scorned by those more
strictly in tune with the present times.88
This letter suggests Barthes wants to export magic, myth, and rhetoric out of antiquity; he wants
to “set us free from the idea, the content”—and thus, like Valéry, to prioritize the study of forms.
When it comes to the myth analyses that would be published in the early to mid 1950s, we
should note that myth analysis works largely without semiotics and can instead function via
rhetorical analysis.89 In a sense, Barthes tries to ascertain the forms of an argument within a
myth. In some cases, this is quite literally an argument made by certain individuals. In “Blind
and Dumb Criticism,” Barthes maps out the common argumentation of critics: “I don’t
understand [Marxism or existentialism], therefore you are idiots.”90 More commonly, however,
Barthes works with a dispersed, collective discourse, whose “speaker” is the (petite) bourgeoisie.
As Barthes later put it, “What defines Mythologies is a systematic and tireless assault on a type
of monster I called la petite bourgeoisie (to the point of turning it into a myth).”91 This is not, in
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essence, a “semiotic” assault. The quasi-Marxist perspective combined with clever rhetorical
insights perhaps resembles Kenneth Burke more than applied semiotics.92
In Mythologies’ first and perhaps most famous example, “The World of Wrestling,” the
wrestlers’ physique “constitutes a basic sign”93; but there is no rigorous semiotic notion of sign
here.94 However, Barthes deploys concepts emerging from the dramatic and rhetorical material
of his dissertation era: the “natural meaning” of wrestling’s rhythm “is that of rhetorical
amplification”; “Wrestling presents man’s suffering with all the amplification of tragic masks.”95
Though of course he radically shifted towards (petite) bourgeois society rather than Greek
tragedy and French literature, he did not simply jettison his rhetorical and classical disposition
from the mid 1940s. Here emerged the nexus of myth, mythology, and mythical/magical
words/signifiers, suggesting that Mythologies, at least in its title and key terms, simply would not
exist without these formative Greek years.
“Myth Today” embraces Saussure and speaks incessantly of signs, signifiers, signifieds,
and signification. Perhaps the most quotable and influential insight of “Myth Today” is its
discovery of “the very principle of myth,” which is that myth “transforms history into nature.”96
However, in one of the least quoted passages, Barthes claims that “it is through their rhetoric that
bourgeois myths outline the general prospect of this pseudo-physis [pseudo-nature] which
defines the dream of the contemporary bourgeois world.”97 We should thus modify his famous
decree: myth rhetorically transforms history into nature or “pseudo-physis” (perhaps another
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Greek trace of his dissertation). Furthermore, Barthes admits that the “rhetorical forms” of
bourgeois myth are always accessible even though “we cannot yet draw up the list of the
dialectical forms.” He stipulates that:
One must understand here by rhetoric a set of fixed, regulated, insistent figures,
according to which the varied forms of the mythical signifier arrange themselves. These
figures are transparent inasmuch as they do not affect the plasticity of the signifier; but
they are already sufficiently conceptualized to adapt to an historical representation of the
world (just as classical rhetoric can account for a representation of the Aristotelian
type).98
Thus the linkage between myth or magic and rhetoric again returns, but unlike the letter of 1945
and the dissertation, Barthes speaks of the (mythical) “signifier” in place of the (magic or
mythological) “word.” He then goes on to elaborate seven heterogenous “figures” of myth,
although they should not be called “figures” strictly speaking: they are essentially macroscopic
argumentative or logical patterns rather than microscopic syntactic-semantic twists. We could
call them persuasive tactics:
1. The inoculation
2. The privation of History
3. Identification
4. Tautology
5. Neither-Norism
6. The quantification of quality
7. The statement of fact99
Some of these have analogues in traditional logical fallacies; for instance, neither-norism (nicer
in French: ninisme) resembles the argument to moderation. Soon after presenting these, Barthes
concludes that “the very end of myths is to immobilize the world: they must suggest and mimic a
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universal order which has fixated once and for all the hierarchy of possessions.”100 He
effectively outlines a rhetoric of stagnation, the means by which bourgeois myth “stifles” man
“in the manner of a huge internal parasite.”101
Remarkably, this kind of political-rhetorical analysis has nothing to do with semiotics and
instead springs from the classic questions of political rhetoric: how are opponents asserting their
position? By which persuasive means? How to refute them? For although Barthes writes a
section called “Myth on the Left”—in which myth is ephemeral and “inessential”—it is in “Myth
on the Right” where Barthes deploys heavy rhetorical analysis to disarm bourgeois ideology.
Though eager to prove the value of semiology in the first part of “Myth Today,” its terminology
wanes towards the end as Barthes sharpens his rhetorical and ideological critique, foregrounding
the classical function of rhetoric as a way of observing the available means of persuasion.
Barthes wields, at times like these, a structuralism-without-signs, an analytical approach that
decomposes objects into rhetorical functions. After the liminal text “Myth Today,” Barthes
would increasingly use Saussurean terms and mix them with other linguists’, but it is not clear
that he ever entirely displaced rhetorical analysis as a habit of critique.
In the 1950s, another ingredient gets added to the stew of structuralism(s), which has
nothing to do with Saussure. Lucien Goldmann’s The Hidden God (1955) and its “genetic
structuralism” (if it can be called structuralism at all) influences Barthes’ conception of the
sociology and history of literature, though the work does not have much in common in method
with Barthes’ On Racine (1963, with parts appearing earlier). Goldmann’s genetic structuralism,
roughly speaking, constitutes a Marxist sociology of literature (following György Lukács) that
allows structures to evolve and be historicized. This differs immensely from the Lévi-Straussian
structuralism of mathematical abstractions and direct imports from linguistics. Though Barthes
much more strongly identifies with Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, he keeps the door open for
sociological and Marxist explorations aligned with Goldmann, his EPHE colleague. Barthes
appreciated Goldman’s “history of the signified in literature,” but hoped to expand—if
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possible—to a whole “history of significations.”102 Rhetoric will offer Barthes an exploration of
both the history and mechanisms of signification. Barthes notes that despite Racine’s reputation
as “the most ‘natural’ of our poets,” figures of thought are legion in this work, and calls for a
“modern work on classical rhetoric” in 1960.103

4.12 “The Structuralist Activity” (1960s)
Moving from the 1950s into the booming years of French structuralism in the 1960s, Barthes
still has not entirely abandoned his rhetorical origins despite taking on the role of chief
structuralist impresario. This becomes clear in the readily-anthologized essay “The Structuralist
Activity” (1963). What Barthes calls the “activity” of the structuralist mirrors a long tradition of
rhetoric that analyzed the genres, occasions, and especially the means of persuasion. In this essay
one can indeed replace the many instances of the words “structural” and “structuralist activity”
with “rhetorical” and “rhetorical analysis” and end up with a cogent text. Barthes writes:
What is new is a mode of thought (or a “poetics”) which seeks less to assign completed
meanings to the objects it discovers than to know how meaning is possible, at what cost
and by what means. Ultimately, one might say that the object of structuralism is not man
endowed with meanings but man fabricating meanings, as if it could not be the content of
meanings which exhausted the semantic goals of humanity, but only the act by which
these meanings, historical and contingent variables, are produced. Homo significans: such
would be the new man of structural inquiry.104
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If we bond together, as Kenneth Burke does, meaning and persuasion, we understand in this
passage the rhetorical fabrication of meaning, which is to say, meaning as an outcome of
persuasion. The goal of rhetoric, as envisioned by Aristotle and reusing Barthes’ words, was to
“know how [persuasion] is possible, at what cost and by what means.” Or one could take the
approach of changing or restricting the semantic to the pragmatic or instrumental in the above
passage and arrive at homo rhetoricus. Yet this is not even necessary. Compare Barthes’ sense of
structuralism to I.A. Richards’ call from 1936 for a “revived Rhetoric” that:
must itself undertake its own inquiry into the modes of meaning—not only, as with the
old Rhetoric, on a macroscopic scale, discussing the effects of different disposals of large
parts of a discourse—but also on a microscopic scale by using theorems about the
structure of the fundamental conjectural units of meaning and the conditions through
which they, and their interconnections, arise.105
Barthes’ desire to know “how meaning is possible” resembles Richards’ “inquiry into the modes
of meaning,” which seeks “structure,” “units,” and “conditions.” Richards notes that persuasion
“poaches” on the other aims of discourse, hence his desire to cast a wider net.106 Unless one
provides strict criteria that rhetorical analysis must operate on a lesser domain of texts, the
analytical-taxonomical strain of thinking that runs through Aristotle and Quintilian—at least in
terms of its goals—is not fundamentally different from Barthes’ survey of structuralism at this
time.

4.13 The rustle of Greece (1960s)
Towards the end of “The Structuralist Activity,” Barthes channels Hegel’s understanding
of signification among the ancient Greeks. Barthes was no expert Hegelian, but he drew
extensively on Hegel’s account to evoke the activities of structuralism, as well as his own. In The
Philosophy of History, Hegel tackled the oracle at Dodona: “The rustling of the leaves of the
sacred oaks was the form of prognostication there. Bowls of metal were also suspended in the
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grove. But the sounds of the bowls dashing against each other were quite indefinite, and had no
objective sense; the sense—the signification—was imparted to the sounds only by the human
beings who heard them.”107 This is indeed the ultimate source of the “rustle” (bruissement) of
language that so preoccupied Barthes. “Hegel gave a better definition of the ancient Greeks,”
claims Barthes, “by outlining the manner in which they made nature signify than by describing
the totality of their ‘feelings and beliefs’ on the subject.”108 In “The Structuralist Activity,”
Barthes drew heavily on Hegel’s Greeks:
According to Hegel, the ancient Greek was amazed by the natural in nature; he constantly
listened to it, questioned the meaning of mountains, springs, forests, storms. …
Subsequently, nature has changed, has become social: everything given to man is already
human, down to the forest and the river which we cross when we travel. But confronted
with this social nature, which is quite simply culture, structural man is no different from
the ancient Greek: he too listens for the natural in culture, and constantly perceives in it
not so much stable, finite, “true” meanings as the shudder of an enormous machine which
is humanity tirelessly undertaking to create meaning.109
Hegel speaks of a “shuddering awe,” “an instinctive dread” in the Greeks “when a signification
is perceived in a form” that is at once attractive and repulsive.110 In Barthes’ account of l'homme
structural from 1963, who is “no different from the ancient Greek,” the function of the artist and
analyst is ultimately that of the “manteia; like the ancient soothsayer, he speaks the locus of
meaning but does not name it.”111 Barthes’ understanding of literature as a particularly “mantic
activity” is thus indebted to Hegel via the curious alignment of the ancient Greek and l'homme
structural.
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This text leads naturally to Barthes’ investigations the following year into protostructuralist rhetoricians such as Aristotle. Rhetorical analysis is very much a “structuralist
activity”: rhetoricians are always listening for this “shudder” of the “enormous machine” that
produces persuasion, and, following Plato’s critiques, are less interested in or indifferent towards
“stable, finite, ‘true’ meanings.” Although there are thousands of rhetorical manuals for
producing texts, rhetorical analysis, like structuralist analysis, generally concerns itself with
immanent features and does not have a general theory or treatise simultaneously suitable for all
its possible objects. This structuralist manifesto mentions Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, and Dumézil,
yet remains remarkably open to a portable, transhistorical structuralism. Barthes does say that
structuralists reveal themselves through the lexicon of signifier and signified, langue and parole.
And yet he pushes beyond Saussure to a very broad “structuralist activity” whose “goal … is to
reconstruct an ‘object’ in such a way as to manifest thereby the rules of functioning (the
‘functions’) of this object.”112 For Barthes, Saussure yields the structuralist insignia, but the
“activity” may as well be Greek. Barthes savoured Hegel’s imagery of “rustling” Greek winds
long after the mid-1960s structuralist boom. Even in 1975, Barthes pictured himself “like the
ancient Greek as Hegel describes him.” Whereas the Greek listened to the “rustle of branches, of
springs, of winds, in short, the shudder of Nature,” Barthes listens to “the rustle of language, that
language which for me, modern man, is my Nature.”113 Detaching himself from rigorous
linguistics, he sought new rustlings of language, associated with utopia, in the avant-garde.

4.14 The myth of Baltimore (1960s)
Up until this point, we have considered a rooted, Parisian Barthes. Though his journey to
the famed Johns Hopkins conference in the fall of 1966 was not a monumental event for Barthes,
it has been invested with such an aura, centered on Derrida and the origins of “French Theory” in
America, that it should be addressed. Returning to this conference highlights Angermuller’s
point—that “there is no post-structuralism in France”—and enhances my contrast of the
rhetorical regions of structuralism with the more purist ones associated with anthropology and
linguistics.
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One could write a Barthesean critique of the “myth of Baltimore”: the naturalizing effects
of the tale of the Johns Hopkins conference that evacuated the histories of nuanced FrancoAmerican intellectual commerce and the dispersed centres of structuralism. It is a seminal myth
for Americans, for it perhaps installs Derrida as a Hermes figure, a trickster who outwits and
ousts Lévi-Strauss, a fleet-footed emissary shuttling back and forth across the Atlantic. In reality,
neither Lévi-Strauss nor structuralism was vanquished in France. Derrida admits this fated
“autumnal conference” with his “elders” (Barthes, Lacan, Vernant, and so on) cannot be the
dawn of poststructuralism (since this is a concept Derrida rejects) but believes it symbolized an
important Franco-American “alliance” of sorts.114 This was not exactly, however, Derrida’s
conference, at least not by design. It was in fact organized between the sixth section of EPHE
and Johns Hopkins115 and must be understood by de-emphasizing the spectacular nature of
Derrida’s performance.
Derrida, Barthes, and Todorov flew to the conference together, but two key invited
speakers associated with EPHE and rhetoric could not attend—Genette and Jakobson.116
Barthes’ talk, in effect, condensed his EPHE rhetoric seminars, but steeled them with a polemical
edge—one designed to parry and jab rather than, as with Derrida, to slice in half. Dosse’s
account of the conference first singles out Barthes as one of the “stars of the effervescence in
French intellectual life,” noting that Barthes begins his talk with the “repression of rhetoric” that
caused a rift between literature and linguistics.117 Barthes offers what he terms semio-criticism, a
pursuit “much more than stylistics,” as a means of repairing this conflict, a way by which
“literature and linguistics are in the process of finding each other again.”118 We should highlight
“finding each other again”: this recognition pleased classicists in the room, like Pietro Pucci: “As
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a classical philologist, I am very happy to see that rhetoric has returned to a place of importance
in modern literature and hear this return of rhetoric spoken of and justified by a sort of discourse
on rhetoric in the classical world.”119 Barthes concludes his talk by again invoking rhetoric as
antecedent: “literature is itself a science … of human language. Its investigation is not …
addressed to the secondary forms and figures that were the object of rhetoric, but to the
fundamental categories of language.”120 This closing thought was an echo of the youthful
dissertation epigraph he drew from Valéry: rhetoric, inadequate in itself, would point the way to
the deepest categories of language. Todorov’s first and final sentences also engaged Valéry’s
gauntlet: to regard, in rather brutal terms, literature in near equality with language itself. If
Genette and Jakobson had actually attended the conference, their contributions might have
engaged this same terrain mapped out by Valéry.
Barthes, despite various attempts, did not take to America; American critics, at this
conference, did not take to Barthes’ rhetorical project (they would later adore him in general).
The spirit of Barthes’ rapprochement seemed lost on Paul de Man, the most hostile audience
member, who would later stake his career on a sort of “deep rhetoric.” He castigated Barthes: his
methods failed to “show any progress over those of the Formalists” and present “a false
conception of classicism and romanticism … simply wrong.”121 Derrida proved much more
hospitable, and understood Barthes as suggesting that new literature strives to “think the
adventure ... that was Western history, the history of metaphysics.”122 The next year, Barthes
was again in Baltimore, and wrote to Derrida that reading Of Grammatology there was “like a
book by Galileo in the land of the inquisition, or more simply a civilized book in Barbary!”123
Barthes’ adventure in America was thus a brief one, unlike Derrida’s.
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North American academics oriented towards literary criticism are eager to understand
this event as if Derrida was Jimi Hendrix and structuralism was the guitar he set ablaze on the
Woodstock stage, heralding a new thing called “post-structuralism” in his virtuoso performance.
Yet this term, applied at this early and strange juncture, remains remarkably indeterminate:
Derrida virtually had a room full of card-carrying structuralists from the sixth section of EPHE
(Social and Economic Sciences) he could have accosted, yet he targeted the absent Lévi-Strauss,
who hails from EPHE’s fifth section (Sciences of Religion). Whatever Derrida’s reasons for
sparing the sixth section—we should never discount the weight of friendships—the narratives
told about this event, as far as literary criticism is concerned, remain disjointed until Derrida is
directly related to Barthes and his immediate peers—Genette, Todorov, Kristeva, Sollers—who
were generally friendly with Derrida.
As Samoyault reflects on Baltimore, Barthes and Derrida “reacted against anything that
stabilized and confined meaning, even if Barthes tended towards pluralization while Derrida
emphasized the need for a perpetual slippage (not quite the same thing).”124 Barthes, in what he
calls his “midlife,” developed a positive relation to Derrida, but it was not a decisive one: “I
belong to a different generation from Derrida—and probably from his readers.”125 Barthes
suggests that Derrida, to some extent, dispelled “the phantasm of scientificity” within the
“semiological project” and “disrupted the balance of the structure.”126 Nonetheless, the practice
of “scientific” literary criticism in France only accelerated after the fall of 1966, with the
founding of the journal Poetique in 1970 representing an important waypoint. Whereas Derrida
mounted, one could say, a covert rhetorical reading of structuralism in 1966, Barthes and his
peers at EPHE at this time were overtly citing the rhetorical discipline as a spiritual predecessor
for structuralism.
And yet, these two faces of rhe-structuralism both appear rather sensational in comparison
to their contemporary structuralist activities. As a counterstatement to Baltimore, we should
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consider the special double issue of Yale French Studies from October 1966. Devoted to
structuralism, it begins by cautioning the reader that “the world did not have to wait for the
French before discovering structuralism,” citing “Geneva, Prague, Copenhagen, New York, and
Cambridge, Mass,” and positions linguistics—not just Saussure—as rightful origin.127 It does
not skimp on anthropology, despite its literary orientation. Geoffrey Hartman’s contribution to
this issue runs through a similarly dispersed geography and mantically warns that structuralism
has heretofore “respect[ed] the separation of disciplines. … It is not suited for monogamy,
however; and is about to form a dangerous alliance with literary criticism.”128 This issue of Yale
French Studies very much respects the multiple legacies of linguistics behind structuralism and
begins with a careful piece by linguist André Martinet. Yet Barthes, in this issue, is mentioned
minimally. Thus this document and its pluralistic European and American pre-war structuralisms
counter the rather singular thread of Saussure to Barthes (or Derrida) relentlessly anthologized in
North American literary theory. My generation is often taught structuralism hastily en route
towards later theories, sometimes simply to justify reactions against a rather brittle form of it
(which, in fact, triumphed during its supposed “defeat”). Thus it can become a reversed
chronology since we are unbound to time’s arrow and never lived through the eras in which the
thought unfolded unpredictably.

4.15 Was Barthes a structuralist?
We have considered three major Barthesean moments in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s;
Barthes’ continued affections toward rhetoric cast doubt upon whether he ever entirely
“converted” to structuralism. Now, we will set aside rhetoric for a while, and consider Barthes’
structuralist status on its own. My aim here is not to entirely remove him from the scene of
structuralism, but simply to show that he fit poorly with the “high structuralists,” the inner circle.
This will give the next chapter more latitude in attaching Barthes to rhetoric, and exploring some
of his insights that probably would have suffered under a more rigorous application of
linguistics, although he might have better ingratiated himself with the martinets of language.
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Barthes’ great gusto for promotion and prediction, in my view, put him in the role of
structuralism’s intrepid impresario rather than a lead actor on stage. Too mercurial to put on an
epic Wagnerian cycle, he nonetheless expended enormous energies on a mix of lesser operatic
productions for structuralism, offering manifestos and applications, reviews and critiques:
something closer to journalism than scholarly monograph. There are essentially three
“structuralist Barthes”: the one he professed to be (the definitional Barthes), the one he was
thought to be (the doxic Barthes), and the one, through his critical practice, that he actually was.
On the record, he was careful. Structuralism for Barthes had a “limited meaning”: “systematic
research that has a semantic frame of reference and is inspired by the linguistic model.”129 Yet
an insidious problem lurks within such statements. Barthes believed that structuralist analysis
had no surefire “canonical method” and was beset by “divergencies of approach.”130 Barthes’
own structuralist practices reveal no singular or standard model of linguistics. Thus Barthes
cannot be taken as a synecdoche, pars pro toto, for French literary structuralism and especially
not of structuralism in more general sense. Barthes at his most rigorous peak in The Fashion
System is “proof that semiotics, dutifully applied, is capable of anything, even of turning such a
witty essayist as Barthes into a perfect bore.”131 In our infatuation with Barthes, we have taken
the wrong texts, from the wrong author, as representations of strict structuralism. The more
careful, which is to say boring, legacies of the structuralist incursion into North America are
scarcely remembered, as are the structuralists held in highest esteem by other structuralists.

4.16 Relations with high structuralism
Though Barthes did not often see himself as a prototypical or archetypical structuralist,
we should consider who he thought best fit this label. A seemingly innocuous comment he made
a few months before his death stands out and propels this investigation: “strictco sensu, only
Dumézil, Benveniste, and Lévi-Strauss are structuralists.”132 A remarkable list: no literary
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figures, no one in Barthes’ inner circle, and no attempt to tactfully reference his own 1960s
structuralist apogee. Precisely this same “triad” of “masters” was recognized, for instance, by
Jean-Pierre Vernant.133 Dumézil, Benveniste, and Lévi-Strauss, are, we might say, the
structuralist’s structuralists (or the Collège de France’s). Though Barthes barely ever mentions
Dumézil—it was Foucault who championed Dumézil to Barthes134—he effusively praised
Benveniste (in “Why I Love Benvensite”) and Lévi-Strauss (in various unreciprocated tributes).
Barthes clarifies here that the literary criticism that one is inclined to call “structuralist” should
properly be called “semiological,” and that it has two branches: “Narratology and the analysis of
Figures.”135 He seemingly refers to the poeticians and rhetoricians of the 1960s and early 1970s,
noting that “there’s no longer any collective, systematic force [in 1979] that would allow me to
present a meaningful synthesis of the discussion of literary works.”136 Barthes himself was a
venerable systematizing force of the 1960s, and having bowed out of this enterprise, thus
contributed to the ambivalence he perspicuously detects.
Anglophone critics have often misunderstood Barthes’ rank in the structuralist hierarchy:
what appeared high from the outside was in fact low on the inside. As Samoyault claims in her
biography of Barthes, Lévi-Strauss’ “fully fledged science” of structuralism could only hold the
“field for methodological experimentation” that Barthes explored in a certain amount of
contempt.137 Whereas Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism sought to “uncover laws” as a “general theory
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of relations,” “structural semiology continues to harbour a demystifying ambition as it attacks
dominant opinions, the doxa, and ultimately language itself.”138 Thanks to texts such as “Myth
today,” the old doxic and political vectors of classical rhetoric again resurfaced, fortified and
arguably obscured by semiology. These experimental avenues appeared messy and impure in the
hands of Barthes for the highest-ranking structuralists and linguists, who often perceived him as
a journalist or witty essayist who fell short of true science.
Benveniste, unlike Lévi-Strauss, did not register for Barthes during the rise of
structuralism in the 1950s and early 1960s. Yet after Kristeva arrived in Paris in December 1965,
and rapidly became a major force in Barthes’ seminars in early 1966, she introduced Barthes to
Benveniste.139 Barthes quickly devoured enough Benveniste to bring his thought to Baltimore in
October 1966 (further proof that this year was, as Dosse claims, structuralism’s annum mirabile).
As if implying that Benveniste is the consummate cosmonaut of language, Barthes’ “Why I Love
Benveniste” (1966, with a 1974 sequel) begins by comparing the incomplete discovery of outer
space to that of linguistic space and then expounds his underappreciated virtues as both linguist
and stylist (the latter being an increasingly important value within rhe-structuralism). And yet
Benveniste and the coterie of linguists at his level often chose not to publicly recognize Barthes’
applications of linguistic and structural notions to literature. Appearing in 1966, during the peak
of structuralist jubilance, the collection Problèmes du langage —featuring Benveniste,
Chomsky, Jakobson, Martinet and other internationally renowned linguists—treated rather
different “problems of language” than we might imagine Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault
addressing under such a title, and only one text, by the Hungarian linguist Iván Fónagy, dealt
with properly poetic and literary material that would possibly fit under a term like rhestructuralism.140 Benveniste’s thought, as we will later see, trickled downwards from high
structuralism to rhe-structuralism, lapped up by Barthes and Kristeva in the late 1960s. Whereas
rhe-structuralism “marketed”—and expanded the market for—high structuralism, the properly
intellectual content of Barthes’ circle could not, as it were, cascade upwards against the force of
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symbolic gravity. Barthes was quite right that “there are profound ideological divergences
between the various representative figures [of French structuralism] who have been crammed
into the same structuralist pigeonhole, for instance between Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, Lacan, or
Althusser.”141 At the same time, grouping Barthes with his fellow admirers of Valéry and poetics
such as Genette and Todorov remains natural, since they would all look back upon rhetoric’s
mostly forgotten history to buttress and feed contemporary criticism.

4.17 Criticisms of Barthes
Barthes’ impurities as a structuralist, according to his harshest critics, moderately to
massively undermine his project. From linguists such as Georges Mounin and Roy Harris to
literary critics such as Paul de Man and the eccentric Marxist philologist Sebastiano Timpanaro,
Barthes was beset by fascinating and sometimes vicious accusations. His syncretic mixture of
various linguists—Saussure, Hjelmslev, Greimas, and Jakobson, plus assorted Marxist and
psychoanalytic jargon—supposedly tainted any allegiance he could claim to Saussure. Harris
mounts particularly brutal attacks on Barthes’ scare-quoted “structuralism” from Elements of
Semiology, expounding his failure to reconcile the contradictory concepts he appropriates from
linguists like Saussure and Hjelmslev; he indeed becomes a “’theorist’ wielding intellectual
scissors, who supposes that ideas can be cut up and pasted together again in any collage that he
or his public find attractive.”142 De Man’s “Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism”
was fairly harsh, but more tempered than the bluntly hostile remarks he made after Barthes’
presentation at Johns Hopkins. De Man correctly suggests that Barthes is an “impure”
structuralist: “the work of ‘pure’ structuralists such as the linguist Greimas and his group or of
some among Barthes' most gifted associates, such as Gérard Genette or Tzvetan Todorov, is
more rigorous and more exhaustive ... Barthes is primarily a critic of literary ideology and, as
such, his work is more essayistic and reflective than it is technical.”143 From within and without,
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it was this issue of rigour that ensured he could never sit comfortably in an ultra-technical,
systematized vocation.
To Barthes’ detractors, his syncretic combination of linguists revealed a confused mind,
and forced Barthes into the more literary role of essayist; the muddle of various sciences he calls
semiotics, semio-criticism, and trans-linguistics failed to live up to their scientific promises. As
his student Compagnon suggested, Barthes did not entirely, or consciously, understand his own
rhetorical métier. Eloquent as he was, Barthes could not genuinely articulate his desire to polish
up l'ancienne rhétorique, restore its old resplendence, and send it forth into the fray under the
dazzling new pennants of linguistics. Just as the Swiss flag resembles the Danish, the banner of
Saussure looked much like that of Hjelmslev.
By the end of this chapter, we find Barthes in a somewhat precarious position: better at
marketing structuralism than doing structuralism, celebrated by many, but not always by those
who mattered most to him. But understanding his weaknesses is necessary to understand his
strengths, especially when close to each other, as they often are. Structuralist impurities were
often rhetorical pieties. He was never the Lévi-Strauss of literature, nor the Benveniste. And yet,
inspired by Valéry, Barthes would realize that rhetoric’s institutional weakening had left a great
void in literary and linguistic modernity. As we will see in the next chapter, Barthes quite
brilliantly mapped out what was missing, although the gaping chasm spanned too far Barthes
alone to fill. Whereas Paulhan had previously confronted this space aesthetically and
psychologically, Barthes will see it as nothing less than the ruins of the “civilization” of rhetoric.
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5

Barthes in the Ruins of Rhetoric

“Rhetoric can constitute a crucial evidence of civilization, for it represents a certain mental
selection of the world, i.e., finally, an ideology.”—Roland Barthes1
In the preceding chapter, Barthes’ eccentric structuralism was reassessed from two
vantages: firstly, the early continuities within rhetoric, and secondly, the discontinuities between
his work and the “high” structuralists. He often became stuck between rhetoric and structuralism,
or put more optimistically, had one foot in each. But we have only seen smatterings of Barthes’
thoughts on rhetoric. The present chapter will present and interpret Barthes’ many writings,
interviews, and seminars on the institutions, histories, theories, and practices of rhetoric, as well
as reflect upon his own well-studied eloquence. Rather than being a “rhetorician” in the most
classic sense of producing a treatise on persuasion, Barthes became a kind of rhetorical
archeologist, bricoleur, custodian, and critic, a thinker of rhetoric’s European institution. To an
extent rarely understood or appreciated, rhetoric’s institutional legacy hounded him, availing
itself of Barthes’ uncertainty as to its extant or extinct status, doggedly following him from the
Valéry era of the 1940s to his final months of 1980, when he lamented, “Writing is no longer the
object of a Pedagogy (in the very broad sense of the term): …Rhetoric has been degraded,
technocratized,” transformed into “techniques of expression” and mere “writings.”2 Barthes
sought a “new rhetoric,” roughly speaking, but hesitated during the many moments when the
“old rhetoric” showed signs of life.
Caught up in what has been called a “love-hate” situation between him and the art,
Barthes vacillated between these extremes and ended up closer to love at the time of his death,
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but not definitively so: an appropriately weak commitment to a weakened institution. Though far
from a reliable partisan belonging to the “party” of rhetoric, Barthes would readily repudiate the
forces responsible for its marginalization, torch the reductive sketches of the institution, and
expound the inadequacies of its half-baked or nonexistent replacements. Yet this is not the
impression generated from his famous, brave, and harsh judgement—one he did not exactly
follow—in favour of “reducing Rhetoric to the rank of a merely historical object; seeking, in the
name of text, of writing, a new practice of language; and never separating ourselves from
revolutionary science.”3 Though rhetoric offered Barthes a hinge between some of his famous
terms, such as readerly and writerly, and sometimes became a foil against which to define
various “revolutionary” activities, a reading of his complete work undermines the notion that he
saw rhetoric as merely a “historical object.” On the one hand, the “Old Rhetoric [is] now
permanently alien to our world of language”; yet on the other, rhetoric offers relief from “a
strictly modern myth[:] language is reputed to be ‘natural,’ ‘instrumental.’”4 Pulled between
conservative and radical impulses, Barthes faced a predicament that has only worsened of late.
Given a brutal instrumentalization of rhetorical studies, a quasi-conservative exploration of the
old rhetoric readily appears more radical and worthy than pursuing the streamlined “rhetoric lite”
of today.
In general, we owe much to Barthes. With rhetoric, however, he is something of a tragic
hero, making his greatest achievement an unusual one. For although he righteously drew
attention towards a wrongly neglected institution—with eloquence, no less—and can be credited
for many insights, he attempted to move an immovable rock through his ample but not
omnipotent polemical force. Rather than a sign of weakness, this is a sign of the immensity of
what he was up against. The problem of weak survival entailed, and still entails, navigating
between nostalgic and Whiggish narratives, between a distant and mystified golden age and the
modern dystopia of “effective communications.” Perceiving the rhetorical civilization beneath
our own constitutes a formidable accomplishment. In hindsight, this might have been a good
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juncture to rest on his laurels. For the next question—what exactly is to be done with these
rhetorical remnants? —strikes me as the aporia that will swallow him.

5.1

Rhetoric between life and death

For most scholars, Barthes went too far in his criticisms of rhetoric-as-institution,
carelessly throwing out some of the good along with the bad. In light of rhetoric’s weak survival,
however, his desire to cleave the former rhetoric from the nascent rhetoric, and his hesitancy to
declare a decisive “death,” make considerably more sense in his particular liminal moment.
Barthes grappled with rhetoric at its most subterranean point of a five-century period in France.
And he was born into a literary scene of peak Terror, which, at least as Surrealism, troubled him,
and came of age among quasi-terroristic currents of thought from phenomenology to various
forms of positivism.5 If one grew up reading Lanson’s textbooks in school and Sartre at home,
imagining the massive rhetorical revival that we now take for granted is difficult indeed.
As we have seen in the first two chapters, we must not equate the ruination of rhetoric
with its absence: many pedagogic foundation stones survived the collapse of the edifice, and
these Barthes perceived better than most. Unlike his theorist contemporaries, he was keenly
interested in what we could call “superstructural” status of rhetoric, its full social-historical
totality which was far from obvious at the time. In this sense of rhetoric—also my preferred
sense—the institution reveals itself through a never-ending series of thick descriptions and
historical elucidations rather than through pithy essentialist definitions. Since Plato coined
rhêtorikê, an exhausting and perhaps exhausted process of redefining the term has beckoned
thinkers from Aristotle to Barthes. His short definitions remain interesting—and made good use
of new linguistic concepts—but fall short of what I perceive to be the most original aspect of
Barthes’ rhetorical thought: a “civilizational” reading of the institution, an anthropology or
sociology of rhetoric rather than a philosophy.

5

“I don’t like the notion of automatic writing at all, … which implies an idealist view of man divided into a
speaking subject and a profound inner subject. … It’s always this idea of origins, of depth, of primitiveness, in short,
of nature, that bothers me in the Surrealist discourse.” Roland Barthes, "The Surrealists Overlooked the Body," in
The Grain of the Voice (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 244.
217

5.2

Neither structuralist nor poststructuralist

Before, during, and after the apparent climax of Barthes’ interest in rhetoric in the mid1960s, he engaged in a more familiar form of rhetorical literary criticism, drawing heavily upon
ancient terminology. Meanwhile, he developed his own well-studied form of eloquence—written
eloquence—set against the strong monological and oratorical dimensions inherent in traditional
French pedagogical and political rhetorics, dimensions he found repulsive. The lifelong
“rhetorical Barthes” is more continuous than the somewhat contradictory Barthes recently
captured by Jonathan Culler: “In some ways, he is both the archetypal structuralist, with his
writings on semiology and narratology, and the model poststructuralist, with his rejections of
systematizing projects, his love of the fragment and his increasing evocations of the personal and
affective dimensions of thought.”6 Though this apparent paradox confounds many, it resembles
the more tractable difference between Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Plato’s Phaedrus: the rhetorical
system versus the amorous relation. Barthes pursued both: he would venture down what he calls
the “double river” of synchronic and diachronic rhetorics, as well as the less systematic and
rational aspects in the orbit of eros. From this perspective, he is not a contradictory
(post)structuralist but simply someone keen to explore the full breadth of rhetoric’s offerings.
The late Barthes of A Lover’s Discourse, read according to the history of rhetoric, is more of a
pre-structuralist than post: he returns to Plato after the “ancient structuralism” of Aristotle.
As we will see time and time again, Barthes was torn between appreciating the grandeur
of the “old rhetoric” and his desire to critique and reinvent it; he wondered whether it could be
freed of its prescriptive and aristocratic ills. Despite this seemingly confounding conflict and its
different interpretations among scholars, Barthes’ rhetoric courses, I argue, directly and
unambiguously invigorated his thought: the “new rhetoric” (the writerly, the Text and its
production, the violation of norms) would now have a definite foil in the “former rhetoric” (the
readerly, the work and its composition, the respect for norms). In this way, the central drama of
Barthes encompasses a series of ironies gyrating around the new and old rhetorics: the nostalgia
for the old at the time of the new, the graceful composition of radical texts, the rhetorician, as it
were, in the closet. Barthes’ nostalgia—he belonged, as he puts it, to the avant-garde’s
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rearguard—often blurred the new and old rhetorics together as the former slipped so readily into
the latter.
First, I will consider Barthes’ reputation as a rhetorician and Hellenist—these were
formative roles, not accidental ones—and compare him to Nietzsche, who is remarkably similar
in these regards. Then I will move to Barthes’ valuations of rhetoric and his most famous
manifesto about rhetoric’s history and destiny. Caught between praising rhetoric as a magnificent
forgotten institution and damning it as a conservative edifice that must be rebuilt from scratch,
Barthes runs the gamut from grandiosity to suspicion. We will see, however, that he much more
firmly believed in studying rhetoric’s history—and developing its historiography, which was
virtually non-existent at the time. Moving beyond the rhetoric course, we will perceive its
influence on major texts such as S/Z and grasp how rhetoric informs his pedagogy and his
profound mistrust of oratory and agonistic discourse. Finally, Barthes’ own eloquence will be
taken up—the theorist of rhetoric who morphs, without warning, into the practitioner.

5.3

Reputation as rhetorician

Whereas Barthes’ rhetoric often surprises Anglophone readers and critics, it is well
known by those closest to him. Antoine Compagnon, one of Barthes’ later students and advocate
of a “rhetorical Barthes,” claims that Barthes “missed rhetoric, just as Paulhan missed it in Les
Fleurs de Tarbes, but he did not know what it was”; “Under the name of writing [écriture],
Barthes reinvented what rhetoric called style.”7 Compagnon notes that the publication in 1970 of
Barthes’ first rhetoric seminar was one of the major positive influences on rhetoric’s reputation
in France.8 Although Marc Fumaroli would take a strong anti-theory stance as he rebirthed
French rhetoric through its history, he credited Barthes, whose seminars he attended and aided,
for putting it back in the spotlight. Alongside the various writings of Compagnon, perhaps the
most celebratory treatment of rhetoric emerges in Phillipe Rogers’ Roland Barthes, Roman;
Michel Beaujour’s Poetics of the Literary Self-Portrait treats the rhetorical Barthes more
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harshly. In sum, French critics were well aware of Barthes’ excavations despite certain qualms as
to his methods and purposes.
On the other hand, Anglophone academia has largely ignored the rhetorical or classical
Barthes. This stems, in part, from the greater symbolic capital and educational effort afforded in
France to rhetoric and classics, and the drives in North America to appropriate the most radical
areas of French intellectualism. On its surface, rhetoric and classics indeed fail to offer the
apothegms (eg. “the author is dead”) for which our market hungered. Despite this obscurity, the
spotlight on Barthes blazed so brightly that a few scholars picked up on the legacies of the
ancients in his work. To my knowledge, the most comprehensive treatment in English of
Barthes’ rhetoric owes to Peter France.9 Almost three decades old, this article could not access
the “complete” works of Barthes (which have been appended after being deemed “complete”)
nor does it touch on Hellenism, a natural companion to the rhetorical tradition. Patrick
O’Donovan, Michael Moriarty, and Nicholas Pagan engage special aspects of the rhetorical
Barthes; Robert Scholes perhaps represents the first North American to understand Barthes as a
“formidable rhetorician, an ingenious, mercurial man of letters,”10 contrasting him with Genette
in Structuralism and Literature (1974). Yet given the countless books and articles on Barthes
that consider truly minor themes in his work or apply him to areas he never knew, it is an
egregious oversight that his rhetorical enterprise never received a monograph, considering its
total integration of the methodological, stylistic, thematic levels of his work. Rather than the full
Barthes-rhetoric relation, scholars tend to prefer focusing on Barthes as writer, i.e., the rhetoric
of Barthes (for instance, Roland Barthes: The Figures of Writing by Andrew Brown).
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The entirety of the Barthes and rhetoric discourse need not be elaborated, but it is worth
reviewing Peter France’s prescient article. He ultimately concludes that Barthes engaged in “not
an unproblematic celebration and continuation of ancient rhetoric, nor a naïve modern rejection
of its artifice, but a complicated love-hate relationship which is exemplary for the modern writer
and indeed for the modern student of rhetoric.”11 France divides the Barthes-rhetoric relationship
into three dimensions, the first being “Rhetoric as Model”: rhetoric as a generally worthy protostructuralist discipline that “privileged the impersonal system against the notions of personal
expression or creativity.”12 “Rhetoric as Enemy,” the second dimension, concerns three
Barthesean objections: rhetoric’s quasi-bourgeois power and status, rhetoric’s all-too-tidy
separation of form and content, and the “monological” domination inherent in oratory and
pedagogy.13 Finally, “Rhetoric as Springboard” concerns Barthes own rhetorical-writerly
practice: France contends that Barthes is more Montaigne than Cicero, “making original use of
an old art, indulging himself quite consciously in classical forms, but never in a simple-minded
way. The old rhetoric is subverted and renovated, but it retains its power to affect the reader.”14
These three dimensions are indeed borne out by Barthes’ texts that France could not access, and
today we can add more.

5.4

Reputation as Hellenist

Anyone reading an introduction to Barthes might struggle to remember that he was
potentially destined to become a Hellenist (if his education in classics is mentioned at all). But
this is an important fact in itself—and in connection to rhetoric. His Sorbonne license on Greek
tragedy began with an epigram on rhetoric; his knowledge of Attic Greek (and Latin) helped him
considerably in exploring the “ancient” structuralists (as he once referred to Aristotle and
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Quintilian). Though Barthes provokes us with his “trademark use of Greek terms,”15
understanding him as a Hellenist has barely begun.16 Whereas Barthes offered many sweeping
programmatic statements on rhetoric, his tireless interest in Greece never took the form of a
Nietzschean polemic that thrust (non-rhetorical) Greek legacies into the spotlight. Barthes was
knowledgeable enough to write a long piece for the Encyclopédie de la Pléiade on “Greek
Theatre” (1965), but the measured encyclopedic style demanded by the Histoire des spectacles
volume prevented him from freely speculating on Greek inheritance.
For almost his entire life Barthes was effectively silent on his profuse Greek lexicon, so
common in his rhetoric work. Yet on January 19, 1977, Barthes delivered a session at the
Collège de France that finally justified the “Greek network” in the course he was teaching
(which had more than 75 Greek terms of note). He asks: “Why prioritize a Greek network? Why
not be French, like everyone else? Why make things complicated, convoluted, in some pseudoerudite garment?”17 Though some of the six justifications answering this question are embedded
in the course topics of “idiorhythmy” and “living together,” three can be extracted in the context
of his entire work:
a. “The Greek word pinpoints a concept that serves simultaneously as an origin, an
image and defamiliarizes.”18
b. “The Greek word generalizes and emphasises. It acts as a summary, an ellipsis—
and in this respect ensures a productive unfolding ( = etymological inventiveness).
More generally, a dossier to be opened: on the concept-words from one language that
get inserted into another idiom.”19
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c. “Philology (or pseudo-philology) is slow-going. To have recourse to Greek words =
not to be in any particular hurry; besides, when the point is to let the signifier expand
and spread like a fragrance, that slow pace is sometimes necessary. In today’s world,
any technique that entails slowing down: something progressive about it.”20
To these explicit justifications for the “Greek network” one should also add the more cynical and
implicit notion of what he terms the “pseudo-erudite garment”: the possibility that Greek terms
among French intellectuals signal erudition and hence symbolic capital. Nonetheless, Barthes
concludes with the memorable image of “letting the signifier expand and spread like a
fragrance,” and indeed the number of the petals in Barthes’ philological potpourri seems beyond
measure.

5.5

The formative role

Removing this formative grid of rhetoric and Hellenism would gravely disfigure Barthes.
Subtracted of all the theoretical topoi from the ancients, one could still have a semiotic
technician or provocateur critic of French literature. But the Barthes who rhetorically analyzed
mythologies, the writer and the lover (Phaedrus), the erudite pedagogue at the Collège de France
filling his courses with ancient terms, the actor (Darius in Aeschylus’ Persians), the theatre
critic, the traveler in Greece, the theorist pushing beyond semiotics into the old “discourse on
discourse” that rhetoric represented—these would wink out of existence. Perhaps most
importantly, the eloquent Barthes, the writer of pleasurable insights (rather than painful
obscurities), who attracted more acclaim as a stylist than all his peers—this Barthes
fundamentally depends on rhetorical dressage. “The art of a writer like Roland,” as Compagnon
recalls, is one of “seizing the occasion, kairos, a notion we often discussed.”21 Yet kairos is only
one of the many classical and rhetorical concepts he applied—not just to texts, but to himself.
Like his friend Foucault—soon to be his eulogist at the Collège de France—Barthes hinted at his
affinity with sophists. In his course The Neutral at the Collège, Barthes first notes that the
sophists were accused of showing off a great variety of shoes without ever teaching the art of
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shoe-making—and then quips: “I don’t construct the concept of Neutral, I display Neutrals.”22
As we will see, however, Barthes was engaged in much more than a sophistic “display” of
rhetoric or a kairotic métier, and indeed conceptualized rhetoric in a variety of novel ways.
Barthes’ often-allusive orientation towards rhetoric hints, frustratingly, that we are seeing
a mere introduction to the real work yet to come. He indeed mocks himself for his habit of
“providing ‘introductions,’ ‘sketches,’ ‘elements,’ postponing the ‘real’ book till later.”23 One of
these books he imagined or flirted with was ‘A History of Rhetoric,’ and he notes that this
“foible,” this habit of anticipation, “has a rhetorical name: prolepsis.”24 Yet these books—“a
History of Rhetoric, A History of Etymology, a new Stylistics, an Aesthetics of textual pleasure”
and so on— are “never abandoned … they fulfil themselves, partially, indirectly, as gestures,
through themes, fragments, articles.”25 Proleptic as Barthes was, a thousand rhetorical gestures
and invitations await the inclined reader despite his frustrating failure to deliver a dedicated
monograph on rhetoric. We should take him up on his request: “One would wish ... that instead
of establishing influences and schools, literary historians would reconstruct the literary
ideological climate of a period, the rhetorical apprenticeship of writers.”26 Barthes’ own
“rhetorical apprenticeship” becomes much clearer when compared to the greatest rhetorician of
interest to postwar French thought, Friedrich Nietzsche.
Barthes’ investment in rhetoric and Hellenism became roughly commensurate with
Friedrich Nietzsche’s. Like Barthes, this philologist was a teacher-practitioner of rhetoric and a
student of Greek theatre. Nietzsche’s hyper-anthologized “On Truth and Lies” and its quotable,
all-too-quotable “mobile army” of rhetorical terms and intensifications taught students about the
rhetoricity of truth—but hid the philology, the study and appreciation of rhetoric and sophists,
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that guided Nietzsche to these insights.27 Perhaps understanding Barthes as a rhetorician is no
more radical than calling Nietzsche a philologist or writer (or Dichter) before philosopher.
Barthes and Nietzsche both synthesized and borrowed earlier works on rhetoric, “plagiarizing”
them in the way that teaching often demands. Nietzsche lifted, sometimes word for word, from
Gustav Gerber’s Language as Art, and some scholars believe this work shaped much of
Nietzsche’s philosophy of language. Barthes’ notes warn of possible “involuntary quotations,”
since he effectively created “personal propaedeutics.”28 Indeed, he was much like the medieval
compilator, a natural role for broaching such a syncretic or amalgamating discipline as rhetoric.
Rhetoric: detour or destination? Nietzsche, according to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe,
ultimately took an “incomplete and inconclusive” “detour” through rhetoric, which opened up a
“strange breach” after he fundamentally “abandon[ed]” the art.29 Here Barthes differs from
Nietzsche. After the mid-1960s Barthes made fewer titular references to rhetoric, and cooled his
fervor for its disciplinary status, but rhetorical notions firmly integrated themselves right until his
death. What Barthes gave up was not rhetoric, but the dream of systematizing it: he happily and
freely explored its expanses late in his career (the rhetoric of love, kairos, sophists), but no
longer felt it conceptually possible—or personally desirable—to structuralize it.

5.6

Gazing upon rhetoric

Let us consider one particular day in Barthes’ life that would seem a microcosm of his
total sentiments towards rhetoric. On the 16th of August, 1964, Barthes finds himself in his
familial village of Urt, where he will one day be buried. “Lost among Greek and Latin words,”
Barthes writes to his dear friend Philippe Sollers as he prepares to run his rhetoric seminar at
EPHE in the coming school year.30 On the same day, he writes to Michel Butor and Georges
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Perros. “My heart is heavy,” he writes to Perros, “my overly sensitive ‘soul’ is troubled, but
Quintilian sets many things right.”31 As if channeling the archetypal ritual of humanism—like
Poggio Bracciolini uncovering Quintilian’s complete institutio oratoria in 1416 in a forlorn
monastery32—Barthes appears awestruck by the ancients, conveying this epiphany to Butor.
Whereas Cicero and Plato irritate him, it is Quintilian and Aristotle who prove delightful as
proto-structuralists:
I’m reading the Ancients, and am so fascinated by the coherence of their system that I
really don’t know anymore how I’m going to connect that to our literature—and yet that
was my great idea at the beginning. I’d like to talk with you about this—if we haven’t
already, because I know, I feel that you would share my interest. Some of them get on my
nerves, like Cicero and even Plato; others delight me, like Aristotle and Quintilian: an
expected division for a structuralist! The “heart” and “soul” are more powerless, more
agitated than ever, “understanding nothing,” but fortunately there’s Quintilian and the
classification of the status causae.33
This short passage suggests the same questions that haunt his overall relation to rhetoric: what is
the fate of the old rhetoric in relation to contemporary (“notre”) literature, for instance, to Butor?
How does rhetoric relate to structuralism, or at least to the ancient structuralists such as Aristotle
and Quintilian?
An answer to this latter question came quickly to Barthes. He soon positions Rhetoric as
the “glamorous ancestor” of “literary structuralism.”34 Furthermore he will tendentiously favour
the structuralists of antiquity over the organicists: “Cicero owes everything to Aristotle, but de-
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intellectualizes him”;35 “Isn’t all rhetoric (if we except Plato) Aristotelian? No doubt it is”;36
“Aristotle is, after all, the father of the structural analysis of works.”37 In the seminar manuscript
entitled “Avant-propos: L’Empire Rhétorique,” Barthes suggests that his “method” will be
structuralist analysis, but it will be applied to two research objects: rhetoric and structuralism
itself. Or as he jots down in his notes:
•

Research : never only on a subject, but also, always, into itself. The gaze of the observer
is part of the thing observed. (Physics, Phenomenology, Semiology)

•

Our method, declared: structural analysis.

•

Seminar: 1 subject but 2 objects : rhetoric, structuralism.

•

This structuralism, thanks to rhetoric, will itself encounter a new, sizable object:
history.38

In looking in on itself, the structuralist regard necessarily finds the history of rhetoric. Barthes
will thus scour the vast remains of what he calls l'ancienne rhétorique, realizing its literary,
political, and sociological importance, for new glimmerings of textual and linguistic science—
while simultaneously urging an “indispensable critical distance” from this “ideological object.”39
L'ancienne rhétorique, however, is perhaps neither old nor distant. In a clever and
controversial move, Barthes’ very terminology ages rhetoric: by putting ancienne in front, he
hints at the former rhetoric—not rhétorique classique or antique—even though the new rhetoric
“may not yet have come into being: the world is incredibly full of Old Rhetoric.”40 The term
l'ancienne rhétorique also vaguely suggests l’ancien régime; the Revolution marks or anticipates
the decline of rhetorical institutions (and its Terror invites Paulhan’s “anti-rhetoric”). Though
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perhaps presumptuous in cleaving old and new, Barthes admits—and this is the crux of rhetoric’s
weak survival—that le monde est incroyablement plein d'ancienne Rhétorique.41

5.7

The great manifesto

After Barthes assembled the most promising shards of this arcane “super-civilization” of
rhetoric, a final proclamation at the end of his excavation, the last paragraphs of the postscript he
affixed to the ancient rhetoric seminar, epitomizes his career-long project of rhetorical
archeology and appropriation. In perhaps the most important polemic he ever advanced about
rhetoric, he simultaneously affirms its crucial role in shaping literature and decrees it must be
exceeded. The three crucial points—“which reach me from this ancient empire in my present
enterprise”—include:
[1] The conviction that many features of our literature, of our instruction, of our
institutions of language … would be illuminated or understood differently if we knew
thoroughly (i.e., if we did not censor) the rhetorical code which has given its language to
our culture. …
[2] This notion that there is a kind of stubborn agreement between Aristotle (from whom
rhetoric proceeded) and our mass culture. … A kind of Aristotelian vulgate still defines a
type of trans-historical Occident, a civilization (our own). …
[3] This observation, disturbing as it is in foreshortened form, that all our literature,
formed by Rhetoric and sublimated by humanism, has emerged from a political-judicial
practice (unless we persist in the error which limits Rhetoric to the “Figures”): in those
areas where the most brutal conflicts—of money, of property, of class—are taken over,
contained, domesticated, and sustained by state power, where state institutions regulate
feigned speech and codifies all recourse to the signifier: there is where our literature is
born. This is why reducing Rhetoric to the rank of a merely historical object; seeking, in
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the name of the text, of writing, a new practice of language; and never separating
ourselves from revolutionary science—these are one and the same task.42
This manifesto offers a microcosm of Barthesean thinking, laden with marxism, structuralism,
and his theoretical foci (“sous le nom de texte, d’écriture”). It will be referenced often as “the
manifesto” and much emerges from it.

5.8 Grandiosity, suspicion, and the “whole rhetorical culture of our
civilization”
The manifesto embodies a pattern of rhetoric’s grandiosity in Barthes’ career. Here “all
our literature” is grandly—perhaps hyperbolically—“formed by Rhetoric”; earlier in the aidemémoire he describes the discipline in the most magnificently totalizing terms: a “veritable
empire” that swallows up the West, indeed forming a “super-civilization” with a “monumental
history.”43 The term “monumental history,” tantalizingly dropped in by Barthes, references a
Sollerean riff on Braudel.44 Though in his course he urges an “indispensable critical distance”
from rhetoric’s ideology, his infatuation with this “glamorous object of intelligence and
penetration” is obvious, this “grandiose system which a whole civilization, in its extreme
breadth, perfected in order to classify.”45 Barthes thus dignifies rhetoric and its enormity even in
his critical moments.
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Rhetoric is characteristically expansive for Barthes. He dubs the reductive tendency
towards the figures an “error” in the great manifesto (as argued previously, Genette’s error).
Barthes tends to refer to rhetoric, in various texts, as a great “whole.” In “Dominici, or the
Triumph of Literature” from Mythologies he claims: “Antithesis, metaphors, flights of oratory, it
is the whole of classical rhetoric which accuses [Dominici] the old shepherd.”46 Later in his
career, he is still comfortable discussing “the whole rhetorical culture of our civilization.”47 In
interviews, he articulated speech as springing from “a whole collection of cultural and oratorical
codes.”48 This “whole,” this vast corpus of rhetorical forms, was never to be understated. In
addition to rhetoric’s synchronic span, he expounds its age: “for a long time indeed,” Barthes
remembers, the “second linguistics,” the “linguistics of discourse,” proclaimed “a celebrated
name, that of Rhetoric.”49 On the heels of his rhetoric seminars, Barthes launched his talk at
Johns Hopkins with the truism that the “genuine theory of language” called rhetoric “reigned
from Gorgias to the Renaissance.”50 In the ensuing discussion, philologist Pietro Pucci
commended Barthes’ “return of rhetoric.” Barthes responded to him and the audience51: “I have
always conceived rhetoric very broadly, including all reflections on all forms of work, on general
technique of forms of work.”52 Barthes measures rhetoric and its history on an imperial scale,
rivaling the great categories of literature and (super)civilization—grandiose comparisons, but not
out of line with the longue durée milieu surrounding him.
Literature, Language, Rhetoric: these three terms are often capitalized by Barthes as if to
suggest their vast dominion. Despite being such a fine writer and vehement critic of cliché,
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Barthes could not resist the trite amplifications and hyperboles that the discipline of rhetoric used
on itself from antiquity onward; the rhetoric of rhetoric, as it were, proved irresistible. Barthes
apparently feels that the public knowledge of rhetoric has been so decimated that he should
reinforce the reader with impressive figures as to rhetoric’s age and extent. This quantitative
trivia tells us rhetoric ruled discourse for over two thousand years; rhetoric’s “several hundred
figures” are indeed “foundations for […] the world.”53 Again and again he returns to the size and
age of the discipline: “Rhetoric and its figures: this is how the West meditated on language, for
over two thousand years.”54 Barthes’ lofty estimate of rhetoric, however, finds itself tempered by
a host of critical statements—hyperbolic in the other direction—and these take us back to the
manifesto passage and its microcosm of Barthesean rhetoric.
The second tendency revealed by the manifesto is Barthes’ desire to go beyond Rhetoric,
to suggest its obsolescence (as in his title l’ancienne rhétorique) so that he and his fellow
believers in this manifesto can achieve “a new practice of language.” This desire to “reduce”
rhetoric does not strictly contradict the previous aggrandizing tendency. Barthes—as a kind of
structuralist salesman—must make rhetoric seem obsolete (yet still fascinating) to make newer
intellectual products more desirable (and bestow upon structuralism a “glamorous” pedigree).55
Furthermore, Barthes—or any Marxist-leaning thinker—cannot simply endorse rhetoric
wholesale because of its history of being weaponized by the state in “brutal conflicts—of money,
of property, of class”; elsewhere he calls Rhetoric “the great literary code” of “the times of
greatest social division.”56 In “Rhetorical Analysis” (1967), Barthes claims artful speaking is
both “a sign of social power and an instrument of that power,”57 wryly noting that the young
bourgeois in France end their secondary education with the classe de rhétorique (a culminating
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pattern imported from antiquity to the Jesuit pedagogic hegemony and beyond). According to
Barthes, French literature’s “very language has been formed in the rhetorical, classical, and
Jesuitical mold. To be true to itself today, it must therefore escape these conditions, and its very
past opens up original paths of escape.”58 Thus, Rhetoric with a capital ‘R’ is not revolutionary
for Barthes since it is doubly troubled by an intellectually conservative pedigree and Marxist
criticisms. And yet, despite its unfashionable, unradical status in Parisian intellectualism, Barthes
contends that we must study rhetoric with great seriousness.
Rhetoric fittingly compels Barthes into an epideictic mood, into the extremes of praise
and blame. One of the crucial questions of this chapter, then, is the extent to which Barthes’
career keeps him within or takes him beyond the borders of the rhetorical empire—which by his
own admission is the largest intellectual empire of all. This is a most difficult task because of the
tension Barthes relentlessly identifies between rhetoric and its foes. As he later writes in The
Pleasure of the Text, his “primary task” is to “re-establish within the science of language what is
only fortuitously, disdainfully attributed to it, or even more often, rejected: semiology (stylistics,
rhetoric, as Nietzsche said).”59 Yet this comes with a second task: “to restore within science what
goes against it: here, the text.”60 Though Barthes’ contrarian impulses do not entirely negate his
expansive estimates and praise, dubbing rhetoric a “merely historical object” detached from
“revolutionary science” is quite harsh.
These two tendencies—grandiosity and celebration, bracketing and suspicion—define
Barthes’ rhetorical pathos. Neither tendency is disinterested and scientific; the pathos of the
ancient art seeps through the Saussurean dams he constructs to harness what he dubs the “double
river” of classical rhetoric (one synchronic stream, one diachronic). Barthes radiates a sense of
re-discovery, lamenting the lack of synoptic modern rhetoric manuals in French. Thanks to this
societal neglect and ignorance, and the limited scope of his readings, Barthes will be able to
define and redefine rhetoric in stimulating ways without being hamstrung by the ancient and
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incessant debates as to rhetoric’s domains, aims, and essences. Barthes was certainly a
rhetorician according to his own frameworks (yet shy to consider himself as such). His most
systematic definition of rhetoric is a “meta-language” that spans six activities—rhetoric as a
technique, teaching, science, ethic, social practice, and ludic practice. Before considering this
signature definition, let us consider some of his briefer characterizations.

5.9

Minor definitions of rhetoric (linguistic)

Manifold short definitions or characterizations of rhetoric abound in Barthes’ work,
scattered en route to other topics. For instance, he claims “rhetoric is the science that encodes the
sending of messages” and then laments the lack of a rhetoric of reading, a corresponding science
of decoding.61 On another occasion, Barthes asks, “What is it that makes a verbal message a
work of art?”62 Whereas the formalists focused on Literaurnost, and Jakobson on poetics,
Barthes responds to this question with “rhetoric, so as to avoid any restriction of poetics to
poetry and in order to mark our concern with a general level of language common to all
genres.”63 These pithy attempts often articulate rhetoric, not in the classical dimensions he knew
in the 1940s, but in the most advanced linguistic terminologies he could find.
Barthes often gave rhetoric’s old images new linguistic frames. In one of his most
compelling attempts at simplicity, he states, “rhetoric can be defined as the connotative level of
language.”64 Here he opens up a whole dimension of rhetoric based on sentiment and intuition
required to understand connotation. As Barthes writes in Elements of Semiology (1964),
“rhetoric is the form of the connotators”—in the Hjelmslevian sense of “form”—whereas
ideology is the form of their signifieds.65 What Barthes means by the “the rhetoric of an image,”
in this vein, is simply “the classification of its connotators”: its “figures” will be “formal
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relations of elements,” subject to “the physical constrains of vision.”66 Defining rhetoric as the
“connotative level of language” or “the form of the connotators” perhaps resonates with Kenneth
Burke’s notion of the “dramatistic” level of language that he opposes to the “scientistic” in his
famous essay “Terministic Screens.”
Owing to connotation, rhetorical analysis cannot always remain fixed upon a textual
object and requires a subjective interpreter. Asked whether the semiologist has a guaranteed
objectivity during rhetorical analysis, Barthes responds with an elongated “no”:
The analysis of rhetoric requires the researcher to rely on their own feeling as a reader,
something which might shock the positivist procedures associated with experimentation.
As soon as we study language, we come up against this obstacle. There is no “proof” of
language other than its readability, its immediate understanding. In order to prove the
analysis of a language being made you always have to come back to the “linguistic
sentiment” of the person who is speaking. In any case, my exteriority to the language that
I am analyzing is only provisional. Indeed my own description itself could in turn be
taken up by another wider and more coherent system of explanation.67
This appeal to sentiment and subjectivity contrasts remarkably with the formalizing impulses of
Barthes’ contemporaries, who were eager to develop the most objective, or at least technical,
areas of rhetoric. Yet here Barthes saw a way forward; he was increasingly keen to open up
structuralist science to literature, rhetoric, and other discourses of feeling and pleasure.
Rhetoric escapes positivism, at least in the mind of Barthes. Worried about “bourgeois
positivism … superbly—abusively—disengaged from language,” he claims that “the task facing
structural discourse is to make itself entirely homogeneous to its object.”68 In a sense, “science
will become literature.”69 He suggests that the new structuralist should:
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Transform himself into a “writer,” not in order to profess or to practice “style,” but in
order to recognize the crucial problems of any speech act. ... The relations of subjectivity
and objectivity—, or to put it another way, the subject’s place in his work—can no longer
be conceived as in the palmy days of positivist science.70
Here he echoes the “shock [to] positivist procedures”; the notion that “the analysis of rhetoric
requires the researcher to rely on their own feeling as a reader.”71 Barthes’ consummate
rhetorician, rather than simply a stylist, becomes a diagnostician or pathologist of speech acts.

5.10 Minor definitions of rhetoric (amorous)
Whereas these pithy definitions would have been impossible without modern linguistics
(Hjelmslev and Jakobson), Barthes will also tackle rhetoric in one of its most classical
formulations from Phaedrus. Rhetoric’s erotic-amorous dimension bridges the young Barthes as
classicist to the old author of A Lover’s Discourse.72 Whereas many scholars envision Barthes’
interest in desire as a poststructuralist or psychoanalytic move, it is arguably a Platonic one,
latent in his earlier work. In an expansive definition of rhetoric from 1963, for instance, we see
the discipline of rhetoric “linked … to all communication” and chiefly to love:
This zone [of controlled literary communication], a vital one, is called rhetoric, whose
double function is to keep literature from being transformed into the sign of banality (if
too direct) and into the sign of originality (if too indirect). The frontiers of rhetoric may
widen or narrow, from Gongorism to stenography, but it is certain that rhetoric, which is
nothing but the technique of exact information, is linked not only to all literature but even
to all communication, once it seeks to make others understand that we acknowledge
them: rhetoric is the amorous dimension of writing.73
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The first sentence seemingly heads towards a Paulhanian tension between banality and
originality. But this gives way to writing’s “amorous dimension,” and Barthes follows this
definition with the maxim “to write is a mode of Eros”; “there is no other significatum in literary
work.”74 Plato is not mentioned explicitly here, but shortly his rhetorical seminar will teach that
“rhetoric is a dialogue of love”75 while specifically citing Phaedrus (to which a section of A
Lover’s Discourse was much later dedicated). All of his subsequent work on amorous or erotic
themes—a Lover’s Discourse, Pleasure of the Text, his various writings on Sade, the nude, the
striptease, and so on—are within the rough domain defined by Plato’s ancient intermingling of
love and rhetoric; as Barthes writes, studying the “pleasure of language” was to an extent
anticipated by the epideictic (celebratory) genre of “old Rhetoric,” although this pleasure was
constrained by the “natural.”76 Of course, Barthes was not content to simply rehash old rhetorical
themes in his career—except in the EPHE seminar, a piece of “personal propaedeutics” created
because he could find no adequate manual, no “chronological and systematic panorama” of
rhetoric in French.77 His typical procedure was to take an old notion from Roman or especially
Greek rhetoric and then attempt to radicalize or exceed it, addressing the gaps between ancient
and modern sciences of discourse.

5.11 The six practices of rhetoric
We approach the EPHE seminar suspecting that Barthes will, like many rhetoricians
before him, definite rhetoric expansively and eloquently. Even defining rhetoric—and metonyms
like eloquence and the consummate orator—at this point is itself a stereotyped rhetorical gesture
from which Barthes breaks through a more structuralist, annaliste approach. Let us consider a
few of the most famous sayings to establish what Barthes is up against. Firstly, the psychagogic
definition from Phaedrus: rhetoric as techne psychagogia tis dia logon, an “art which leads the
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soul by means of words.”78 Secondly, Aristotle’s analytic definition: “Rhetoric is a counterpart
[antistrophos] to dialectic” and “may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means
of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.”79 Thirdly, the moralistic definition of the
ideal orator from Cato the Elder and much popularized by Quintilian: the vir bonus dicendi
peritus, a good man speaking well.80 In addition to capturing rhetoric in one shot, there is also
the strategy of defining it recursively; one can say the discipline is the sum of its five parts or
canons, and then define their parts, the parts and of parts, and so on.
The genius of Barthes’ definition—which is more of a thick description than the
highlighting of an essence—issues from its overlapping rather than distinct parts, yielding a
sociological and anthropological orientation with six “practices” constituting a “metalanguage,”
that is, a “discourse on discourse”:
1. A technique: the techne of persuasion, a “body of rules and recipes” with designs
on the auditor or reader
2.

A teaching: a personal or institutional practice of transmission and examination

3. A science (or proto-science): the observation and classification of linguistic
phenomena, “argumentative language and ‘figured’ language”
4. an ethic: a “body of ethical prescriptions whose role is to supervise … the
‘deviations’ of emotive language”
5. a social practice: “the privileged technique … which permits the ruling class to
gain ownership of speech”
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6. a ludic practice: a form “mockery” and transgressive play directed to the rest of
rhetoric’s “repressive … institutional system”81
These practices present themselves at the start of the “Aide-mémoire,” opening up the scope of
rhetoric to an unprecedented extent, recasting it with provocative terminologies. If we take these
six practices as constitutive of the rhetorical discipline, then the new “discourse on discourse”
that Barthes developed across his career truly transcends only one of them while developing the
other five. It is the Proto-scientific aspect of rhetoric that Barthes truly surpasses, drawing on
Saussure, Jakobson, Greimas, and Hjelmslev. Here Barthes becomes 5/6th rhetorician and 1/6th
something else.

5.12 The aide-mémoire: critique and apology
Though Barthes’ Aide-mémoire demystifies and “reads” the institution of rhetoric in an
absolutely novel way, particularly with respect to social class, he simultaneously introduces new
mystifications. In stipulating that “we shall limit ourselves to Athens, Rome, and France,”82 he
transforms the “rhetorical empire” into imperial rhetoric as written by the victors of its
intellectual history (decades earlier Paulhan had already recognized Arabic rhetoric, for
instance). Barthes even rules out America and Belgium, which, in hindsight, yielded some of the
most vital contributions to in twentieth-century rhetorical theory: Kenneth Burke and the
“Brussels School of Rhetoric.”83
Such rejections facilitated the structuralist adoption of rhetoric, smoothing over rough
patches (regrettably, some of the most interesting ones). The magnum opus of the Brussels
School, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, would not jive with synchronic
investigation because of its philosophical and legalistic density, relatively minimal treatment of
the figures, and focus on arguments moving though temporal and logical space (light on
81
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linguistics, it never mentions Saussure). Such structuralist biases of Barthes’ circle manifest
themselves in the rhetoric issue of Communications 16, published at EPHE. The issue’s
appended bibliography of rhetoric refers to The New Rhetoric as original but marginal in
rhetoric’s overall revival.84 And yet, from our vantage today, The New Rhetoric is precisely the
opposite of marginal. It is hard to imagine the course of later structuralism and French
philosophy—which transgressed so many norms around argumentation—if it had critiqued or
absorbed the argumentative teachings of the Brussels school. Barthes himself admitted his
distaste for the disputative aspect of rhetorical performance, making him a poor candidate for
theorizing argument (though he did a fine job of it for Mythologies).
Despite these distortions, Barthes ultimately gave rhetoric the ingenious structuralist
treatment it deserved—and invited. Already in antiquity rhetoric had relentlessly taxonomized
itself with “structural” zeal, and Barthes brought this passion to light in the very structure of his
own exegesis. After a brief introduction, he divides the totality of rhetoric into its diachronic
aspect, “The Journey,” which forms the first half of “The Old Rhetoric,” and its synchronic
aspect, “The Network,” which forms the second half. He strangely maintains that he is not
writing a history of rhetoric, but only a “long diachrony” of “seven moments, seven ‘days’
whose value will be essentially didactic.”85 The synchronic aspect, on the other hand, represents
rhetoric’s “subtly articulated machine, a tree of operations, a ‘program’ designed to produce
discourse.”86 Each paragraph is given a scrupulous subheading such as “A.3.2.” for the
“Journey,” and “B.1.21.” for the “Network.” In its original French publication, it even features
one diachronic appendix, a chronology of rhetoric, and a synchronic appendix, a taxonomic chart
of rhetoric, plus an index that references famous terms to a point on “The Journey” or “The
Network.” In this way, “The Old Rhetoric” becomes a fittingly structuralist monument for a
deeply structural discipline that, to this day, has not given up on its taxonomical fervor.87
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Barthes’ renowned zeal for classification thus returns to, continues, and embodies perhaps the
longest and greatest taxonomic history and passion outside the biological realm.

5.13 Barthes, latent Annales historian
In the genesis and execution of Barthes’ aide-memoire, what is absolutely remarkable and
virtually never discussed is its annaliste quality. Barthes claims, “neither a technique, nor an
esthetic, nor an ethic of Rhetoric are now possible, but a history? Yes, a history of Rhetoric (as
research, as book, as teaching) is today necessary, broadened by a new way of thinking” that
includes “historical science” (the Annales, more or less) as well as other disciplines near or under
the umbrella of structuralism.88 The Annales school, however, remained largely ignorant of
rhetoric despite its potential for elucidating mentalités and the genre of history.89 And yet, the
school expanded a historiographic space—towards social history and the longue durée—
propitious for studying the institutions and practices of rhetoric. Institutionally speaking, Barthes
could not have been closer to the Annales; he ran his rhetoric seminars in the sixth section of the
EPHE, over which Braudel presided. While playing a key administrative role in the sixth
section90 he published various non-rhetoric texts in Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations.
More importantly, in shared pursuit of new historical objects and methods, there emerged an
“intellectual proximity between Roland Barthes and ‘l’esprit des Annales.’”91 When Barthes
began thinking of rhetoric on monumental timescales and its total social institution and
ideology—its mentalité if it could be said to have one—he broke free of the positivist history that
typically characterizes the discipline.92
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The seven articles and reviews Barthes published for the Annales between 1957-64 are
often forgotten, but the lexicon, methods, and milieu of the Annales were certainly at hand when
Barthes and his peers intensified work on rhetoric in the mid 1960s.93 It is true that the strictly
philosophical dimension of rhetoric’s history runs askew to the social history traditionally
enshrined in the Annales. Yet as Genette proved with his Annales piece “Enseignement et
rhétorique au XXe siècle” (1966), the social-pedagogical dimension of rhetoric fit with the
notion of an era’s “mental equipment.”94 One of Barthes’ achievements with his work on
rhetoric was indeed to deflate the “great men” approach to history and emphasize social and
pedagogical continuities. Barthes did not publish any rhetoric work in Annales: Économies,
Sociétés, Civilisations, yet the last word of this title tantalizes us. Consider his famous claim that
Rhetoric “watch[es] immutable, impassive, and virtually immortal” over “regimes, religions,
civilizations” as they “come to life, pass, and vanish without itself being moved or changed.”
Indeed he claims “Rhetoric grants access to what must be called a super-civilization: that of the
historical and geographic West.”95 These statements are rife with traditional Annaliste ideology :
the pairing of history and geography, the marginalization of political history, and the valorization
of (longue) durée.
Barthes speaks of his generation “suffocating” under a “monist” history which
structuralism helped relieve through pluralism; historians such as Braudel revealed “the
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coexistence of structures of differing wavelengths.”96 We should note, however, that Braudel’s
structuralism has relatively little to do with the Lévi-Strauss tradition and its focus on abstract
structure and function.97 In Braudel’s sense, “structure was architecture and construction, but it
had to be observable and located in concrete reality.”98 But instead of crediting Braudel, Barthes
cites a vague, capacious “structuralism” as the essential provocation towards rhetoric.
“Structuralism,” claims Barthes, “leads us to work on a new timescale”; Rhetoric
represents the ultimate demonstration of this as a “very long term object (two and half thousand
years).”99 Despite rhetoric’s felicity for synchronic investigation, Barthes regarded it as
necessarily part of a new “diachronic structuralism”; this emergence would avoid “bring[ing]
history more or less to a standstill” through standard synchronic methods.100This diachronic
structuralism seeks codes which are “historical—they are born, prevail and die in obedience to
forces that are as yet unknown and are perhaps something like a new ‘secret of history.’”101 As
examples, he offers Foucault’s code for clinical medicine, and of course the rhetorical code
comprised of the “connotative signifiers” of literature, “stable for more than a millennium.”102
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Since the transformation of the rhetorical code, which Barthes dates to the late nineteenth
century, entailed shaking up “the whole ‘ideology’ of literature,” it is necessary to investigate the
history of rhetoric and not just its flattened figures. Seeking a criticism “both structural and
historic,” Barthes recognized rhetoric as the literary code. In hindsight, the continuity that
Barthes sought when he spoke of “literary signification from Antiquity to the nineteenth century
(at least in France)” perhaps evaded him. Yet he perceived, to his credit, that the understanding
of literature’s ideology and history would be virtually coextensive with mapping the “Code” of
rhetoric: that which disciplines and watches over (surveiller) linguistic deviations.103
One of the major insights from Barthes’ ancient rhetoric seminar emerges in a hyperbolic
but seductive thesis on rhetoric’s taxonomic (and hence structural) permanence and power across
societies and histories. Sociology, anthropology, and history join forces as Barthes claims that
rhetoric’s massive system of classification:
Is the only feature really shared by successive and various historical groups, as if there
existed, superior to ideologies of content and to direct determinations of history, an
ideology of form; as if—a principle anticipated by Durkheim and Mauss, affirmed by
Lévi-Strauss—there existed for each society a taxonomic identity, a sociologic in whose
name it is possible to define another history, another sociality, without destroying those
recognized at other levels.104
On an anthropological or sociological level, Barthes’ thesis thus implies that rhetoric’s structure
of classifications constitutes a singular, transhistorical “feature,” a signature of “what must be
called a super-civilization: … the historical and geographical West.”105 Although he risks
essentializing the “West,” this “taxonomic identity” represents one of the most promising
remnants in Barthes’ commonplace book of unfinished ideas about rhetoric.
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5.14 From the rhetoric seminars to “The Death of the Author”
If we have just encountered “peak rhetoric” coinciding with “peak structuralism” circa
1966, then where does Barthes go from here? It is unclear how Barthes’ rhetoric seminars
eventually give way to his Balzac seminars in the era of “The Death of the Author” (1967) and
S/Z (1970). Yet precisely this era of the mid to late 1960s becomes crucial in any argument about
structuralist apostasy or transformation: scholars inclined to a poststructuralist Barthes would
want to locate some sort of rupture here. Instead, perhaps, we find a Barthes deeply informed by
his rhetorical studies, and yet (over)confident that he can move past l'ancienne rhétorique—
associated with the readerly and rhetorical realm of composition—to a new writerly, textual
production.
In early 1967, his course was “Recherches sur le discours de l’Histoire,” which continued
his linguistic-rhetorical program, but at a discursive level superior to the sentence, in hopes of
understanding classic historical writing from Herodotus to Michelet.106 The research shifts,
roughly speaking, from the history of rhetoric to rhetorical analysis of the historian. From
September to December 1967, Barthes was teaching at Johns Hopkins and lecturing about
rhetoric at major American universities, but this remains obscure today.107 From the American
vantage, the seminal or representative moment arrives when he publishes “The Death of the
Author” in an extremely unusual place: the Fall-Winter issue of Aspen (1967), the avant-garde,
loose-leaf, multimedia “magazine in a box.”108 Often misdated to its later European publication
in 1968 (without equivalent fanfare), this text cannot be understood as a “text of ‘68”: it fits best
in his EPHE research program, alongside the rhetoric and Sarasine seminars, and his discovery
of Émile Benveniste.
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Benveniste, who is not explicitly named in “Death of the Author,” is nonetheless
resoundingly present. Who or what has killed the author? As we saw earlier, Barthes began the
story of authorial demise with Mallarmé and Valéry. Linguistics is the final cause of death, for it
“furnishes the destruction of the Author with a precious analytic instrument[:] ...linguistically,
the author is nothing but the one who writes, just as I is nothing but the one who says I.”109 But it
is not “linguistics” as a whole: it is really Benveniste, whom Barthes began reading the previous
year. Thanks to Kristeva’s introduction, Barthes (like Todorov) championed Benveniste in his
Johns Hopkins talk, claiming “the linguistic I can and must be defined in an entirely apsychological fashion: I is nothing but 'the person who utters the present instance of discourse
containing the linguistic instance I (Benveniste).”110 Barthes carries precisely this notion forward
into “The Death of the Author.” Between Valéry’s attack on the Author—with “the lessons of
Rhetoric” teaching Valéry about the “linguistic and ‘accidental’ nature of his activity”111—and
Benveniste’s recursive definition of I, Barthes was well equipped to claim the death of the
author. In this text’s complex Anglophone reception, one also wonders about the “accidental”
nature of the translator’s activity: in three different translations, hasardeuse emerges as
“hazardous,” “chance,” and “accidental.”
In characteristic rhe-structuralist fashion for Barthes during the 1960s, his thought
combines cutting-edge linguistics with an older rhetorical critique, or perhaps a radicalization of
rhetoric made possible by linguistics and contemporary literature. In 1968, Barthes claims that
Benveniste’s “ideas on enunciation (in particular on the person) turned out to be very much like
certain explorations made by writers themselves” such as Valéry and Mallarmé.112 These writers
“foregrounded not the composition—as in the days of rhetoric—but, more radically, the very
production of the literary text.”113 For Barthes, the history of rhetoric becomes a prelude towards
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a certain courtship: “the strivings of linguists towards literature and of literary critics towards
language.”114 Indeed rhetoric “necessarily prefigured a science of discourse”; the “intuitions of
rhetoric have often been profound.”115 And yet, classical rhetoric’s “normative position”—its
precepts—“held it back.”116 For Barthes, the linguistics represented by Benveniste and the
deeper, non-normative rhetoric of modern French literature coincide with the Author’s demise.
Benveniste’s work is like the “simmering … of water that’s about to boil, that warmth that raises
raise science towards something else[:] … what I call ‘writing’”; its practitioners include
contemporaries such as Kristeva, Genette, and Derrida.117 This was one of Barthes’
quintessential programmatic moves: pointing out the convergences between as many fields as he
could—between the histories of rhetoric, linguistics, and literary production—which is why he is
so often referred to as an intellectual barometer for his times.
Ultimately, “The Death of the Author” should be (quite fittingly) estranged from Barthes’
authorship: it is merely the most forceful amalgamation of notions that had been circulating in
Paris for some time, which eventually percolated into his seminar. For instance, in the rhetoric
seminar of November 1965, Sollers noted “the author's necessary disappearance in writing” in
the paper he delivered on Mallarmé.118 To use a phrase of Sollers, “the coffin of rhetorical
speech had been forced open”:119 but the only thing inside was an indiscernible, muted mummy;
the death of the author should be regarded as an authorless concept, or at least, a collectively
authored concept, passing through the prismatic structure of the EPHE’s sixth section. Though
the “The Death of the Author” proved to be Barthes’ consummate polemic for American
audiences and a symbol of radicalism, it went theoretically “forward” while going historically
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“backward” to a time before Lansonism had built the author up as an ensemble of factual atoms.
This underestimated double direction strikes me as almost characteristic of this thinking.

5.15 S/Z and pleine rhétorique
The next major work Anglophones tend to value, S/Z, represents perhaps the worst
possible text to shoehorn into a structuralist/poststructuralist rubric. Its famous distinction
between readerly and writerly texts, however, can be readily aligned with Barthes’ shifting
rhetorical program. In S/Z, and more generally in his texts emerging in the late sixties, we find
Barthes significantly more confident that l'ancienne rhétorique, which he deems the essential
inventive grid for classic literature, has given up the majority of its best secrets. In S/Z, this
corresponds to the readerly:
A Renaissance author (Pierre Fabri) once wrote a treatise entitled Le grand et vrai art de
pleine rhétorique. In like manner, we can say that any classic (readerly) text is implicitly
an art of Replete Literature: literature that is replete: like a cupboard where meanings are
shelved, stacked, safeguarded (in this text nothing is ever lost: meaning recuperates
everything); like a pregnant female, replete with signifieds which criticism will not fail to
deliver; like the sea, replete with depths and movements which give it its appearance of
infinity, its vast meditative surface; like the sun, replete with the glory it sheds over those
who write it, or finally, acknowledged as an established and recognized art: institutional.
This Replete Literature, readerly literature, can no longer be written: symbolic plenitude
(culminating in romantic art) is the last avatar of our culture.120
The readerly partakes of replete, which is to say classically rhetorical, literature: the safeguarded
pregnancy of meaning. The “rhetorical code” is indeed “powerful in the readerly text.”121
So, where does Barthes’ rhetoric go from here, given that he claims “we must renounce
structuring this text in large masses, as was done by classical rhetoric and by secondary-school
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explication: no construction of the text”?122 Barthes, in effect, proposes a new orientation to
rhetoric: the point will not be to “manifest a structure”—which is what the old rhetoric allows us
to do—“but to produce a structuration” that is fundamentally open-ended:
The five codes create a kind of network, a topos through which the entire text passes (or
rather, in passing, becomes text). Thus, if we make no effort to structure each code, or the
five codes among themselves, we do so deliberately, in order to assume the multivalence
of the text, its partial reversibility.123
Barthes appropriates the old rhetorical notion—the topos—but elevates it to the constitutive level
of the “entire text.” Looking back, Barthes regarded S/Z as “both an analysis of the text and, as I
see it, a theory of the text—of the classical text, the readable text.”124 Yet the growing
Barthesean and Tel Quelian theory of the Text, wagered upon a kind of new, multivalent, nonnormative rhetoric that, to use Barthes’ words, would “de-originate the utterance”
[l’énconciation].125 To dispense with the origin of these “voices” or “codes” transgresses
classical rhetoric’s precepts, which focus, so often, on unifying the speaker and what is spoken
(under ethos and other terms). Rhetoric features a whole authorial science for inscribing oneself
into the discourse, for being present, powerful, and credible. But in the Text, the novelist can
only be “inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, figured in the carpet”; the author can
only come back as “guest.”126 The orator desires precisely the opposite: to become host.
Metaphorically speaking, the Text is a “network”: “a result of a combinatory systematic”; the
work, however, is “an organism which grows by vital expansion, by ‘development’ (a word
which is significantly ambiguous, at once biological and rhetorical).”127 In this way, Barthes
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tries to constitute the Text as a “post-rhetorical” object—while using a rather rhetorical notion,
the topos. Barthes’ tendency to “slip back” into rhetoric is formidable.

5.16 The Text “after” rhetoric
S/Z represents the peak ennui Barthes felt facing the mighty explication-dissertation duo
reigning over literary pedagogy, a duo explored in the second chapter. “The structure,” Barthes
writes in S/Z, “is not the plot or the plan. Therefore, this is not an ‘explication de texte.’”128 The
structure of his commentary repeats the structure of the literary object, he explains, because of
the “distaste” and “intolerance, which I still feel—perhaps on a purely personal and temporary
level—toward the dissertation and its forms of exposition.”129 Though he admits he might return
to this traditional format, “at the moment I can only try to undo, destroy, disperse the
dissertational discourse” since the “rhetorical or syllogistic model of expression” yields no more
pleasure.130 Thus, even though the “rhetorical models” were “suitable,” he dispenses with them:
“I was able to ‘speak’ the text, without ever feeling the need to outline it. Thus, there is really no
other structure to this work than my reading, the advance of a reading as structuration.”131 Yet
Barthes was not alone in eroding the dissertation and its outlining practices, and includes
Kristeva, Sollers, Levi-Strauss, Lacan, and Derrida as fellow thinkers who, against convention,
suit their texts to their objects.
Barthes’ concept of the Text was in some sense built within the hollowed-out remains of
rhetoric’s schools. An essay such as “From Work to Text” (1971) could not have emerged
without a historical account of rhetoric’s decline:
The Text requires that one try to abolish (or at the very least to diminish) the distance
between writing and reading. … In the times of the greatest social division (before the
setting up of democratic cultures), reading and writing were equally privileges of class.
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Rhetoric, the great literary code of those times, taught one to write (even if what was then
normally produced were speeches, not texts). Significantly, the coming of democracy
reversed the word of command: what the (secondary) School prides itself on is teaching
to read (well) and no longer to write.132
As we saw in the first two chapters, the decline of rhetorical pedagogy in France—how to
write—coincided with the birth of literature departments—how to read. Barthes hopes the Text
will entail a rebalancing of this history. Even as late as 1976, Barthes laments that “on the
reading side, we have nothing—no science, no art—that corresponds to rhetoric. … We currently
have neither a rhetoric nor a psychology … of the reader.”133 After studying classical rhetoric,
“the science that encodes the sending of messages,” Barthes tried, for years, to come up with its
reading analogue, to debunk the notion that “the reader is the brother of the author.”134 By
constantly analogizing to the rhetorical past, he imagined a certain future—a future that was
always programmatic, rarely concrete, and never quite able to stand on its own.

5.17 Against agonistic discourse
Despite the enormous array of pre-existing literary and philosophical grievances against
rhetoric, Barthes still managed to find largely original points for criticism. Rather than classic
complaints against rhetorical trickery and iniquity, Barthes became particularly concerned with a
tendency towards agonistic intellectual exchange and pugnacious orality endemic to modern
French intellectualism (which we met in the first two chapters). For Barthes, spoken exchanges
often represented a dangerous domain, especially since someone must get the “last word”:
In the space of speech, the one who comes last occupies a sovereign position, held,
according to an established privilege, by professors, presidents, judges, confessors: every
language combat (the machia of the Sophists, the disputatio of the Scholastics) seeks to
gain possession of this position; by the last word, I will disorganize, “liquidate” the
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adversary, inflicting upon him a (narcissistically) mortal wound, cornering him in silence,
castrating him of all speech.135
Partly owing to these dangers, Barthes wants to refuse “the machè, the Law of verbal combat, of
jousting instituted centuries ago in the West.”136 Despite his reputation for dueling Picard—
which he certainly did not enjoy—he distrusted combative verbal “games”:
One should also look at the situation in France today (I speak of conflicts of speech):
visible taste of the French people for the (verbal) agōn: heirs of the Greeks, without their
genius: rugby, football, antagonistic sports → one-to-one debates, confrontations, debates
between adversaries, etc. Equivocal regime: it’s coded (in fact), but one pretends to be
natural, spontaneous, truthful, to oppose referents as if speech were purely transparent,
instrumental → always this great naturalizing drive, this refusal to take responsibility for
the codes, for the games.137
Barthes deeply distrusted these coded intellectual conflicts, or what we could perhaps call the
mythologization of agonistic speech. Inherited from the rhetorical superstructure, these conflicts
worsen under the apparent death and weak survival of rhetoric: in the former systems of
discourse, at least the “games” were explicit, as they had been under Scholastic and later
humanist pedagogies.
For Barthes and for us, however, the games have gone underground. For instance, any
academic can relate to the experience of the question and answer period after a lecture, wherein
non-questioning “questions” get posed. These questions, as Barthes puts it, are the “assertion of a
plenitude” rather than a genuine “expression of a ‘want.’”138 Yet in this “game” of pseudoquestions and pseudo-answers, one is only allowed to respond to the content, and not the manner
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of asking: “What I receive is the connotation; what I must give back is the denotation.”139
Barthes then compares these games, somewhat unfavorably, to the disputatio of medieval
rhetoric and pedagogy:
Our intellectual discussions are as encoded as the old scholastic disputes; we still have
the stock roles (the ‘sociologist’, the ‘Goldmannian’, the ‘Telquelian’, etc.) but contrary
to the disputatio, where these roles would have been ceremonial and have displayed the
artifice of their function, our intellectual ‘intercourse’ always gives itself ‘natural’ airs: it
claims to exchange only signifieds, not signifiers.140
Whereas a medieval disputatio would stage its two bachelors on either side of the quaestio—
respondens and opponens—adjudicated by a master, the modern discursive codes politely hide
themselves despite their sometimes brutal “airs” of the natural or neutral (Tel Quel’s
excommunications come to mind). Barthes tended to appreciate that the Old Rhetoric was not
shy to show its seams: discourse would reveal that it was in fact stitched together, sewn out of
signifiers rather than being a natural representation of signifieds.

5.18 Against oratorical pedagogy
From Barthes’ experiences as a lycée and then Sorbonne student, eventually running
seminars at EPHE and ultimately lecturing at the Collège, he built a little-known critique of what
we might call oratorical or monological pedagogy, or what Bourdieu might call “magisterial
discourse.”141 And whereas Bourdieu primarily attacks institutional structures, Barthes considers
the personal and interpersonal dimensions of teaching—often late in his life, from a position of
increasing safety. The non-agrégé Barthes will confront the workings of French pedagogy in a
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far less systematic way than the agrégé Bourdieu (though a “geographic” outsider with respect to
Paris, he was an “academic” insider).142
Barthes’ own teaching and his critique of pedagogical life reveals an extremely curious
feature: this admired pedagogue with a famously beautiful voice distrusted the spoken word, its
agonism, and its ability to seize the “last word.” This aversion, which has readily lent itself to
psychoanalytic and biographical explanation, also aligns with his political suppleness, which
avoided the most dogmatic left politics and shunned the soapbox. Barthes’ renowned discretion
and aversion to appearing hysterical accentuates and perhaps generates his distaste for the
spoken word: “I greatly prefer writing to speech. … I’m always afraid of theatricalizing myself
when I speak … [and of] hysteria, of finding myself drawn into collusive nods and winks.”143
The text offers Barthes a reprieve: “I love the text because for me it is that rare locus of language
from which any ... logomachy is absent. The text is never a ‘dialogue’: no risk of feint, of
aggression, of blackmail, no rivalry of ideolects.”144 In Barthes’ embrace of the text and
rejection of oratory, his own disposition seamlessly fuses with his theoretical rationalizations.
Barthes’ most extensive political-pedagogical critique, “Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers”
(1971), concerns the ancient rhetorical notion that teaching and speech are fundamentally
interconnected: Rhetoric begat “the whole of our teaching.”145 He seeks to update this tie with a
variety of modern tools, especially Lacanian psychoanalysis, to respond to his contemporary
teaching “crisis.” More implicitly, he critiques rhetoric’s dominant “monological” tendency. The
writer is an “operator of language on the side of writing”; the teacher is “on the side of speech,”
and the intellectual, in between, “prints and publishes his speech.”146 Teaching, speech, and the
142
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Law are associated together: “all speech is on the side of the Law.”147 This trifecta will be
subjected to Barthes’ scrutiny.
Barthes creates something reminiscent of Paulhan’s Rhetoric and Terror distinction. Since
the Law acts as an “equilibrium” between the permissible and the forbidden, what Barthes terms
“repressive discourse” enacts a preference “for vacillations, for verbal oppositions, for the thrust
and parry of antitheses, to be neither for this nor for that. … Repressive discourse is the
discourse of good conscience, liberal discourse.”148 This is opposed with what Barthes terms
“Terrorist discourse”: “a native violence which is the consequence of the fact that no statement
can directly express the truth yet has no other system at its disposal than the word’s coup de
force.”149 In the final section called “Peaceable Speech,” Barthes claims, “violence is always
present (in language), and this very presence is why we may bracket its signs and thereby
dispense with a rhetoric: violence must not be absorbed by the code of violence.”150
“Repressive” as rhetoric may be, Barthes, like Paulhan, opposes it to violence.
In pedagogical practice, Barthes preferred the “utopian” space of the seminar—“small, to
safeguard not its intimacy but its complexity”—over the great lecture hall.151 Barthes’ image for
the ideal “meeting of speakers,” where everything is “relaxed” and “disarmed,” is that of “certain
places, abroad, where kif is smoked” (he complains of his “bronchial incapacity”).152 The
“teaching space” would pursue “floating (the very form of the signifier); such floating destroys
nothing; it is content to disorientate the Law.”153 But this “utopia” was not feasible at the
Collège de France, where he uttered the most notorious statement of his late period: the
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purported fascist tendency of language. Barthes’ inaugural lecture approaches something of an
anti-lecture, a lecture against viva voce lectures. He famously declares “language [la langue]—
the performance of a language system [tout langage]—is neither reactionary nor progressive, it is
quite simply fascist; for fascism does not prevent speech [dire], it compels speech.”154 Though
this statement baffles or irritates many readers, perhaps it merely expresses Barthes’
longstanding suspicions towards oratory in the most forceful way possible: the fear of “the
authority of assertion, the gregariousness of repetition.”155 In their own ways, writing, text, and
literature find themselves valorized against speech: “this grand imposture which allows us to
understand speech outside the bounds of power ... I for one call literature”; literary freedom
depends on the “labor of displacement” directed towards the writer’s language (langue) and not
upon strictly personal-political concerns.156

5.19 The eloquent Barthes: reflexivity of rhetoric
Professing to be a rhetorician, being identified as a rhetorician, constitutes a special
problem. In most disciplines, the form of commentary distances itself from the content that
concerns the discipline (music critics write, rather than sing, their critiques). Yet rhetoricians—or
orators, or sophists— enact a strange reflexive, performative, and perhaps confessional drama.
As Michel Beaujour writes of Barthes:
To admit this rhetoricalness would get one caught in the endless play of doxa and
paradox, and it would be confessing to sophistry, an impossible admission in a cultural
context where (rebellious or established) verisimilitude tries to pass for truth at all costs
or to deny truth value to any assertion. A striker out of predicates, such as Barthes, is
reluctant to have his name on file as a rhetorician.157
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Having oneself “on file as a rhetorician” becomes simultaneously a problem of showmanship, of
credibility, of authority. When it comes to writing about writing, rhetoric about rhetoric, and
literature about literature, Barthes risked an ethos challenge, like many of his contemporaries. He
wisely chose to theorize his own performance, which, as with Derrida, at least partially defended
him against charges of extravagance (in such situations the most damning thing is professing to
be completely arhetorical).
As an entry point in Barthes’ ethos, we should note that rhetoric belongs to the ecrivain
(“author”) rather than the ecrivant (“writer”). Whereas the ecrivant forgoes “rhetorical
figures”—their text is “polished flat”—the ecrivain that Barthes identifies with “is willing to
renounce the guarantees of transparent, instrumental writing.”158 The renouncing of instrumental
writing in favour of a more explicitly rhetorical practice reveals itself most prominently Barthes’
articulation of nouvelle critique. The new criticism that Barthes articulates against Picard defines
itself by grappling with what Barthes terms the “problem of language,” and in effect, the
problem of rhetoric. Barthes explains, “If new criticism has any reality, it is ... in the solitude of
the act of criticism, which is now declared to be a complete act of writing”; an ecrivain in this
sense is someone “aware of the depth of language, not its instrumentality or its beauty.”159 The
critic merges with the writer to the extent that they peer together into this abyss.
However, this “transgression” finds itself “overtaken” by a profound change in
“intellectual discourse as a whole.”160 Starting with Loyola, and passing through Sade and
Nietzsche, Barthes claims that the “rules of intellectual presentation” have been increasingly
“consigned to the flames.” Moving on to Lacan, who “no longer separates the particular case
from the idea,” and to Lévi-Strauss’s “new rhetoric of variation … that encourages us to take a
certain responsibility for form,” Barthes maintains, “one and the same truth, common to all
discourse, is being sought, whether the work be fictional, poetic or discursive.”161 Whereas
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“classico-bourgeois society saw in discourse an instrument or a decoration,” it is now “a sign and
a truth.”162 Moving through a host of important thinkers, Barthes comes very close to saying
explicitly that the forbearers and proponents of nouvelle critique are those who (further)
rhetoricize their discourse to contend with the “problem of language.” Yet this irritated the “high
structuralist” Lévi-Strauss, who wrote to Barthes in 1966, after reading Criticism and Truth,
complaining of “too much indulgence in subjectivity, affectivity, and, let us use the word, a
certain mysticism with regard to literature. For me, the work is not open … and it is precisely
[its] closure that allows an objective study to be done on it.”163
In Barthes’ hymn to Genette, “The Return of Poetician,” similar themes emerge of
collapsing the distinction between creative and critical gestures. He explains that “This return ...
tends to make the poetician into a writer, to abolish the hierarchical distance between ‘creator’
and ‘commentator.’”164 The “sufficiently wily” Genette and his “extreme discretion” enjoy the
“fantasmatic power” represented by the “demon of classifying and naming”; though Barthes
praises Genette's style as “perfect,” Genette’s status as poetician is not about stylish writing, but
rather about “accept[ing] the return of the signifier in his own discourse.”165
Barthes often apologizes for, or hedges upon, his vocational or disciplinary status: he is
neither detached scientist-analyst-linguist nor straightforward critic (or producer) of literature. In
1969 he explains that “for twenty years, my investigations have been concerned with literary
language, without my being altogether comfortable in the role of a critic or a linguist.”166 And
even in 1977, he finds himself stuck: “And though it is true that I long wished to inscribe my
work within the field of science—literary, lexicological, and sociological—I must admit that I
have produced only essays, an ambiguous genre in which analysis vies with writing.” The essay
made him vulnerable. Julia Kristeva defended him against “the wardens of ‘rigor’”: for Barthes,
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“the term ‘essays’ should not be perceived either as showing rhetorical humility or as admission
of weak theoretical discourse … but as a methodological exigency of the most serious kind.”167
Yet Barthes admits that he aligned himself with Tel Quel and “eccentric forces” rather than
representing pure semiology.168 Though internally conflicted, his liminality drew him towards
the pluralistic and tolerant domain of rhetoric writ large. The lingering fog over Barthes’ rhetoric
and lifetime intellectual output emanates, in large part, from his marked preference for
journalistic and essayistic (and hence personal) modes of production as well as pedagogical (and
hence quasi-communal) ones over a more classically academic output. Whereas someone like
Foucault produced a series of long, serious, and intentionally book-like monographs, key Barthes
books were often written in response to specific requests by others, and the publication of the
book sometimes lagged his intellectual direction by several years (eg. Mythologies, The Fashion
System). The books that Anglophone scholars consider to be “essential Barthes” (eg. S/Z,
Pleasure of the Text, Criticism and Truth, etc.) make up less than a tenth of his complete works.
What of Barthes’ own style? De Man describes the tone of early Barthes as a “trumpet
blast,” which is “only slightly muted” in later works, a “tone of a man liberated from a
constraining past.”169 De Man, whose own style tends towards the melancholic, posits that “A
somewhat euphoric, slightly manic tone runs through Barthes’ writings, tempered by
considerable irony and discretion but unmistakably braced by the feeling of being on the
threshold of making discoveries.”170 This style—and he does not always adopt it—I would call
his epiphanic mode. At the height of his powers, this epiphanic writing becomes a covenant
between Barthes and his readers, ensuring a feeling of mutual or collaborative discovery; when it
goes astray, Barthes breaks off towards triviality or technicality. On a more concrete level of
style, perhaps the best characterization of his signature syntax comes from his translator Richard
Howard: “Barthes, a writer of great persuasion and power, characteristically ‘runs’ to a very long
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sentence, a rumination held together by colons and various signs of equivalence (‘in other words,
‘i.e.,’ ‘in short’); clearly he is reluctant to let his sentence go until, like Jacob’s angel, it turns and
blesses him.”171 As a stylist Barthes falters with technical semiotic materials (eg. The Fashion
System); he reaches his peaks, unsurprisingly, when writing about literature, rhetoric, and
writing.

5.20 Topoi
Fortunately, when Barthes’ reprobate linguistic methods failed him his rhetorical topoi
more than compensated, at least in a literary milieu. Though others have pointed to their
presence in his work, in my understanding, the topoi constitute a powerfully integrated method
that spans from the material organization of his writing to the abstracted, discrete locations of his
thought. Though he elaborates their power in classical rhetoric in his course, he also envisions
elsewhere their new relevance for les sciences humaines: a “sort of grid ... through which one
could successfully pass all the sciences that we today call social and human.”172 There are at
least three levels of topoi in Barthes’ oeuvre. Firstly, his compositional strategy of thousands of
index cards, which were used as “an organisational device, a kind of ‘creativity machine’ that
served a crucial function in the very construction of his written texts.”173 Secondly, many of his
published texts reveal a piecework, “topical” structure, which resists a treatise form on a
macroscopic level. Thirdly, on the most conceptual level, there are the topoi abstracted from his
texts. For instance, potential topoi that link Barthesean “themes” with rhetorical and classical
notions include myth/mythology, sport/agon/contest, drama/theatre/spectacle, pedagogy, play
(ludic rhetoric), politics, and fashion/figuration (and its absence, nudity).
Though elaborating these must take place in further work, it suffices to say that Barthes’
topoi took him everywhere and are largely responsible for the sense that, more than any
contemporary, Barthes touched on the broadest elements of culture. He was thus a “topologist,”
and though this word is only used today for one field of mathematics, it conveys the recurring
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patterning of his thought that we see prominently from early texts like “In Greece” all the way to
late texts like A Lover’s Discourse. Literary critics and theorists tend to ignore topoi because
they belong to inventio, or the compositional phase, and are thus furthest removed from the final,
authorized work. Yet these topoi are the trellis upon which Barthes’ writing grows. His critically
celebrated capacity for breadth has become attributed, in a sense, to semiotics: wherever there
are signs in culture Barthes could freely roam. However, in those “signs” that appeared the most
radical and unusual, Barthes often returned to the classics as both inventive wellspring (the
classical role of the topoi) and legitimator of discourse (the prestige of classics).

5.21 Conclusion
No single turn of phrase captures Barthes’ trajectory, but perhaps we might say he got
“caught up” in rhetoric: both carried forward and carried away. He describes himself with this
same hedging: “My own historical position … is to be in the rearguard of the avant-garde. Being
avant-garde means knowing what is dead; being ‘rearguard’ means still loving it—I love the
novelistic but I know the novel is dead. There we have, I think, the exact place from which I
write.”174 Much the same could be said for rhetoric—with the twist that rhetoric was almost, but
not entirely, “dead” for Barthes—nor were its old values. Near the end of his life, Barthes writes:
Little by little I recognize in myself a growing desire for readability. I want the texts I receive
to be ‘readable,’ I want the texts I write to be ‘readable,’ too. ... A ‘well-made’ sentence
(according to a classical mode) is clear; it can tend towards a certain obscurity by a certain
use of ellipsis: ellipses must be restrained; metaphors too; a continuously metaphorical
writing exhausts me. A preposterous notion occurs to me (preposterous by dint of
humanism): ‘We shall never be able to say how much love (for the other, the reader) there is
in work on the sentence.’175
Barthes certainly worked his sentences. Ultimately, he internalized the values of the former
rhetoric more than he knew (making it a current rhetoric of sorts). He never strayed too far from
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the Platonic path he articulated in 1963: rhetoric is “linked not only to all literature but even to
all communication, once it seeks to make others understand that we acknowledge them: rhetoric
is the amorous dimension of writing.”176 Barthes’ attraction to this notion across his career
ensures that he remained eloquent and readable while he programmatically detailed, but could
not entirely deliver, a new “writerly” world built upon the ruins of the old rhetoric: a tragic
indecision splitting Barthes between conservative and radical, between restoring and rejecting
l’empire rhétorique. But his hamartia, if it exists, was not such a weakness. Rather, he erred in
trying to imagine the outside of something that has no outside (not in Europe, at least). If he had
wanted to see beyond the old rhetoric, he should have immersed himself, as Paulhan did, in
Malagasy poetry—in any culture distant from the monument that so transfixed him. Barthes
briefly toured through Japan, the “empire of signs,” but did not learn enough to genuinely relate
it back to his homeland, the empire of rhetoric.
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6

Cumulative Conclusion

Barthes did not like “getting the last word,” and faced with the task of a conclusion, I
hope to tie up and loosen various strands in equal measure. The first move is precaution. A grand
synthetic history written by one hand—a multi-volume “decline and fall of the rhetorical empire”
that would satisfy scholars in the five to ten most relevant disciplines—does not exist, and thus
cannot be cross-checked against the comparatively skeletal outlines here (fleeting episodes and
factors rather than bold narratives and causes). Rather than taking a view from nowhere, I have
tended to explore historical receptions, which introduce their own contingencies.
But if after such disclosures we can still say that rhetoric survived in weakened form,
then perhaps we should hesitate before writing up the broad contours of “French thought” as the
usual narrative of almost pure “thoughts” and “thinkers” that moves in the same direction as the
scientific exploration of language: forward. For rhetorical practices and passions confuse this
directionality; radical French thinkers of the twentieth century looped back through rhetoric’s
history, advancing genuinely original thoughts nonetheless enmeshed in the conserved (even
conservative) social structures of rhetoric. On the micro scale of intellectual history, one thinker
seems to leapfrog past the next, moving inevitably forward. On the macro scale, however, the
frogs play their game on a sinking log: the match between individual and institutional directions
is illusory. This we particularly perceive in Barthes, who, despite appearing to move forward
with the theoretical currents of language after about 1950, was curiously pulled back into the
institutional mysteries I have explored. To go back is not inherently good or bad, but it does
complicate things. Structuralism’s “insistence on the signifier,” claims Jameson, is what makes it
so original—and yet also, from my perspective, so ancient.1
The notion of a “turn” is thus a tricky one. In Linguistic Turns, 1890-1950, Ken
Hirschkop demonstrates that the (plural) European turns towards language carry latent within
them an astonishing degree of social concern: “language is a metonym for problems of social
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order and social division, democracy and consent, nationality and difference.”2 Structuralism
represents the “grandest and most extravagant linguistic turn of them all,” as well as the “most
self-conscious.”3 Its enthusiastic embrace of Saussure and other doughty linguists indeed turned
towards something new, delivered with emancipatory and democratic ideals (for instance,
Barthes’ “Saussure, the Sign, Democracy”). Simultaneously, however, structuralism in Paris
summoned—and was summoned by—a weakened rhetoric (which, for the purposes of a more
dramatic “rebirth of rhetoric,” could be written off as fully dead). The new democracy of the sign
thereby flirted with the old aristocracy of the word. But rather than figuring out precisely if and
when the rhetorical “master’s tools” can or cannot dismantle the “master’s house,” we examined
a preceding problem: how much of the old rhetorical superstructure remained standing in the
twentieth century. In short, quite a bit.
What I have called rhe-structuralism is but one of many possible opportunistic
beneficiaries of rhetoric’s weak survival scenario. Despite rhe-structuralism’s many theoretical
insights, it was too often alienated from its underlying social institution and overinvested in
classifications. Valéry’s avatar Monsieur Teste utters these last words: “Learnedly to die …
Transiit classificando.”4 This means to die in (or by) classifying, to traverse or pass (though life)
classifying. We first encountered the extremes of this taxomania in Dumarsais, his peers, and his
strange reception, all of which forsook elements of the Jesuit tradition. Transiit classificando
serves as fitting epitaph for the ambitions of a certain faction who perceived that a monstrously
messy institution could be cleaned up in a matter of years.
This institution, on the face of it, attracted deeply strange temperaments in the twentieth
century. There never was a second coming of Cicero. Paulhan tended towards veils of irony,
cloaks of pseudonyms, and the backroom dealings of the NRF, whereas Barthes sometimes
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elected to become an oratorical mute, only feeling secure in writing. Gifted with the best voice of
all his recorded peers—a timbre sonorous with a touch of sweet—he was scared to use it, lest he
sound like Charles de Gaulle or Pierre Poujade inflicting his finale upon a captive audience.
Barthes could muster incisive political-rhetorical analyses—glimmers of a French Kenneth
Burke—but these were far from his standard fare.5 The writings of Barthes and Paulhan proved
antithetical to the robust public oratory to which classical education had aspired. In their own
distinct ways, they enact the “literaturization” of rhetoric: George Kennedy’s term for rhetoric’s
tendency to shift from primary (oral, civic) to secondary (literary, personal) contexts. Quite
curiously, Sartre will be the most oratorical—and most indifferent towards rhetoric—of all his
peers. Despite their textual (and sometimes oral) brilliance, the intellectuels of post-Dreyfus
France proved to be a fundamentally new entity in the social order.

6.1

Slow history and le regard lontain

I do not begrudge the journalists and scholars who threw themselves into documenting
the structuralist turn in France as a “revolution”—who only had a few years’ distance from its
happenings and lacked today’s copious resources—or the professors who assign the same old
chapter of Saussure followed by Barthes’ “Myth Today”—who have only known the odyssey of
the sign in French thought. But as I hope to have shown, we have reason to believe that the
“event” of postwar Parisian intellectualism’s infatuation with language does not exactly belong
to the conventional history of discovered ideas, for it is so enmeshed in peculiar and powerful
French “structures” almost entirely invisible to the standard primary texts. In this perspective,
rhetoric endured as a cultural bassline; the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism was but a
deceptive cadence improvised on top.
If we insist that this “spell of language” properly belongs to the order of events, then we
should at the very least expand beyond the moments of linguists (e.g. Saussure and Benveniste)
and their readers (e.g. Barthes and Derrida). For beyond this relatively tight network of texts, we
have perceived an immense attitudinal realm, the dialectical realm of Rhetoric and Terror, which
fluctuates over various timescales. In the way that Paulhan perceived it, this space does not
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belong to linguistics, but rather to those language-users overly confident in or doubtful of (mere)
words. The anxiety of Terror operates upon this much larger and less vocationally bound
demographic, and sweeps up literature and philosophy for obvious reasons but it also affects
more casual discourses (as well as fields I have not covered such as visual arts). Paulhan cleverly
detached his thinking from linguistics so that he could insinuate the Rhetoric-Terror dynamic
into an “everyday” aesthetic-psychological domain (everyday for those who worry about
originality and banality, at least). Postwar French thought turned away from a century and a half
of Terror as it much more obviously turned towards language. A true Terrorist might indeed
perceive the peak structuralism of 1966 as a kind of (Thermidorian) reaction.6 The intensity with
which Barthes’ circle threw themselves into langage tel quel became commensurate with the
long-term summation of Terror and its repressive effects.
Paulhan’s sense of Terror, with all of its aesthetic and affective extremism, draws upon a
much broader and more diffuse terrain: the ancient and plural forms of contempt for rhetoric in
general. In exploring the failure of the trope-focused “rhetoric restrained” hypothesis, we first
met an “Enlightened” hostility to rhetoric in the eighteenth century. But this was a half-hearted
disdain, for the philosophes still respected “eloquence” even when they rejected the “rules”
taught by their clerical teachers (as Fumaroli suggests, one can speak of a “Voltaire jesuite”
trained at Louis-le-Grand, “le collège des lumières”).7 Later, this contempt for rhetoric
intensified through a litany of anti-clerical, republican, and positivist dimensions. Regrettably, I
have had to leave out many potential members of the anti-rhetoric “Committee of Public Safety”
from Pascal to nineteenth-century Romantics. And instead of engaging the important and thorny
reception of the ancient sophists, their modern avatars, and their enemies, we encountered the
more recent “clerical sophists” and their over-the-top mythologists such as Michelet. But I hope
to have at least evoked the deeply plural dimensions of this contempt for rhetoric, from
theological ruptures to positivist dogmas and from anti-elitism to artistic anxieties over clichés.
The complexity of this contempt ultimately rivals the richness of its object, and prompted
Paulhan to pursue his untimely linguistic-turn-without-linguistics.
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6.2

What kind of institution is rhetoric?

But it is not enough to simply trace the purview and reputation of rhetoric, since these, in
themselves, cannot speak to its full institutional nature. Rhetoric is no ordinary institution, and it
is not the same thing as language. For Saussure, a language distinguishes itself from other social
institutions by being uniquely unsuitable for revolution. A potential revolutionary would have
better luck in more specialized and transitory domains: “systems used by a certain number of
individuals acting together and for a limited amount of time,” such as “legal procedures,
religious rites, [and] ships’ flags.”8 It would be vastly easier, Saussure implies, for certain
seafarers to learn and implement a brand-new system of nautical communication than for an
entire linguistic community to revolutionize its natural language. Using this sort of analysis, one
could conceivably classify rhetoric, a social institution, based on its degree of inertia, and speak
to its life, death, and or weak survival. Yet there is an immense problem with this line of
thinking, since rhetoric sometimes refers to a certain kind of linguistic practice, and sometimes
refers to a theoretical edifice descripting and prescribing such a practice. In other words,
sometimes rhetoric is analogous to ships communicating with flags, and sometimes it is
analogous to the captains or sailors pondering this nautical communication system.
This duality of practice and discourse on the practice proves potentially disastrous for
historians trying to chart rhetoric’s fortunes and for reformers trying to be rid of it. Much
institutional knowledge has been lost in the gap between them. Rather than deal with these two
layers of abstractions, I have tended to transpose rhetoric into the order of more tangible social
structures (religious orders, educational institutions). Despite increasing the risk of reductionism,
rhetoric’s manifold interfaces with political, religious, and social history come into greater relief
this way, and with these interfaces, so does the tenacity of l’émpire rhetorique. Here, systems of
reproduction vastly outweigh systems of representation. In grasping the institutionality of French
rhetoric, pedagogic plans (such as the Ratio Studiorum) are to ingenious treatises (such as
Dumarsais’ Des Tropes) as the Bible is to an apocryphal letter. Though the Ratio itself laid down
a mighty blueprint, it had in fact amalgamated early humanist pedagogies, and these will
invariably bring us back to antiquity. Though we have briefly visited five centuries of French
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rhetoric over a comparatively long duration, I have shortchanged a true Braudelian approach by
twenty to thirty centuries or more. To truly grasp rhetoric’s institutional nature, one ought to start
with Plato coining rhêtorikê, with sophists, or with Homeric rhetorical performance avant la
lettre. In this way, one might (or might not) find an era of pure rhetorical practice without a
system of commentary upon it. Or one could follow the example of Paulhan’s pioneering
ethnography in Madagascar to better measure the contingencies of European rhetorics, all too
easily taken for universals.9
French reformers and critics deeply underestimated what it would take to destroy such an
institution, but studying their thinking remains instructive. Though Renan serves us well as a
cartoonish enemy of l’empire rhéorique who can be relied upon to brutally misconstrue it at
every turn, he was less wrong about the French education system, and correctly perceived its
relative (but not absolute) affinity for style, form, and literature compared to the land of
Geisteswissenschaften. Asserting a series of false dichotomies—an exclusive choice between la
forme ou le fond, les mots ou les choses—he sensed that the ENS, supposedly a “school of style”
in its letters division, risked turning France into “a nation of speakers and editors, without
concern for the substance of things and the real progress of knowledge.”10 Of course, France did
not have to make an exclusive choice. French intellectualism opted for words and things, wordsas-things, things-as-words, and all the messy states in between that would come to the fore via
rhe-structuralism and other logophilic modes of thought. Educational critics, Renan included,
ultimately pushed their contrasts too forcefully (form versus content, Jesuits versus Jansenists,
France versus Germany). But their work informs a slower, more sober take on intellectual history
in which individuals, and even organized groups of individuals, lack power over the most
formidable institutions until they stop underestimating them (and perhaps even after). Paul
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Verlaine’s injunction to “seize eloquence and wring its neck” is equal parts eloquent and
impossible—that is, outside his poem.11

6.3

Historiographic reflections

Coming to the somewhat contrarian conclusion of weak survival has gone hand in hand
with unusual approaches to this historical terrain (unusual for rhetoric, at least). Several
historiographic maneuvers should be disclosed in case they were not obvious. The first move, the
most basic one, was simply to take some initial distance from the individual’s philosophical
rationale for rhetoric and instead prioritize collective forces. Even if one fully believes Derrida
and his good faith argumentation for the philosophic necessity of his prose styles, this process of
justification wears thin when stretched across the most famous ten, twenty, or fifty French
thinkers, with nary a dry or neutral writer among them. Rhetorical choices of course bear an
individual, ethical aspect. But after (what I feel to be) an excess of close readings for rhetorically
rich texts, a future anthropologist will hopefully elucidate the cultural order of rhetoric beyond
texts, or at least beyond the usual ones. Barthes suggested such an investigation, but as was his
endearing yet frustrating fashion, he quickly moved on to the next diamond in the rough. Rather
than give elaborate methodological justifications for the range of “rhetorically interesting”
personages I considered, I have simply amassed neglected historical details and interpreted them.
These suffice, I hope, to show that rhetoric was not dead, but they also leave out a great many
thinkers, teachers, and schools.
When considering the rhetorical richness of Parisian intellectualism, we should hesitate
before situating the relation between thought and its rhetorical form in the individual thinker, and
thereby underestimate the collective forces at work, whether creative, hortatory, or repressive
ones. Acknowledging these forces at a level greater than the individual frees us from a certain
moralistic framework. Here style, especially good or bad style, belongs to the order of the
liberated individual, whose stylistic boudoir offers limitless “choices” for dressing up thought on
any occasion. If our choices were truly this abundant and deserving of discrete moral
consideration, our indecision would readily render us mute. Rather, the task should be to figure
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out why and how our gut decisions—if they can be called decisions—came to be. For such
answers, we might turn to the surrounding environment, culture, and society: anywhere except
l'homme même.
A second move, which has sought to elucidate a rhetorical superstructure (and a bit of
infrastructure), could be regarded as roughly Braudelian. Its risks are known: the abstraction or
reification of such structures tends towards freezing history (l’histoire immobile is the classic
reproach against structurally informed histories). In a hyper-Braudelian approach, humans seem
to swarm on top of structures like ants upon a rockface, a monolith almost impregnable to
anything less than geologic forces. But this is not exactly the approach I have taken. Human
minds devised, or at least modified, the educational structures that often concerned us.
Sometimes, however, I have indeed been concerned with abstractions: the rhetorical agonism and
precocity endemic to elite French intellectualism has a certain cultural diffusion. Still, these
educational structures trace back to blueprints devised by the human mind, blueprints with
ideological and theological import on an almost personal scale.
Balancing the move towards grand structures, a third move looks towards the agency and
ideology of small groups. This microhistorical tendency asserts itself in quarrels of the sixteenthcentury Latin Quarter (and the religious strife about twenty miles away at Port-Royal-desChamps). To perceive such contingencies, we can imagine a range of rather personal decisions
along roads not taken. Had Ramus not forsaken Catholicism before dying as a St. Bartholomew’s
day martyr, perhaps France would have mired itself in “method,” the Ramist watchword
(complicit, for Walter Ong, in the “decay of dialogue”). Or had Loyola not recruited fellow
humanists to join his brotherhood in Christ and ultimately form the greatest order of the CounterReformation, perhaps Rome would have found another instrument for its ideological objectives.
But there is little guarantee such an alternative would have featured the robust, rhetoric-loving,
precocious humanism that is the hallmark of Jesuit secondary education. Though one can no
longer hear Latin on the streets of the Latin Quarter, without Loyola, Polanco, and Nadal
imparting such life into the language through their pedagogic ambitions, it seems doubtful that
Latin composition would have made it to the late nineteenth century (while its translation
lingered on as an unavoidable exercise for the khâgneux we encountered).

269

The strangest and most powerful irony or tension of the Jesuit pedagogic and literary
enterprise bears remembering: the order who did the most for eloquence and fine writing—and
their ideals—implemented their ambitions through strikingly unpolished and utilitarian texts (the
Ratio Studiorum, Spiritual Exercises, etc.) under rather pragmatic objectives.12 These texts do
not explicitly propound humanistic values and higher pedagogic principles, which is why we
have to turn, for instance, to the letters sent between the first Jesuits and the scholarship that
brings us backstage. I highlight them if only to show the importance of para-philosophical and
para-literary figures in shaping philosophy and literature proper. Perhaps what we call theory still
faintly follows the Ignatian wisdom of “becoming all things to all.”13
The fourth and final move I will reflect upon allows the nonsynchronous nature of
rhetoric and its host society to come to the fore. In times of restricted literacy, the institution
closely attached itself to literate social groups in France. By 1950, however, the situation differs
radically. Pierre Nora’s “Khâgne 1950” conveys an elite culture of logos, an enduring humanistic
cult of the word. While other twenty-year-olds seek jobs under the Marshall Plan or witness the
defeats of Indochina, Nora struggles in his own pedagogic anno domini MCD with its requisite
Latin and Greek. He fails the concours d’entrée and will not become a normalien (though he
ultimately attains his agrégation in history). Despite this classical pedagogy’s patent irrelevance
to the national concerns of 1950, it will leave obvious traces in those thinkers politically engaged
in their contemporary world (one does not see North American activists peppering polemics with
arcane philological musings—at least until they acquired this affectation through French
Theory). Despite the profound political and societal chasm between the Paris of 1600 and 1950,
its pedagogical worldview—for a small cadre of talented humanists—remains more continuous
than one might think. But of course, this pedagogic enclave could not keep out the political
forces impinging upon the khâgneux and normaliens.14 From an outsider perspective, a
communist classicist is a rather strange character, but perfectly plausible from the inside.

12

Cf. Barthes, Sade, Fourier, Loyola, 39.

13

Cf. 1 Cor. 9:22, Loyola, Letters and Instructions, 66.

14

See Sirinelli’s voluminous writings on this topic.
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6.4

Rhetorical training or rhetorical trauma?

Pedagogic priorities transpose themselves, imperfectly but perceptibly, into the thinkers
who had once been under their yoke. The khâgne’s timetable and its implicit hierarchy of values
rubs off on the khâgneux, supporting a more-than-theoretical interest in language: French and
philosophy, six hours each. Latin, Greek, and history, three hours each. English, two hours.15
Though Nora will undertake such a schedule and still end up a historian, such conditions remain
rather unfavorable to a historicist revolution. If structuralism saw Clio’s “exile,” as per Dosse’s
phrase, then we should remember that this muse of history faced poor institutional conditions
from the outset (with an important exception: the strong but narrow conception of literary history
under Lansonism, which seemed to incite its own “reactionary” or contrarian tendencies).16
Perhaps what Barthes once called the “student’s structuralism” facilitated mature structuralism.17
The elite echelons of French education infused and conditioned French thought, priming it—
through humanistic values, specific aptitudes, and a diffused habitus—for its remarkable
reception of structuralism and its fellow travelers.
As Perry Anderson initially suggested, a rhetorically rich elite education system wielded
formative power even at those moments when thinkers called these institutions into question—
during the incredible period of intellectual and cultural “effervescence” the nation experienced
for two generations after the war, a time of “particular brilliance and intensity” under “an exotic
marriage of social and philosophical thought,” often conducted via “virtuoso exercises in style”
and “oracular gestures.”18 Bourdieu’s critiques stand out here. One of his aims, in a sense, was to
liberate a modern homo academicus from the old Jesuit homo hierarchicus. Yet even his
sentences—serpentine, hypotactic, and twisted with jargon—seemed to sprawl upwards, like ivy
on an educational edifice, towards the sunlight of social distinction; even as style was questioned
in theory, it triumphed in practice. Or in the words of Derrida, elite educational institutions
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Nora, "Khâgne 1950," 88.
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François Dosse, "Le moment structuraliste ou Clio en exil," Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, no. 117 (2013).
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Barthes, Criticism and Truth, 38.
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Anderson, The New Old World, 141-43.
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dictate “a moral and political system that forms at once both the object and the actualized
structure of pedagogy.”19 Given this vexing circularity, it is little wonder that radical thought
sometimes stumbled in critiquing its own pedagogic origins and its elaborate rhetoric.
Just as the eighteenth-century philosophes were torn between the benefits and pitfalls of
their religious and often-Jesuit educations, twentieth-century French thinkers, Derrida included,
struggled to determine precisely where the demanding, “tough love” training in rhetoric,
philosophy, and the humanities verged on pedagogic sadism (recall their descriptions:
“monstrous,” “terrible,” “torture”).20 Foucault preferred studying prisons to schools, which,
although laden with surveillance, discipline, and punishment, seemed rather boring to him.
Postwar French thought lacked, with certain exceptions, the critical distance required to turn the
hermeneutics of suspicion back upon the institutions in which it climaxed. The question of a just
pedagogy resembles Kant’s formulation of Enlightenment insofar as it hinges upon maturity—
upon the paternalistic determination of the “best interests” of the immature student or of an
immature humanity. Evidently, such interests are neither transhistorical nor universal, and we
still have much to gain from an anthropological and comparative bent.

6.5

Politics of weak survival

The political stakes of rhetoric’s weak survival ought to be highlighted for future research
since my treatment has been regrettably thin here. The rhetorical resurgences in the twentieth
century seemingly sprung from the nightmarish anxieties of the nineteenth—but with an
enormous political reorientation. The nascent patrons of rhetoric would not be the antiDreyfusards such as Brunetière, nor the clerical authorities who rightly perceived rhetoric
offering supple instruments of moral, religious, and political control. Rather, they would
typically fall along the secular centre (Paulhan) to left (Barthes). However far such logophilic
intellectuals skewed to the left, however, they typically passed through a highly competitive,
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“I think through deconstruction you should study and analyze these [rhetorical] models and where they come
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the history of the models and then try not to subvert them for the sake of destroying them but to change the models
and invent new ways of writing—not as a formal challenge, but for ethical, political reasons.” Derrida and Olson,
"Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A Conversation," 9.
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combative, hierarchical, and structurally right-wing education system: a system they sometimes
fought and sometimes justified (it was hard for them, as it is hard today, to determine precisely
where its boons end and perils begin). Raymond Aron indeed imagined the ENS as “Left or
extreme Left”21 and yet the grueling process necessary to pass its concours d’entrée would seem
the stuff of heroic rightest mythologies.
Certainly, a lesson here is that liberatory projects can fall victim to their own linguistic
elitism (inculcated rather than innate) and infighting (a largely cultural tendency). Barthes will
accuse his nation of indulging an ancient agōn: the French represent the “heirs of the Greeks,
without their genius,” too eager for athletic competitions, too eager for intellectual combat.
Comparatively speaking, at least, Barthes was right. Within this agonistic culture even leftist
thinkers overemphasized their mutual differences. Or just as vexingly, they did not comment
upon or acknowledge others in close physical and intellectual proximity (a passive aggression).
A patient army of Anglophone scholars, though they might reject this characterization, laboured
to subtract from radical, anti-hierarchical thought the aristocratic remnants of its genesis.
We should not commit the genetic fallacy and indict any given thought purely for its
institutional origins. At the same time, however, assuming the great Parisian works emerged in
peaceful, private, and monastic contemplation constitutes extreme institutional naivety. Rather,
we often detect collective traces of the esprit khâgneux-normalien-agrégé: a confident,
combative, and rhetorically ingenious worldview, all too aware of competition yet shy to spell
out the rules of the game, a game which preceded and exceeded them and yet was masked by a
“great naturalizing drive.”22 Barthes—an academically-informed journalist and essayist rather
than a career academic—had a better vantage than most for creating a new Mythologies of
French intellectualism. Though even he could not muster a comprehensive social-political
critique of the “games,” his style suffered less from their machinations.
The political dimension of weak survival continues into the present, and readily blends
into the religious one. A formidable tension spans between the nineteenth century—where
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Michelet inveighed against the Jesuits with vicious and conspiratorial abandon, and more
moderate critics charted their linguistic excesses—and the various rhetorical renaissances under
largely leftist intellectuals during the twentieth. Today, one most often finds the Jesuits on the
Catholic left. And just as curiously, their very conservation of a classical education and
eloquentia perfecta now appears a “progressive” bulwark against a rising technocracy interested
in stripping rhetoric of its humanism and harnessing it towards “effective communication” and
“optimizing” the interfaces between capital and human “capital.” Perhaps rhetoric might
ultimately suffer a fate worse than death: an instrumental immortality, an institution permanently
“degraded” and “technocratized,” as Barthes noted four decades ago, into mere “techniques of
expression” (lucrative ones).23 Let us hope not. It would be remiss to ignore centuries of
religious affinities (and disaffinities) with humanism in arguing for the contemporary
humanities—or should I say, having faith in the humanities—for this sort of inquiry shields us
from the bleak utilitarianism which already favours the enemy.
One of the problems with the genesis and reception of “theory,” from my perspective,
proved to be its (claimed) tendency of breaking away from its predecessors, from itself, and from
its neighbors. At least a few of these breaks, as I hope to have shown, can be repaired through
interdisciplinary history. In an age of fragmentary humanities, becoming a bit “Lansonian” is not
a bad idea (without, of course, the hubris of purging rhetoric or other constitutive features).
However unfashionable the term humanism might be today, it cannot be extricated from the
intellectual history of modern Europe, nor from the secular and religious history of rhetoric,
pedagogy, and literature. French Theory proved incapable of truly outstripping its profoundly
humanistic origins, the eruditio and eloquentia tracing through a richly religious saga that, even
when it reached the secular age, arguably retained a certain sacredness of word and text. Both the
object and method of this dissertation suggest the continuity between “classical” and
“theoretical” humanities (if Michelet could invent a concept as grand and powerful as the
Renaissance, then surely a few of our quibbling distinctions could be uninvented). Though
rhetoric will likely never become the science des sciences humaines it has sometimes aspired to
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be, its study effaces needless barriers and excessive radical posturing endemic to past and present
discourses.

6.6

Resistance and conquest across the Atlantic

French thinkers were not mere pawns of the rhetorical superstructure, and this has
consequences for their reception history. Some thinkers resisted normative strictures: Barthes
more lyrically, Derrida more forcefully. Studying their travails inclines us to respect this right to
resistance. But if it is true that our Anglophone superstructures are less centralized, hierarchical,
and harsh than the French (and I have not explicitly proven this here) then we might question the
way in which French thought was translated and instrumentalized in the last half century, far
beyond the hexagon.
One can translate a book, but one cannot easily “translate” its surrounding pedagogical
matrix. Simone Weil’s fruitful study under an éveilleur such as Alain cannot be quickly
recontextualized in North America, nor can one relay Pierre Nora’s branding by the “red-hot
iron” of French class in the khâgne of Louis-le-Grand. After realizing that aspiring philosophers
passed (or failed) the arduous agrégation de philosophie, they are more easily forgiven for
wanting to blow up the history of metaphysics with any rhetorical dynamite they could find. But
this exigence—which demanded real argumentative violence given its original pedagogical
conditions—lacks a North American analogue requiring the same degree of force. Rhetoric’s
closest thing to a golden rule is contextual (and hence cultural) propriety. As per Ignatian
wisdom, to win over the powerful one must “study their temperament and adapt”: in other words,
do not be a deconstructive choleric in a faraway land of melancholics or phlegmatics.24 The
meeting of French and American rhetorical temperaments, which too often tended towards raw
emulation rather than analogy, yielded a strange, meretricious progeny whose ungainliness we
are still struggling with today.
Through all the capricious translations, non-translations, and mis-translations between the
two intellectual worlds that Cusset details in French Theory, an often-inseparable bundle of
philosophical “thought” and rhetorical “form” shaped significant portions of North American
24
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academia. Critics and journalists often evoke this process as if it were simply a matter of
intellectual cognacs and handbags, the import of the luxury goods and fashions of the Parisian
mind. They use words such as cachet or argot, perhaps maître à penser or maître-penseur. Of
course, this analogy is mostly fluff, because as trendy as certain ideas might be, Anglophone
importers much more often seek intellectual sustenance than hedonism. I would render the transAtlantic encounter rather differently. From the perspective of the pedagogic longue durée,
various Anglo-Franco hybrids in the orbit of “theory” might strike us as footnotes to the
Reformation. The descendants of the Latinate and rhetorically adept pedagogic empire
established, maintained, and ideologically justified by the Catholic church and its agents finally
and decisively breached the sober strongholds of latent Protestant intellectualism, some of which
had misconstrued rhetoric’s provenance centuries ago. To see if such speculative narrative
gambits have merit, we should expand our classic histories of conscious ideas to this pedagogic
unconscious.

6.7

Final reflections

Though rhetoric is fundamentally “about” language, the institutional essence of rhetoric is
ultimately not linguistic. This patently preposterous notion emerges from the sketches of weak
survival I have given here. The narrative of the old rhetoric “progressing” to the theoretical
consideration of language yields tools still useful today, but suffers from its scientisms and
presentisms. The elite French tradition considered here features much more in common with
classical dressage than with modern “communications.” Horses, it is true, do not read Cicero.
And yet like the equestrian institution, this rhetoric involved relentless exercise and evaluation
within exacting but arbitrary standards of a martinet culture, conferring the highest prestige,
elitist in the extreme, moving fluidly from one gait—baroque, overwrought, and decadent—to
another cadence—muscular, disciplined, and robust—and back again. French rhetoric’s
performative piaffes and locutionary levades often betrayed its origins as a gymnastique d’esprit;
the seemingly ridiculous and superficial “dances” of dressage built the deep musculature of its
horses, strengthening their very sinews (equestrians speak of gymnasticizing the horse). Thus the
rhetorical rococo of French thought—florid and flamboyant—blurs, in an ephemeral and almost
imperceptible shift, into daring and genuine, but often intuitive, argumentative prowess (how can
we know the prancer from the prance?). Perceived in this gymnastic dimension, which insinuates
276

itself between theory and practice and foils them both, and which concerns the unsaid beyond the
ken of the said, we can ultimately appreciate rhetoric’s tenacity, and the sources of its power.
Whether we commend the vitality and supple elegance of the horse or contest its missteps and
faulty comportment, we should not, in the end, forget about its trainer, nor the most mysterious
covenant that spans between the two.

277

Works Cited

Abbot, Don Paul. "Splendor and Misery: Semiotics and the End of Rhetoric." Rhetorica 24
(2006): 303-23.
Anderson, Perry. The New Old World. London: Verso, 2011.
Angermuller, Johannes. Why There Is No Poststructuralism in France: The Making of an
Intellectual Generation. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.
Aristotle. Art of Rhetoric. Translated by J.H. Freese. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1926.
Augustine. Confessions. Edited and Translated by Henry ChadwickOxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008.
Auroux, Sylvain, and Bernard Colombat. "L’horizon De Rétrospection Des Grammairiens De
L’encyclopédie." Recherches sur Diderot et sur l'Encyclopédie 27 (1999): 111-52.
Bach, Emmon et al. Problèmes Du Langage. Gallimard, 1966.
Badiou, Alain. "The Adventure of French Philosophy." New Left Review, no. 35 (2005): 67-77.
Balzac, Honoré de. "Petites Misères De La Vie Conjugale." In Oeuvres Complètes, 543-704.
Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1879.
Barilli, Renato. Rhetoric. Translated by Giuliana Menozzi. Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1989.
Baring, Edward. The Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945–1968. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Barthes, Roland. "Acrimboldo, or Magician and Rhétoriqeur." Translated by Richard Howard. In
The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on Music, Art, and Representation 129-48.
New York: Hill and Wang.
———. Album: Unpublished Correspondence and Texts. Translated by Jody Glading. Edited by
Éric Marty. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.
———. "Am I a Marxist?" Translated by Chris Turner. In 'The "Scandal" of Marxism' and Other
Writings on Politics, 46-48. London: Seagull Books, 2015.
278

———. "Answers." Translated by Chris Turner. In 'Simply a Particular Contemporary', 1-44.
London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. Criticism and Truth. Edited and Translated by Katrine Pilcher KeunemanMinneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
———. "D'eux À Nous." In Oeuvres Complètes, edited by Éric Marty, 454-55. Paris: Seuil,
2002.
———. "The Death of the Author." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language,
49-55. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. "The Division of Languages." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of
Language, 111-24. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. The Eiffel Tower, and Other Mythologies. Translated by Richard Howard. Berlekey:
University of California Press, 1997.
———. Elements of Semiology. Translated by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1967.
———. "Entre Le Plaisir Du Texte Et L'utopie De La Pensée." In Oeuvres Complètes, edited by
Éric Marty, 533-40. Paris: Seuil, 2002.
———. "From Science to Literature." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of
Language, 3-10. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. "From Speech to Writing." Translated by Linda Coverdale. In The Grain of the Voice,
3-7. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
———. "From Work to Text." Translated by Stephen Heath. In Image, Music, Text, 155-64.
London: Fontana, 1977.
———. "The Future of Rhetoric." Translated by Jody Gladding. In Album: Unpublished
Correspondence and Texts, edited by Marty Éric, 102-14. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018.
———. "A Great Rhetorician of Erotic Figures." Translated by Linda Coverdale. In The Grain
of the Voice, 252-57. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
———. How to Live Together: Novelistic Simulations of Some Everyday Spaces. Translated by
Kate Briggs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
———. "The Image." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language, 350-59.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. Incidents. Translated by Richard Howard. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1992.
279

———. "Interview on Structuralism." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine Gift, 61-70.
London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "An Interview with Jacques Chancel." Translated by Chris Turner. In 'Simply a
Particular Contemporary', 45-81. London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "Introduction to Structural Analysis of Narriatives." Translated by Richard Howard. In
The Semiotic Challenge, 95-135. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
———. "L'ancienne Rhétorique: Aide-Mémoire." Communications 16 (1970): 172-223.
———. "L'express Talks with Roland Barthes." Translated by Linda Coverdale. In The Grain of
the Voice, 88-108. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
———. "Le Centre D'études Des Communications De Masse : Le C.E.C.Mas." Annales.
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 16, no. 5 (1961): 991-92.
———. "Lecture in Inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, Collège De France,
January 7, 1977." October 8 (1979): 3-16.
———. "Letter to Jean Risatat." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine Gift, 154-55.
London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "Linguistics and Literature." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine Gift, 71-84.
London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "Literature Today." Translated by Richard Howard. In Critical Essays, 151-61.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
———. A Lover's Discourse: Fragments. Translated by Richard Howard. London: Penguin,
1990.
———. Michelet. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1987.
———. "Myth Today." Translated by Annette Lavers. In Mythologies. New York: Hill and
Wang, 1972.
———. Mythologies. Translated by Annette Lavers. New York: Hill and Wang, 1972.
———. The Neutral. Translated by Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005.
———. Oeuvres Complètes. Edited by Eric Marty. Edited by Eric Marty. 5 vols. Vol. 2, Paris:
Seuil, 2002.
———. "Of What Use Is an Intellectual?" Translated by Linda Coverdale. In The Grain of the
Voice, 258-80. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.

280

———. "The Old Rhetoric: An Aide-Mémoire." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Semiotic
Challenge, 12-94. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
———. "On a Use of the Verb 'to Be'." Translated by Chris Turner. In 'The "Scandal" of
Marxism' and Other Writings on Politics, 67-73. London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "On Gide and His Journal." In Barthes: Selected Writings, 3-17. Oxford: Fontana, 1983.
———. On Racine. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1964.
———. "On S/Z and Empire of Signs." Translated by Linda Coverdale. In The Grain of the
Voice, 68-87. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
———. "On the Fashion System." Translated by Andy Stafford. In The Language of Fashion,
92-96. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.
———. "On the Fashion System and the Structural Analysis of Narriatives." Translated by
Linda Coverdale. In The Grain of the Voice, 43-62. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
———. "On Theory." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine Gift, 133-51. London: Seagull
Books, 2015.
———. "The Photographic Message." Translated by Stephen Heath. In Image, Music, Text, 1631. London: Fontana, 1977.
———. "Plasir Aux Classiques." In Oeuvres Complètes, edited by Éric Marty, 57-67. Paris:
Seuil, 2002.
———. "Pleasure in Language." Translated by Chris Turner. In 'Masculine, Feminine, Neuter'
and Other Writings on Literature, 77-81. London: Seagull, 2016.
———. The Pleasure of the Text. Translated by Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang,
1975.
———. "Preface." Translated by Richard Howard. In Critical Essays, xi-xxi. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1972.
———. The Preparation of the Novel. Translated by Kate Briggs. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011.
———. "Reading Brillat-Savarin." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language,
250-70. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. "Recherches Sur Le Discours De L’histoire." In Oeuvres Complètes, edited by Éric
Marty, 1293-95. Paris: Seuil, 2002.
———. "Response to a Survey on Structuralism." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine
Gift, 53-56. London: Seagull Books, 2015.
281

———. "Responses." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine Gift, 171-76. London: Seagull
Books, 2015.
———. "Responses: Interview with Tel Quel." Translated by Vérène Grieshaber. In The Tel
Quel Reader edited by Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack, 249-68. London:
Routledge, 1998.
———. "The Return of the Poetician." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of
Language, 172-75. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. "Rhetoric of the Image." Translated by Stephen Heath. In Image, Music, Text, 32-51.
London: Fontana, 1977.
———. "Rhetorical Analysis." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language, 8389. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. Roland Barthes. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.
———. The Rustle of Language. Translated by Richard Howard. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1989.
———. "The Rustle of Language." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language,
76-79. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. S/Z. Translated by Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.
———. Sade, Fourier, Loyola. Translated by Richard Miller. London: Jonathan Cape, 1977.
———. "Saussure, the Sign, Democracy." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Semiotic
Challenge, 151-56. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
———. The Semiotic Challenge. Translated by Richard Howard. 1st ed. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988.
———. "The Sequences of Actions." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Semiotic
Challenge, 136-50. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
———. "The Structural Analysis of Narriative." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Semiotic
Challenge, 217-45. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
———. "The Structuralist Activity." Translated by Richard Howard. In Critical Essays.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
———. "Structure of the Fait-Divers." Translated by Richard Howard. In Critical Essays, 18595. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
———. "Style and Its Image." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language, 9099. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
282

———. "The Surrealists Overlooked the Body." Translated by Linda Coverdale. In The Grain of
the Voice, 243-45. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.
———. "To Learn and to Teach." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language,
176-78. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. "To the Seminar." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of Language, 332-42.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. "To Write: An Intransitive Verb?". In The Structuralist Controversy, edited by Richard
Macksey and Eugenio Donato, 134-56. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
———. "Une Histoire De La Civilisation Française. Une Mentalité Historique." Annales.
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 5 (1960): 997-1000.
———. "Valéry and Rhetoric." Translated by Jody Gladding. In Album: Unpublished
Correspondence and Texts, edited by Marty Éric, 180-88. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2018.
———. "A Very Fine Gift." Translated by Chris Turner. In A Very Fine Gift, 147-51. London:
Seagull Books, 2015.
———. A Very Fine Gift. Translated by Chris Turner. London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "Where to Begin?" Translated by Richard Howard. In New Critical Essays, 79-89.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
———. "Works of Mass Culture and Explication De Texte." Translated by Chris Turner. In A
Very Fine Gift, 35-39. London: Seagull Books, 2015.
———. "Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers." Translated by Richard Howard. In The Rustle of
Language, 309-31. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
———. Writing Degree Zero. Translated by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith. New York: Hill
and Wang, 2012.
Barthes, Roland, and François Wahl. "Dante Et La Rhétorique." France: France Culture,
September 26 1965. https://youtu.be/xDWD15et5Hw.
Baudrillard, Jean. America. Translated by Chris Turner. New York: Verso, 2010.
———. Cool Memories Iv 1995-2000. Translated by Chris Turner. London: Verso 2003.
Beaujour, Michel. "Jean Paulhan Et La Terreur." In Jean Paulhan : Le Souterrain, edited by
Jacques Bersani, 118-50. Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1976.
———. Poetics of the Literary Self-Portrait. Translated by Yara Milos. New York: New York
University Press, 1991.
283

———. Terreur Et Rhétorique. Paris: Jean-Michel Place, 1999.
Benjamin, René. La Farce De La Sorbonne. Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1921.
Benjamin, Walter. "Dream Kitsch [Gloss on Surrealism]." Translated by Howard Eliand. In The
Work of Art in Its Age of Mechanical Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media,
edited by Michael W. et al. Jennings, 237-39. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008.
Bennington, Geoffrey. "The Truth About Parrhesia: Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Politics in Late
Foucault." In Foucault/Derrida Fifty Years Later, edited by Penelope Deutscher Olivia
Custer, and Samir Haddad, 205-20. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
Benveniste, Émile. Problems in General Linguistics. Translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral
Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1971.
Bernier, Marc André. "Ad Majorem Feminarum Gloriam. L’essai De Rhétorique À L’usage Des
Jeunes Demoiselles (1745) De Gabriel-Henri Gaillard Et La Tradition Jésuite." In
Femmes, Rhétorique Et Éloquence Sous L'ancien Régime, edited by Claude La Charité
and Roxanne Roy, 123-34. Saint-Etienne: Publications de l’Université de Saint-Etienne,
2012.
Beugnot, Bernard. Les Muses Classiques. Essai De Bibliographie Rhétorique Et Poétique. Paris:
Klincksieck, 1996.
Bialostosky, Don, and Lawrence D. Needham. "Introduction." In Rhetorical Traditions and
British Romantic Literature, edited by Don Bialostosky and Lawrence D. Needham, 1-8.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995.
Bize, Pierre. "Postface." In Khâgne ... Et Après : Lycée Louis-Le-Grand, 1934-1939 edited by
Marcel Garrigou, 317-26. Toulouse: Éditions Arts et Formes, 1994.
Blair, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. London: Thomas Tegg, 1841.
Blanchot, Maurice. "The Ease of Dying." Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg. In Friendship,
149-68. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
———. "How Is Literature Possible?" Translated by Michael Syrotinski. In The Blanchot
Reader, edited by Michael Holland, 49-60. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
———. The Infinite Conversation. Edited and Translated by Susan HansonMinneapolis
University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
———. "Literature and the Right to Death." Translated by Lydia Davis. In The Work of Fire,
300-44. Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 1995.
———. "Mystery in Literature." Translated by Mandell Charlotte. In The Work of Fire, 43-60.
Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 1995.
284

Bloch, Ernst. "Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics." New German Critique 11
(1977): 22-38.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew
Adamson. Edited by John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
———. Outline of a Theory of Pratice. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011.
———. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. Translated by Susan
Emanuel. Stanford: Standford University Press, 1995.
———. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power. Translated by Lauretta C.
Clough. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. Reproduction in Society, Education and Culture.
Translated by Richard Nice. London: SAGE Publications, 1990.
Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claude Passeron, and Monique de Saint Martin. Academic Discourse:
Linguistic Misunderstanding and Professorial Power. Translated by Richard Teese.
Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Braudel, Fernand. The Identity of France: Volume I: History and Environment. Translated by
Siân Reynolds. New York: HarperCollins, 1990.
———. The Identity of France: Volume Ii: People and Production. Translated by Siân
Reynolds. New York: HarperCollins, 1992.
———. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip Ii. Translated by
Siân Reynolds. 2 vols. Vol. 2, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
Bréal, Michel. Quelques Mots Sur L'instruction Publique En France. Paris: Hachette, 1872.
Bremond, Claude, and Thomas Pavel. De Barthes À Balzac. Paris: Albin Michel, 1998.
Brémond, Henri. A Literary History of Religious Thought in France. Vol. 1, London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936.
———. A Literary History of Religious Thought in France. Vol. 3, London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936.
Breton, André. "The Poet's Function." Translated by Richard Howard. In The History of
Surrealism, edited by Maurice Nadeau, 304-05. London: Jonathan Cape, 1968.
———. "Second Manifesto of Surrealism." Translated by Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane. In
Manifestos of Surrealism, 117-94. Ann Arbor: The University of Michicgan Press, 1969.
Brown, Rollo Walter. How the French Boy Learns to Write. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1915.
285

Brunetière, Ferdinand. "An Apology for Rhetoric." Translated by D. Nichol Smith. In
Brunetière's Essays in French Literature, 235-55. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898.
———. Science and Religion. Odd Volumes, 2016.
Burson, Jeffrey D. "Distinctive Contours of Jesuit Enlightenment in France." In Exploring Jesuit
Distinctiveness, edited by Robert Aleksander Maryks, 212-34. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
Camus, Albert. "On a Philosophy of Expression by Brice Parain." Translated by Ellen Conroy
Kennedy. In Lyrical and Critical Essays, edited by Philip Thody, 228-41. New York:
Knopf, 1969.
Caradonna, Jeremy L. The Enlightenment in Practice: Academic Prize Contests and Intellectual
Culture in France, 1670-1794. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012.
Caussin, Nicholas. "From on Sacred and Profane Eloquence." Edited and Translated by Wayne
A. Rebhorn. In Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric 273-83. Ithica: Cornell University
Press, 2000.
Cave, Terence. "Corneille, Oedipus, Racine." In Convergences: Rhetoric and Poetic in
Seventeenth Century France, edited by David Lee Rubin and Mary B. McKinley, 82-100.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989.
Chaignet, Antelme Édouard. La Rhétorique Et Son Histoire. Paris: F. Vieweg, 1888.
"The Characteristics of Jesuit Education, 1986." In The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th
Anniversary Perspectives, edited by Vincent J. Duminuco, 161-216. New York: Fordham
University Press, 2000.
Chevalier, Jean-Claude. "La Pédagogie Des Collèges Jésuites." Littérature, no. 7 (1972): 120-28.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Cicero on Oratory and Orators. Edited and Translated by J.S.
WatsonCarbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.
Claudin, Anatole. The First Paris Press: An Account of the Books Printed for G. Fichet and J.
Heynlin in the Sorbonne 1470-1472. London: The Chiswick Press 1898.
Codina, Gabriel. "The 'Modus Parisiensis'." In The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th Anniversary
Perspectives, edited by Vincent J. Duminuco, 28-49. New York: Fordham University
Press, 2000.
Cohen-Solal, Annie. Sartre: A Life. Translated by Anna Cancogni. Edited by Norman MacAfee.
New York: Pantheon Books, 1987.
Compagnon, Antoine. "Comment Parler De La Littérature?". Le Débat, no. 32 (1984/5): 176-81.
———. L'âge Des Lettres. Paris: NRF Gallimard, 2015.

286

———. "La Rhétorique À La Fin Du Xixe Siècle (1875-1900)." In L'histoire De La Rhétorique
Dans L'europe Moderne 1450-1950, edited by Marc Fumaroli, 1215-50: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1999.
———. La Troisième République Des Lettres. Paris: Seuil, 1983.
———. "Literature in the Classroom." In A New History of French Literature, edited by Denis
Hollier, 819-24. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
———. Literature, Theory, and Common Sense. Translated by Carol Cosman. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
———. "Pourquoi 1966?" Fabula-LhT, no. 11. (2013).
Compayré, Gabriel. Histoire Critique Des Doctrines De L'éducation En France. 2 vols. Vol. 2,
Genève Slatkine Reprints, 1970.
———. The History of Pedagogy. Translated by W. H. Payne. Boston: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1889.
Compère, Marie-Madeleine. "La Postérité Du Père De Dainville En Histoire De L’éducation
[Online]." In François De Dainville: Pionnier De L’histoire De La Cartographie Et De
L’éducation. Paris: Publications de l’École nationale des chartes, 2004.
Coste, Claude. "Roland Barthes: Terror in Poetry." Barthes Studies 2 (2016): 72-94.
Courtés, Joseph. "Rhétorique Et Sémiotique : De Quelques Divergences Et Convergences."
Revue des Sciences Religieuses 52, no. 3-4 (1978): 227-43.
Cubitt, Geoffrey. The Jesuit Myth: Conspiracy Theory and Politics in Nineteenth-Century
France. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Culler, Jonathan. "Foreward." Translated by Andrew Brown. In Barthes: A Biography, edited by
Tiphaine Samoyault, xi-xiv. Cambridge: Polity, 2017.
———. Structuralist Poetics. Routledge Classics Edition ed. London: Routledge 2002.
Cusset, François. French Theory. Translated by Jeff Fort. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2003.
d'Alembert, Jean le Rond. "Elocution." In Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences,
des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. (Autumn
2017 Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago - ARTFL Encyclopédie Project 2017.
http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.
———. "Éloge De M. Du Marsais." In Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des
arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. (Autumn 2017

287

Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago - ARTFL Encyclopédie Project 2017.
http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.
Dainville, François de. L'éducation Des Jésuites (Xvle-Xviiie Siècles). Edited by MarieMadeleine Compère. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1978.
———. La Naissance De L'humanisme Moderne. Vol. 1, Paris: Beauchesne, 1940.
De Certeau, Michel. L'etranger Ou L'union Dans La Différence. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer,
1969.
———. The Writing of History. Translated by Tom Conley. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1988.
de Man, Paul. "Roland Barthes and the Limits of Structuralism." Yale French Studies 77 (1990):
177-90.
de Romilly, Jacqueline. L'enseignement En Détresse. Paris: Julliard, 1984.
de Sacy, Samuel Sylvestre. "Topo, Disciple, Philosophie." Nouvelle Revue Française, September
1952, 45-59.
Debray, Régis. Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France. Translated
by David Macey. London: Verso, 1981.
"Declaration of January 27, 1925." Translated by Richard Howard. In The History of Surrealism,
edited by Maurice Nadeau, 240-41. London: Jonathan Cape, 1968.
Deleuze, Giles. "How Do We Recognize Structuralism?" Translated by Michael Taormina. In
Desert Islands and Other Texts, edited by David Lapoujade, 170-92. Los Angeles:
Semiotext(e), 2004.
Derrida, Jacques. "A Certain 'Madness' Must Watch over Thinking: Jacques Derrida's Interview
with François Ewald." In Derrida and Education, edited by Gert J.J. Biesta and Denise
Egéa-Kuehne, 55-76. London: Routledge, 2005.
———. "Deconstructions: The Im-Possible." Translated by Michael Taormina. In French
Theory in America, edited by Sylvère Lotringer Editors: Sande Cohen, 13-31. New York
2001, 2001.
———. "Force and Signification." Translated by Alan Bass. In Writing and Difference, 3-30.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
———. "If There Is Cause to Translate I: Philosophy in Its National Language." Translated by
Sylvia Söderlind. In Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2004.

288

———. "Letter to a Japanese Friend." In Derrida and Differance, edited by David Wood and
Robert Bernasconi, 1-5. Warwick: Parousia Press, 1985.
———. "Where a Teaching Body Begins and How It Ends." Translated by Jan Plug. In Who's
Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1, 67-98. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2002.
———. "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." New Literary History 6, no. 1
(1974): 5-74.
Derrida, Jacques, and Hélène Cixous. "From the Word of Life." Translated by Ashley
Thompson. In White Ink: Interviews on Sex, Text, and Politics, edited by Susan Sellers.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
Derrida, Jacques, and Gary A. Olson. "Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A
Conversation." Journal of Advanced Composition 10, no. 1 (1990): 1-21.
Donelley, John. "The Congregation of the Oratory." In Religious Orders in the Catholic
Reformation, edited by Richard DeMolen, 189-215. New York: Fordham University
Press, 1994.
Dosse, François. Giles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives. Translated by Deborah
Glassman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
———. The History of Structuralism. Translated by Deborah Glassman. 2 vols. Vol. 2,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
———. The History of Structuralism. Translated by Deborah Glassman. 2 vols. Vol. 1,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
———. "Le Moment Structuraliste Ou Clio En Exil." Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire, no. 117
(2013): 133-47.
———. New History in France: The Triumph of the Annales. Translated by Peter V Conroy, . Jr.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994.
———. "Oxymore, Le Soleil Noir Du Structuralisme." EspacesTemps 47-48 (1991): 129-43.
———. Pierre Nora: Homo Historicus Paris: Perrin, 2011.
Douay, Françoise. "Biographie." In Des Tropes Ou Des Différents Sens, edited by Françoise
Douay, 29-38. Paris: Flammarion, 1988.
———. "Du Discours À La Dissertation : Aspect Du Passage De Rhétorique À La Littérature En
France Au Xixe Siècle." 129-50. Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'université de
Provence, 2005.

289

———. "Dumarsais, Beauzée, Fontanier : De La Grammaire Générale Aux Questions De
Baccalauréat." In Pierre « Émile » Fontanier : La Rhétorique Ou Les Figures De La
Révolution À La Restauration, edited by Douay and Sermain, 37-75. Lévis, QC Les
Presses de L’Université Laval, 2007.
———. "La Rhétorique En France Au Xixe Siècle À Travers Ses Pratiques Et Ses Institutions :
Restauration, Renaissance, Remise En Cause." In L'histoire De La Rhétorique Dans
L'europe Moderne 1450-1950, edited by Marc Fumaroli, 1071-214. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1999.
———. "Les Recueils De Discours Français Pour La Classe De Rhétorique (Xviiie-Xixe
Siècles)." Histoire de l'éducation, no. 74 (1997): 151-85.
———. "Non, La Rhétorique Française, Au Xviiie Siècle, N'est Pas « Restreinte » Aux Tropes."
Histoire Épistémologie Langage 12, no. 1 (1990): 123-32.
Dumarsais, César Chesneau. "Definition of a Philosophe." In The Portable Enlightenment
Reader 21-22. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.
———. Des Tropes Ou Des Différents Sens. Edited by Françoise Douay. Paris: Flammarion,
1988.
Dupont-Ferrier, Gustave. Du Collège De Clermont Au Lycée Louis-Le-Grand, 1563-1920. Vol.
2, Paris: E. de Boccard, 1922.
Durkheim, Émile. The Evolution of Educational Thought: Lectures on the Formation and
Development of Secondary Education in France. Translated by Peter Collins. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
———. Moral Education: A Study in the Theory & Application of the Sociology of Education.
Translated by Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer. Edited by Everett K. Wilson.
New York: The Free Press, 1961.
Éluard, Paul, and André Breton. "Notes Sur La Poésie." In Oeuvres Complètes, 471-82, 1968.
Erhmann, Jacques. "Introduction." Yale French Studies, no. 36 and 37 (1966): 5-9.
Eribon, Didier. Faut-Il Brûler Dumézil? : Flammarion, 1992.
———. Michel Foucault. Translated by Betsy Wing. London: Faber and Faber 1993.
Faublée, Jacques. "Jean Paulhan Malgachisant." Journal de la Société des Africanistes 40, no. 2
(1970): 151-59.
Febvre, Lucien. Combats Pour L’histoire. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1992.

290

———. "How Jules Michelet Invented the Renaissance." Translated by K. Folca. In A New Kind
of History: From the Writings of Lucien Febvre edited by Peter Burke, 258-67. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
Febvre, Lucien, and Henri-Jean Martin. The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing 14501800. Translated by David Gerard. Edited by Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and David
Wootton. London: NLB, 1976.
ffrench, Patrick, and Roland-François Lack. "Introduction." In The Tel Quel Reader edited by
Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack, 1-8. London: Routledge, 1998.
Foucault, Michel. Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel. Translated by
Charles Ruas. London: Continuum, 2004.
———. "Distance, Aspect, Origin." Translated by Patrick Ffrench. In The Tel Quel Reader
edited by Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack, 97-108. London: Routledge, 1998.
———. Dits Et Écrits. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Paris: NRF Gallimard 1994.
———. "Language to Infinity." Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. In
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, edited by James D. Faubion, 89-102. New York:
New Press, 1998.
———. Language, Madness, and Desire: On Literature. Translated by Robert Bononno.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015.
———. The Order of Things. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
———. "Polemic: Monstrosities in Criticism." Diacritics 1, no. 1 (57-60 1971).
———. "The Prose of Actaeon." Translated by Robert Hurley. In Aesthetics, Method, and
Epistemology, edited by James D. Faubion, 123-35. New York: New Press, 1998.
———. Speech Begins after Death. Translated by Robert Bononno. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2013.
———. "A Swimmer between Two Words." Translated by Robert Hurley. In Aesthetics,
Method, and Epistemology, edited by James D. Faubion, 171-74. New York: New Press,
1998.
France, Anatole. Les Dieux Ont Soif. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1912.
———. The Wicker-Work Woman: A Chronicle of Our Own Times. Translated by M. P.
Willcocks. New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1922.
France, Peter. Rhetoric and Truth in France: Descartes to Diderot. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972.

291

———. "Roland Barthes, a Rhetoric of Modernity." In Proceedings of the Canadian Society for
the History of Rhetoric, edited by Albert W. Halsall. Ottawa: Canadian Society for the
History of Rhetoric, 1989.
Fumaroli, Marc. "The Fertility and the Shortcomings of Renaissance Rhetoric: The Jesuit Case."
In The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773, edited by John W. O'Malley
et al., 90-107. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.
———. L'age De L'éloquence : Rhétorique Et «Res Literaria» De La Renaissance Au Seuil De
L'époque Classique. Genève Droz, 1980.
———. "La Rhétorique Humaniste." Commentaire, no. 99 (2002/3): 706-09.
———. Leçon Inaugurale Faite Le Mercredi 29 Avril 1987. Paris: Collège de France, 1987.
———. "Préface." In L'histoire De La Rhétorique Dans L'europe Moderne 1450-1950, edited by
Marc Fumaroli, 1-16: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.
———. "Voltaire Jésuite." Commentaire SA, no. 69 (1995): 107-14.
Furet, François, and Jacques Ozouf. Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to
Jules Ferry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Furetière, Antoine. Nouvelle Allégorique Ou Histoire Des Derniers Troubles Arrivés Au
Royaume D'éloquence. Edited by Mathilde Bompart and Nicolas Schapira. Toulouse:
Société des Littératures classiques, 2004.
Gaillard, Gabriel-Henri. Rhétorique Françoise À L'usage Des Jeunes Demoiselles. 7e ed. Lyon:
L’imprimerie de Leroy, 1792.
Garrigou, Marcel. "Prologue." In Khâgne ... Et Après : Lycée Louis-Le-Grand, 1934-1939, edited
by Marcel Garrigou, 5-7. Toulouse: Éditions Arts et Formes, 1994.
Genette, Gérard. "Enseignement Et Rhétorique Au Xxe Siècle." Annales. Économies, Sociétés,
Civilisations 21, no. 2 (1966): 292-305.
———. Figures I. Paris: Seuil, 1966.
———. Figures of Literary Discourse. Translated by Alan Sheridan. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1982.
———. "La Rhétorique Et L'espace Du Langage." Tel Quel, no. 11 (1964).
———. "Paul Valéry: Literature as Such." Style 33, no. 3 (1999): 475-84.
———. "Préface." In Les Tropes, edited by César Chesneau Dumarsais. Genève: Slatkine
Reprints, 1967.

292

———. "Rhetoric Restrained." Translated by Alan Sheridan. In Figures of Literary Discourse,
103-26. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.
———. "Sketching an Intellectual Itinerary." Translated by Alison M. Gingeras. In French
Theory in America, edited by Sylvère Lotringer Editors: Sande Cohen, 71-86. New York
2001, 2001.
Godzich, Wlad. The Culture of Literacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
Graham, Ruth. "The Enlightened and Revolutionary Oratorians in France." Journal for
Eighteenth Century Studies (1981): 171-83.
Grendler, Paul F. "The Culture of the Jesuit Teacher 1548–1773." Journal of Jesuit Studies 3
(2016): 17-41.
Guéhenno, Jean. Diary of the Dark Years, 1940-1944: Collaboration, Resistance, and Daily Life
in Occupied Paris. Translated by David Ball. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Guicharnaud, Jacques. "Higher Education." Yale French Studies, no. 22 (1958): 89-115.
Guiney, M. Martin. Teaching the Cult of Literature in the French Third Republic. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Haring, Lee. "Jean Paulhan’s Research in Oral Literature." L'autre voix de la littérature [online],
no. 75-76 (2014).
Harris, Roy. Saussure and His Interpreters. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001.
Hartman, Geoffrey. "Structuralism: The Anglo-American Adventure." Yale French Studies, no.
36 and 37 (1966): 148-68.
Hegel, G.W.F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Translated by H.B. Nisbet. Edited by Allan
W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
———. Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. London: Henry G. Bohn,
1857.
———. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977.
Hirschkop, Ken. Linguistic Turns, 1890-1950: Writing on Language as Social Theory. Oxford
Oxford University Press, 2019.
Hobsbawm, Eric. The Age of Capital: 1848-1875. London: Abacus, 1997.
Horvath-Peterson, Sandra. Victor Duruy & French Education: Liberal Reform in the Second
Empire. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984.

293

Houdart-Mérot, Violaine, and Ralph Albanese. "Literary Education in the Lycée: Crises,
Continuity, and Upheaval since 1880." Yale French Studies, no. 113 (2008): 29-45.
Howard, Richard. "Translator's Note." Translated by Richard Howard. In Critical Essays, ix-x.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by
Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1974.
Jameson, Fredric. The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and
Russian Formalism Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972.
The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum of 1599. Translated by Allan P. Farrell. Washington, DC: Conference
of Major Superiors of Jesuits, 1970.
Jordan, David P. "The Robespierre Problem." In Robespierre, edited by Colin Haydon and
William Doyle, 17-34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Jouvency, Joseph. De La Manière D'apprendre Et D'enseigner. Translated by H. Ferté. Paris:
Hachette, 1892.
Kaplan, Alice. The Collaborator: The Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach. Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 2000.
Kristeva, Julia. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Translated by
Thomas Gora, Alice Jarcine and Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1980.
———. Language the Unknown: An Initiation into Linguistics. Translated by Anne M. Menke.
New York Columbia University Press, 1989.
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Translated by Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 2006.
Lacoste, Michèle. "Choix Bibliographique." Communications, no. 16 (1970): 230-35.
Lacoue-Labarth, Philippe. "The Detour." Translated by Gary M. Cole. In The Subject of
Philosophy, 14-36. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Lamont, Michele. "How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques
Derrida." The American Journal of Sociology 93, no. 3 (1987): 584-622.
Lanson, Gustave. L'université Et La Société Moderne. Paris: Armand Colin, 1902.
———. Méthodes De L'histoire Littéraire. Homme Et Livres Genève: Slatkin Reprints, 1979.
Lavisse, Ernest. Souvenirs. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1912.

294

———. "Souvenirs D'une Éducation Manquée." In L'éducation De La Démocratie, 1-35. Paris:
Félix Alcan, 1903.
Lawall, Sarah N. "Review: The Structuralist Controversy." Contemporary Literature 12, no. 1
(1971): 128-31.
Le Goff, Jacques. "Barthes Administrateur." Communications 36 (1982): 43-48.
Leonard, Miriam. Athens in Paris: Ancient Greece and the Political in Post-War French
Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Leuwers, Hervé. "Maximilien De Robespierre, Élève À Louis-Le-Grand (1769-1781). Les
Apports De La Comptabilité Du « Collège D’arras »." Annales historiques de la
Révolution française, no. 371 (2013).
Levie, Sophie. "Jean Paulhan, Rédacteur En Chef De La Nouvelle Revue Française De 1925 À
1930." Études littéraires 40, no. 1 (2009): 55-75.
Liard, Louis. L'université De Paris. Paris: H. Laurens, 1909.
Logie, John. "The Birth of "the Death of the Author"." College English 75, no. 5 (2013).
Loyola, Ignatius. Letters and Instructions. Edited by Martin E. Palmer, John W. Padberg and
John L. McCarthy. Saint Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2006.
Lyotard, Jean-François. Discourse, Figure. Translated by Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
MacDonald, Michael J. "Introduction." In The Oxford Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, edited by
Michael MacDonald, 1-30. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Marie, Catherine. "Port-Royal: The Jansenist Schism." Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. In
Realms of Memory, edited by Pierre Nora and Lawrence D. Kritzman, 301-51. New
York: Columbia University, 1996.
Marrou, Henri Irénée. A History of Education in Antiquity. Translated by George Lamb. Toronto:
Mentor, 1964.
Martin, A. Lynn. The Jesuit Mind: The Mentality of an Elite in Early Modern France. Ithica,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Merquior, J. G. From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist
Thought. London: Verso, 1986.
Meyer, Michel. "The Brussels School of Rhetoric: From the New Rhetoric to Problematology."
Philosophy and Rhetoric 43, no. 4 (2010): 403-29.
Michelet, M. J. "M. Michelet's Lectures." Translated by G. H. Smith. In Jesuits and Jesuitism, 122. London: Whittaker and Co, 1846.
295

Milne, Anna-Louise. The Extreme in-Between: Jean Paulhan's Place in the Twentieth Century.
London: Legenda, 2006.
Milo, Daniel. "Les Classiques Scolaires." In Les Lieux De Mémoire, Tome 2 : La Nation, edited
by Pierre Nora, 517-62. Paris: Gallimard, 1986.
Montesquieu. The Persian Letters. Translated by George R. Healy. Indianapolis Bobbs-Merrill,
1964.
Moody, Joseph N. French Education since Napoleon New York: Syracuse University Press
1978.
Moriarty, Michael. "Rhetoric, Doxa, and Experience in Barthes." French Studies LI, no. 2
(1997): 169-82.
———. Roland Barthes. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
Mouchard, Claude. "Postface." In Traité Des Tropes. Paris: Le Nouveau Commerce, 1977.
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